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Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in
Colombia
The signing of the peace agreements between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP) and the Colom-
bian Government in late November 2016 has generated new prospects for
peace in Colombia, opening up the possibility of redressing the harm inﬂicted
on Colombians by Colombians.
Talking about peace and transitional justice requires us to think about how
to operationalize peace agreements to promote justice and peaceful coex-
istence. This volume brings together reﬂections by Colombian academics and
practitioners alongside pieces provided by researchers and practitioners in
other countries where transitional justice initiatives have taken place (notably
Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Peru). This volume
has been written in the south, by the south, for the south.
The book engages with the challenges that lie ahead for future generations
of Colombians. Rivers of ink have dealt with the end goals of transitional
justice, but victims require us to take the quest for human rights beyond the
normative realm of theorizing justice and into the practical realm of engaging
how to implement justice initiatives.
The tension between theory—the legislative frameworks guaranteeing
human rights—and practice—the realization of these ideas—will frame
Colombia’s success (or failure) in consolidating the implementation of the
peace agreements with the FARC-EP.
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón is a Colombian political scientist. He is a Research
Associate at the Department of Political and International Studies at Rhodes
University in South Africa and a Researcher at the International Institute of
Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands. Fabio works at
the intersection between theory and practice, and his research interests are
related to state strength, civil war, conﬂict and protests in the midst of glo-
balization. In addition to his academic publications, his analysis has been
published by Al Jazeera, Time, The Conversation, Los Angeles Times, and
Warscapes among others.
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Europa Perspectives in Transitional Justice
The Europa Perspectives in Transitional Justice series from Routledge, edited
by Professor Tim Murithi, provides a platform for innovative research and
analysis of concepts, strategies and approaches to dealing with the past in
deeply divided societies worldwide. The series encourages multidisciplinary
scholarship on issues relating to reconciliation and how it is enhanced by
eﬀorts to promote redress and achieve socio-economic justice. The series aims
to provide an invaluable resource for academics, policymakers, peace practi-
tioners, researchers and all those interested in issues relating to addressing the
deep-seated divisions within countries and communities. It also aims to pro-
pose forward-looking recommendations on how to achieve societal
transformation.
The series comprises individual and edited volumes which provide analysis
of transitions taking place at the global, regional and country levels, as well
as engaging with thematic issues in the broad ﬁeld of transitional justice and
reconciliation.
Tim Murithi is Extraordinary Professor of African Studies at the Centre for
African Studies, University of the Free State, and also Head of the Justice
and Reconciliation in Africa Programme at the Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa. He has more than 21 years of
experience in the ﬁelds of peacebuilding, governance, international justice and
security in Africa. He sits on editorial boards and advisory panels for the
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, African Journal of Conﬂict
Resolution, the Africa Peace and Conﬂict Journal and the journal Peace-
building. He is author and editor of eight books; in addition he has authored
more than 75 journal articles, book chapters and policy papers.
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1 Transitional justice and the ‘Colombian
peace process’
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón
The signing of the peace agreements between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP) and the Govern-
ment of Colombia in late November 2016 has generated new prospects for
peace in Colombia, opening up the possibility of redressing the harms inﬂicted
on Colombians by Colombians.
The negotiation process and the agreements have been explicit about the
importance of justice and the prioritization of victims. In fact, the negotiation
agenda established the topic of justice for victims as central to the peace
process. Other elements of the agreements relate to land, demobilization, dis-
armament and reintegration of cadres, illicit crops and illicit drugs, and political
participation.
The agreements regarding victims and justice present a roadmap for a
journey towards a more peaceful environment. They signal the intention and
commitment of actors to reach this goal, but institution building and speciﬁc
policies and programmes to implement these agreements are necessary to
achieve it. Statehood and peace have never been built by decree; they are built
by institutions, bureaucrats, and by government policies that are consistent
across time.
Peacebuilding and state-building must not be seen as processes which are
disconnected from justice. The strengthening of institutions, endowments,
processes, and practices that realize the agreements signed in a peace process
will condition the possibility of justice agreements being implemented. They
also aﬀect citizens’ perceptions of the credibility of their state.
For this process of state-building and for the consolidation of a justice fra-
mework to take place successfully, institutions and the state apparatus must
assess the gaps between the commitments contained in the agreements and
the realities of the country. This ensures that institutions can be designed to
implement procedures and processes accordingly. If we are talking about
peace and justice seriously we need to think about how to operationalize
peace agreements, otherwise we risk pursuing armchair justice in favour of real
justice, and using the peace agreements and their transitional justice frameworks as
hollow rhetorical tools rather than pathways to peace.
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Transitional justice is a broad label that refers to a series of diﬀerent
interim arrangements applied in post-agreement scenarios, with diﬀerent out-
comes (De Greiﬀ, 2012). In the case of Colombia, the idea of transitional
justice has been embraced as the primary framework through which the vic-
tims and perpetrators of the Colombian conﬂict will be engaged, and as the
mechanism for the provision of justice and redress (Gobierno de Colombia y
FARC—EP, 2016).
Transitional justice as a ﬁeld of practice and study in intra-state conﬂicts is
fairly new (less than 40 years old); claims with regard to what must be done in
transitional justice initiatives thus seem, in some cases, to be driven by nor-
mative claims rather than by evidence (Teitel, 2000). Because of this, the
process of making transitional justice initiatives a reality remains a great
challenge in practice (Fischer, 2011). Determining how best to operationalize
transitional justice in the context of the frailty of the state —a natural context
to a post-conﬂict scenario—is thus no easy endeavour.
Reﬂecting on the challenges related to the idea of justice within the
Colombian agreements is vital. The implementation of the agreements on
transitional justice can cement (or fail to) a social covenant to reassert the
legitimacy of the Colombian state in its territory after more than 50 years of
internal war and violence. Being aware of the challenges ahead of imple-
menting the agreements with regard to transitional justice is as important as
achieving the agreements themselves.
What has been agreed on in Colombia is neither good nor bad per se. It
constitutes an opportunity, a roadmap, and a framework for attempting to
consolidate state legitimacy within the country. This volume distances itself
from debates regarding what justice is, what justice should be, and how
should it be implemented. Instead, the focus is placed on how what has been
agreed to relates to the implementation of the transitional justice initiatives,
and what challenges they will face in their implementation in relation to the
victims’ needs in the Colombian context.
It is these challenges that this volume considers. It focuses on identifying
the challenges facing the implementation of the objectives of the transitional
justice component of the peace agreement between the FARC—EP and the
Colombian Government. By reﬂecting rigorously on some of the challenges
to be encountered in realizing this vision of justice, this work hopes to inform
the debate on what is required to bring justice to the victims of the Colombian
conﬂict in accordance with the peace agreement and the transitional justice
frameworks it establishes. A full understanding of these challenges should
inform the implementation strategy and practice for the peace agreements.
This volume will explore the following challenges with respect to the con-
ception and implementation of the transitional justice framework in Colombia:
reconciliation, memory, education, land, gender, demobilization and reintegration.
This reﬂection is led by Colombian academics and practitioners, in part-
nership with researchers and practitioners in other countries where transi-
tional justice initiatives have taken place (notably Bosnia and Herzegovina,
2 Transitional justice and the peace process
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South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Peru). This volume has been written in the
south, by the south, for the south.
Transitional justice: Tensions and challenges of a ﬁeld in the making
In modern peacemaking processes aiming to move countries away from civil
war and internal conﬂict, it is common to see provisions for justice arrange-
ments made as part of peace negotiations. These are commonly referred to as
transitional justice mechanisms. Transitional justice has become a more pop-
ular approach to post-conﬂict reconstruction in the case of civil wars and
internal conﬂicts since the late 1980s when Latin American dictatorships
transitioned from dictatorial regimes towards fuller democracies (Sriram,
2010; Sriram, 2000).
The prevalence of transitional justice in ‘modern’ peacebuilding is illu-
strated by the fact that transitional justice initiatives now tend to be inte-
grated into peace negotiations in order to facilitate post-conﬂict peacebuilding
(Kostic, 2012). State-building initiatives, combined with mechanisms to deal
with past atrocities, are expected to lead to stability and reconciliation (De
Greiﬀ, 2012). Transitional justice as part of peace agreements aims to estab-
lish channels to determine accountability for war crimes, to individualize
responsibility, and to generate a comprehensive view of violent pasts (Kostic,
2012). The measures and mechanisms created to achieve these ambitious
objectives constitute transitional justice: the addressing of human rights viola-
tions via the establishment of tribunals; truth commissions; lustration; repara-
tions; and political and societal projects aimed at fact-ﬁnding, reconciliation,
and remembrance (Fischer, 2011).
A number of debates and tensions exist within the ﬁeld and practice of
transitional justice: notions of justice—retributive or reparative—compete;
international jurisprudence, institutions and norms often contrast with
national and local legal frameworks; institutions and cultural practices, each of
which may be employed to diﬀering degrees, shape the transitional justice process;
and ﬁnally, the end of the process is contested—should transitional justice establish
truth, or deliver retributive justice? The Colombian peace process illuminates
each of these debates and demonstrates the possibility of moving beyond the
dichotomies implied in these debates to achieve a more holistic process.
Traditionally within the ﬁeld of transitional justice the policy options for
reparation, retribution, and restoration have been seen as mutually exclusive
and debated in opposition to each other. This has limited the potential for
transitional justice processes to be perceived and operate as an integral
approach for peacebuilding, able to consider diﬀerent needs and alternatives.
One of the main examples of this opposition is the debate of peace versus
justice: a legalist approach advocates for an emphasis on criminal justice in
order to deter future human rights violations, while those in favour of focus-
ing on peace agreements may allow élites related to the conﬂict to be included
in post-conﬂict scenarios (Fischer, 2011).
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The ﬁeld of transitional justice evolved from an initial legalistic view,
focused on processing war crimes, and extending its aims and objectives to
include a broader and transformative dimension (Teitel, 2000). Transitional
justice mechanisms must support institutions seeking justice to redress
aggressions, whilst also supporting future good governance (Andrieu, 2010)
and the consolidation of institutional legitimacy and the rule of law (Betts,
2005). These multiple objectives have driven the implementation and design
of transitional justice initiatives towards a more comprehensive interpretation
of the ﬁeld. Recent transitional justice initiatives combine provisions that aim
to improve accountability and adherence to the rule of law, reform institutions,
and rebuild trust. These mechanisms are believed to provide for reconciliation
while consolidating justice and reparations (Fischer, 2011).
The objectives of the transitional justice framework contained in the
agreements established between the Colombian Government and the FARC—
EP relate to access to justice, the deﬁnition of a justice system that serves the
Colombian society, and its contribution to reparation. Hence, the agreements
combine elements of both restorative and retributive justice. In doing so, the
agreements aim to create a system with the objectives of justice, restoration,
reparation, and non-repetition (Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016).
The agreements between the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government
pursue a third way in comparison to other agreements on justice for victims,
by not applying the dichotomy of retributive and restorative justice. The
agreements include a series of elements that combine reparation, retribution,
and restoration of the rights of the victims. The Colombian agreements
appear to constitute an example of what is referred to in the literature as a
‘hybrid’ justice system (Sriram, 2010). The ‘local versus international’ debate
frames another set of opposing ideas within the transitional justice ﬁeld.
When transitional justice mechanisms are implemented, they are in some
cases applied in accordance with international rules and standards to the
detriment of local and national rules and practices. Where this is the case,
tensions and legitimacy gaps may be created. This is especially true for com-
munities that had no access to formal systems of justice before conﬂict
emerged (as is common in weak states) and depended on customary law but
that post-conﬂict are required to pursue justice and reconciliation processes
outside of this through institutions shaped by international rules and stan-
dards. The introduction of new laws, institutions and trials that are perceived
to be alien structures can be cause for concern and can be seen as colonial
instruments. The literature refers to this privileging of the international over
the local as the ‘liberal’ co-option of customary law and local forms of justice.
These initiatives are commonly encountered as removed or distant, and often
fail to support sustainable peacebuilding initiatives (Andrieu, 2010).
This should not make of local initiatives of justice a romantic goal for jus-
tice in opposition to international frameworks per se. Their advantages lie on
the capacity of allowing a context-sensitive operation, empower citizens and
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link the processes of transitional justice with the experiences and realities of
communities (Lederach, 1997).
However, local frameworks are not exempt of their own challenges. In
some cases, “local” justice frameworks and customs ignore the rights of
women, minorities and LGBTI communities, making of local initiatives
means reproduction of existing inequalities through a local/localized “justice”
system. Also there is the risk of spoilers, former warlords or remaining armed
actors manipulating this process for their beneﬁt (Hirblinger, 2017). Thus,
assuming that local/localized processes are better than international processes
can be a simpliﬁed description of the challenges of implementing these
initiatives at a local level (Mac Ginty & Polanska, 2015).
The transitional justice framework contained in the agreements established
between the Colombian Government and the FARC—EP speaks to local
realities and necessities, and it relates to the international jurisprudence set by
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The agreements were
shaped by the interplay between international jurisprudence on human rights
(and the obligations/restrictions imposed on nations by international treaties
in this regard) as well as the demands of national legislation and context.
Another dilemma that often arises in discussions around transitional justice
relates to the role that ‘truth’ and the role truth and reconciliation commis-
sions, as opposed to trials and courts, can play in reconciliation. Truth com-
missions have been presented as viable alternatives to trials and prosecutions
and as eﬀective mechanisms for countering denial about human rights abuses.
Truth has the potential to provide partial redress for victims, contributing to
healing and reconciliation (Fischer, 2011). In addition, it is argued that truth
commissions can promote public dialogue (Sriram, 2010). However, critics of
truth commissions assert that revealing the truth about human rights viola-
tions can become an impediment to reconciliation as it can also promote
animosity, reopen wounds, and increase political instability (Skaar, 2013).
Some academics are in fact sceptical of the very idea that truth-telling
mechanisms in themselves can bring healing and maintain peace in a post-
conﬂict society (Mendeloﬀ, 2004). Another critique to the use of truth com-
missions is the fact that these commissions often lead to the creation of oﬃ-
cial, state-sanctioned versions of a violent past. This can impose particular
versions of the conﬂict, often making the multiplicity of individual experi-
ences and interpretations of an armed conﬂict less visible (Andrieu, 2010).
Where this happens, it creates controversy regarding whose truth is presented
by truth commissions when these processes are undertaken (Loyle & Davenport,
2016).
The task of implementing transitional justice mechanisms as part of peace
processes and agreements is riddled with diﬀerent dilemmas. These dilemmas
are inherent to the transition from war to peace, and in moving from agree-
ments to practice, and require decision-making on how to proceed and eﬀec-
tively achieve justice in accordance with the requirements of particular
contexts. Context-speciﬁc requirements relate to the actors and the histories
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of the particular contexts that suﬀered violence and war. Framing discussions
about transitional justice as centred merely on theoretical dichotomies and
debates will illuminate the type of initiatives undertaken, but may also
obscure reﬂection on the capacity of the agreements and the instruments set
in place to achieve peace and to incorporate the voices of the victims. A
strong focus on the context/s in which the transitional justice process will be
undertaken is necessary for the latter.
We must not forget that transitional justice is a mechanism that is used to
deal with pasts comprised of mass human rights violations within reconcilia-
tion and peacebuilding processes in contexts of state weakness and fragility.
The preﬁx transitional is not given loosely, and we need to reﬂect on how to
eﬀect these transitions to take place. This requires researchers to see transi-
tional justice through a peacebuilding and a process lens, and not solely from
a human rights perspective (Andrieu, 2010). Transitional justice is thus likely
best served by a toolset that allows for the combination of diﬀerent mechan-
isms to achieve these ends (De Greiﬀ, 2012). The ﬁnal goal of transitional
justice is peace, and that is where our focus should be oriented.
Transitional justice in the ‘international’ context: restorative and
retributive debates meet the Colombian agreements
The decision about what justice means also depends on whom the justice
system is focused on: the perpetrator (amnesty, prosecution, and lustration) or
the victim (ﬁnancial compensation, truth telling, and memorialization1).
In the case of Colombia, the agreements reveal a holistic model of
restoration and retribution. On the side of restoration, the Colombian exam-
ple uses an existing legal framework deﬁned by the existing Victims’ Law. The
Victims’ Law establishes a mechanism for repairing the harm done to victims
by diﬀerent actors in the conﬂict (Gobierno de Colombia, 2011). In addition,
some of the agreements hint at a reparative role for the perpetrators of crimes,
in that they outline a possible role for the latter in activities such as de-mining
processes,2 the participation of victimizers in illicit crop eradication pro-
grammes, and the construction of infrastructure projects by perpetrators.
Such activities can be seen as a twofold mechanism that is both retributive
and reparative (Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016).
The agreements between the Colombian Government and the FARC—EP may
break new ground in relation to the abandonment of the dichotomy of inter-
national/national/local deﬁnitions and standards of justice, reaching a middle
ground that is able to comply with national needs and international standards,
and that incorporates notions of both restorative and retributive justice.
In combining elements of restorative and retributive justice, and in bridging
international and local understandings and standards of justice, the agree-
ments outline a system that aims toward justice, reparation, and non-repetition,
and which serves as a guideline for institutionalizing this process. However, its
implementation will prove challenging.
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The legalistic language of the agreement can be seen to give preponderance
to penal sentences. It does not clarify how the reparative aspects of the
agreements speak to the needs of the victims. This is as a result of the fact
that the previous peace processes, and the institutions which emerged from
them, were not as focused on the needs of the victims. The ‘what’, but not the
‘how’, is clearly stated. The work to operationalize and implement the plans
to reach the objectives deﬁned by this transitional justice framework is left to
the existing institutional structures. This transitional justice approach, being
holistic and multiple in its aims, is diﬀerent to the previous peace processes
that gave rise to the existing institutional framework. The existing institutions
are thus not necessarily well equipped to implement the current transitional jus-
tice process or to achieve its aims. Reﬂection is necessary to determine how the
existing institutions need to be adapted in order to perform the functions that
they will be called upon to provide. In addition, the lack of clarity on the process
of integration of the special jurisdiction for peace with the integrated system of
truth, reparation, and non-repetition leaves the role of the victims in this process
open to interpretation (see Chapter 5). This ambiguity regarding how the process
will be grounded has been met with concern by some sectors of the Colombian
polity and the international community (Amnistía Internacional, 2016).
A complex institutional setting complicates the system designed for truth,
reparation, and non-repetition in the peace agreement. This institutional
layout reﬂects the intersection of a series of mechanisms and institutions that
should bring a comprehensive understanding of restorative justice, reparation,
and retributive justice and its connection to the wider peace process. The
transitional justice process that is taking place aims to recognize the rights of
the victims beyond the peace agreement with the FARC—EP (victims from
paramilitaries, the armed forces, and other operating guerrillas will have
access to the beneﬁts under this framework).
According to the agreements signed in Bogotá, human rights abuses will
not be the object of pardons or amnesties or alternative judicial punishments. It
is worth noting that this jurisdiction will be applied to both citizens and ﬁghters
responsible for crimes within the Colombian conﬂict. It can thus become a
framework for bringing justice for atrocities committed by both the FARC—EP
and the Colombian Government forces (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2016).
The role of victims in the Colombian agreements seems to be more pro-
nounced than in other transitional justice initiatives. The framework includes
clauses that are orientated towards a victim-focused justice, supporting truth
and reconciliation initiatives rather than a functioning as a simple punitive device.
However, victims did not participate directly in negotiating the agreement,
although the negotiations were informed by the views and needs of a group of
60 victims, which met once with the negotiation teams of the FARC—EP and
the Colombian government in Havana to represent the voice of more than eight
million victims (Verdad Abierta, 2014). As the agreements did not involve the
victims’ consent or approval it could be claimed that their participation was
more aesthetic than real. Within the context of a patriarchal society the extent
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of meaningful participation by indigenous groups; Afro-Colombians; lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) minorities; and women in
the implementation of the agreements remains to be seen.
Transitional justice is part of an agenda for change. It is necessary, yet not
suﬃcient in itself, to achieve change (Sriram, 2010). The capacity of the state to
implement this agenda will deﬁne its success. This is something already demon-
strated in Colombian history; it has proved diﬃcult and challenging to fulﬁl the
promises made in previous peace initiatives (Amnistía Internacional, 2012).
Structure of the book
To reﬂect on these questions regarding the challenges facing the transitional
justice process within the wider Colombian peace process, the volume is
structured in three sections. The ﬁrst section deals with the background of the
Colombian conﬂict and previous peace attempts. The second is concerned
with the challenges of transitional justice with regard to forced displacement,
land, gender, reconciliation, the demobilization of former combatants, memory,
and the intergenerational transmission of the history of the Colombian armed
conﬂict. The third section focuses on the lessons for Colombia from transitional
justice initiatives in Peru, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and South Africa.
The book begins with a brief history of the conﬂict and of previous peace
processes, making the case that the current peace process is best understood
in relation to the wider historical process of state consolidation and successive
peace attempts in Colombia (see Chapter 2). The current peace process and
the agreements reached with the FARC—EP are the outcome of an eﬀort that
involved several peace processes over the last three decades. This longer his-
torical process explains, informs, and guides the current peace process with
the FARC—EP, as Nasi notes in Chapter 3.
The Colombian Government has implemented and experimented with a
diversity of measures in pursuit of justice and transitional justice in Colombia.
These developments have occurred in line with the evolution of the ﬁeld of
transitional justice. As Velázquez notes in Chapter 4, initiatives including justice
in peace processes are not new in Colombia and have taken diﬀerent forms, such
as amnesties, pardons, restitution, and reparation programmes. The current
agreements with the FARC—EP are an evolution of these previous experiences.
The volume proceeds to present and discuss in detail the agreements between
the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government and its transitional justice
component. Transitional justice agreements are anything but simple mechan-
isms, and Colombia’s is no exception. As Gamboa and Díaz argue in Chapter 5,
the agreements present a model that can be seen as the intersection of the
international demands and the national needs for transitional justice.
With this background established, the volume proceeds to analyse the
challenges facing the implementation of these transitional justice mechanisms
in a country still in transition. The analysis of the challenges with regard to
the implementation of the agreements and their success is informed by an
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analysis of the capacity of and the challenges faced by Colombian institutions
in previous peace initiatives and as well as the current context. There is a
multiplicity of elements that should be considered in relation to the initiatives
for transitional justice in Colombia, but given the restrictions of what can be
discussed in a book, the debate in this text will be centred on land, gender,
demobilization, reconciliation, the role of truth and memory, and education.
Challenges encountered in relation to policies regarding land and its resti-
tution in Colombia are discussed in two chapters. In Chapter 6, Peña Huertas
discusses a series of challenges seen in the implementation of previous initia-
tives. These diﬃculties are part of a structural problem present in previous
initiatives undertaken by the state to deal with the land issue. Initiatives for
peace and justice operate in the context of a political economy where institutions
are often weak, underfunded and overstretched.
The volume proceeds to reﬂect on the insights gained through a gendered
lens. As Céspedes argues in Chapter 7, particular understandings of gender in
relation to transitional justice initiatives can, in fact, overshadow other types
of victimization, and misinform other policy initiatives, as she demonstrates is
the case with policies responding to land dispossession and their impact on
women. The particular biases of a narrow gender perspective are entrenched
in much of the transitional justice ﬁeld, where gender is considered primarily
or only as it relates to sexual abuse. This can lead to policy and implementa-
tion blind spots, leaving a great deal of the victims in Colombia ostracized. At
least 50% of the victims of the Colombian conﬂict are women.
There are victims and victimizers. We speak of cadres as perpetrators, but
rarely do we see also see them as victims. Cadres have been represented in
public discourse as dangerous animals, lurking in wait to attack their fellow
citizens. However, in most cases, cadres have been also victims of war, and
their role within a transitional justice framework as it links to reconciliation
and reintegration into society should not be overlooked. Citizens that have
been pushed to ﬁght against each other should be seen as humans who were
pushed towards warfare, unless we assume a Hobbesian vision of humanity.
Acosta and Reyes reﬂect in Chapter 8 on how justice, reconciliation, and
reintegration can cohabit. Supporting initiatives where former victimizers can
play their role in restitution and reparation, whilst helping former victims
become able to transcend their own victimization in a post-agreement setting
as both victims and perpetrators are reintegrated into society, can promote
transitional justice. As reconciliation is a relational concept, we cannot expect
to achieve reconciliation without the victimizers.
The volume proceeds to reﬂect on the tensions between justice, memory,
and education, and the possibilities for transitional justice mechanisms to
support memory, history, truth, and reconciliation exercises. Doing so might
entail challenges for Colombia, as Jimeno presents in Chapter 9. An analysis
of justice and memory processes highlights the tensions between local and
national actors and agendas, and the tensions between mandated versions and
processes of memorialization in practice. Tejada takes this reﬂection forward in
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Chapter 10, through discussion of the work of the truth commission for
Colombia in the light of the transitional justice mechanisms which have been
established. Tejada explores whether these can, or cannot, promote reconci-
liation. Finally, Sánchez, in Chapter 11, interrogates the understanding of the
links between memory and education in an analysis of how education inter-
acts with, creates, and re-creates narratives and understandings of the conﬂict.
However, the Colombian experience and the challenges facing the imple-
mentation of its transitional justice framework are not wholly unique. It is
important to reﬂect on and understand the challenges faced in comparable
experiences and practices elsewhere in the world, as this can inform Colom-
bia’s path forward. The experiences of South Africa, Peru, Sri Lanka, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are thus brought to the fore to inform reﬂection on
the challenges that transitional justice will face in Colombia. Colombia will
most likely not travel the same path as these countries, but can learn from the
challenges they faced and the response they mobilized in the implementation
of their transitional justice initiatives.
In Chapter 12, Delgado and Guzmán reﬂect on the lessons demonstrated
by the case of South Africa regarding advancing a new social covenant
against the backdrop of a broad failure to adequately tackle structural issues
such as inequality and eﬀective reparation for the victims of the apartheid
regime. García-Godos reﬂects on the experience of Peru, and outlines how the
dangers of the politicization of transitional justice mechanisms can aﬀect the
credibility of transitional initiatives and their institutions, weakening their
mandates and enfeebling the possibility of justice in Chapter 13. The experi-
ence of the conﬂict in Bosnia and Herzegovina then presents the dangers of
elevating imposed versions of transitional justice that are internationally
legitimate, but perceived as too far removed from the citizens, thus creating a
sense of illegitimate justice, as Monroy-Santander argues in Chapter 14.
Finally, the case of Sri Lanka warns us against the instrumental use of tran-
sitional justice mechanisms as a way to fulﬁl a checklist of what needs to be
done in the eyes of the international community. As Jayasundara-Smits
argues in Chapter 15, we must be aware of the danger of making transitional
justice mechanisms a totem that allows countries to claim their liberalness
and openness, while sweeping aside the needs of the victims.
In all of these cases, and in past transitional justice experiences in Colom-
bia, challenges have emerged most forcefully in the practice, rather than in the
theory. The framework set into place by the peace agreements and their
implementation in Colombia opens up a new opportunity and constitutes a
junction between two possible scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, the imple-
mentation of transitional justice mechanisms is beneﬁcial and important in
improving Colombian democracy, creating a series of public policy instru-
ments with the potential to increase the legitimacy of the state, and recognize
the human rights of the victims of the conﬂict. The second scenario is shaped
by the looming risk of other armed groups, and a virulent opposition to the
peace agreements and transitional justice. These ‘spoilers’, and failures of the
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institutional framework of transitional justice, could undermine and oppose
the objectives of peace in Colombia, leaving Colombia with the agreement,
but a weak justice and a general discontentment with peace.
The Colombian case can serve as a valuable case study through which to
explore strategies to deal with human rights violations and build peace, while
considering the challenges these objectives entail. To reﬂect on the practical
challenges related to the implementation of the agreements regarding transi-
tional justice and human rights in Colombia in light of the experiences of
Colombians on the ground, as well as those related to the nature of pertinent
institutions and their capacity to realize the human rights of Colombians
aﬀected by the conﬂict, is thus a point of departure from which to inform
contributions towards peace—the aim of transitional justice.
The following chapters should thus be seen as an engagement with the
challenges ahead for Colombia as a nation in its foreseeable future. However,
if we discuss transitional justice as part of peacebuilding it is vital that aca-
demics, politicians, activists, and international organizations transcend their
discourse and address how to implement changes in order to build peace,
given these challenges and these frameworks. Rivers of ink have dealt with the
end goals of transitional justice, but victims require us to take the quest for
human rights beyond the normative realm of theorizing justice and into the
practical realm of engaging how to implement justice initiatives.
The tension between theory—the legislative frameworks guaranteeing
human rights—and practice—the realization of these ideas—will frame
Colombia’s success (or failure) in consolidating the implementation of the
peace agreements with the FARC—EP.
Notes
1 Memorialization can be understood as a cultural approach to confronting a trau-
matic past through practices of remembrance, representation and commemoration
where communities come to terms with a diﬃcult event through means of expres-
sion such as novels, ﬁlms, music, performances, monuments or museum exhibitions.
(Obradovic´-Wochnik, 2013).
2 Since 1990 it is estimated that more than 11,000 people have died or been injured
by landmines. 38% of the victims are civilians and 62% are members of the armed
forces. 80% of the victims have been injured and 20% died (Dirección para la
Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, 2015).
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2 Conﬂict and peace in the making
Colombia from 1948–20101
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón
Introduction
This chapter discusses the evolution of the Colombian conﬂict and the exis-
tence of peacebuilding initiatives with diﬀerent groups as part of the process
of consolidation of statehood in Colombia since 1948. Both war and attempts
at peace-making in Colombia have coexisted since 1948 (Palacios, 2012).
To understand the coexistence of peace initiatives and the active pursuit of
violence in Colombia, we need to understand the violence beyond the broad
narrative that the Colombian armed conﬂict is essentially a ﬁght between the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo
(FARC—EP)2 and the Colombian state. Various groups with diﬀerent agen-
das overlap in each of the diﬀerent provinces of Colombia, making this
understanding imprecise. Colombia is a country in which diﬀerent armed
groups have exerted violence in the same territory: paramilitaries, Ejército de
Liberación Nacional (ELN)3, Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL)4, Bandas
Criminales (BACRIM)5, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)6,
organized armed groups, and drug traﬃckers are some of the labels used to
describe some of the organizations still operating in the country alongside the
FARC—EP dissidents.
Thus broader understanding is necessary to reconsider accounts that depict
the violence which has taken place in Colombia since 1948 as solely FARC—
EP related. Several violent conﬂicts, peace attempts, and agreements have
taken place with other groups in the last ﬁve decades (López Hernández,
2016). Colombia has signed at least nine peace agreements with diﬀerent
groups since the 1980s. This has all taken place while violence was ongoing in
the country (López Hernández, 2016; Palacios, 2012).
Recent scholarship on the Colombian conﬂict presents a more nuanced
description of the violence in Colombia and an understanding of the ‘grey-
scales’ that enable the mix of illicit crops, drug traﬃcking, state weakness,
guerrilla groups, peace processes, peace agreements, and the prevalence of
violence and warlordism to emerge almost simultaneously in the same terri-
tory (Romero, 2003; Duncan, 2006; González González, 2014).
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The emergence of the FARC—EP could be deﬁned as the outcome of the
transformation of a particular self-defence force. In fact, it can be argued that
some of the founding FARC—EP members were victims of the ‘political’
violence in Colombia between 1920 and 1950 (Sánchez Gómez, 1988). In a
way, the FARC—EP is the oﬀspring of the failure by the state to deliver jus-
tice to all their citizens and its incapacity to achieve a monopoly of violence
in the country (Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2015; Cor-
poración Observatorio para la Paz, 2009; Aguilera, 2014). Other authors
argue that the dynamics of violence that co-created the FARC—EP were
actually a continuation of the existing partisan violence before 1948 (Meer-
tens & Sánchez, 1983; Molano, 1994). The birth and the origins of the
FARC—EP are a matter of academic debate; the fourteen diﬀerent accounts
of the origin of the conﬂict in Colombia presented by the historical commis-
sion of the conﬂict of Colombia are proof of this (Comisión Histórica del
Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2015).
The state has sought to end the violence either by negotiation or by mili-
tary defeat both before and after the emergence of the FARC—EP. However,
these attempts to consolidate the power of the state have been obstructed by
some sectors that have beneﬁted from the conﬂict at a national or local level,
thus fuelling the violence. The tension between war and peace is a constant of
modern Colombian history (Palacios, 2003; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
This chapter presents a brief summary of the Colombian conﬂict, and of
previous peace processes that took place in the country after 1948. The his-
tory of Colombia and its violence is analysed considering the peace negotia-
tions, peace attempts, military oﬀensives, and the demobilization initiatives that
involved multiple armed groups during the tenure of successive governments in
the country between 1948 and 2010.
This interval can be characterized as comprising two main periods: 1948 to
1991, and 1991 to 2010. The initial period of 1948–1991 can be considered as
that of the emergence of the modern form of violence in Colombia: the
period begins in 1948 with violent initiatives throughout the country follow-
ing the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and ends with the establishment
of a new political covenant in the 1991 Constitution. The period of 1991 to
2010 can be considered a period of transformation, between the enactment of
the new constitution and the 2012–2016 peace process with FARC—EP (see
Chapter 3). The 1991–2010 period saw multiple peace processes and several
demobilizations. At the same time, counter-responses by armed actors and
local élites against the democratic openings of the 1991 Constitution and the
peace agreements signed in this period were observed.
The emergence of left-wing guerrillas and the 1991 Colombian
Constitution
The emergence of violence in modern Colombia saw its inception in the
period known as ‘La Violencia’ (the violence), a wave of inter-party violence
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between 1948 and 1958 in which almost 2% of the population of the country
was assassinated (Palacios, 2003). This process led to the rise of multiple liberal
guerrilla groups and armed right-wing groups.
The period between the emergence of the guerrillas and the passing of the
1991 Constitution can be understood as having three main phases. Between
1948 and 1964 bipartisan violence transmuted into a rural war and gave rise
to the left-leaning guerrilla movements that are still in existence today. The
period between 1964 and 1982 was marked by the ﬁrst attempt by the state to
defeat the left-wing guerrillas militarily, some overtures towards negotiation
processes which failed, the end of the National Front duopoly, and the Gov-
ernment of Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–1982) and its counter-insurgency
policy. Finally, the period between 1982 and 1991 is characterized by the
emergence of the state’s ﬁrst oﬃcial attempt to negotiate a peace deal with
FARC—EP and other guerrilla groups: this met with a degree of success
while failing in other respects. The period ended with the drafting of the 1991
Constitution.
From ‘the violence’ to the emergence of a rural war: 1948–1964
As a response to La Violencia, several armed groups (which lacked any cen-
tralized or structured organization) proliferated across the countryside;
against a background of increasingly violent clashes, the ‘pájaros’ (Con-
servatives) and guerrillas (Liberals) emerged as ‘self-defence’ groups (Palacios,
2003). Violence took a stronger partisan line after the election of President
Mariano Ospina Pérez (1946–1950), and was expressed in the recurrence of
pogroms by Conservatives on Liberals and their reprisals, and in calls by
Catholic priests across the country for their congregations to support the
Conservative Party, condoning violence against Liberals from their pulpits,
and in some cases participating actively in that violence. Not only had the
Government sought a political cleansing of their opponents from the state
bureaucracy, but the state also turned a blind eye when violence targeted
Liberals (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983). This practice continued and escalated
during the government of Laureano Gómez (1950–53) whose incendiary
rhetoric brought the country closer to a civil war (Palacios, 2012). The irre-
sponsibility of the Government and its authoritarian actions triggered a
peaceful coup d’état and ushered in a military regime promoted by politicians
from both parties who wanted to stop the civil war (Palacios, 2003).
The assumption of the presidency by Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June
1953, at the head of a military administration, brought the oﬀer of an
armistice to the liberal guerrillas, and the promise of both peace and the
monopoly of violence within the country. The military regime promised to be
a neutral holder of the monopoly of violence, as other institutions—such as
the police—were seen as biased by signiﬁcant segments of the population.
The promise of peace came in the form of an amnesty that was to be war-
ranted by the military rule, taking place between 1953 and 1958. Indeed, both
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the Pinilla Government, and the military junta that followed (after the coup
d’etat of 1957 that ousted Pinilla) managed to demobilize several of the liberal
guerrilla groups (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983; López Hernández, 2016).
After 1958, a bipartisan duopoly called the National Front (which was to
last until 1974) emerged as a solution to the violence, which both traditional
political parties had employed as a means to achieve political power. Under
the arrangement, both parties were to participate in government alternately.
Violence was greatly reduced under the National Front, but this political
agreement between the Conservatives and the Liberals failed to allow for the
entrance of new political parties into the system, or to guarantee the safety of
citizens beyond the bipartisan violence (Molano, 1994). It also overlooked the
violence to which some of the demobilized liberal guerrillas were subjected,
which led to the belief that the state would not honour agreements and the
promise of peace for former ﬁghters, and that peace would not be warranted
by the state (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983).
In the meantime, the Cold War winds were blowing: the Cuban Revolution
and the fear of the spread of communism across Latin America also inﬂu-
enced Colombian politicians and their fears. It was feared that the remaining
self-defence groups that had not demobilized were liable to become instru-
ments of socialist interests and act as the seeds of a Cuban-style revolution in
Colombia (Pizarro Leongómez, 2011). In the Colombian Congress there was
a strong partisan debate about the prevalence of some groups bearing arms,
and whether and how they constituted a threat for the Colombian state. In
fact Senator Álvaro Gómez claimed at the time that areas such as Marque-
talia (where one of the peasant self-defence forces was located) constituted an
aﬀront to state sovereignty and were in fact ‘independent republics’ (Gutiérrez
García & Marín Suárez, 2013). As a consequence, the Government decided to
act to abort the possibility of a left-wing guerrilla force emerging in the
country. A military campaign unfolded in 1964 to some degree of tactical
success, uprooting existing groups identiﬁed as potential seeds of communist
revolution in Colombia. However, the campaign failed strategically, as it in
fact accelerated the birth of the Marxist guerrilla movement, radicalized other
organizations, and informed a narrative of a repressive state that was not to
be trusted.
From the birth of the guerrilla movements to the end of the security statute:
1964–1982
The late 1960s and the decade which followed were dominated by the military
response of the Colombian Government to the rise of ‘new’ armed groups
and the transformation of old groups; this period also saw the entrance of
new elements that further complicated the Colombian conﬂict: drug traﬃck-
ing and paramilitary forces.
As early as 1965, the government of León Valencia (1962–1966), recogniz-
ing the challenges of controlling the totality of the Colombian territory and
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informed by fears of the spread of communism, issued Decree 3398, which
established a legal framework to support the creation of self-defence groups
that could be armed in order to defend the state against the feared guerrillas
and spread of communism in the country (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983; Pala-
cios, 2012). During this period there were no formal peace oﬀers from or to
any guerrilla groups, and initial attempts to tackle the guerrillas were medi-
ated by military operations. Diﬀerent governments took diﬀerent approaches.
The administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–1970), for example,
passed Law 48 of 1968, which deﬁned the legal framework for the con-
solidation of self-defence forces, and pursued a military approach to combat-
ing armed groups. The latter policy was continued by the government of
Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–74), and included military operations such as
Operation Anorí in 1973, in which the ELN was nearly destroyed. The
objective of the state was to reclaim the monopoly of violence in the territory
through force.
Yet, in this period, more armed groups were born: the EPL in 1965 and the
Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) in 1974 (Palacios, 2012). The EPL was of
Maoist origin and emerged as the radicalization of some members of the
Colombian Communist Party, following debates around the Sino-Soviet split
(Vargas Velásquez, 2000). The M-19 took its name from the date of the
allegedly fraudulent presidential elections of 1970.7
Meanwhile, drug traﬃcking was becoming established within Colombian
society, as the permissive stance of some political leaders allowed for an inﬂux
of money from drug traﬃcking into the economy and political system, and
the legalization of drug lords’ incomes (Pécaut, 2013). During this period
(1974–1982) private self-defence groups (some of them the same self-defence
forces created during the 1960s) merged their hatred of guerrilla groups with
the funding from drug traﬃckers, large landowners, cattle growers and emer-
ald traders—creating the seeds of a future ‘paramilitarism’ in the country
(Gutiérrez Sanín & Barón, 2005).
The governments of the 1960s established a legal framework that allowed
for the emergence of counter-insurgency self-defence forces.8 In contrast, the
1970s brought increased confusion around the legal regulation of these forces.
The absence of the state monopoly of violence, conjoined with the interests of
drug traﬃckers and local élites, allowed for diﬀerent groups to project their
own military force in diﬀerent parts of the country (García-Peña Jaramillo,
2005; Romero & Valencia, 2007). In some respects the Colombian state
turned a blind eye, as the armed forces saw these groups as allies in their ﬁght
against the guerrillas (Ronderos, 2014). The government of Alfonso López
Michelsen (1974–78) made attempts to start peace negotiations with the ELN,
but failed to start a formal process.
President Turbay (1978–1982) was elected toward the end of the decade,
and established the highly repressive ‘security statute’, under which the Gov-
ernment adopted a militarized response to the rise of guerrilla groups. This
response commonly included human right abuses, torture, and disappearances
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across the country (Ramírez Bacca & Marín Arenas, 2015). Interestingly, in
addition to a martial approach, the Turbay Government attempted the start
of a negotiation process with the FARC—EP in 1981; however this process
failed to formalize.
From martial law to peace and the promise of a social covenant: 1982–1991
In 1982 the newly-elected government of Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982–
1986) led a fresh attempt to build a peace process with the guerrilla forces, but
encountered a series of obstacles related to the growth of paramilitaries and
drug traﬃcking within the country. In facing this challenge, the Betancur
Government adopted a diﬀerent approach to solving the violence in Colom-
bia. During this period, the state considered a new peace process with the
guerrillas. While peace processes were previously understood as processes of
amnesties, or demobilizations, no formal peace negotiations had previously
been undertaken with the left-wing guerrillas. The infrastructure and the
institutions for peace started to be built in this period.
The Government’s ﬁrst attempt at a peace process with the FARC-EP was
expressed in the La Uribe agreements signed in 1984.9 A ceaseﬁre was also
agreed with the EPL, the Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera (ADO)10 and
the M-19.11 The agreements were weak in their implementation, as the state
lacked either the experience or the capacity to verify, arbitrate, and implement
the agreements. However, they allowed for the emergence of the Union
Patriótica (UP)12 party and the introduction of the political expression of the
FARC—EP’s agenda into mainstream politics. Despite the promise oﬀered by
the agreements, the Government argued that the FARC—EP used the cease-
ﬁre they established to grow militarily. At the same time, the armed forces did not
honour the ceaseﬁre, and members of the UP were massacred in face of the
indiﬀerence of state institutions (Palacios, 2012). Trust was not established,
thus processes were not successful.
In the 1980s the country also found itself ﬁghting not only guerrillas, but
also drug traﬃckers. In 1979 the Turbay Government signed a Treaty of
Extradition with the USA, permitting that country to extradite Colombians
indicted in US courts.13 Following this, increased pressure from the US Govern-
ment, and the ‘war on drugs’ paradigm it pursued, led in turn to greater pressure
being placed on drug cartels by the Colombian Government in the 1980s. This in
turn unleashed a violent response from these groups (Matthiesen, 2000). This
new battlefront for the state was evidenced by the assassination of the Justice
Minister, Lara Bonilla, in 1984, and the perception that the state was besieged by
this violence was highlighted by the 1985 attack by the M-19 guerrillas on the
Palace of Justice in Bogotá (where Colombia’s Supreme Court was based).
The administration of Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) continued the
eﬀorts for peace, notably with the M-19 group (most of these meetings were
secret, and were not oﬃcial), while the UP gained ground politically, winning
several posts in municipalities and some seats in the Senate and the Congress
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(Cepeda, 2006). In 1988, the M-19 kidnapping of the leader of the Con-
servative Party (the son of former President Gómez) mobilized political sup-
port and public opinion in favour of a peace process. The inclusion of the
Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL)14, the EPL, the Partido Revo-
lucionario de Trabajadores de Colombia (PRT)15, the Corriente de Renova-
ción Socialista (CRS—a faction of the ELN)16, and the Comandos Ernesto
Rojas in diﬀerent peace processes contributed to a broader (yet incomplete)
national peace process. This process still failed to include the ELN and the
FARC—EP.
Yet, the signing of these agreements, as well as the peace agreements with
the M-19, signalled the possibility of peace in the 1990s. The electoral cam-
paign for the presidential election in the 1990s reﬂected a state that was trying
to attain peace and change, but was under siege from diﬀerent actors. The
assassination of three presidential candidates (Galán of the Liberal Party,
Jaramillo of the UP, and Pizarro of M-19) showed that instability and con-
tinued conﬂict was desirable for some groups such as paramilitaries, drug
traﬃckers and even some members of the establishment.
The progress towards peace and the creation of an initial institutional fra-
mework for peace during this period culminated in a reform that changed the
outdated constitution of 1886, the 1991 Constitution (Cárdenas et al., 2006;
Banks & Alvarez, 1991; Uprimny, 2003). Facilitated by the peace process, the
1991 Constitution served to provide a framework which allowed, among
other things, the recognition of the rights and entitlements of indigenous and
Afro-descendant communities, the creation of mechanisms for political
participation and the reassertion of a multi-party democracy.
The ‘end of history’: the 1990s, 9/11 and Uribe
Many considered that an encompassing and ambitious constitution would
ﬁnally aﬀord space for a stronger social covenant in Colombia, and while the
FARC—EP and the ELN were not part of the 1991 constitutional assembly
process, the promise of a more open state and the possibility of peace were
tangible. In addition, international developments such as the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the promise of the ‘end of history’ brought dramatic transitions
that could support peace in Colombia (Fukuyama, 1989).
However, hopes for the consolidation of peace in Colombia were countered
by the response of right-wing groups and politicians against the 1991 Con-
stitution; the encroachment of illicit drugs as the fuel for the Colombian
conﬂict, which allowed left-wing armed groups to survive the demise of the
Soviet Union and escalate confrontations;17 and a series of unexpected con-
sequences of democratization in the country, such as the co-optation of poli-
tical posts across the territory by paramilitaries (López Hernández & Ávila
Martínez, 2010; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
This period saw two formal attempts to achieve peace with the FARC—EP:
one during the administration of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994), and
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another during that of Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998–2002). Thereafter, the
successive administrations headed by Álvaro Uribe (2002–2006 and 2006–2010)
pursued a military approach towards peace with the guerrillas.
From hope to the emergence of the FARC—EP as an electoral force: 1991–98
Following the signing of the new constitution in 1991, and given that some
groups demobilized successfully, the government decided to increase pressure on
other guerrillas to force them to negotiate. The government therefore attacked
former safe havens of the guerrillas that had not accepted its oﬀers of a peace
process (Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, 2009). However, the eﬀects of
this strategy appeared to be limited.
Whereas the peace processes at the beginning of the 1990s facilitated the
demobilization of several guerrilla groups (notably the M-19, the MAQL, the
CRS and the EPL), the outcomes of these processes were not homogeneous:
the paths of the cadres of these organizations varied after their demobiliza-
tion. The M-19, MAQL, and the CRS cadres followed a largely successful
reinsertion process. In contrast, the EPL and several of its cadres returned to
warfare to feed the ranks of paramilitary groups.
Several elements explain the recidivism of the EPL cadres in comparison
with the other groups who demobilized in the early 1990s. Among these were
the lack of options for demobilized cadres, the weak institutional capacity of
the demobilized groups to undertake initiatives for their cadres, and the
incapacity of the state to provide security for demobilized cadres. In the case
of the EPL the most notable factor was the terror campaign unleashed by the
FARC—EP18 that saw demobilized EPL cadres as either traitors or competi-
tors for the political control of the provinces of Urabá and Córdoba. The
assassination of hundreds of former EPL cadres between 1991 and 1995 by
the FARC—EP (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1999)19
pushed former EPL cadres to join other armed groups, and inﬂamed the
violence in these provinces.
As noted, the policy of the Gaviria Government was not solely military; it
also attempted a joint peace process with the ELN and the FARC—EP, with
negotiations taking place in Venezuela and Mexico. The initial approaches
managed to deﬁne a ten-point agenda, and a series of preliminary agreements,
including agreement on mechanisms for veriﬁcation (one of the weaknesses of
the previous peace process). These negotiations were overshadowed by the
doubt (or lack of commitment) by the FARC—EP regarding the possibility of
reaching an agreement and a peace process. The negotiations broke down
after the kidnapping of a former minister by the EPL and his subsequent
death in captivity.
With the arrival of the government of Samper (1994–98), the focus of the
state and the military forces was dispersed by the internal crises of legitimacy
of the presidential ﬁgure within the country. As the president’s campaign
received money from drug traﬃckers to support his presidential bid (El
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Espectador, 2016), Samper lost credibility and legitimacy both inside and
outside the country. The involvement of drug money in ﬁnancing the victory
of Samper added to the prevalent challenge of drug traﬃcking and produc-
tion, and the existence of armed contenders continued to challenge the state’s
monopoly of violence. As a result, the armed forces distrusted the government
because of the role of drug money in his election. This allowed the FARC—
EP and paramilitaries to expand thanks to the resources they accrued from
illicit crops and illicit drugs, and their taxation. Hence there was signiﬁcant
growth of the FARC—EP and the paramilitaries during this period (Duncan,
2006; Pécaut, 2008).
The weakness of the state and the strength of contesting armed groups was
evident in the increase in the extent and intensity of military operations under-
taken by the FARC—EP. The military oﬀensive of the FARC—EP led the
government to abandon several military outposts, which reduced the military
presence in several areas of the country (Palacios, 2012). Hundreds of soldiers
were lost on the battleﬁeld, and hundreds more kidnapped by the FARC—EP.
The strength of paramilitary forces also increased during this period. While
paramilitaries developed an institutional framework in the late 1960s, their
greater encroachment into the Colombian conﬂict was facilitated by Law 356
of 1994, which normalized the possibility of the privatization of security by
diﬀerent actors (which was termed convivir 20) in those areas of the country
where security was precarious.21 This growth of paramilitary activity was
facilitated by existing institutional links between paramilitary forces and
regional élites who shared common goals related to counterinsurgency war-
fare, creating a symbiosis between paramilitary groups and some regional
leaders across the country (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
In addition to this process, there was a resurgence of the violent response
by élites to the democratization process of the 1991 Constitution. The
repressive and violent backlash against democratic overtures by actors that do
not want to lose their privileges in a context of violence became a character-
istic feature of the Colombian State, which explains why democratic openings
in Colombia have been frequently been followed by violence and repression
(Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
Paramilitaries took advantage of the vulnerability of city-based Colom-
bians, who felt cornered by the guerrillas in the face of the weakness of the
Colombian armed forces. They gained public support and political credibility
beyond the regions where they had inﬂuence through a successful advocacy
and media campaign (Ronderos, 2014). However, by 1997, when the Con-
stitutional Court of Colombia declared the law that rendered the creation of
the convivir organizations unconstitutional, the damage was already done.
Their growth, expansion, and co-optation of local institutions had already
taken place, furthering the entry points for private armed groups formed in
the 1980s into the state apparatus (Romero & Valencia, 2007).
This period (1991–98) also saw a reconﬁguration within armed groups.
After 1997 the diﬀerent paramilitary groups aﬃliated under the Autodefensas
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Unidas de Colombia (AUC)22. Their members (paramilitaries and drug car-
tels) used their private armies as part of their economic and political strate-
gies in diﬀerent parts of the country (Llorente & Deas, 1999). Their aﬃliation
presented a more homogeneous façade and enabled them to communicate a
more coherent discourse beyond their illegal activities.
In this context, the Samper Government decided to negotiate with the
guerrillas to release kidnapped soldiers and police oﬃcers. This was not a
peace process, but a prisoner release/exchange.
In the presidential elections of 1998, the candidate elected by Colombians
was the one who appeared to be the closest to starting a negotiation process
with the FARC—EP. This made the FARC—EP and the debates around their
existence central to Colombian politics, transforming the FARC—EP into a
deciding factor in the next elections.
Elections, war and peace: 1998–2002
President Pastrana was elected with a strong public mandate to achieve peace
with the guerrillas (Pastrana Arango, 2013). A new peace negotiation with
the FARC—EP began in 1999 and ended in 2002. This failed. Contrary to
what might be assumed, this was not related to international political
dynamics and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA, but
rather it was determined by the internal dynamics of the process.
From the outset, the peace process was laden with problems regarding the
nature and the structure of the negotiation itself. As the negotiations were
held without a ceaseﬁre, every military action by the guerrillas undermined
the credibility of the process (Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, 2009).
Colombians could not cope with the dissonance of peace conversations while
military actions were taking place.
There were also paradigmatic diﬀerences between the actors at the nego-
tiation table, as well as diﬀerent time frames and logics that clashed. For the
Government, the peace process was conceived in terms of fulﬁlling the man-
date given to Pastrana by Colombians, whereas for the FARC—EP, the peace
process was taken as proof of their strength, evident from their bringing the state
to a negotiation table through sheer force. Both actors sought to achieve peace,
but their logics around peace and envisioned endgames were completely
diﬀerent.
A series of additional elements complicated the negotiations. One of these
was the existence of a demilitarized zone as the size of Switzerland that the
FARC—EP used as a tactical ‘safe haven’. As noted, FARC—EP kidnappings
of civilians, and constant attacks on police stations and military bases across
the country, led many to regard the peace negotiations as dissonant with the
actions of the FARC—EP. During this period the paramilitary forces con-
tinued an aggressive political and military campaign, exploiting the public
sentiment against the FARC—EP (Bonilla, 2012). The campaign depicted the
paramilitaries as defenders of the rule of law and the state, while their
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military actions resulted in massacres and, as the consequence of the clashes
to dislocate the guerrillas from several areas in the country, caused forced
displacement to spike.
The peace process was mired in its preliminary stages. The mere deﬁnition
of a negotiation agenda was troublesome, demonstrating a lack of either
commitment or knowledge of the management of a negotiation process. For
example, in the three years of negotiations the parties failed to establish a
veriﬁcation commission, or determine a friendly third party to solve disputes
in the process (Palacios, 2012).
For many Colombians, these years are remembered as years under siege.
This sense, and the successful media campaign deployed by paramilitaries,
increased the existing public sympathy toward the paramilitaries among some
sectors of the Colombian élites, following the logic that ‘the enemy of my
enemy is my friend’ (Ronderos, 2014). During this period, paramilitaries
managed to inﬂuence and co-opt several political posts across the country,
consolidating their power and encroaching themselves into the Colombian
political system.
This was an unexpected outcome of the 1991 Constitution. The constitu-
tion provided for decentralization in order to allow representation to inform
public policy. However, the co-optation and manipulation of local, regional,
and national politics by power players with weapons and money from drug
traﬃcking was not anticipated (López Hernández & Ávila Martínez, 2010;
Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
This peace process came to an end when the FARC—EP hijacked a com-
mercial airplane and kidnapped a member of Congress who was aboard.
However, in spite of the fact that the FARC—EP was seen as an enemy by
society, its inﬂuence on the next electoral campaign remained central. Politi-
cians focused on the ideas of war and peace, and sought ways to appear
supportive of peace but tough on the FARC—EP. Uribe came to power by
giving voice to the frustration of Colombians towards the FARC—EP.
All-out war and peace: 2002–2010
From the beginning of the 2002 presidential campaign, Uribe adopted the
approach of former president López Michelsen of the early 1980s—that the
guerrillas had to be obliged, by force, to negotiate. This was not a new strat-
egy and was reminiscent of the approach undertaken by the administrations
of Turbay, Barco, and Gaviria.
The Uribe Government’s approach to solving the conﬂict diﬀered greatly
from the unpopular peace process of its predecessor. The Uribe Government
became involved in another peace process—not with left-wing forces, but with
the paramilitaries (Pardo Rueda, 2007). This peace process, which was
undertaken between the Colombian Government and the AUC, involved a
demilitarized zone and an ill-deﬁned ceaseﬁre, and managed to garner the
support of the Organization of American States (OAS). The process has been
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widely criticized, however, its implementation created a series of institutions
and structures related to demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
(DDR), aswell as the ﬁrst modern attempt in Colombia to establish a transitional
justice framework.
The new Government improved several security indicators as a result of the
de-escalation of confrontations with the paramilitaries, and the tactical retreat
by guerrillas to the fringes of the state in response to the latter’s military
oﬀensive. Expressed under Uribe, the capacity of the state to reassert its
military might is partially the legacy of the ‘Plan Colombia’ campaign pursued
by the Pastrana Government.
It is ironic that the improved security indicators in this period were
achieved while the number of internally displaced Colombians skyrocketed
(Ibáñez Londoño, 2011). Security might have improved for some, but not for
all Colombians. By the end of Uribe’s ﬁrst term the failures of the peace
process with the paramilitaries emerged (Pardo Rueda, 2007). In addition,
and thanks to the legal framework that instituted a transitional justice fra-
mework as part of the peace process with the paramilitaries, the denunciation
of the alliances between paramilitaries and politicians started to become visi-
ble. A standing symbol of the reach and the connivance between para-
militaries and a sector of the political establishment in these years is the
standing ovation that the leaders of the paramilitary received in the Colom-
bian capital Bogotá in 2004. At that time, paramilitaries claimed to have
inﬂuence over some 30% of the Colombian Congress (López Hernández &
Ávila Martínez, 2010).
One could argue that, in fact, one of the lessons of the Uribe Government
was the acknowledgment by some sectors of Colombian society of the costs
for human rights and democracy incurred in pursuit of an all-out war strat-
egy. The international community and local organizations began to criticize
the human rights violations taking place within the country as a product of
the military campaign. At the same time, the failures of the peace process
with the paramilitaries became evident. New ‘paramilitary’ groups, now
labelled ‘emergent bands’, appeared in the locations of former paramilitary
groups, recycling their repertoires and capacities almost perfectly. As the
guerrillas retreated, the paramilitaries and their oﬀshoots expanded.
In spite of this, the increased perception of security across the country
enabled Uribe to be easily re-elected for a second term in 2006. He achieved
this after modifying the 1991 Constitution to enable presidential re-election.
However, the extension of his political mandate started to compromise the
separation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary
in Colombia, as the 1991 Constitution did not include checks and balances in
the case of re-elections.
Uribe continued his security policy in his second term. The government
facilitated a discourse whereby the members of armed groups were referred to
as terrorists, and Uribe was able to ostracize his political opponents by
labelling them as supporters of terrorist groups (Tickner & Pardo, 2003;
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López de la Roche, 2014). Simultaneously, a nationalist discourse emerged,
and the gloriﬁcation of armed forces was common. Advertisements appeared in
television, radio and printed media, which touted the victories of war and
military operations, and the possibility of winning the war was latent in media
coverage. This world view was bolstered by strategic victories, such as the
killing of the FARC—EP’s military commander and its ‘Chancellor’, as well
as military operations which resulted in the liberation of several people who
had been kidnapped by the FARC—EP. These operations became useful
propaganda instruments for the Government to show its successes. The nationalist,
almost chauvinist, environment made opposition to the government extremely
diﬃcult (López de la Roche, 2014).
The eﬀective propaganda, and the marginalization of opposition, masked
worrying signs. The assassination of civilians, later claimed to be guerrillas or
paramilitaries, by members of the armed forces showed the risks of an all-out
war to institutions: between 2002 and 2008 around 4,000 civilians were mur-
dered by the armed forces and then later presented as guerrillas or para-
militaries (Human Rights Watch, 2015). These events came to be known in
Colombia as the falsos positivos (false positives). The Government put pres-
sure on the military forces to demonstrate results under an incentive system
that equated success with the number of casualties caused to the diﬀerent
illegal groups. The system of rewarding those military units that achieved
higher casualties against the guerrillas or the paramilitaries23 caused some
military units in diﬀerent regions of the country to resort to the assassination
of civilians in the search for rewards and promotions.
In addition to this, accusations of nepotism and corruption came to sur-
round the Uribe Government, which nevertheless attempted to modify the
constitution once again to support Uribe’s serving a third term. The attempt
was aborted by the Colombian Constitutional Court, which ruled that a
second consecutive re-election was against the Colombian Constitution. Still,
a securitization policy and the continuation of the Uribe administration’s
approach proved important for Colombian citizens, since Uribe’s Minister of
Defence, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected as President under the expectation
that he would maintain the approach initiated by Uribe. Once again the
existence of the FARC—EP deﬁned the campaign and the selection of the
incumbent into the Colombian presidency.
The quest for peace: The Colombian state and its history
As seen above, the history of Colombia can be described as a country at odds
with itself. Attempts at reaching peace with diﬀerent armed groups have been
a constant element in the history of the country for the last 70 years. For the
last four decades the state and its institutions have sought to end the conﬂict
in Colombia by either force or negotiation. The multiple peace processes and
formal and attempted negotiations involving diﬀerent guerrillas and para-
military groups across the country are proof of these attempts. Despite
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diﬀerent governments having managed to sign peace agreements with several
organizations, and to demobilize a considerable number of ﬁghters, a great
paradox emerges: peace agreements have not been enough to stop the emer-
gence and continuity of armed organizations within the Colombian state. The
continuation of war and violence in Colombia has been facilitated by the
incentives of illegal drug traﬃcking, the multiplicity of armed actors and
interests in diﬀerent territories, the diﬃculty faced by the state in operating at
the fringes of its territory, and the challenge of consolidating a national
covenant able to incorporate and embrace diﬀerent local elites as part of a
national project.
The Colombian democracy—the longest-running in Latin America—is
belied by many features not typically associated with democracy: more than
7m. citizens becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the
violence, giving it the highest IDP population of any country in the world as
of 2017 (UNHCR, 2017); nearly 1m. assassinations since 1985 (Unidad para
las Victimas, 2017); the death of more than 50,000 combatants; the closure of
political opportunities to political parties not aligned with the liberal or con-
servative élites; the assassination of blossoming political parties; the assassi-
nation of three presidential candidates in a single presidential campaign; and
the stiﬂing of dissent that opposed either radicals, the Government, or local
élites (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014). This is part of the political economy of
Colombia that can be illustrated by its history. Colombia is a case study that
challenges the categories or conceptions of what a democracy is and how it
should operate (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
Between 1948 and 2010 the Colombian democracy saw several eﬀorts
undertaken in the search for peace. Diﬀerent Colombian governments have
pursued peace. This quest, as well as the resilience of violence, has prevailed
across time and been illustrated by the failures of previous attempts at peace
with the FARC—EP and other groups. The peace negotiation with the FARC—
EP that started in 2012 can thus be seen as the continuation of the history of
successes and failures of the Colombian state in the search for peace. Its
emergence is the outcome of a process in the making for four decades, which
resulted in a mutually damaging stalemate between the warring parties and
an interest by the élites of both the FARC—EP and the Colombian Govern-
ment in undertaking a negotiation. This created the space and conditions for
the negotiation between the Santos Government, and the FARC—EP
between 2012 and 2016 (see Chapter 3).
Although the FARC—EP is recognized as the biggest armed organization
challenging the power of the state, the demobilization of cadres from the
FARC—EP will not mean that all the violence in Colombia will disappear
overnight. Paramilitary groups, drug traﬃckers, and other armed groups will
present challenges to the success of the 2016 peace agreement and to the
state’s ability to assert its monopoly of force in the country. The peace process
with the FARC—EP has meant that the state has greater ﬂexibility to allocate
its resources against the remaining armed organizations, so it may oblige
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them to submit to the state, or to facilitate a negotiation/surrendering process.
However, this will require the state to establish government functions in those
places where armed groups prevailed in the past, which may prove a challenge
to state capacity. The provision of justice and other public services is necessary
if the state is to take the opportunity to contest these other organizations and
realize its sovereignty.
Notes
1 The author would like to express his gratitude towards Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín
for his help in the development of this chapter. His contributions to previous ver-
sions of this document and his insights for the development of the text were
invaluable.
2 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army.
3 National Liberation Army.
4 Popular Liberation Army.
5 After the peace process with paramilitaries in the early 2000s the Government
proscribed the used of the word paramilitary and started to use the acronym of
BACRIM (criminal organizations) to designate organizations that were formerly
described as paramilitaries.
6 Gaitanist Self-defence Forces of Colombia.
7 In which the former military dictator Rojas Pinilla lost the election to the Con-
servative candidate, Misael Patrana.
8 By means of Decree 3398 of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968.
9 The Uribe agreements should not be confused with the surname of former pre-
sident Uribe (2002–2010). These agreements were signed on 24 March 1984 in the
municipality of La Uribe (Meta province). The agreements provided for a ceaseﬁre,
and a procedure that would allow the transition of the FARC—EP into civilian
life, a series of development initiatives in areas aﬀected by violence, as well as an
oﬃcial statement of commitment from the state to combating paramilitarism.
10 Labour Self Defence Movement.
11 On 24 August 1984 in Corinto (Cauca province) and El Hobo (Huila province), a
ceaseﬁre was signed in order to facilitate the discussion around the reforms that
would help to constitute a future peace process.
12 Patriotic Union.
13 Agreement ratiﬁed by Law 27 of 1980.
14 Quintin Lame Armed Movement.
15 Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Colombia.
16 Socialist Renovation Stream. This was a faction of the ELN which considered that
the armed struggle was no longer viable and opted for political contestation versus
the state.
17 Some argue, however, that before this time, the left- wing guerrillas were not
actually dependent on ﬁnancial or logistical support from the USSR.
18 A sub-group of the ELN and a dissident faction from the demobilized EPL also
took part in this campaign.
19 This included several massacres, such as those that took place in Filipinas, Las
Moras, San Rafael, La Lolita and La Chinita.
20 Coexistence or cohabitation, in English.
21 During this period at least 529 rural cooperatives were created in 24 provinces
within the country, which involved at least 15,300 citizens (Verdad Abierta, 2013).
22 The United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia was a ‘federal’ organization of right-
wing groups that in some cases included landlords, industrialists and cattle farmers
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looking to defend themselves from the guerrillas; in other cases it involved groups
operating at the borders of legality, such as the emerald miners and traders, and in
other cases it involved drug traﬃckers, and right-wing armed groups—the legacy
of the big cartels of the 1980s.
23 There are other examples on how these ‘body-count’ indicators created perverse
incentives. Notable examples are the assassination of civilians in the Vietnam War
(Daddis, 2011), and more recently the use of these indicators in the war against
drug cartels in Mexico (Ahmed & Schmitt, 2016).
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3 The peace process with the FARC—EP
Carlo Nasi
The long journey to a negotiation
When the government of President Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018) decided
to attempt a new peace negotiation with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio-
narias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP) guerrillas, it was
aware that such a course of action entailed high risks. Previous governments
had failed consistently in their attempts to reach a bargained solution with the
FARC—EP. On two occasions, during the governments of Belisario Betancur
(1982–1986) and Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002), failure to achieve an agreement
was due to the fact that the FARC—EP negotiated only tactically (in order to
attain short-termmilitary and political beneﬁts instead of seeking to end the war).
Even if both governments share part of the blame for such failures, the
FARC—EP never considered renouncing war in the ﬁrst place during these
negotiations (Bejarano, 1995; Pizarro Leongómez, 2011; Nasi, 2009).
The government of President Virgilio Barco (1986–1990) did negotiate with
several rebel groups that eventually turned in their weapons (see Chapter 2),
but was unable to start peace negotiations with FARC—EP (Pardo, 2004;
García Durán, 1992). In fact, Barco’s government demanded that any rebel
organization willing to start peace negotiations should ﬁrst declare a uni-
lateral ceaseﬁre (and comply with it for a few months), which would be
interpreted by the government as a sincere peace gesture. The FARC—EP
announced a ceaseﬁre but then (unlike other rebel groups) did not comply
with it, so the negotiation with them never started (Ramirez, 1991). Later, the
government of President César Gaviria (1990–94) held short-lived peace talks
in Venezuela and Mexico that ended in deadlock. At the time, the FARC—
EP had demanded that the government undertake deep structural transfor-
mations of the Colombian polity and economy, which was at odds with the
fact that a legitimate and popularly elected National Constituent Assembly
had just drafted a new political constitution in the context of a successful
peace negotiation with other rebel groups (Palacios, 2012).
Given previous experiences, it seemed that any peace negotiations with the
FARC—EP were doomed to fail. In addition, the gradual involvement of this
rebel group in drug-traﬃcking activities led diﬀerent governments, analysts,
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and most Colombian citizens to believe that the FARC—EP had mutated
into a greedy criminal enterprise, which sought rents and riches instead of the
ideological agendas ostensibly espoused (Nieto, 2001).
In 1998 the government of President Pastrana made yet another attempt to
reach a peaceful settlement with the FARC—EP. In order to sit at the bar-
gaining table, the government had to abide by a precondition demanded by
FARC—EP, consisting of the demilitarization of ﬁve municipalities (an area
corresponding to 42,000 sq km—approximately the size of Switzerland).
Whereas the FARC—EP had argued that demilitarization was necessary in
order to have a ‘safe space’ from which to conduct the peace talks, the
demilitarized area turned out to be a safe haven where the rebel group
engaged in all sorts of illegal activities. Furthermore, after three years of
intermittent negotiations, and amidst increasing levels of violence between
both actors, the government and the rebels had not even agreed upon a single
item in a long and complex bargaining agenda (Nasi, 2009).
It seemed that both the government and the rebels had negotiated solely for
tactical reasons (as part of a military strategy aimed at defeating the oppo-
nent). Although it failed to reach a negotiated peace, Pastrana’s government
was able to set the stage for turning the tables against FARC—EP through
‘Plan Colombia’, a programme that was aimed at strengthening Colombia’s
institutional and military capacities.1
In 2002, after Pastrana’s peace negotiations with the FARC—EP broke
down, Álvaro Uribe, a right-wing populist politician who promised to ﬁght
back and eventually militarily defeat the FARC—EP, was elected president
(he was re-elected in 2006 to serve a second term). President Uribe’s election
followed the restructuring and strengthening of the Colombian army through
Plan Colombia, which allowed the government to undertake a sustained
military oﬀensive against the rebels (Isacson, 2010).
Plan Colombia helped the Colombian government to regain the upper
hand in the war vis-à-vis the FARC—EP. In fact, before Uribe’s election, the
FARC—EP had attained unprecedented strength. At its peak the FARC—EP
was comprised of nearly 20,000 combatants and had expanded its territorial
control across various regions, especially in Colombia’s southern provinces
(Granada, et al., 2009). Uribe’s government contained the rebel’s expansion.
While never attaining a decisive military victory, the government was able to
weaken the FARC—EP (Granada, et al., 2009), and this hard-line policy
became very popular in Colombia.
When President Santos was elected in 2010 for his ﬁrst term in oﬃce, he
was expected to continue with Uribe’s legacy of dealing with the FARC—EP
solely in military terms, particularly given that he had supported this
approach when he was Uribe’s Minister of Defence. However, two years after
taking oﬃce, Santos started a negotiation process with the FARC—EP, which
prompted a furious reaction by former President Uribe and a number of
right-wing politicians, who accused the government of ‘high treason.’ But why
did Santos opt for a bargained solution in the ﬁrst place?
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President Santos was aware that attaining a decisive military victory over
the FARC—EP would be both very costly and extremely diﬃcult. Colombia’s
vast territory, thick forests, inaccessible mountains and porous frontiers had
always provided the rebel group with plenty of safe havens. In addition, the
FARC—EP had demonstrated a great deal of resilience during ﬁve decades of
armed conﬂict. In spite of the fact that Colombia never approached a truly
revolutionary situation, the FARC—EP seldom (if ever) experienced a short-
age of recruits and funds. High levels of unemployment and poverty in var-
ious rural regions, coupled with a precarious state presence in diﬀerent areas,
played into the hands of the FARC—EP. The FARC—EP had also become a
de facto authority in some regions, providing some form of order and justice
to locals, which helped them recruit followers (Pizarro Leongómez, 2011).
While Uribe’s government was able to push the rebels back to rural areas
and regain control of various territories, this was a far cry from victory. The
FARC—EP did suﬀer heavy casualties, but survived and changed their tactics.
By reverting to small-scale guerrilla tactics, the rebel group was able not only to
better resist the government’s oﬀensive, but also to recover the military
initiative in some parts of the country (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2013).
In any event, the improvement in the military capacities of the Colombian
armed forces facilitated by Plan Colombia produced a sense of vulnerability
in the leadership of the rebel group: for the ﬁrst time ever, the Colombian
armed forces were able to capture and kill not only rank-and-ﬁle guerrillas
and mid-level commanders, but also some of the top FARC—EP commanders.
In particular, the Colombian military killed the FARC—EP’s second in com-
mand, Luis Edgar Devia Silva (also known as Raúl Reyes) in 2008, then his
replacement, Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas (alias Mono Jojoy) in 2010, and later
the top commander Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (alias Alfonso Cano) in
2011. The war became increasingly costly for the FARC—EP, which must
have spurred internal debates in the rebel group about the convenience of
prolonging an insurgency that had not led to revolution in over ﬁfty years
(Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, 2009).
Conversely, President Santos decided to start peace negotiations when it
became clear that not even Plan Colombia had suﬃced to defeat the FARC—
EP on the battleground, and that the all-out strategy entailed signiﬁcant costs
in terms of the legitimacy of the state. More than 4,000 civilians had been
assassinated by the Colombian armed forces during the counterinsurgent
campaign (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Negotiating with the rebels was a
rational course of action, since the war was yielding diminishing returns and
the U.S. government was gradually scaling down its military aid to Colombia.
At the same time, due to Plan Colombia (and the military plans which suc-
ceeded it) any prospects of taking power by force had vanished altogether for
the FARC—EP. After enduring successive severe military blows and realizing
that the war was no longer proﬁtable enough (nor leading to any meaningful
political ends), the rebel group and its leadership must have considered it
prudent to seek a way out of the conﬂict through politics.
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Deciding on the correct timing to approach the FARC—EP was, however,
not an easy decision. The FARC—EP’s top commander, Alfonso Cano, had
been proposing a peace process since the beginning of Santos’ tenure in 2010
(El Tiempo, 2010). However, President Santos was not convinced of the fea-
sibility of sitting at the negotiation table, and was also pressured by Uribe
(and by rightist elements within his own party) to not change course.
After the killing of Alfonso Cano in 2011, President Santos concluded that
the situation was ripe for seeking a bargained solution. In fact, the FARC—
EP was enduring internal turmoil, determining Cano’s replacement and
reconsidering its options. It was then that Santos approached the new top
leader of the FARC—EP, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (also known as Timo-
chenko), with the proposal to secretly explore peace talks. The peace process
started when Timochenko agreed to start a dialogue.
Peace negotiations and the importance of rules and procedures: Lessons
from the past
To avoid placing the negotiation process in the public spotlight, and antici-
pating high political costs in the event that it failed, President Santos opted to
conduct secret pre-negotiations. Although it seemed that FARC—EP leaders
had good reasons to look for a way out of an increasingly costly war, this did
not necessarily mean that the government and the rebel group could agree on
the terms of a peaceful settlement.
Thus, President Santos formed a commission headed by his own brother,
Enrique, in order to secretly meet with FARC—EP delegates and explore the
actual possibility of reaching a peaceful solution (Santos Calderón, 2014).
After six months of pre-negotiations, this commission crafted a procedural
framework, which provided a roadmap for the upcoming negotiations (Oﬁ-
cina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2012). This document speciﬁed the
basic rules of the negotiations, which included:
First, negotiating abroad, speciﬁcally in Cuba. This provision was impor-
tant, because the most recent peace negotiation with FARC—EP, under the
government of Pastrana, had taken place in Colombia, under conditions that
entailed costly concessions for the government.
Santos avoided repeating such a mistake. No areas within the country were
to be demilitarized and it was agreed that the negotiations would not be
conducted in Colombia, but abroad. Cuba, a country respected by the rebels,
was chosen as the site where the peace negotiations would take place.
Second, limiting public participation and media involvement. On previous
occasions, little attention was paid to the role of civil society in the negotiations.
Indeed, when the Pastrana government peace negotiations deadlocked, the
government had agreed with the FARC—EP to ‘democratize the peace talks’,
that is, to invite Colombians of all walks of life to submit proposals in order
to ‘reach the peace’ in the so-called public hearings (audiencias públicas).
Many citizens ended up proposing all sorts of reforms on diﬀerent topics.
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However, this only heightened confusion and produced further delays in the
peace talks (Nasi, 2009). The Pastrana government and the FARC—EP never
deﬁned a procedure to sort out, accept, or discard the citizens’ proposals, which
continued to accumulate. The parties never speciﬁed how this procedure
would lead to peace, or how it would link with the bargaining agenda. Com-
plexity was increased, rather than decreased, by this process. To complicate
matters even further, too many aspects of the negotiations were disclosed to
the public, which fostered posturing and grandstanding by politicians and
FARC—EP delegates.
In contrast, during Santos’s tenure the negotiation team clariﬁed from the
start that the government and the FARC—EP shared the main responsibility
for ﬁnding a way out of the armed conﬂict. Citizens’ inputs would be allowed,
but they would only play a secondary role. It was also emphasized that
negotiations would be conﬁdential, meaning that disclosure to the public
would only occur in due time. Negotiating would take place on bilateral,
conﬁdential terms, with the active support of Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, and
Chile (that acted as guarantors of the negotiation process). This corrected yet
another procedural error committed in past negotiations with the FARC—EP.
Third, negotiating without a ceaseﬁre. In response to the speciﬁc political
conditions of Colombia, the negotiation team opted to negotiate in the midst
of war, which was a risky decision. In fact, the ongoing violent confrontation
between the government and the guerrillas caused grave tensions at the bar-
gaining table, to the point that some political groups even demanded that
President Santos should stop negotiating or should ‘respond blow by blow to
the terrorists’ (El Heraldo, 2014). But the government chose to negotiate in
the midst of war, because a premature ceaseﬁre could have accrued a military
advantage to the FARC—EP and could have strengthened the accusations of
opposing politicians that Santos was surrendering the monopoly of force by
the state. Therefore, during the peace negotiations the armed forces continued
to ﬁght the FARC—EP.
Fourth, negotiating under the rule that ‘nothing is agreed upon until
everything is agreed’. This norm provided an incentive for reaching compre-
hensive peace accords, rather than partial agreements. Indeed, no partial
agreements reached by the parties, regardless of their merits, would ever be
implemented by themselves. This principle also allowed the negotiation to
advance on less contentious topics, fostering progress in several topics without
necessarily stalling the negotiations.
Finally, negotiating a limited agenda. The parties agreed on a limited
number of topics to be included in the agenda. Again, this was a way to cor-
rect past mistakes. During the 1998–2002 failed peace negotiation, the Pas-
trana government did not set limits to the bargaining agenda, with the result
that it eventually included 67 topics concerning all sorts of political, social,
and economic transformations (Nasi, 2009). Pastrana’s negotiating team
conveyed the false impression that ‘anything and everything’ was negotiable,
which was at odds with the fact that the bargaining table was extremely slow
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in showing any results. Failure to reach any agreement after three years of
negotiations ultimately came as no surprise.
President Santos, instead, even before sitting at the bargaining table, agreed
with the FARC—EP on an agenda that made it clear that the peace negotia-
tions would not entail a ‘negotiated revolution’. The FARC—EP was not in a
position to demand anything close to this, since the rebel group never threatened
the stability of the regime and was unpopular throughout Colombia.
The bargaining agenda included six topics, whose rationale, breadth and
scope will be discussed in the next section: 1) agrarian reform, 2) political
rights, 3) drug traﬃcking, 4) victims and transitional justice, 5) end of the
conﬂict, and 6) implementation of the accords.
It is important to emphasize which topics were excluded by the bargaining
agenda: it was clear from the start that the negotiations would not substitute
the Colombian democracy with some other kind of socialist regime, nor that
the capitalist economic system would be overhauled: changes in the ﬁnancial
sector or the abolition of private property were excluded from the bargaining
agenda. The agenda also did not mention a restructuring of the Colombian
military and police: due to the context of the negotiations, it was unthinkable
to let the FARC—EP demand institutional reforms of the Colombian armed
forces. It was a modest bargaining agenda that entailed a few important—
albeit far from radical—concessions to the rebels and that recognized the
advances made in the 1991 Constitution.
The peace accords and the prospects of attaining a sustainable peace
The peace negotiations between the government of Santos and the FARC—
EP oﬃcially started in late 2012 and ended with the signing of a peace accord
on 26 September 2016. Whereas there was fast progress during the ﬁrst year
and a half of the negotiations (in which the parties mostly debated policies
related to rural reforms, deepening democracy, and dealing with drug traf-
ﬁcking), the dialogue slowed down and suﬀered a deadlock when the parties
approached speciﬁc concessions to the FARC—EP and guarantees of com-
pliance by the government, as well as the discussion on the topic of victims
and transitional justice. The ‘deﬁnitive’ peace agreement was signed in a
public ceremony in Cartagena on 26 September 2016.
However, due to sustained critiques by former President Uribe and other poli-
tical sectors who questioned the legitimacy of the agreements and the negotiation
process, President Santos had decided that Colombians should have the ﬁnal
word on the peace accords through a plebiscite that was held on 2 October 2016.
The plebiscite and its vote were intended to foster the legitimization of the
negotiation process and the mandate given to President Santos for achieving
peace. However, defying all polls and predictions, and partly due to a suc-
cessful negative campaign by Uribe’s supporters that massively spread mis-
information through the media (Revista Semana, 2016b), the low popularity of
Santos’s government, a deep distrust in the FARC—EP by Colombians, and
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the diﬃculties inherent in communicating the content of a 300-page agree-
ment to the population, a majority of Colombians rejected the peace accords.
In order to preserve the legitimacy of the peace process, President Santos
was forced to renegotiate the peace accords with the FARC—EP, introducing
many of the concerns of those who were opposed to the agreements. A tense
period followed, during which, ﬁrstly, the government negotiating team met
with former President Uribe and various other politicians and social and
religious leaders who had opposed the peace accords, in order to hear and
collect their objections to the accords. Then there was a renegotiation of the
accords with the FARC—EP in order to change some parts of the peace
agreements (La Silla Vacia, 2016).
It is worth noting that even though the FARC—EP could have vetoed all
(or most) of the proposals for changing the content of the peace accords, the
rebel group chose not to do so, hoping to create a stronger consensus in
favour of the accords. Indeed, implementing any peace accord is very diﬃcult;
implementing it with the majority of the population against it is nearly
impossible. The FARC—EP exercised its veto power only on a few occasions,
when the rebel group perceived that some proposed changes threatened its vital
interests (for example, with regard to proposals aimed at limiting its political
participation following the demobilization of FARC combatants).
When renegotiating the terms of the peace agreement with the FARC—EP,
the government’s negotiation team acted as a broker, fostering various chan-
ges in the peace accords as long as they did not derail the agreements.
Whereas it was important to introduce some changes in the accords, the goal
of achieving peace was equally important.
The government and the FARC—EP signed a new agreement in Bogotá on
24 November 2016. Predictably, despite the fact that both sides included a
number of important modiﬁcations in the accords, this did not translate into
unanimous support for the new peace accords, or lead to a change of position
by those who had opposed the agreements form the start. Part of the oppo-
sition was defused, but former President Uribe and his followers maintained a
radical stance denouncing that the government and the rebels had only
introduced ‘cosmetic changes’ in the accords (El Colombiano, 2016).
Santos next faced the dilemma of submitting the new accords to some form
of popular ratiﬁcation. Given that the previous accords had been rejected in a
plebiscite, it was important to probe whether most Colombians endorsed the
new peace agreements. However, carrying out a new plebiscite was both costly
and risky: even if there had been a number of popular mobilizations
throughout the country in favour of peace, a new plebiscite might have dee-
pened polarization and given the opponents of the peace process another
opportunity to spoil the negotiations. In a worst-case scenario, the govern-
ment risked losing a plebiscite for a second time in a row, something that
would have meant ruining the peace process.
Eventually, Santos opted for a safer option. His government inquired with
the high courts whether ratiﬁcation by Congress could be considered as some
40 The peace process with the FARC—EP
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
form of ‘popular ratiﬁcation’, considering that Congressmen had been popu-
larly elected (Revista Semana, 2016a). When the courts supported the idea of
ratiﬁcation by Congress, the government went ahead, taking advantage of its
majorities in Congress. Congress swiftly ratiﬁed the accords on 1 December
2016 (BBC Mundo, 2016).
This opened the way for a new stage in the peace process: implementation.
As at late 2017 the implementation of the peace accords was taking place, and it
was diﬃcult to anticipate whether it would lead to a sustainable peace, as this
is something which can only be assessed in the long term. At the same time,
however, one can bring forth some ideas on the foreseeable eﬀects of the
accords.
Regardless of the content of the accords, they do imply the termination of a
long-standing insurgency by the FARC—EP. Although certain other rebel
groups and other illegal armed actors (which are primarily engaged in drug-
traﬃcking) will not simply disappear because of the signing of a peace accord
with FARC—EP, bringing an end to the FARC—EP’s insurgency constitutes a
milestone that will, by and large, bring a major share of the violence to an end.
With regards to the various topics of the peace accords, it is worth men-
tioning that the accords include a modest—albeit very important—agrarian
reform. This issue is signiﬁcant because the FARC—EP has been (at least
primarily) a rural phenomenon. Colombia has a long history of forceful dis-
possessions of the lands of peasants and a track record of failed agrarian
reforms (Machado, 2009), which partly explains the rise, proliferation, and
endurance of insurgencies. Even though the claim that the FARC—EP
represents (or is supported by) a majority of Colombian peasants is ludicrous,
most of the FARC—EP’s social support comes from speciﬁc rural areas. For
the FARC—EP, an agrarian reform programme has been central to its poli-
tics and identity, as shortly after its foundation, the rebel group proposed such
an initiative (Ferro & Uribe, 2002).
The peace agreements mention the creation of a land fund for distributing
terrains to landless and land-poor peasants, which aims to contribute to
redress past injustices (see Chapter 6). However, this is not a radical or revo-
lutionary rural reform programme. The peace accords do not include expro-
priations of large landowners, nor do they set any limits to large rural
landholdings (Colombian rural landholdings are technically not limited by
size). Rather, the government is expected to buy land and also use land owned
by the state (the so-called baldíos) in order to redistribute them to peasants,
especially in the areas most aﬀected by the armed conﬂict.
The formalization of land titles is expected to complement this policy. Land
ownership in Colombia’s rural areas is deﬁned by a high degree of inform-
ality, as nearly 60% of owners lack land titles. The creation of special tribu-
nals to resolve disputes over land property will be useful in promoting
formalization and defusing conﬂicts. In addition, the government is expected
to make substantial development investments in those rural areas that have
been aﬀected the most by war, assisting peasants with credit and technical aid
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to improve the productivity of rural areas. As such the agreements can be
read as a rural development plan, rather than as a rural revolution agenda.
The accord on political rights includes a mix of measures aimed at
improving the protection of the rights of opposition parties and the creation
of broader avenues for political participation. One should mention that
Colombia has maintained democratic procedures for decades, and that no
government has legally banned any opposition parties.
At the same time though, opposition parties have endured diﬀerent types of
exclusions due to various structural barriers. For instance, between 1958 and
1974, the Frente Nacional (FN or National Front), a power-sharing agree-
ment aimed at stopping La Violencia2, restricted access to government to
parties other than the Liberals and the Conservatives (Sánchez, et al., 1984).
When the FN ended, Liberal and Conservative politicians largely succeeded
in prolonging this power-sharing agreement into the late 1980s by resorting to
informal understandings. Only with the Constitutional Reform of 1991 was
the FN fully dismantled, which allowed the election of hitherto marginalized
political groups.
Even more troublesome than the FN has been the violent exclusion of
some political parties that seemingly threatened the status quo. For instance,
in the mid-1980s, in the context of the peace process between the adminis-
tration of President Belisario Betancur and FARC—EP (which ended in fail-
ure), this rebel group formed a political party, the Unión Patriótica (UP), to
participate in electoral contests (Dudley, 2008). However, the UP did not
function as a regular party, but formed part of the FARC—EP’s strategy to
take power by combining both legal and illegal means (the so-called ‘combination
of all forms of struggle’).
This led to a very violent reaction by rightist groups, in particular by some
regional élites that believed that the UP threatened their political status and
promoted the FARC—EP’s revolutionary agenda (Romero, 2003). These
élites sponsored right-wing paramilitary groups, which, sometimes in collu-
sion with the Colombian military, virtually annihilated the UP in a short
space (Romero, 2003; Dudley, 2008).
Even if the FARC—EP has also been guilty of killing scores of politicians
belonging to diﬀerent political parties, the extreme violence endured by the
UP ﬁnds no parallel in Colombia: from the mid-1980s many politicians and
supporters of the UP were threatened and killed by rightist militias, to the
point that this party was forced out of the electoral competition in the 1990s.
Counter-intuitively, in spite of the annihilation of the UP, in those same
years Colombia gradually became a relatively safer place for other left-wing
political parties. Colombia experienced an eﬀective democratic opening fol-
lowing President Barco’s partly successful peace processes of the late 1980s
and the early 1990s, and the crafting of a new constitution in 1991. As var-
ious guerrilla organizations handed in their weapons and formed legal poli-
tical organizations (see Chapter 2), these parties made important democratic
inroads. Since 2003 the Polo Democrático Alternativo, a political party which
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includes both former guerrillas and politicians from the left (not necessarily
connected with rebel groups), was able to elect Bogotá’s mayor3 three times in
a row. It has become clear that left-wing parties can compete in electoral
contests and win elections without their candidates being killed.
However, due to the precedent concerning the systematic killing of UP
members, the importance of broadening political participation is vital for the
FARC—EP. Furthermore, in spite of the democratic opening of the early
1990s, various social movements have been repressed and several human
rights defenders have been killed by either private militias or even the state’s
coercive apparatus (Human Rights Watch, 2013). There is still plenty of room
for deepening democracy in Colombia, as assassinations of social and political
leaders are still common in the country.
The accord on political rights will oﬀer greater guarantees to opposition
parties and social movements, such as the creation of a statute for opposition par-
ties (something that has been non-existent in Colombia), removing legal
obstacles for the creation of new political parties, improving access to mass
media for opposition parties, and introducing a series of measures to improve
the transparency of the elections and strengthen social movements. The FARC—
EP will also receive speciﬁc incentives: they will be granted 10 seats4 in Congress
(ﬁve in the Senate and ﬁve in the House of Representatives) in the elections of
2018 and 2022, regardless of the electoral results. In addition, the political party
formed by the FARC—EPwill be funded by the state andwill be allowed to use a
series of mass media tools in order to disseminate its message.
These speciﬁc agreements have been very controversial in Colombia.
Former President Uribe and other sectors have opposed the peace process, as they
consider that FARC—EP leaders, especially those responsible for gross human
rights violations, should not be allowed to have any political positions. On the
other hand, supporters of the agreements consider that granting the FARC—
EP 10 seats in Congress constitutes some sort of compensation for the mas-
sacre of UP members. Furthermore, many consider that guaranteeing the
FARC—EP—for a limited time—a few seats in Congress is a fair price that
Colombians should pay if the rebel group is expected to lay down its weapons
for good. This is an important incentive for the FARC—EP to make the
transition from violence to politics.
The accord on illicit drugs includes various provisions aimed at curbing the
production, traﬃcking, and consumption of illicit drugs. This agreement,
however, includes a great deal of wishful thinking. In fact, a variety of crim-
inal groups (besides the FARC—EP) are involved in drug traﬃcking and
many peasants throughout the country cultivate illegal crops independently of
the presence of the FARC—EP in their territories. Drug production and
traﬃcking is an international industry that transcends the FARC—EP.
This accord includes provisions related to policies that have been imple-
mented in the past in the ‘war against drugs’ that have not been particularly
successful (Pardo, 2004). They aim to target peasants, drug traﬃckers and
drug consumers, each in a diﬀerential manner. Peasants who cultivate illicit
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crops would be helped by the government to substitute them with legal ones.
Drug addiction will be approached as a public health issue, and the con-
sumption of drugs would be considered as a medical problem rather than a
criminal oﬀence. Finally, drug traﬃckers would be dealt with using the
repressive apparatus of the state.
The foreseeable eﬀects of the drugs policies included in the peace agree-
ments are hard to assess. In the renegotiated accords it became clear that in
order to enjoy the beneﬁts of transitional justice, the FARC—EP is expected
to provide information about the illegal economies in the regions where their
units were active and exercised eﬀective control over territory and the popu-
lation. The new agreements also state that there will be no amnesty if drug-
traﬃcking-related oﬀences were for the personal enrichment of guerrillas
(Goebertus Estrada, 2016).
A looming risk is that the so-called criminal gangs (bandas criminales, or
BACRIM) will take over drug production in regions formerly controlled by
FARC—EP. As long as the government will not be capable of oﬀering alter-
natives of employment and wealth generation that replace the avenues created
by drug production and traﬃcking, and will not be able to reassert state pre-
sence in these areas, Colombia will never become a country free of illicit drugs.
In any event, the accord is signiﬁcant because the FARC—EP will change
from being an organization involved in drug traﬃcking and drug production
to a legal organization that is expected to sever all its ties with the production
and commercialization of illicit drugs. The FARC—EP is expected to help the
government in the ﬁght against drug traﬃcking by providing information,
and also supporting the state to reach the areas where it has been absent.
Another element of the agenda negotiated with the FARC—EP concerns
victims and transitional justice (see Chapter 5). The government stated from
the very beginning of the process that the negotiation would be centred on
protecting the victims’ rights (Rettberg, 2013). In 2011, before the peace pro-
cess started, the Santos government issued a law aimed at compensating mil-
lions of victims of Colombia’s armed conﬂict (Congreso de la República de
Colombia, 2011). Even if it will be very diﬃcult to redress all the victims’
rights—considering the high number of victims of the conﬂict—this is essen-
tial for healing the wounds caused by the war, to deter the emergence of new
armed groups, and to consolidate the role of the Colombian state. Both the
state and the FARC—EP are expected to undertake restorative actions in
relation to the victims in order to ameliorate or repair some of the damage
caused in the course of war (Goebertus Estrada, 2016).
The FARC—EP, as well as the other actors involved in the Colombian war,
has committed plenty of hideous crimes throughout ﬁfty years of confronta-
tions. Fighters of the Colombian conﬂict are responsible for numerous homi-
cides, kidnappings, bombings, rapes, and the forced displacement of
communities among other violations. Granting a blanket amnesty to the
guerrillas was not a feasible option for negotiators, as Colombia had ratiﬁed
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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But FARC—EP leaders had made the point that various politicians and
entrepreneurs were (also) culprits in the Colombian war, as their institutions
were responsible for atrocities. The FARC—EP also stated that they would
not become the ﬁrst guerrilla organization in the world to end up in jail after
signing a deﬁnitive peace accord (El Espectador, 2015). This debate seemed
intractable, and its resolution required ﬁnding a delicate balance between
peace and justice.
After a prolonged deadlock on this issue, an ad-hoc committee of lawyers
was formed in order to help both parties deal with the dilemmas of Transi-
tional Justice (Pizarro Leongómez & Valencia, 2009). This committee crafted
a formula, which seemed to be in accordance with the letter of the Rome
Statute, but did not necessarily imply sending the FARC—EP leaders to jail.
According to this formula, those guerrillas and actors in the conﬂict who had
committed gross human rights violations and confessed all wrongdoings will
have an ‘eﬀective restriction of freedom’ (in a place other than in jail). Those
actors who confessed all wrongdoings but not in a timely manner will spend
some years in regular jails, and those actors who are reluctant to confess their
crimes and later found guilty by the Colombian courts will spend up to 20
years in jail (Oﬁcina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2016).
As with most transitional justice formulas, this accord emphasizes that
serving justice is not only about retribution, but implies other mechanisms
such as truth-telling and reparations to victims (see Chapter 5). There is little
doubt that this accord entails some degree of impunity: perpetrators of gross
human rights violations will get oﬀ the hook with light sentences, which has
spurred bitter debates in Colombia.
After the parties resolved the impasse related to transitional justice, the
negotiations focused on the measures that were necessary to ensure the imple-
mentation of the agreements, and also on the speciﬁc rules of the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. However, the negotiations
deadlocked when the parties approached these points. In fact, the FARC—EP
was well aware of the risk that in the future, either another president, or the
Colombian Congress, or the high courts could neglect or even reverse the
peace agreements. After having negotiated for over four years, the FARC—
EP realized that the peace accords could simply vanish due to the democratic
procedures inherent to a check and balances system.
In order to ensure that the peace accords would be implemented and that
their implementation would not be jeopardized in the future, the government
and the FARC—EP agreed on a special procedure by which the peace
accords would initially be approved by Congress (without undergoing mod-
iﬁcations), then revised by the Colombian Constitutional Court, and ﬁnally
considered as a special treaty of the Geneva Conventions and incorporated
into the Constitution. This convoluted formula basically implied giving a
non-modiﬁable, almost supra-constitutional status to the peace accords,
which caused great deal of controversy. However, during the renegotiation of
the accords, this procedure was virtually discarded. Eventually the Colombian
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Congress was put in charge of introducing changes in the laws and the Con-
stitution, in accordance with the peace accords, and following a ‘fast-track’5
procedure. That is, the FARC—EP had to rely on the government’s majority
in Congress for the introduction of normative changes that would allow the
implementation of the accords.
Finally, concerning the DDR process, the FARC—EP agreed to gradually hand
in all its weapons to the United Nations and temporarily concentrate its
combatants in diﬀerent locations across Colombia, in order to facilitate its
transition from a guerrilla organization to a legal political party (see Chapter 8).
The successes of peace and its uncertainties
The Santos government epitomizes rationality under ﬁre. Accordingly, it
approached FARC—EP leaders only when the rebel group seemed to have
real incentives to seek an end of war. The peace process started through a pre-
negotiation scheme that agreed on a roadmap for the peace talks—and a
series of reasonable rules for making progress and solving diﬀerences at the
bargaining table—and that clariﬁed that there would be no ‘negotiated revo-
lution’ in Colombia. Santos’s government formed a negotiation team that
included trustworthy, competent negotiators. After four years of a continuous
and diﬃcult negotiation process, the government and the FARC—EP signed
a peace accord.
Unlike all previous Colombian presidents and governments, President
Santos was able not only to negotiate productively with the FARC—EP, but
also to arrive at deﬁnitive, well-crafted peace accords. Structure preceded
rhetoric and guided the negotiations towards achievable objectives. Whereas
most people expected that Colombia would ﬁnally turn the page of war after
ﬁve decades of suﬀering, an unexpected turn of events provoked a severe
crisis. The spoiling eﬀorts of former President Uribe and opponents to the
agreements apparently paid oﬀ when most Colombians rejected the accords
in October 2016.
While the peace accords entailed a few and relative modest (albeit impor-
tant) political and economic transformations, Uribe and his followers (as well
as other conservative groups) convinced many people that, rather than
bringing a sustainable peace, the peace accords were tantamount to disaster
and the surrender to terrorism, as they would transform Colombia into a
communist nightmare: ‘another Cuba or Venezuela’.
Against all odds, the Santos government was able to sign new accords in
such a way that many concerns of the opposition were taken into account.
While overcoming this hurdle, implementing the peace accords will be no
easy matter, and will constitute the ﬁnal test for peace for the Colombian
state. Politicians such as Uribe will keep riding on the discontent with the
government, spreading fear and polarizing the country around peace. Trust in the
current government has been successfully eroded, and, with every future election,
the question remains whether the newly elected oﬃcials will help implement
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these agreements successfully. Peace is itself a prisoner to politics and the passions
of a country trying to envision a future without warfare and violence.
Notes
1 Plan Colombia was originally intended to be a counter-narcotics (not a counter-
insurgency) programme. However, as the FARC—EP became involved in drug
traﬃcking, and after the ‘9/11’ attacks in the USA, it became easy for the US and
Colombian Governments to taunt the rebels with being a drug-traﬃcking organi-
zation and devote most of Plan Colombia’s resources to attacking the rebels.
2 A civil war that involved Liberals and Conservatives ﬁghting for state power.
3 The seat of the major of Bogotá is Colombia’s second most important political
position, behind that of President.
4 Corresponding to 3.73% of the total amount of seats in the Colombian Congress.
5 The ‘fast track’ procedure reduces from eight to three the number of debates that
are necessary in order to introduce (or modify) laws in Congress, and also limits the
possibility of making substantial changes in the text of the laws in which the gov-
ernment and the FARC have reached an agreement (El Espectador, 2016).
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4 The emergence and consolidation of
transitional justice within the realm of
Colombian peacebuilding
Marco Alberto Velásquez Ruiz
Introduction
This chapter gives an account of how transitional justice has emerged and has
consolidated within the realm of peacebuilding processes in Colombia. In
particular, the chapter describes the progressive inclusion of a transitional
justice legal framework as part of the peace negotiations that have taken place
in the country, from the decade of 1980 until the formulation of The Victims
and Land Restitution Law (hereinafter VLRL) and its supplementary
regulations.1
The chapter’s main statement is that the emergence and adoption of a
transitional justice framework in Colombia is aligned with the conducting of
peace negotiations with diverse actors of the country’s armed conﬂict. The
advancement of these initiatives was the outcome of a favourable political
scenario for the inclusion of a transitional justice framework as part of the
national peacebuilding agenda. On the other hand, transitional justice—both
its normative foundation and institutional structure—has progressively
acquired a crucial role in the shaping of the content and extent of the corre-
sponding negotiations. Therefore, it is argued that the processes of con-
solidation of transitional justice frameworks here considered are the direct
precursors of the current Colombian peacebuilding initiative, which incorpo-
rates a vital transitional justice component. Thus, the current agreements are
a new stage of the peace infrastructure that has been under construction in
Colombia since the 1980s.
The chapter is organized as follows: ﬁrstly, it presents the legal antecedents
to the adoption of a transitional justice framework within the context of
Colombian peacebuilding. Herein, particular focus is given to a series of
domestic laws that, during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, embedded
alternative criminal justice incentives into the process towards the eﬀective
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the members of diﬀerent
insurgent armed groups. Next, the study focuses on Law 418 of 1997, which is
considered to be the earliest attempt to introduce certain transitional justice
elements into the political context of a peace negotiation between the
Colombian Government and the insurgency. Thirdly, Law 975 of 2005, or the
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Justice and Peace Law2 (JPL), is depicted as a law that, for the ﬁrst time,
recognized the need to incorporate a proper transitional justice project in the
country in order to achieve durable peace. Finally, the chapter presents the main
aspects of the VLRL, which was a fundamental instrument for the peace
agreements with the FARC—EP, and was the existing jurisprudence before
the implementation of the currently applicable transitional justice framework.
Antecedents: peace through alternative criminal justice
Nowadays it is widely accepted by both academics and practitioners that
addressing the legacies of past violence and human rights abuses is necessary
for fostering sustainable peace. In this regard, it is argued that the imple-
mentation of transitional justice mechanisms—both as a preliminary requisite
and as a subsequent measure—may lead to the success of peace negotiations
and the sustainability of what is accorded. However, at the outset of the 1980s,
transitional justice and peacebuilding were on separate paths. The former was
an emerging ﬁeld that devoted its attention to addressing transitions from
dictatorships to democracies in the western hemisphere. As a result, the
negotiated settlement of internal armed conﬂicts had the formulation of dis-
armament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategies as its main
focus. Further actions linked to the correction of the structural causes that gave
rise to the conﬂict to reduce the risks of that conﬂict relapsing. The structural
conditions fuelling violence were not directly considered at the time.
Colombia had a long history of political violence that, by the 1980s, was
increasingly aﬀecting the country´s stability. Public authorities were dealing
with the strengthening of the guerrilla groups that emerged in the 1960s (see
Chapter 2). Likewise, the occasional association between the radical political
right, certain landlords, and the drug cartels, resulted in the consolidation of
paramilitary structures that contested the power of the state. From being ori-
ginally a matter of public order, mainly located at the fringes of the state (in
Figure 4.1 Legal Evolution of Transitional Justice in Colombia
Source: Own elaboration.
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rural Colombia), the confrontations and the challenges to the state’s authority
turned into a serious concern for authorities across the country. Under such
strains, the achievement of peace became a central aim for the state and
society, and thus it became an attractive political platform for politicians.
Several governmental initiatives to facilitate the cessation of hostilities
between the parties of the conﬂict, promote the demobilization and reincor-
poration of rebel soldiers, and encourage the further establishment of peace
dialogues, took place with variable results (Boudon, 1996). Between 1981 and
1993, a series of norms were enacted to oﬀer amnesty or pardon for political
crimes (sedition, rebellion, and riot) and other connected conducts to members
of the insurgent armed actors who decided to leave the arms and reincorporate
to civilian life.
The government of President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–1982) inau-
gurated the passing of these types of norms with Law 37 of 1981 and its
supplement, Decree 474 of 1982. These legal instruments provided for
amnesty on political and connected crimes—except for kidnapping, extortion,
and homicides not related to clashes and combats—to promote the end of
conﬂict. Yet, this legal framework contrasted with the fact that in 1978 a
controversial ‘security statute’ had been enacted to invest both the executive
and the military with exceptional mechanisms to counter the activity of the
guerrilla groups and other criminal structures associated with the drug cartels.
The legal framework facilitated a peace initiative and the possibility of the
demobilization of ﬁghters; however, disarmament within an environment of
the restriction of freedoms and rights characteristic of the ‘security statute’
came at odds with the intentions of Law 37. This limited the impact of this
framework to support the achievement of peace agreements. The legal fra-
mework was in place; however, political willingness was missing at the time.
The arrival of President Belisario Betancur Cuartas to power in 1982
entailed the assumption of a diﬀerent approach to the insurgency and the
alternatives and mechanisms to be used to settle the internal armed conﬂict.
Turbay’s ‘security statute’ had ceased in June of that year, and a peace commission
was subsequently created to drive negotiations—under a distinct political envir-
onment—with certain armed groups. This move was accompanied by the
enactment of new laws concerning the granting of incentives to the members
of the guerrillas aimed at encouraging their demobilization and reintegration
to civilian life. Law 35 of 1982 was one of them. While it oﬀered the same ben-
eﬁts as its predecessor, it included additional features that could arguably be
identiﬁed as early manifestations of justice and reparation as part of a jurisdic-
tion for peace. The law recognized the possibility that the victims of the conﬂict
could obtain economic redress from the members of insurgent armed groups,
regardless of the granting of amnesties. Likewise, it authorized the govern-
ment to seek resources to develop social assistance programs in favour of both
the expunged and the people located in the regions aﬀected by the conﬂict.
In 1984, President Betancur´s incipient peace negotiation policy became
more robust. Preliminary accords with the guerrilla groups Fuerzas Armadas
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Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP), Movi-
miento 19 de Abril (M-19), and Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) were
promoted in order to start formal negotiations. Within this context, the
Colombian Congress passed Law 49 in June 1985, as a way of advancing on
the incentives to accelerate peace dialogues. In comparison with its pre-
decessor, which acknowledged the possibility to concede amnesty to the
members of the insurgency, this law assumed a diﬀerent approach. Instead of
oﬀering the clearing of criminal records upon demobilization, it authorized
the executive to reprieve the members of the armed groups after they were
subject to a judgement, which in any case had to be limited to political and
connected crimes. Since the infraction was not disregarded, it was possible for
the victims to seek truth and reparation from the responsible actor. This can
be regarded as an innovative element that resembles a transitional justice
framework: a tacit recognition of the existence of a series of entitlements for
the aﬀected population, within the context of a peace process. Yet, although
they initially appeared to hold enormous potential, the prospective peace
processes failed, and the application of the corresponding legal framework
did not fulﬁl the promise of the mandate given by the law (Boudon, 1996).
Be that as it may, by the end of the 1980s, a number of peace negotiations
started to have positive results. In particular, the national government and
various guerrilla groups including M-19, EPL, Partido Revolucionario de los
Trabajadores (PRT), and Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL),
reached peace agreements between 1990 and 1993 (Palacios, 2012). As with
the previous attempts to ﬁnalize the internal political violence, these accords
were supplemented by a legal base that provided incentives for the massive
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of guerrilla members.
Framed within a comprehensive peace plan entitled the Political Pact for
Peace and Democracy3, Law 77 of 1989 and Decree 213 of 1991 oﬀered both the
cessation of criminal procedures and pardons for the insurgency. In turn,
these laws acted as a catalyst to the promulgation of other legal instruments
that allowed the demobilization of smaller rebel groups in the following
years.4 An overview of these attempts to regulate the context of peace nego-
tiations in Colombia indicates that although they were conceived to respond
to the need to ﬁnalize conﬂict and provide stability, they did not directly
include the components of justice, truth, and reparation required of modern
transitional justice. Moreover, it is evident that these laws had similarities
with the DDR programmes developed by the United Nations (UN) in the
context of peacekeeping operations (Laplante & Theidon, 2006).
Colombia has pioneered these kind of DDR measures, since the UN
Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)5 became the ﬁrst peace-
keeping mission mandated to assist in a DDR process in 1990 (United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010). Overall, the main
goal of the Colombian Government was to address the concerns associated
with the maintenance of public order within the country. In contrast, sub-
sidiary considerations were directed at securing lasting peace beyond the mere
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cessation of hostilities, and the situation of the victims of the armed conﬂict
received far less attention.
Transitional justice elements within a peacebuilding context:
Law 418 of 1997
As the previous section illustrated, the DDR-oriented legal instruments, enac-
ted between 1981 and 1991, produced variable outcomes with respect to the
eﬀective achievement of peace agreements with insurgent actors. During the
next ten years, while the human rights discourse started to expand within and
through several popular and institutional scenarios in Colombia, the country
experienced a considerable escalation of the armed conﬂict’s extent and intensity.
In spite of the conﬂict’s upsurge, by 1997 the Colombian Government and
FARC—EP initiated a number of humanitarian actions toward the possible
establishment of new peace dialogues. In that regard, a portion of the country’s
rural territory was cleared to facilitate the commencement of negotiations (El
Tiempo, 1997).
Within this context, Law 418 was passed by Congress by the end of 1997,
in order to oﬀer an alternative to the legal initiatives that had already been
proposed and thus to facilitate the formalization of negotiations. In fact, on
14 December 1998, the Pastrana administration and FARC—EP agreed to
begin formal peace talks the next year, on 7 January 1999.
Although this law continued to address the country´s armed conﬂict issue
as a strict matter of public order, and not as a circumstance that required
exceptional measures such as a transitional justice framework, it introduced
an alternative perspective to the normative meaning of peace for Colombian
society. In that regard, the law’s regulatory aim was the provision of eﬀective
tools to ensure the validity of the constitutional principle of the estado social
de derecho, 6 and the eﬀective protection of the rights and fundamental free-
doms enshrined by the Constitution and the international treaties to which
Colombia subscribed.
Law 418 authorized the government to conduct dialogues and sign peace
accords with insurgent armed groups in order to end the armed conﬂict,
ensure the eﬀective implementation of international humanitarian law and
human rights, and encourage ceaseﬁre and demobilization. Thus, it estab-
lished a commission to determine the possibility of negotiating with the
guerrillas, and included provisions to consider the importance of other armed
groups, such as the right-wing paramilitary groups, and the importance of
their existence for the sustainability of peace policies (Laplante & Theidon,
2006, p. 61). Additionally, the law provided for amnesty for political crimes to
those members of the outlawed armed groups who chose to participate in an
individual or collective demobilization (Center for Justice and Accountability,
2014). In this way, Law 418 shared the scope of the laws previously enacted in
Colombia to develop alternative criminal-oriented mechanisms to facilitate
the end of conﬂict (Burbidge, 2008; Kerr, 2005; Ahmad, 2006).
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Most importantly, Law 418 recognized the situation of the victims as one
of the key factors to be addressed in order to achieve peace and stability in
the country. Unlike the legal instruments previously enacted to address the
termination of the armed conﬂict, this law transcended the setting of DDR-
oriented measures. It included speciﬁc mandates for several national autho-
rities for the assistance of people aﬀected by violence caused by the actors in
the internal conﬂict in Colombia.
In order to determine the constellation of people that should be assisted,
the law included a deﬁnition of ‘victim’. Thus, Law 418 provided the ﬁrst
deﬁnition of ‘victim’ in Colombian legislation. The deﬁnition accounts for the
civilian population whose life, personal integrity, and property were aﬀected
by actions that occurred in the context of the armed conﬂict. Therefore, the
law indicates that the state has the duty to provide humanitarian assistance,
education, and healthcare to the victims; create housing programmes directed
to meet their speciﬁc requirements; and give ﬁnancial assistance for the
replacement of belongings of those people aﬀected by conﬂict-related vio-
lence. Although Law 418 was a legal device that created incentives to facil-
itate the end of the conﬂict and confrontations, the incorporation of the
victims’ assistance component indicates the rise of a concern around the need
to balance the attribution of alternative criminal treatment with the require-
ments of justice in its retributive, restorative, and distributive versions, proper
of a transitional justice discourse.
Given its content and extent, the institutional obligations introduced by
Law 418 were supported by the application of the social solidarity principle.
This principle states that when a person is in a situation of manifest vulner-
ability due to his economic, physical or mental condition, and assistance
cannot be provided by himself or his relatives, an exceptional obligation to
assist that person is grounded in head of the state.7
Yet, it is important to assert that the social solidarity principle was not yet
a formal recognition of the victims’ rights to justice, truth, and reparation.
Moreover, article 47 of Law 418 established that the assistance given to the
victims was by no means an acceptance of any type of responsibility by the state.
Hence, the state’s scope of action was associated with the above-mentioned
social solidarity principle and not to any type of transitional justice duty. The
state’s responsibility was the principle, rather than the assumption of respon-
sibility towards their citizens. The introduction of Law 418 into the Colom-
bian legal framework contributed to changing the identiﬁcation of DDR
initiatives as isolated strategies to ﬁnalize the armed conﬂict in Colombia.
Rather, it included the idea that any institutional scheme to achieve durable
peace should consider the situation of the victims of the conﬂict. Thus, it
permeated previous considerations about the role of the state in guaranteeing
order and stability within its territory. Moreover, it made visible the obliga-
tion to assist people aﬀected by the violence produced in the context of
internal war, even if such duty arose from considerations of social solidarity.
While Law 418 includes no express reference to transitional justice, it
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certainly incorporated a number of discursive and normative elements that
resemble the ﬁeld.
The Justice and Peace Law (JPL): the recognition of the need for a
transitional justice project in Colombia (TJ 1.0)
Whilst Law 418 is recognized for the incorporation of the victims’ rights dis-
course within the Colombian legal framework and its relation to conﬂict
resolution and peace, the JPL (Law 975 of 2005) introduced transitional jus-
tice’s rationality and structure to the Colombian legal regime and jurisdiction.
However, such novelty did not come without controversy. On the one hand,
some critics identiﬁed this legal instrument as a strategy to decree amnesties
regarding serious crimes and human rights violations to paramilitary groups.
On the other hand, although the JPL consecrated the victims’ rights to justice,
truth, and reparation in the context of the achievement of peace, it lacked
operative measures to ensure their eﬀectiveness.
The rise and development of the JPL is directly related to the negotiation
process and the attempt at dismantling paramilitary groups that occurred
under the mandate of President Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010). In May 2002,
Uribe became the president of Colombia after a ﬁerce political campaign that
was based on two ideas: the rejection of dialogue with guerrillas after a failed
peace negotiation attempt with FARC—EP (Cárdenas, 2002) , and the pro-
mise of the intensiﬁcation of military activity against illegal armed groups in order
to achieve the end of the conﬂict (Burbidge, 2008). Surprisingly, in August
2002, the government began negotiations with the paramilitaries’ umbrella
organization, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).8 By July 2003,
the parties reached a preliminary agreement in which the establishment of
national peace was identiﬁed as a primary objective (Arvelo, 2005; Forer &
Guerrero Torres, 2010; Pizarro Leongómez & Valencia, 2009).
Although the corresponding demobilization process was initially conducted
under the framework of Law 4189, it soon became clear to the authorities that
the nature and magnitude of the crimes committed by paramilitary groups
surpassed the possibilities of a legal instrument designed to grant amnesty for
political crimes. In August 2003, the Uribe administration submitted a ﬁrst
draft law to Congress, whereby certain crimes associated with serious human
rights violations—not pardonable under Law 418—could be subject to alter-
native punishment (Kerr, 2005; Posnanski, 2005; Pizarro Leongómez &
Valencia, 2009)10. International governance actors, political actors and
Colombian civil society levelled strong critiques at the legal instrument’s sys-
tematic lack of awareness of the rights of the victims. The proposed legislation
coincided with the International Coordination and Cooperation Roundtable
for Colombia, held in London in July 2003 and Cartagena in February 2005,
in which the Colombian Government and potential donors discussed the
suggested DDR process’s compatibility with international standards on truth,
justice, and reparation (Laplante & Theidon, 2006). Consequently, the
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Government introduced a new proposal in which provisions for truth, justice,
and reparation were included as part of the strategy to ﬁnalize the conﬂict
and achieve peace. In that regard, the Colombian Congress approved the JPL
in July 2005 (González Chavarría, 2010; Easterday, 2009).
The JPL’s aims to incorporate a transitional justice framework in Colombia
faced two major challenges: ﬁrst, the continuation of hostilities around the
country by diﬀerent armed groups, and second, the systematic denial by the
government of the existence of an armed conﬂict in the country. In this
regard, it is worth noting that although the process was compared with other
peace and reconciliation projects in ‘transitional societies’ such as South
Africa, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland, Colombia fell short of being a
transitional society as diﬀerent guerrillas were still at war (Burbidge, 2008).
In this context, like its predecessor, the legal instrument embodies a tension
between the state’s political need to promote DDRand the obligation to respect
the rights of the victims of the armed conﬂict. In that regard, the law seeks to
compensate the granting of generous penal beneﬁts to those who committed
atrocious crimes—seen as an incentive for demobilization and reinsertion—
with the recognition of the rights of the victims (Laplante & Theidon, 2006).
However, when compared with Law 418, the JPL brings about important
novelties in relation to the role of the state in the achievement of durable
peace. Particularly, it includes new elements on the assumption of the state’s
obligations regarding the situation of people aﬀected by the conﬂict.
The incorporation of an extended deﬁnition of victim reﬂects a more com-
prehensive understanding of the context and dynamics of the conﬂict, and
increases the authorities’ duty to assist the victims by extending the deﬁnition
of ‘victim’ to include relatives of those directly aﬀected by violence. In addi-
tion, the provision of assistance to victims does not depend on the identiﬁcation
of the victimizer.
The formal consecration of the victims’ rights to justice, truth, and repara-
tion represents the inclusion of a transitional justice framework within the
realm of institutional action. In this respect, the expansion of the role of the
state not only occurs in terms of the amount of people to be attended, but
regarding the nature of the measures that have to be implemented.
Notably, the law establishes a formula to conduct reparations: when it is
not possible to undertake actions oriented to place the victim back in the
situation prior to his aﬀectation (restitution), authorities must provide mone-
tary compensation for the damages caused. In parallel, the JPL provides for
both actions towards the re-establishment of the victim’s dignity and guarantees
of non-repetition. This formula is supplemented by the development of collec-
tive reparations programmes, which are oriented to recover institutional stabi-
lity at the zones most aﬀected by violence, and where most of the vulnerable
communities were originally located (Pizarro Leongómez & Valencia, 2009).
The prescription of restitution as the most adequate way to redress people
aﬀected by the conﬂict raises a very important consideration. In the realm of
transitional justice, authorities might have to aﬀect certain private rights and
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expectations in order to reconstruct the prior situation of the claimant. In a
number of cases, compliance with the demands of eﬀective restitution might
require the implementation of distribution-oriented measures, which go
beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance to the victims or their pre-
ferential inclusion in regular social programmes intended for the most vul-
nerable sectors of the society. The very content and extent of the right to
reparation might require the production of exceptional actions, able to transform
certain situations related with the access to scarce resources.
Be that as it may, the JPL has fallen short of fulﬁlling its formal aspirations
with regards to integral reparation, and particularly in relation to restitution.
Despite the consecration of a sophisticated transitional justice rationality that
has an undisputable inﬂuence on both the content and extent of the victims’
rights and the role of the state in ensuring such entitlements, the mechanisms
designed to crystallize the normative pretentions of transitional justice have
proved to be either incomplete or inoperative. By January 2013 only 14 sen-
tences had been passed, and although in the process important progress was
made with regards to the right to the truth, this legal framework actually led
to a de facto amnesty for almost all of those who demobilized (Oﬁcina
Internacional de Derechos Humanos Acción Colombia—OIDHACO, 2013).
Therefore, in the quest for durable peace, a generous formulation of the
reparatory principle contrasts with a precarious institutional design that has
severe logistical and procedural problems (Uprimny Yepes, 2005).
Although the victims’ right to reparation is thoroughly consecrated, the
JPL ends up restricting its scope to the obligation of the insurgent armed
actors to provide redress to victims. In that sense, reparation is projected as a
mere procedural action in the context of the alternative criminal procedures
aimed at facilitating demobilization, and not as an independent component of
the transitional justice process in Colombia. Reparation is instrumental for
demobilization and reintegration, thus victims become a token of sorts.
Within this context, eﬀective redress depends on either the victimizer’s con-
fession in an ongoing criminal procedure, or the establishment of a connec-
tion between the victim’s aﬀectation and the proof of activity of an armed
group that is going through a process of demobilization and reinsertion
(González Chavarría, 2010). Moreover, reparation—including the restitution
of lands and other assets—requires the surrender of goods proceeding from
illegal activities by the armed actors, and exceptionally on government
resources from the national budget and private donations that are admi-
nistered by a reparation fund speciﬁcally created for that purpose (see
Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, whereas the law identiﬁes the return of property as an
act of restitution, it does not provide any further regulation on the matter
(Burbidge, 2008, p. 574).
The JPL deﬁned the criminal justice system as the sole mechanism by
which victims could claim economic redress. This prevented victims from
being integrally redressed, and it also restricted many citizens from having the
chance to access a formal procedure to claim their rights (Easterday, 2009). In
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a country with entrenched asymmetries of power between the poor and the
wealthy, victims were placed in a condition of marginalization and socio-
political ostracization, which reduced the possibility of accessing a formal
justice system (see Chapters 6 and 7). In addition, the basket of funds and
resources to fund reparation initiatives was reduced to goods that proceeded
from illicit activities. This disregarded the capacity of paramilitary groups to
legalize through legal and illegal means their assets and their illicit origin
(Díaz & Marín, 2008).
Moreover, the Uribe administration introduced a series of legislative
initiatives that contributed to regularize the illegality of the land appropria-
tion that occurred in the context of the conﬂict. In addition, the government’s
denial of the existence of an armed conﬂict in Colombia minimised the co-
responsibility of the state towards the victims. This had the eﬀect of limiting
the obligation to pay reparations or implement further measures to address
the harm produced both in the context of armed confrontations, and with
respect to structural causes limited to the implementation of the law
(Laplante, & Theidon, 2006).
The Colombian Constitutional Court addressed some of the JPL’s deﬁ-
ciencies. In 2006, the tribunal revised the law’s adjustment to the Constitution
and clariﬁed several aspects related to the right to reparation, in order to provide
‘teeth’ to the law´s application (Uprimny Yepes, 2005). The tribunal required
that all goods coming from demobilizing armed actors—not only those with an
illicit origin—should be considered eligible to supplement the funds and
resources for restitution or compensation as the law originally established.
Although the tribunal rejected limits in the budget as a reason for not com-
plying with the mandate for paying reparations to the victims, the criteria on
the exclusion of state liability and the application of the principle of social
solidarity were maintained. In this regard, the Court considered that tax-
payers were also victims of the conﬂict, and had not caused any damage from
which compensatory duties could be established (Laplante & Theidon, 2006).
The gaps left by Law 418 and the JPL were the object of concern within
Colombia’s Congress. Thus, in 2007, a number of congressional representa-
tives from diﬀerent political movements registered a bill that intended to for-
mulate and develop a state policy with respect to the rights of the victims in
Colombia. This was informed by the critiques formulated by diﬀerent societal
actors (Proyecto de Ley 157/2007 Cámara de Representantes, and Proyecto de
Ley 044/2008 Senado de la República). Such proposals aimed at compiling
the dispersed legal instruments with respect to the protection of victims, and
included a number of innovative dispositions regarding the eﬀective repara-
tion of people aﬀected by the conﬂict (Rettberg, 2008).
Whilst the projected bill followed the ethos introduced by the JPL with
respect to the victim’s right to reparation, it intended to extend such protec-
tion to people aﬀected by any of the warring parties of the conﬂict—including
state agents—thus recognizing the complexities of the Colombian conﬂict.
Moreover, the proposal went further with the introduction of speciﬁc
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mechanisms in order to guarantee the centrality of material restitution. The
2007 proposal included a guiding principle to operationalize patrimonial
reintegration. According to it, reparation should be driven by the need to
reconstitute the victim’s economic worth, understood as the set of rights and
obligations that can be economically estimated or the universe of assets and
liabilities attributed to an individual. Furthermore, the bill had speciﬁc refer-
ences to the state’s obligation to adopt measures enabling the eﬀective resti-
tution of goods whose dispossession was a consequence of the conﬂict,
regardless of the nature of those assets, or their legal status, in favour of the
victim (this was included because a great deal of dispossession aﬀected peasants
who did not have the legal titles of their properties).
However, in spite of the great support that the proposal had among diﬀer-
ent sectors of Colombian society and other international actors, in July 2009
the legislative project was defeated after two years of discussion. The Gov-
ernment argued that budgetary constraints made it untenable, but the radical
reluctance of the Uribe Government to accept the existence of state victims
within the Colombian conﬂict was a central aspect of the rejection of this
initiative. This acceptance on the part of the state would have entailed the
consequent acceptance of an obligation to repair the situation, not grounded
in the principle of the state’s duty towards its citizens, but rather as a response
to a legal mandate (González Chavarría, 2010).
The Victims and Land Restitution Law: Transitional Justice Redux
(TJ 2.0)
An analysis of the previous transitional justice initiatives in Colombia
revealed the complexities and the evolution of the jurisdiction behind a state’s
aim to achieve peace. An account of the early attempts to develop a legal
response to the problem of violence (and its consequences) illustrated how
the country’s national project—the consolidation of the rule of law and a
social compact—became gradually intertwined with the speciﬁc objectives
of transitional justice.
Informed by the spirit of the human rights discourse, the process of creat-
ing legal responses to the problem of violence (and its consequences) in
Colombia evolved from the plain implementation of DDR strategies—to
facilitate the resolution of the conﬂict and bring stability—to the recognition
of the fundamental relevance of the rights of the victims, and ﬁnally towards a
understanding of peace that included the victims. Transcendental to this shift
was the participation of a variety of actors, including diﬀerent sectors within
the polity, civil society, and the international community. They have played a
central role in the inclusion of a wider and more comprehensive transitional
justice rationality into the legal processes, whereby the victims’ rights to justice,
truth, and reparation are equipped to become eﬀective entitlements.
Land policies acquired importance in the design and implementation of
transitional justice in Colombia as a result of the identiﬁcation of restitution
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as central to redressing victims’ rights. Yet, the very ambitious objectives
incorporatedwithin these legal instruments have lacked eﬀective mechanisms to
fulﬁl such expectations. This is due to the absence of eﬃcient mechanisms to
enforce the victim’s entitlements and rights. In that sense, transitional justice
was a plan that still required the reﬁnement of its components and its operation
to achieve its transformative goals.
From a political standpoint, the current Colombian transitional justice
project is grounded in a number of events: the election of President Manuel
Santos in 2010; the recognition of the existence of an armed conﬂict within
Colombia by the Government; and the start of a peace process with FARC—
EP. In September 2010, the Santos Government introduced a new transitional
justice initiative to the Colombian Congress, which incorporated some features
of the bill that was defeated in 2009.
The new proposal considered both the establishment of a general frame-
work to address the rights of the victims of the conﬂict, and the creation of an
exceptional land restitution regime to conduct reparations. In June 2011, the
Congress passed Law 1448—commonly known as the Victims and Land
Restitution Law11 (LVRT). This law was designed as a general framework
that recognizes victims as subjects of special protection, and consequently
provides provisions for their rights to be appropriately redressed. Land resti-
tution was placed as the primary reparatory component. In turn, the LVRT
demanded a number of supplementary norms that could provide institutional
support to its mandate, and would allow it to comply with its mandate, in
order to align it to the country’s constitutional order.
A number of decrees that supplement the LVRT (Decree 4800 of 2011 and
Decree 4829 of 2011) formed the ﬁrst group of supporting norms. They
deﬁned operative mechanisms, new institutions, and diﬀerential criteria to
meet the objectives of the transitional justice project envisioned in Law 1448.
In particular, the victims’ right to reparation was regulated comprehensively,
as these norms addressed the processes required to undertake the process of
land restitution, and deﬁned mechanisms in order to protect the property rights
of the victims over abandoned and looted lands. In addition, a number of insti-
tutions were created to facilitate these processes. These are the Administrative
Unit for Victims Reparation,12 which performs as the co-ordinator of the
reparation component, and the Administrative Unit for Land Restitution,13
which is in charge of the material accomplishment of this task (Decrees 4801,
4802, and 4803 of 2011). Finally, as a result of the inclusion of the human
rights discourse in the Colombian constitutional order, speciﬁc reparation
measures were provided for ethnic groups, including indigenous groups, and
Afro-Colombian communities (Decrees 4633, 4634, and 4635 of 2011).
The enactment and implementation of the LVRT in 2011, including its
supplementary regulation, was crucial for launching the new version of the
Colombian state’s transitional justice project. As a result, restorative justice
was conceived to address the complex consequences of the conﬂict, in a
manner that went beyond addressing past human rights violations. In this
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way, the norms and regulations embedded in Law 1448 provide a wider array
of answers to the social needs created by the confrontations (Moore, 1973).
For that reason, it can be argued that this law and its associated regulation had
a better chance of addressing the rights of the victims, and it is more likely to
produce tangible changes in society, including the possibility to distribute—or
redistribute—economic entitlements. This due to a massive and systematic
land restitution programme, which is expected to facilitate the realization of
the victims’ right to reparation. Furthermore, this restorative justice initiative
is designed to work in tandem with the outcomes of the peace process
between the Colombian Government and the FARC—EP. Therefore, the
implementation of Law 1448 and its mandate constitutes not only an act of
individual reparation intended to reconstitute the situation of the victim, but
also a peacebuilding framework.
The land restitution programme included in the Victims’ Law is a funda-
mental part of the transitional justice initiative, since it intends to expedi-
tiously realize and secure the victims’ right to reparation by means of the
restitution of the lands that were denuded by widespread acts of violence. Not
only is it a restorative measure, but it could prove to be a structural driver for
post-agreement peacebuilding. Thus, the challenge for the state is to be able
to redress the extensive damage suﬀered by more than half a million rural
households, most of which are mired in dire poverty. The success of restitu-
tion depended on the design of a system and an institutional infrastructure
capable of restoring the usurped rights in an eﬀective way (see Chapter 6).
To achieve this, the system required speciﬁc measures for addressing the
particularities of plundering. For example, in regular civil law, in disputes
between private individuals in which the ownership of property rights is to be
determined, ordinary legislation applies, but applying it in post-conﬂict sce-
narios fails to understand the challenges of massive land dispossession in a fra-
mework where stolen land is legalized (see Chapters 6 and 7). Rather, the land
restitution procedures aiming at justice should incorporate an understanding
of the impact of the armed conﬂict on peasantry and their livelihoods (Ibáñez
& Velásquez, 2008). For this reason a law incorporating restorative justice
was required. The establishment of a special land dispossession fund (see
Chapter 6) supported such an intervention. Finally, since violence is a social
process that radiates its eﬀects beyond direct victims to aﬀect other persons
collaterally, collective reparations are also considered within Law 1448.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind two speciﬁc issues around the
operative possibilities of victims’ reparation brought by Law 1448. First,
although social welfare measures are based on the state’s general obligation to
provide for its citizens and do not intend to substitute reparations, in the case
of the victims of the armed conﬂict these measures are imbued with an
intrinsic reparatory eﬀect and should be recognized as such (De Greiﬀ &
Duthie, 2009). Second, the authorities must perform in a way that the imple-
mentation of the transitional justice scheme will be eﬀective and will not
compromise the country’s promises for sustainable peace.
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Conclusion
This chapter has given an account of how transitional justice emerged and
consolidated in Colombia as part of the national project of peacebuilding.
The progressive adoption of a transitional justice framework in the country is
the product of eﬀorts undertaken by diﬀerent actors—the national govern-
ment, the insurgent groups, civil society, international organizations, and
diplomatic agents—towards the achievement of peace. The evolution of the
frameworks and the consolidation of a legal infrastructure around the
national project of peace have permitted the progressive enactment of legal
instruments dedicated to address the situation and rights of the victims of the
conﬂict in a more comprehensive way. Likewise, the transitional justice
mechanisms that have emerged in the middle of peace negotiations have paved
the way to give legal space and legitimacy to the undergoing peace negotiations
and brought up important elements to the corresponding discussions.
A series of legal instruments that were enacted during the 1980s and 1990s,
which intended to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion
of the insurgency, included certain normative elements that resemble, and in
fact, in the Colombian case, built the legal infrastructure that informed a
widening understanding of rights and victims within the Colombian transi-
tional justice discourse. Examples of this are the provisions for the victims to
obtain economic redress from the insurgency, or that the government should
create social assistance programmes in favour of the parties of the conﬂict.
However, it was not until the passing of Law 418 of 1997 that the rights of
the victims started to be recognized explicitly by public authorities. This law
linked the possibility to achieve peace in the country to international human
rights and humanitarian law standards. In 2005 (the limitations and contra-
dictions proper of the political environment of that period notwithstanding)
the JPL provided the foundations of the current Colombian transitional jus-
tice project. The rights of the victims to justice, truth, and reparation were
formally consecrated and developed, even if this initiative lacked eﬃcient
mechanisms to make the mandate of the law eﬀective. Finally, the Victims
and Land Restitution Law appeared in 2011, and was the natural evolution of
a framework that has been drafted in Congress and implemented in practice
as the result of diﬀerent peace initiatives in the country. Thus its vocation—to
aim for durable peace by means of the deployment of a responsive system of
promotion and protection of the rights of the victims—was not a surprise.
Rather it was the outcome of the learning from the experiences, errors, and
challenges of the Colombian state attempting to reassert its role as sovereign
and guarantor of human rights to its citizens.
Notes
1 Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, Law 1448/2011.
2 Ley de Justicia y Paz.
3 Pacto Político por la Paz y la Democracia
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4 A series of decrees provided the legal framework for the demobilization of a series
of groups, such as the Decree 1943/1991(for the demobilization of the Ernesto
Rojas Movement); the Law 104/1993 (for the demobilization of the Milicias urba-
nas de Medellín, Frente Francisco Garnica de la Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón
Bolívar); and the Law 241/1995 (a framework which allowed the extension of the
beneﬁts to non-demobilized members of the latter armed groups).
5 (November 1989 – January 1992.
6 Social and democratic rule of law.
7 This principle has its origin in the Colombian Constitution of 1991.
8 United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia.
9 Extended and amended in regards of that occasion by law 782/2002 and decree
128/2003.
10 Decree 2758/2003.
11 Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras.
12 Unidad Administrativa para la Reparación de Víctimas.
13 Unidad Administrativa para la Restitución de Tierras.
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5 The Transitional Justice Framework
agreed between the Colombian
Government and the FARC—EP1
Camila de Gamboa Tapias and
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón
For Katia, a bright shooting star
Introduction
Colombia has experienced a violent conﬂict for more than ﬁve decades. Since
the 1980s, successive governments have implemented diﬀering justice frame-
works in their eﬀorts to achieve peace (see Chapter 4). The government of
President Juan Manuel Santos negotiated a peace agreement with the
FARC—EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Peace talks began
oﬃcially in November 2012, with the parties reaching an agreement on 24
September 2016. While the Constitution did not oblige the President to sub-
ject the agreement to public vote for its approval, President Santos publicly
announced at the beginning of negotiations in 2012 that the agreement would
be subject to a plebiscite. This was considered important for the political
legitimacy of the agreement.
When the Colombian Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality
of the plebiscite in July 2016 (i.e. prior to it taking place), it ruled that the
agreement could be implemented by the President only if the plebiscite resul-
ted in its approval, expressed through a vote of the citizens (Corte Con-
stitucional de Colombia, 2016). In addition, the Colombian Congress had
previously approved a constitutional amendment to give extraordinary
powers to the Santos administration to implement the institutions and pro-
cedures that the agreement called for, and the Congress also had the power to
approve these laws using a ‘fast track’ mechanism.2 Thus, the implementation
of peace agreements depended on the approval of the agreement through the
plebiscite (Congreso de Colombia, 2016a).
On 2 October 2016, Colombians voted in a plebiscite and rejected the
agreement by a razor-thin margin.3 Actors in Colombia and overseas were
perplexed by the results of the plebiscite; it was expected that the possibility
of peace would produce a consensus among Colombian citizens in favour of
the agreement. The vote of the plebiscite against the agreements was not only
a vote against peace; it reﬂected opposition to the demobilization incentives
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
given to the FARC—EP in the agreements. Some segments of the Colombian
polity feared losing their economic and political advantages (acquired legally or
otherwise), and other citizens opposed the agreements because they opposed
Santos’s policies in general, rather than the peace agreement speciﬁcally.
The vote against the agreements can be seen as evidence of a reduction in
the state’s legitimacy and the outcome of a dangerous polarization in
Colombian society fuelled by some political parties, such as the Centro
Democrático4, led by former President Uribe. A discourse of scepticism and
fearmongering, coupled with a successful misinformation campaign, framed
the proposed peace as a descent into a communist dystopia (La Silla Vacia,
2016) that would erode traditional family values. This proved eﬀective in
mobilizing Colombians against the agreement.
The success of the campaign against the agreement was aided by the Santos
administration’s ineﬀective communication of the agreement to large sectors
of the population, and the failure of some political parties to adequately
mobilize their constituents in favour of the agreement (Revista Semana, 2016).
The irony of the outcome of the vote is that the agreement was in fact approved
in the majority of the regions which are most aﬀected by the violence (Regis-
traduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016; Fundación Ideas para la Paz,
2016a). The idea of retributive justice and its ‘absence’ from the agreement
was one of the main arguments made by the advocates of the campaign
against the agreements, and one of the most important issues in the political,
juridical, and ethical discussions in Colombia and abroad with regard to the
transitional justice taking place in the country. An amended agreement was
signed and ratiﬁed in November 2016 (see Chapter 3).
In this chapter we analyse the transitional justice framework deﬁned by the
peace agreements between the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government, as
captured in point ﬁve of the ﬁnal agreement signed in Bogotá in November 2016:
the ‘Sistema integral de verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición,
incluyendo la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz; y compromiso sobre Derechos
Humanos.’5 This system is designed to regulate the transitional justice frame-
work agreed upon in the accords. It aims to recognize the rights of victims,
impose certain judicial and extra-judicial burdens upon the members of the
FARC—EP and other armed actors responsible for violations of human rights,
and establishes guarantees of non-repetition through diﬀerent mechanisms.
In analysing the transitional justice framework, we examine the principles
that inspired the agreements on victims and four of the key mechanisms
described in it: the Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth;6 the Unit for the
Search for Missing Persons in the Context and as a Result of the Conﬂict;7
measures on Comprehensive Reparation for Peace Building; the Guarantee of
non-Repetition; and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.8
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace and its emergence as an iteration of the
previous transitional justice frameworks implemented in Colombia is
explored in the section which follows. In the ﬁnal section, we analyse some of
the challenges to the implementation of the transitional justice agreements,
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reﬂecting on the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the agree-
ments, and how this may provide legal stability (or instability) for diﬀerent
constituents and for peace in Colombia.
The principles and mechanisms deﬁned by the transitional
justice agreement
The agreement on the victims of the conﬂict starts with the recognition by the
government and the FARC—EP that the main aim of this agreement is to
compensate victims. In addition, it states that all the measures described in
the agreement are intended to be comprehensive. This introductory portion of
the agreement recognizes that the armed conﬂict in Colombia has multiple
causes, and has resulted in great harm and suﬀering for the population. It
describes the kinds of harms produced by the violence, including forced dis-
placement, deaths, disappearances, sexual violence, and trauma; and it lists
the diﬀerent population groups aﬀected by these harms, including women,
children, and the poorest and most vulnerable population sectors (including
minorities, Romani, indigenous groups and Afro-descendants) (Gobierno de
Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016).
The recognition of all the victims of the conﬂict and of the responsibility of
diﬀerent groups—not only the FARC—EP and the state—for the victims’
conditions is one of the guiding principles of this agreement. The agreements
provide for the participation of victims to assure the satisfaction of their rights,
the clariﬁcation of the truth, reparation for victims, guarantees for their perso-
nal safety, and reconciliation, as well as the guarantee of non-repetition.
A human rights perspective informs the agreements reached and the tran-
sitional justice model agreed on by the parties. This rights perspective is a lens
through which the harm that the armed conﬂict has caused victims is
acknowledged, and informs the approach through which the Government, the
FARC—EP, other groups, and society in general aim to respond to victims’
demands and needs.
The transitional justice system agreed in the peace agreement is considered
to be holistic. In a holistic approach, transitional justice mechanisms are
complementary, in the sense that all eﬀorts to protect the rights of the victims
to justice, truth, reparation, and the guarantee of non-repetition are interrelated
and not exclusive of each other (de Greiﬀ, 2012).
Therefore, the agreement considers that justice cannot be achieved in the
absence of any of the proposed mechanisms or the victims’ rights described
above—all of which are regarded as necessary for justice. The comprehen-
sive system thus entails diﬀerent mechanisms such as: The Commission for
the Clariﬁcation of Truth; The Unit for the Search for Missing Persons in
the Context and as a Result of the Conﬂict; Measures on Comprehensive
Reparation for Peace Building; and the Guarantees of Non-Repetition (see
Figure 5.1).
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The Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, Coexistence, and
Non-Repetition
The agreement recognizes the clariﬁcation of truth, coexistence, and non-
repetition as one of the mechanisms that victims’ organizations have deman-
ded, thus its inclusion not only responds to best practices in the ﬁeld but also
to the citizen’s demands (de Greiﬀ, 2012). The Commission has three goals
(Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016):
i To clarify what happened over the course of the conﬂict by explaining its
complexity and describing the serious human rights violations9 and
breaches of international humanitarian law that occurred in the course of
the confrontations, in order to promote a societal understanding of the
conﬂict and make the lesser-known aspects of the conﬂict visible.
ii To acknowledge victims as: agents whose rights ‘were infringed’ by
society and as political agents who can contribute to the country’s trans-
formation. To recognize the responsibility of all the institutions and
individuals who have participated directly or indirectly in the conﬂict.
iii To promote coexistence in the territories where the conﬂict primarily took
place through the peaceful resolution of conﬂicts and the construction of
a democratic culture that promotes tolerance, co-operation and solidarity.
All these goals are based on the premise that truth-building is essential for
peacebuilding and reconciliation. The goals and mandates of the Commission
for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition must be
understood in conjunction with the other points of the agreement, such as
rural development; mechanisms for the prevention of the production and
traﬃcking of illicit drugs; and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
(DDR). This means that in order to build sustainable peace, it is necessary to
undertake the task of a truth commission, but the successful implementation
of the other elements of the agreements by the state are also necessary (see
Chapter 3). Ascribing the whole project of peace and reconciliation to a truth
commission might be overambitious, and can hamper its eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness (de Greiﬀ, 2012).
One of the main aspects of the truth-telling mechanisms included in the
agreement between the FARC—EP and the Government is the principle that
both actors have a moral and political commitment to respect the rights of
victims by contributing to the clariﬁcation of the truth and acknowledging
their responsibilities. It is important to mention that the Commission is not a
judicial body: ‘its activities will not be of a judicial nature and cannot imply
any criminal accusation against any of those who appear before the Com-
mission […] and the information [collected] cannot be transferred by it to
judicial authorities’ (Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016). This serves
in principle to maximize the number of involved actors that can contribute
towards the work of the Commission. This includes illegal actors, individuals
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or institutions that suﬀered directly or indirectly from the conﬂict or partici-
pated in it, and are willing to testify or confess to crimes that they would not
be willing to talk about under other circumstances.
Truth commissions are one of the most commonly used mechanisms to
bring the history and the memory of past human right violations into the
public space in countries transitioning from repressive regimes, civil wars, or
internal conﬂicts. Truth commissions have had diﬀerent purposes and focuses,
emerging in some cases as substitutes for criminal prosecutions, as part of
processes of democratization away from dictatorship, or as part of transitions
away from civil conﬂict. In other cases (in Peru, for example), truth commis-
sions were created prior to the initiation of criminal prosecutions, and their
results were used as inputs in criminal prosecutions.
Currently, truth commissions are understood as an oﬃcial, yet extrajudicial
mechanism that is not meant to replace criminal prosecutions, but rather to
complement the juridical truth with a wider historical account of the political,
economic, and social conditions that gave origin to human rights violations,
so that the actors involved in the violence recognize their actions, and victims
have a space where their histories can be heard (Uprimny Yepes & Saﬀon
Sanín, 2006).
The Colombian Truth Commission’s period of study is the entirety of the
Colombian armed conﬂict, but given that the conﬂict has lasted over 50 years,
the Commission has the authority to establish priorities for its research. The
Commission has a working period of three years to produce a ﬁnal report
(Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016). To clarify the diverse and
complex causes of the conﬂict, the Commission can analyse previous histor-
ical events, and its work can be supported by other previous reports and
research,10 such as the work of the Historical Commission on the Conﬂict
and its Victims11 and other initiatives.
The Search Unit for Missing Persons in the Context and as a Result
of the Conﬂict
The agreement explicitly addresses forced disappearances, given that it is one
of the main crimes of the Colombian armed conﬂict.12 The transitional jus-
tice agreement recognizes that many people have been ‘disappeared’ due to
actions by state agents, the FARC—EP and other armed groups in Colombia.
Some victims’ organizations focusing on disappeared persons expressed their
satisfaction with the establishment and objectives of this unit (Fundación
Ideas para la Paz, 2016b). The goal of the Unit for the Search for Dis-
appeared Persons in the Context and as a Result of the Conﬂict is to con-
tribute to satisfying victims’ rights to truth and reparation. The unit is
transitory, and has a non-judicial, humanitarian character. It has three main
functions (Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016):
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i To account for the universe of disappeared citizens within the armed
conﬂict and identify those still alive.
i To identify the remains of the deceased.
ii To co-ordinate and promote the processes of ‘searching, identifying,
locating, and the digniﬁed return of remains’.
These activities must be co-ordinated with other state institutions such as
the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science, the Truth
Commission, and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, among others, in order to
report the unit’s actions and provide information, and to allow for the active
participation of victims and their organizations, and international organiza-
tions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Interna-
tional Commission on Missing Persons.
Reparation: Measures for Comprehensive Reparation for Peacebuilding
Another important aspect of the system of justice agreed upon is its complex
conception of reparation, which includes early measures for the acknowl-
edgment of collective responsibilities.13 Mechanisms to implement this
include a national plan for collective reparations and territorial plans for
collective reparations, individual and collective psychosocial rehabilitation,
collective processes of return for displaced persons, and the reparation of
victims living abroad, as well as measures for land restitution.
The agreement expressly states that all groups and individuals who have
caused harm during the conﬂict must contribute to repairing the injuries they
caused and that this contribution ‘will be taken into the account in order [for
them] to receive any special treatment in matters of justice’ (Gobierno de
Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016, p. 146). This recognizes that there were several
groups other than the state and illegal armed groups that participated directly
or indirectly in the conﬂict and beneﬁted in some way from it.14 The
mechanisms outlined in the paragraph above provide avenues for this
reparation.
In addition, the agreement states that in its reincorporation into civilian
life, the FARC—EP must carry out actions that contribute to reparation. For
example, they will undertake reparatory actions by participating in the recon-
struction of infrastructure, particularly in territories aﬀected by the conﬂict; and
in programmes to remove anti-personnel mines, by participating in programmes
for the substitution of illicit crops; and by contributing to the search, location,
identiﬁcation and recovery of remains of persons reported missing or dead.
The agreement expressly aﬃrms that the FARC—EP, as an insurgent
organization, ‘commits to contributing to material reparations for victims and
in general to their comprehensive reparation, on the basis of the events iden-
tiﬁed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace’ (Gobierno de Colombia y
FARC—EP, 2016, p. 186).15 The inclusion of this provision is in fact is one of
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the interesting outcomes of the amendment process which followed the initial
rejection of the agreements. The explicit obligation of the FARC—EP to
redress victims with their own resources was included in the amended and
adopted agreement. As the FARC—EP participated in drug production and
trade activities, extortion, and kidnapping, it is likely that they have resources
to make this contribution.
It is important to understand that the model of transitional justice proposed
for Colombia beneﬁts from Colombia’s long experience with reparations, and
the establishment of an institutional capacity for this (see Chapter 4). The
agreement on victims has the potential to articulate and strengthen proce-
dures for reparation within the context of existing legislation and institutions.
Guarantees of non-repetition
Achieving peace whilst avoiding a relapse into violence is an important goal:
however, its attainment depends on the extent of the actual and eﬀective
implementation of the provisions in the agreement, including the mechanisms
regarding victims. Besides the measures on victims, the accord also creates a
unit for persecuting criminals and dismantling criminal organizations. As was
shown by the experience of the demobilization and reinsertion of former
members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)16 as part of the
peace process with the paramilitaries, such measures are necessary to address
the risk that criminal structures will continue operating (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2015).
Even in the case of a full demobilization and reintegration into civilian life
by the totality of the FARC—EP, a series of armed groups that operate in
diﬀerent parts of the country (paramilitaries or other guerrilla groups) will
remain. Their existence presents a looming risk to the agreements and their
implementation, as these groups may attempt to proﬁt from the power
vacuum generated by the demobilization of FARC—EP units. There is also a
high risk of retaliations against former combatants and demobilized cadres17
(MAPP/OEA, 2017). In the case of Colombia, the possibility of non-repetition
depends on the dismantlement of other insurgent and criminal organizations
across the country. This in turn depends on the consolidation of other peace
processes, ensuring the monopoly of violence by the state, and the establish-
ment of mechanisms that could demobilize these groups—which is something
to bear in mind as regards the current peace process with the Ejército de
Liberación Nacional (ELN)18.
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace
To analyse the structure of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, it is important
to consider the Justice and Peace Law (JPL),19 and how the experience in
implementing it informs the current framework. It can be argued that the
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current transitional justice setting was in fact incepted by the lessons learned
in enacting the JPL.
The lessons from the Justice and Peace Law
During the ﬁrst peace process with the paramilitary forces undertaken by the
Colombian Government, the Uribe administration created a legal framework
for facilitating the demobilization of the AUC. The draft legislation was very
generous in protecting the rights of the victims in its declaration of principles,
but did not establish legal instruments to implement these rights. The draft
bill sought a formula for peace that did not meet the demands for justice for
the victims of the crimes committed by the AUC (Uprimny Yepes & Saﬀon
Sanín, 2006). This legislation became the Justice and Peace Law, Law 975
(Congreso de Colombia, 2005).20
After this law was approved by Congress, the Constitutional Court of
Colombia reviewed the legislation, considering the challenges brought against
it by organizations and citizens who claimed that Law 975 did not guarantee
victims’ rights (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2016). The rulings by the
Constitutional Court and the modiﬁcations this court made to Law 975
sought to provide legal instruments that, while oﬀering generous reductions of
penalties to the armed actors, would also seek to guarantee the victims’ rights
to truth and reparation (Uprimny Yepes & Saﬀon Sanín, 2006).
Despite the modiﬁcations of the Constitutional Court, additional problems
were associated with the implementation of the JPL. These related to the
institutional weaknesses of the judicial system in Colombia and the lack of
appropriate legal instruments to ensure that the mandate of the law was
achieved (Uprimny Yepes, et al., 2006). The JPL appeared not to have taken
into account the context of institutional weakness inherent in the Colombian
criminal justice system, and in this sense failed to consider and establish
mechanisms and procedures to respond to these challenges. The JPL, as
approved by Congress, was a law created to respond to an extraordinary
situation, enacted with ordinary tools (de Gamboa, 2010).
The emergence of challenges facing the implementation of the law was thus
no surprise. These included: the low capacity of the criminal justice system;
insuﬃcient co-operation between the diﬀerent state agencies involved in the
process; diﬃculties in eﬀectively monitoring the demobilization and reinser-
tion of the members of the armed groups; a lack of clarity regarding which
governmental entity was responsible for the process of DDR; problems of co-
ordination among state institutions in managing and using information rela-
ted to the JPL process; the absence of resources to protect ex-combatants,
witnesses, victims, prosecutors, and judges; and the creation of institutions
with several duties but without the clear legal mandate or enough resources to
fulﬁl them (International Crisis Group, 2006).
Signiﬁcant power and economic asymmetries between the demobilized
AUC members and the victims were also not addressed by the law (see
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Chapters 6 and 7). Therefore the guarantees of victims’ rights depended
almost entirely on the capacity of the state and its institutions to guarantee
the legitimate defence of the victims’ rights in a context where demobilized
AUCmembers were better positioned to command eﬀective legal representation
(de Gamboa, 2010).
The negotiations with the FARC—EP regarding the victims and their
rights thus departed from the Santos Government’s recognition that previous
transitional justice norms, such as the JPL, did not fully assure victims’ rights,
the promotion of peace, or the strengthening of the rule of law. The previous
peace process with the paramilitaries produced just thirty-ﬁve sentences from
the pool of 4,643 cadres that had been identiﬁed to be charged. The process
with the paramilitaries appeared to operate as a de facto amnesty, and
demonstrated the challenges of implementing a transitional justice framework
in Colombia (Verdad Abierta, 2015).
The Government also acknowledged other failures from the peace process
with the paramilitaries. The truth mechanisms implemented were recognized as
very limited, since they depended on what the paramilitaries chose to admit in
the judicial proceedings. In addition, the negotiation team recognized the
tensions between a maximalist tradition (the obligation of the state to prose-
cute all grave violations of human rights) and an approach valuing peace and
non-repetition; and the challenge of ﬁnding a normative pathway balancing
concerns for justice, peace, and non-repetition in a context with strongly held
claims, often without available supporting evidence (Orozco Abad, 2012).
The negotiators adopted a hybrid approach, able to meet international
standards whilst responding to the particularities of the Colombian context.
The Justice Component of the Agreement on Victims
When the FARC—EP entered into a negotiation process with the Colombian
Government, they did not entertain the possibility of embracing a transitional
justice framework. They considered this system to be created by their oppo-
nent (the Colombian state), and they argued their actions in rebelling against
the state should not make them punishable (El Espectador, 2015). However,
by the end of the peace process, the FARC—EP had committed themselves to
a transitional justice framework that complied with international standards
and to a comprehensive agreement on victims’ rights.
The agreement on victims supports the creation of a Special Jurisdiction for
Peace. This agreement managed to address concerns about the sovereignty
and self-determination of the state whilst complying with the principles of
international human rights law. The jurisdiction will consider serious human
rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law committed
in the course of the conﬂict between the FARC—EP and the state.
The jurisdiction applies to all those who participated directly or indirectly
in the armed conﬂict. This includes members of the FARC—EP, representa-
tives from the state,21 and other individuals or groups who were not
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combatants but who engaged in the ﬁnancing of or collaboration with para-
military groups, without having been coerced to do so (Gobierno de Colom-
bia y FARC—EP, 2016).22
The agreements deﬁned a jurisdiction that is not solely focused on the dyad
of the government and the FARC—EP. In that sense, the agreements and the
jurisdiction set in place can promote a wider reconciliation that transcends the
process with the FARC—EP. As it stands now, all groups and individuals can
recognize their responsibilities in the armed conﬂict, and all have the same
opportunity to take advantage of certain legal beneﬁts in order to establish
the truth about their responsibility and assure the reparation of victims. As
such, the agreements speak to a wider notion of peace beyond the agreements
with the FARC—EP. In addition, they establish the possibility of creating a
framework that can be easily implemented should other groups decide to
negotiate their demobilization with the state.
The jurisdiction established by the agreements aims to investigate crimes
against humanity. The agreement recognizes that according to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), those who commit these
crimes are not eligible for amnesties or pardons. Although judges can prior-
itize those ultimately responsible and focus on certain serious crimes, they
must investigate all the grave crimes enumerated without restrictions.23
Second, the jurisdiction establishes a series of incentives for those who com-
mitted grave crimes to submit to justice voluntarily (in return for some bene-
ﬁts) and disincentives to those electing not to submit to this voluntarily (they
will face more severe sanctions). In all cases, oﬀenders must also submit
themselves to the other components of the comprehensive system contained
in the agreement on victims (truth, reparation, and non-repetition).
Guerrillas that submit themselves to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace will
not have their political rights aﬀected. This implies that former FARC—EP
cadres are still eligible for public posts and can run for election at a local,
regional or national level. This has been strongly criticized by the opposition
to the peace agreements, who argue that those citizens who committed crimes
should not be eligible to participate in politics at all. A series of conditions
has been decided by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in order to clarify
the ambiguity with regards to the tension between justice and political parti-
cipation for guerrillas brought by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Corte
Constitucional de Colombia, 2017). For guerrillas to maintain the beneﬁts of
the special jurisdiction, they will have to comply with all the requirements of
the special justice court for truth and reparation of the victims, as well as a
not being involved in any criminal activity after 1 December 2016. Otherwise
they will lose all the beneﬁts of the transitional justice framework.
The agreement also acknowledges the existence of political crimes. There-
fore it gives the state space to operate within international humanitarian law
and the Colombian Constitution, allowing the state to grant amnesty exclu-
sively to FARC—EP rebels. The amnesty law approved by the Colombian
Congress establishes the criteria and enumerates the diﬀerent political crimes
76 The Transitional Justice Framework
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
that will be eligible for amnesty. These include rebellion, sedition, military
uprising, and assassination in combat compatible with international humanitarian
law. It also links drug traﬃcking to political oﬀences if the purpose of this
activity (drug traﬃcking) was linked to the ﬁnancing of rebellion, not for the
purpose of personal enrichment.
A series of provisions was tabled with regard to the members of the security
forces. In 2016, Congress established a similar arrangement resembling the
amnesty and pardons given to the FARC—EP24 in Law 1820. As with the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace, amnesties or pardons for crimes against
humanity are not granted under this Law. In addition, these beneﬁts will not
apply in the case where oﬀences constitute a threat to the morale, discipline,
interests and honour of the armed forces, in accordance with the military
penal code. In addition, these beneﬁts are conditional on state agents’ fulﬁl-
ment of their obligation to make reparations to victims and contribute
towards the truth (Congreso de Colombia, 2016b).
Figure 5.2 How does the special jurisdiction for peace in Colombia work?
Source: Own elaboration.
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The Special Jurisdiction for Peace is composed of several bodies (see Figure
5.2). These comprise: the Chamber for the Acknowledgment of Truth,
Responsibility, and the Establishment of Facts; the Peace Tribunal; the
Chamber for Amnesty and Pardon; the Chamber for the Deﬁnition of Legal
Situations; and the Investigation and Indictments Unit.
The peace agreements achieved between the FARC—EP and the Colom-
bian Government envision a holistic transitional justice model. In line with
this vision, the agreements proclaim the connection and synergy between the
rights of victims to truth, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition. The
content of the agreements on victims create a series of institutions that aim to
redress and guarantee the rights of the victims. These institutions have been
shaped to respond to the needs and particularities of the Colombian context,
and appear to fulﬁl the requirements of international human rights standards.
If this system manages to fulﬁl its mandate in practice, it will constitute a
textbook example of a hybrid model of transitional justice (Sriram, 2010).
However, in spite of the achievement of the agreements, it is important to
reﬂect on the challenges facing their implementation.
The long road to justice and peace: From text to institutions,
justice and statehood
In order to analyse the challenges with regard to the implementation of the
transitional justice framework agreed between the FARC—EP and the
Colombian Government, it is important to understand the political context in
which the implementation of the agreements takes place and the challenges
that some provisions within the transitional justice agreements may create, as
well as the structures and the inter-institutional co-ordination required for
eﬀective implementation.
Since the agreements process began, the political landscape has become
dangerously re-polarized in Colombia. This polarization resembles the split
between political actors that preceded the bipartisan violence of the 1940s
and 1950s from which the FARC—EP emerged. This polarization was illu-
strated in the results of the plebiscite on the peace agreement and the related
debates in the Colombian Congress. The Santos Government has the majority
in the Congress, which has allowed the translation of the agreements into
normative and operative laws, such as the Amnesty Law (Congreso de
Colombia, 2016a), and the law that regulates the transitional justice system
(Congreso de Colombia, 2017). These advances can be rolled back if oppo-
nents to the agreements decide to reform the peace agreements (El País,
2017). Thus, if a political party that opposes the agreements ﬁlibusters the
implementation of the peace agreement or wins the next elections, they can
stiﬂe or reverse the implementation of the transitional justice agreements. If
this occurs, the stalled or stunted implementation of the agreements would
fall short of the commitments signed in the agreements, leading to a default
on peace agreements produced by selective negligence.
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Within the provisions of the agreements, there is great concern in relation
to the provisions related to the crimes committed by members of the Colom-
bian armed forces (Revista Semana, 2017). A provision regarding command
responsibility establishes that a military commander must answer for the
crimes committed by his subalterns. In this case, a superior must be accoun-
table for the actions of the soldiers under his command, even in the case when
he has not taken any active role in these actions, but through negligence or
apathy did not take appropriate corrective or preventive measures (Uprimny
Yepes, 2017). This provision can be interpreted to apply to civilians as well.
International human rights practice establishes that the proof of knowledge
by a superior of the crimes committed by his subalterns can be based upon
eﬀective or inferred knowledge.25 It also states that hierarchical responsibility
is ascribed on a case-by-case basis; it thus allows inquiries into cases where
control and leadership is exerted de facto. However, in the legislation that
regulates the agreements, only explicit and eﬀective knowledge is considered
as proof. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace would thus not be able to inves-
tigate and inquire into cases where military commanders were negligent.
There is therefore the risk of the provision of half-truths in the cases where
members of the armed forces committed human rights violations. In addition,
the laws and regulations tabled in Congress will limit the understanding of the
command responsibility; with the eﬀect of limiting the scope of investigations
and interventions by the ICC. This may mean that in some cases the actions of
military commanders will not be prosecuted at all. The decision by the
Colombian constitutional court with regards to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
did not elaborate on this, keeping alive the risk that the framework imple-
mented in Colombia might not fulﬁl international standards of transitional
justice (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2017).
In addition, questions remain with regard to the incentives for civilians
involved in the conﬂict (for example as sponsors of armed groups) to partici-
pate in the transitional justice process as witnesses or subjects of legal inquiry.
While they may not have criminal responsibility (e.g. an industrial agent who
was extorted and funded a particular group, or a cattle grower who funded
counter-insurgency paramilitary groups), they could have information and
knowledge of the actions in the conﬂict that are vital to establishing the full
truth and to enabling state institutions to understand the organizations and
agents that were linked to war and violence. The decision by the Constitu-
tional Court declared that third parties such as civilians involved in the con-
ﬂict cannot be obliged to participate in this jurisdiction. However, this does
not absolve them (civilians) from their legal or penal responsibility. Therefore
civilians should be judged by the existing judicial institutions and courts.
Thus, it would be expected that those civilians who want to beneﬁt from the
legal framework for peace could present themselves voluntarily to the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2017).
Although the implementation of the transitional justice agreements is
necessary for peace, transitional justice by itself it is not suﬃcient. Inter-
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institutional coordination, commitment, and political consistency are required
from the state, so that the other elements of the agreement (relating to political
participation, rural reform, demobilization, illicit crops and drug production)
are implemented. These additional elements of the agreements point to other
structural issues that deﬁne the Colombian conﬂict. Without solid institutions
in place, the road for peace will be bumpy; however, peace-making always
departs from a point of state weakness, rather than strength and eﬃciency.26
This is the departure point for Colombia, as the state aims to consolidate its
institutions and navigate towards peace and a new social covenant.
It is in this context that the agreed-upon transitional justice system will
take its place. The ambitious aims and objectives of the transitional justice
agreements require eﬃciency, synergies, and a holistic operation from state
institutions to ensure that victims’ rights are redressed and the structural
conditions that gave rise to the conﬂict can be dealt with. However, there is
still ambiguity regarding how the agreements will be enacted, as laws reg-
ulating the provisions of the agreements conform to the text of the agreements
verbatim. The agreements have deﬁned the goals for the state, but not the
processes of how to reach these goals. The repetition of objectives will not
realize them, and may risk creating a hollow mythology of justice and peace
that can in fact erode the legitimacy of the state in the long term.
While the laws, norms and principles tabled in Congress aim to achieve peace,
the practice of implementing the peace agreement is still uncertain.27 It is vital to
develop a clear series of guidelines and principles that operationalize the agree-
ments and the processes associatedwith them. Explicitly articulating the way these
synergies must take place will reduce the risk of tensions, misunderstandings and
delays that can compromise the approach to peace for Colombia.
Notes
1 This text is part of the research project, ‘Public Policies against the Armed Conﬂict
in Colombia and Transitional Justice’. It is also framed within the research project,
‘The Residues of Evil in Post-Totalitarian Societies: Responses from the Perspec-
tive of Democratic Politics’, reference FFI2012–31635, ﬁnanced by the Spanish
Ministry of Finance and Competitiveness.
2 The ‘fast-track’ mechanism allows the shortening of the processes that laws usually
have to go through in Colombia, reducing the number of debates in the Senate and
the Chamber in Congress.
3 The outcome of the vote was: 50.21% of voters voted opposing the agreements and
49.79% voted in favour of the agreements (6,431,376 votes to 6,377,482 votes). The
abstention rate was 63% of eligible voters (21,833,898).
4 Democratic Centre.
5 Agreement on Victims of the Armed Conﬂict: A Comprehensive System of Truth,
Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition, including the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace; and the Commitment to Human Rights.
6 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No
repetición.
7 Unidad especial para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas en el con-
texto y en razón del conﬂicto armado.
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8 Jurisdicción especial para la paz.
9 According to a former Colombian Government oﬃcial, ‘serious violations’ are
those committed in accordance with a plan or policy.
10 Such as the reports from the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory
Group), created by the Peace and Justice Law (Law 975). Nowadays, this group
has become the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (Center for Historical
Memory), a national public entity.
11 The Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas (Historical Commission on
the Conﬂict and its Victims) was established as part of the negotiation process. The
ﬁnal report comprises diﬀerent narratives on the description and explanation of
the Colombian conﬂict (Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2014).
12 According to the Unidad de Víctimas (Victims Unit), 45,646 Colombians have
been ‘disappeared’ since 1985.
13 This form of collective responsibility for wrongs committed, as described in the
ﬁnal agreement, is more akin to political apology than to acts of forgiveness.
Although the agreement refers to forgiveness, in the public discourse of Colombian
groups, in the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975), and in the agreement between the
FARC—EP and the Colombian Government, there is a tendency to describe col-
lective acts acknowledging responsibility as acts of interpersonal forgiveness.
However, interpersonal forgiveness is a private and a volitional act between oﬀen-
ders and oﬀended. In political apologies, a person who publicly represents an
institution, organization or other group, recognizes the wrongs committed by such
groups, and does so in their name (Griswold, 2007; de Greiﬀ, 2008; de Gamboa &
Herrera, In Press).
14 It is not clear if those who beneﬁted from the violence have to contribute towards
reparations.
15 In principle, if the FARC—EP has any material goods, they must report them.
Otherwise they would not be ‘contributing comprehensively’ to reparations, which
could negatively aﬀect the legal beneﬁts that they enjoy as a party to the
agreement.
16 United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia.
17 These retaliations could occur because some guerrillas retaliate against the FARC-
EP because they agreed to peace, or take place in order to provoke violence to
ensure the conﬂict continues.
18 National Liberation Army.
19 Ley de Justicia y Paz.
20 Ley 975 de 2005.
21 The Agreement establishes diﬀerent conditions that apply to the judgment of
agents of the state.
22 The Constitutional Court of Colombia decided that the Special Jurisdiction of
Peace could not oblige civilians to subject to the special jurisdiction. Thus, the
involvement of civilians in the JEP will be only take place when civilians present
themselves voluntarily to it.
23 In fact, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
stated that the justice system outlined in the agreement complies with the Rome
Statute (El Tiempo, 2016).
24 Opposition from retired members from the Armed Forces rejected the possibility
of them to be judged under the same system as the FARC—EP.
25 This can be proved when with the information available to superiors could allow
leaders to infer the possibility of atrocities.
26 Some Colombian analysts equate this process to trying to sail a ship on rough seas
while attempting to ﬁx it (Pizarro Leongómez & Valencia, 2009).
27 Examples of this are the norms that regulate the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and
the Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, which do not explain or provide
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guidance on how institutions can co-operate and share information with regards to
judicial and extra-judicial inquest.
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6 From transitional justice to post-
agreement rural reform: many obstacles
and a long way to go1
Rocío del Pilar Peña Huertas
Introduction
In the 19th century, Colombia failed to develop central state capacity to col-
lect taxes and extract rents (Tilly, 1990). Colombia’s government revenues
were based on the production of commodities, customs duties, and the sale of
vacant lands (LeGrand, 1984). As a result, Colombia has still not fully
developed its capacity to deﬁne, organize, and guide its agricultural frontier.
This institutional vacuum has left the door open for private parties to deﬁne
and organize land in the countryside (Molano, 1989; Bejarano, 1985; Parsons,
1949; Villegas, 1978).
This indiﬀerence by the state to its own role in managing land has led to
the persistence of legal procedures through which large businesses, rural élites
and others have been able to acquire land, dispossessing peasants and settlers
(LeGrand, 1984). This neglect by the state has limited public knowledge
around how much land is available in the country, or what it is useful for
(Sánchez & Villaveces, 2015; Céspedes-Báez, et al., 2015). As a result, it seems
as if Colombia has a land governance regime based on the indirect adminis-
tration of land tenure. This indiﬀerence to organizing the land is in fact a
structural cause of disputes over land rights, which have been at the heart of
the conﬂict and violence suﬀered by Colombians over the last 70 years.
Large land owners and agricultural businesses have appropriated large
tracts of land since the 19th century and have dispossessed settlers and pea-
sants in Colombia through usurpation or violence, all of which was de facto
permitted by the Colombian legal regime (Peña Huertas, et al., 2017). In fact,
one of the particularities of the Colombian armed conﬂict is that it has
involved the massive accumulation and appropriation of rural assets by rural
élites and armed groups across the country (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
However, the exclusion of peasants from the system and the failure of the
state to organize and regulate rural assets do not fully explain the existence of
the Colombian armed conﬂict itself (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014). This exclusion of
the peasantry and incompetence of the state has been pervasive since the
emergence of the Colombian state. The exclusion of peasants from public
policy has been a problem since the inception of the Colombian state, and it
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
persists even today in the design and execution of public policies aimed at rural
development. For example, the 1991 Constitution did not recognize peasants
as political subjects who required special protection from the state (Peña
Huertas, et al., 2014a). This failure has recently been ameliorated through the
public recognition of the diﬀerential eﬀects of the armed conﬂict in rural
areas and rural populations, leading to the enactment of policies, institutions
and laws, such as Law 1448 of 2011 (The Victims and Land Restitution Law),
which contains measures to protect rural populations.
The violence in Colombia has caused an irreparable damage to its victims,
including the systematic forced dispossession of lands from peasants. This
dispossession has been estimated at between two and ten million hectares
(ACNUR, 2012). The Monitoring Committee on Public Policy on Forced
Displacement2 estimates the dispossession to total 6.6m.ha (the size of Ire-
land),equivalent to 15% of the country’s agricultural surface (Garay, 2011).
Interestingly enough, there are no oﬃcial ﬁgures available on this topic by the
Colombian State (see Table 6.1).
Within this context, the objectives of the Victims and Land Restitution
Law are laudable in seeking to restitute land to the victims of the conﬂict,
while looking to achieve a reparations scheme that enables citizens to regain
their land and their rights.
Law 1448 of 2011 (The Victims and Land Restitution Law) is the second
attempt by the Colombian state to introduce justice mechanisms in Colombia
that could be seen as part of a transitional justice framework before the
implementation of the agreements between the Fuerzas Armadas
Table 6.1 Estimations of dispossessed land in Colombia
Study Figures and estimates of
dispossessed and aban-
doned hectares (in millions
of hectares)
Garay Salamanca (dir.) (2011) 6.6
Garay Salamanca (dir.) (2009) 5.5
Ibáñez, A. M., Moya, A. and Velásquez, A. M. (2006) 1.2
Movimiento de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado (2007) 10
Contraloría General de la República (CGR) 2.9
Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) (2001) 4




Acción SocialPPTP (2005) 6.8
Commission to follow up and monitor the Victims and
Land Restitution Law (CSML) (2015)
7
Source: Ruiz-González, 2014.
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Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP) and the
Colombian Government. The ﬁrst initiative was Law 975 of 2005, the Justice
and Peace Law, which had a very limited scope, and whose results continue to
be questioned today (see Chapters 4 and 5). Law 1448 acknowledged the
phenomenon of massive dispossession and forced abandonment that took
place in the country from the 1980s until the ﬁrst decade of this century. As
such, it represented an opportunity for the Colombian state to belatedly
adopt a public policy that acknowledged land dispossession, and positioned
the state to correct this historic trend, starting with the restitution of the
properties taken away from peasants in recent decades.
This chapter reﬂects on the challenges facing the implementation of land
restitution mechanisms in Colombia in a post-agreement scenario with the
FARC—EP. In such a complex scenario, where rural property dispossession
and concentration of land ownership and rural assets is high and institutions are
frail, the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms from this agreement is
likely to be restricted. Therefore, in order to fulﬁl the mandate of transitional
justice mechanisms, the state requires additional mechanisms that can address
the damages caused to the victims of mass dispossession, as well as to ensure
the explicit inclusion of peasant victims in the transitional justice process.
For this reason, the chapter discusses the issue of the dispossession and
concentration of rural assets, and how this is connected to violence and the
failure/absence of state institutions. The chapter undertakes a critical reading
of a speciﬁc transitional justice mechanism that has been implemented in
Colombia (the Victims and Land Restitution Law) and the limitations it
faces. Finally the chapter presents some lessons from the Victims and Land
Restitution Law that might be useful to consider in the implementation of
transitional justice agreements between the FARC—EP and the Colombian
Government.
Inequality, violence, and land
The Colombian state’s capacity to regulate private property rights in the
countryside is precarious: some of the indicators of this are the low rates of
tax collection on land (Sanchez Torres & España, 2013), the informality of
rights over rural assets, the intricate and complex regulations on the nation’s
vacant lands, outdated or non-existent rural cadastres, the lack of co-ordina-
tion between the institutions that regulate lands, and the absence of a land
market3. Colombia could be described as a weak state in terms of its struc-
tural capacities (Mann, 2004). This weakness is particularly evident in the
countryside, where the state has been unable to take a leading role in policy
development and its implementation, but instead tends to react to the inde-
pendent actions of illegal or private actors. Several signiﬁcant pillars of socio-
economic development are mostly absent in Colombia. These include: the
capacity to establish inclusive political and economic institutions, to involve
large numbers of its citizens (in particular peasants) in the governance
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process; the capacity to establish inclusive institutions that extend legal and
economic rights to the greatest number of its citizens; the establishment of
mechanisms for the implementation of public policies independent from
pressures from local élites; and the construction of a bureaucracy that levies
taxes (Bardhan, 2016).
The weak state capacity, and the inequality associated to the dispossession
of land caused by the conﬂict in Colombia (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014) is an
impediment to the state’s performance of its duties, as it prevents the appli-
cation of public policies that aim to correct the problems caused by inequal-
ity. Inequality transcends the economic realm, and deﬁnes also the legal and
the political access of rights of peasants, so that access to opportunities,
resources, and arbitration by the state in contentious issues is limited (Bowles,
2012). Therefore, in societies as unequal as Colombia, only the wealthy and
the powerful have access to state’s protection, justice and resources. For poor
peasants and dispossessed peasants, access to justice and protection by the
state is limited, if not non-existent. When this is considered in conjunction
with the restricted access to credit and insurance it not only reduces their
welfare, but also makes them more vulnerable to violence from illegal actors
(Bowles, 2012). Poor peasants in conﬂict-ridden areas thus face a cocktail of
structural violence from the state and physical violence from illegal actors.
This inequality of access partially explains why land dispossession has been
so widespread and has gone so unnoticed by the state and its institutions.
Even though the armed conﬂict has been a catalyst for dispossession and
concentration, the very institutional design for the assignment and manage-
ment of rural assets contains mechanisms that allow and/or facilitate further
dispossession (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014). Inequality does not only aﬀect land
ownership; it limits access to the state and its institutions in favour of those
who have knowledge of the system, have access to information, and contacts
with the national and local authorities and the legal operators that manage
institutions, resources and networks. Thus, although both low-intensity and
high-intensity conﬂict have led to the accumulation of land and have
increased land inequality in Colombia (Peña Huertas, et. al., 2017), social,
political, and economic structures catalysed these processes due to the weak-
ness of the state in fulﬁlling its social contract.
The initial regulation eﬀorts to regulate land ownership date from the 19th
century, and had essentially two objectives: to raise resources for the state to
pay oﬀ its obligations, and to promote investment in territories where the
state was not present. In practice this meant that the Colombian state dele-
gated the colonization of territories to private parties, disregarding the role of
the state as a provider of justice, law, and order. In the 20th and 21st cen-
turies, land regulations focused on providing land to landless peasants and
settlers in an attempt to reassert the state’s role as a sovereign in its territory.
However, despite the state’s eﬀorts, its capacity to reassert its missing
authority was limited, and the impact has been insubstantial (Sánchez &
Villaveces, 2015). In recent decades, there has been a disjunction between the
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state’s intentions (to reassert its authority and the rights of the peasants) and
the reality, with millions of hectares of land being forcefully dispossessed or
abandoned in the countryside because of the conﬂict (Ibáñez, et al., 2006).
Therefore, despite the fact that Colombian civil law considers property
(ownership rights) a natural and subjective right (Rengifo, 2011), a right
which one has and can assert through state institutions appealing to the
existing regulations, in practice rights to and the acquisition of land owner-
ship shows that citizens are not equal before the law. The equality before the
law touted by civil law is only formal; only those knowledgeable about the
law or with resources to access power structures in the country have real
access to it. Such ‘equality’ renders settlers, indigenous persons, Afro-descen-
dants, and peasants, who for the most part cannot access these power struc-
tures and much less often understand the legal precepts contained in the code,
in an unequal,4 often defenceless, position in relation to landlords, drug traf-
ﬁckers and power structures that have been consolidated in Colombia for
more than a century. This can partially explain why institutions established in
the civil code to regulate land ownership in Colombia have only undergone
slight changes since the 19th century, making them insuﬃcient to govern rural
property law, and feeding tensions with the rules of administrative law for the
assignment of vacant lands (Peña-Huertas, et al., 2014b).
What is evident in Colombia is the challenge of the operationalization of
practices in the context of state fragility and even a lawlessness of sorts. As
Fitzpatrick (2006) points out, ideal models of private property do not account
for the failures in developing countries’ regulatory systems. These systems are
weak; the administrative and coercive capacity and the capacity to regulate
land ownership are limited and, where these institutions are in place, it is
likely that they have been captured by interest groups. In addition, peasants
and victims of land dispossession typically lack the resources, the knowledge,
and the access to networks within state institutions to make use of the state as
a mediator, driving them instead to support informal or illegal mechanisms
that seem to have more legitimacy (or are more accessible) than the state in
several regions of the country.
In the case of Colombia, this inequality in the provision of rights and land
is a consequence of the design of the system that regulates property rights in
the country (LeGrand, 1984). For example, when the national government
was responsible for awarding the vacant lands in the 19th century, the Con-
gress of Colombia established procedures that left the frontier lands outside
the state’s domain, and limited the extent to which citizens could claim land.
Thus, when programmes planned to provide land to settlers took place, they
included provisions that limited the access of settlers to these programmes.
Programmes and projects oﬀering free awards to settlers were established, but
they contained hidden provisions. For example, the fees that had to be paid to
surveyors (who had to measure and map out the properties), were set by the
law, but as small farmers were unable to aﬀord these fees, they were de facto
excluded from the possibility of acquiring ownership titles on the land.
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Numerous agents opportunistically exploited these regulatory distortions
during the periods of high-intensity violence and conﬂict. Those able to exert
violence had access to networks of power, and in some cases they had the
capacity to deﬁne the formal and informal rules of the game. Thus, in the ﬁrst
half of the 20th century in Colombia, the élites involved in land conﬂicts were
also the same ones who established the rules in Congress to regulate vacant
land awards, and they appointed the agents who made the decisions (mayors,
notaries, etc.), which put them in a privileged position of control and access
(Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014). The violence in Colombia co-created the agents
capable of combining the use of violence and law, thanks to their political
resources. This created the institutional conditions required for the drop-by-
drop dispossession that took place during democracy to become a torrent of
expropriation of peasants (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
Violence was historically used for the dispossession of land by leaders of
the Conservative and Liberal parties at national and regional level. However,
in recent decades, the legal instruments of dispossession have been also used
by paramilitary groups and drug traﬃckers. Paramilitary dispossession
involved links with the élites and regulatory institutions through explicit
agreements, joint collective action processes, the large presence of members of
the élite among their leadership, and participation by trade association lea-
ders in decision-making, among others (Gutierrez Sanín & Vargas Reina,
2016). Other groups involved in the violence in the country have learned the
repertoire used by politicians in the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th century. That is why the dispossession has not only been exerted through
violence, but also through legal means, adding to the fear of violence the fear
of law as an instrument of dispossession (Peña Huertas, et al., 2017).
Even though the dispossession of peasants and settlers in Colombia is a
practice that dates back to the 19th century, in the last decades of the 20th
century and the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century forceful dispossession and
abandonment reached levels unheard of (or perhaps previously not docu-
mented). However, the state still lacks accurate data on the extent of this dis-
possession (Ibáñez, et al., 2006). This absence of information on the magnitude of
dispossession prevents a clear understanding of whom was dispossessed of
land, how, and why such dispossession took place, making the design and
implementation of successful public policies in this regard more diﬃcult.
Despite the precariousness in the information available, the Colombian
Government launched an ambitious public policy for land restitution that
became Law 1448 of 2011. The bill, which was later merged with the law on
victims, recognizes explicitly that land dispossession was massive, that it
aﬀected large numbers of peasants and that it had signiﬁcant eﬀects on
society. The dispossession took several forms, from forced purchases at ﬁre-
sale prices to forced exile, physical usurpation of the property and the
destruction of houses and fences that delimited the properties. Such land dis-
possessions were often legalized, through forced transfers, with the participa-
tion of notaries and registration oﬃces, and the tracks of the dispossessors
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were erased through the use of front men and multiple transfers between third
parties, apparently in good faith (Congreso de la República de Colombia,
2011). The law is intended to provide reparations to over 7m. victims of the
conﬂict and to make a transition towards a more inclusive democracy. How-
ever, it is important to note the context of the law’s implementation—the
Colombian state, its practices, and its paradoxes. In the provinces where land
dispossession is the greatest and the law must be implemented, violence is
being exerted and the state is being contested.
Law 1448 of 2011: the intersection of transitional justice, constitutional
justice, and public policy in Colombia
According to Uprimny, transitional justice has four basic premises: ﬁrst,
transitional measures for paciﬁcation must respect a minimum degree of jus-
tice; second, these measures of justice are deﬁned by international law, espe-
cially by the rights of the victims; third, transitional justice admits the
ﬂexibility of these standards; and ﬁnally, there must be a political transition
(Uprimny, et al., 2015). In this sense, transitional justice is envisioned as a
useful tool for recognizing the harm done to victims in armed conﬂicts.
However, its practice in Colombia has faced challenges in reversing cases of
extreme inequality such as land ownership (León Sánchez, 2016). Public
policies’ justice frameworks must enact and implement structural changes so
that the rights of the citizens, especially vulnerable ones, can be recognized
and restituted (Ferrajoli, 2004).
Public policies regarding rural development in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st
century in Colombia were based on the premise that there was no armed
conﬂict, but rather a terrorist threat that put all citizens at risk of becoming
victims. Thus, these policies failed to recognize the abnormalities in the use of
land and its property within the country. However, in 2004 the Constitutional
Court, by means of ruling T-025 (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2004),
ordered the Colombian state to design and implement a public policy to
resolve the situation of the displaced and dispossessed population in Colom-
bia which, according to the Uniﬁed Victims Registry, amounted to over 7m.
displaced persons as at May 2016 (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación
Integral a las Víctimas, 2016).
After this ruling, some victim assistance programmes were created by a
state agency named Acción Social, but it was only in 2011, with the enact-
ment of Law 1448, that the classiﬁcation and clear criteria for the victims of
forced displacement were uniﬁed. Following this, a more coherent policy and
institutional framework was devised in an eﬀort to treat the problem in an
integral manner. During this period, Law 975 of 20055 was issued with the
objective of generating a transitional justice mechanism for the demobiliza-
tion of armed groups, mostly paramilitaries (see Chapters 4 and 5). Although
this law has transitional justice elements, it was not focused on the victims,
but on ensuring that the perpetrators would contribute to the pursuit of truth
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in exchange for judicial beneﬁts, including a reduction in prison sentences. In
addition, the mechanisms of reparation contemplated in Law 975 were insuf-
ﬁcient to cover the universe of the victims of the armed groups.
In 2011, Law 1448 was envisioned as a tool that focused on the victims and their
processes of reparation. This law created a transitional jurisdiction and a legal fra-
mework in order to restitute the land that was dispossessed or abandoned by citi-
zens in relation to the armed confrontations. The idea of a transitional
framework like the one proposed in this bill was to create exceptional mechan-
isms in order to provide reparations and assist the victims of massive and sys-
tematic violations of human rights (Congreso de la República de Colombia,
2011; Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, 2016).
However, the implementation of this law was not free from challenges,
some of which will also aﬀect the implementation of the agreements between
the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government. Law 1448 of 2011 repre-
sents an enormous step by the Colombian Government to defend the victims
and their rights, as it acknowledges that land inequality and the inequalities
in the provision of public services by the state are related to the origin and
persistence of the armed conﬂict (Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus
Víctimas, 2014). Land restitution is perhaps one of the most important
objectives of this law, as it sought to establish speciﬁc standards and proce-
dures for the restitution of the properties of persons who were displaced or
forced into exile during times of repression or armed conﬂict in Colombia, in
accordance to the Pinheiro Principles6.
Questions around the success of Law 1448, its theoretical viability, and its
political convenience have been raised with regards to the focus on land res-
titution as part of the transitional justice measures in Colombia. There is an
existing debate on whether transitional justice has the potential to transform
institutions and structures that enable land inequality. This raises deeper
questions around government institutions, their construction, and the con-
solidation of a state apparatus given the structural weaknesses inherent to a
transitional context such as the Colombian example.
The institutional design of Law 1448 and a preliminary evaluation of its
results (Observatorio de Tierras, 2015) show that the mechanisms that were
created for transitional justice can facilitate the distribution of land and pro-
vision of public goods. An example of this is the fact that some land restitu-
tion judges transcended the recognition of property rights as the only right to
be restituted. There is a trend in restitution judgments in which some of the
judges issued orders to the local and national authorities to provide public
goods such as roads or health centres in addition to the restitution of the
land. This shows that there is the potential for an integral understanding of
the access to the land and its restitution. That is, one which recognizes that
the mere access to a title to property is insuﬃcient if it is not accompanied by
public investments that allow the development of long-term sustainable living
projects, that will inform a holistic understanding of restitution (Peña Huer-
tas, et al., 2017), i.e. a fully developmental programme. However, in spite of
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these legal decisions, the success of these initiatives can be questioned. Often
they involve considerable public spending that, on many occasions, local
governments are not in a position to assume. In addition, there are a number
of challenges around the implementation of these mandates that make of
these decisions interesting, yet harder to account for and evaluate.
The land restitution limitations observed by the Observatorio de Tierras
(2015)7 suggest that in many cases the victims of forced dispossession and
abandonment in Colombia lived in extreme poverty prior to displacement,
and in all cases they experienced high levels of vulnerability. Consequently,
returning to the conditions prior to dispossession may actually be meaningless
in terms of their dignity, as these citizens were already on the fringes in terms
of the recognition of their legal and human rights by the state. As most of the
victims of dispossession had only informal claims on the land, with the status
of occupants rather than owners, it is common to observe that many of the
victims of forced displacement held no deeds on their properties, or a deed
had been issued but was lost, and/or the deed was not registered at the Public
Instrument Registration Oﬃce. Such widespread informality, linked to the
weaknesses in the country’s ownership registration mechanisms, may have
facilitated the dynamics of dispossession (Gutiérrez Sanín, et al., 2014).
In addition, it has been argued that the institutional design of Law 1448
imposes a series of barriers for the integral reparation of the victims within
the existing deadlines set by the law (the mandate holds for 10 years, until
2021). In addition, some of the processes imply the establishment of
mechanisms, but can face severe challenges with regards to their imple-
mentation. One salient example is the process of microfocalization, a proce-
dure that enables restitution in territories according to the prioritization of
cases. This selection of areas requires a security clearance for intervention by
the Ministry of Defence. Thus, as several armed groups still operate in several
rural areas, authorizations and processes such as this become roadblocks and
impose delays on the process for accessing land restitution. Another example
of the challenges in practice is the possibility of secondary occupants who
currently live in the estates that are a matter of restitution, and are not related
with the dispossession or forced abandonment of land, in a similar extent to
the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, challenges remain with regards to
the interpretation and the implementation of the mandate of the law and the
possible obstacles it might face (Observatorio de Tierras, 2015).
The problem of dispossession and land inequality in Colombia is not
explained merely by the use of violence within the context of the Colombian
armed conﬂict. An institutional setting favoured dispossession (by action or
omission). This raises questions regarding the adequacy and feasibility of a
transitional mechanism, and whether a law will be implemented easily in a
context of practices that are embedded in the history and the political econ-
omy of institutions in a context of conﬂict, corruption, and state weakness.
Therefore, it is necessary to see beyond transitional justice and its reach
through legal, formal, and institutional mechanisms, towards mechanisms
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that cope with some of the structural elements that facilitate inequality in the
rural areas of Colombia, and address the material access to land.
Despite the limitations and the challenges of Law 1448 as a transitional
justice mechanism, it is fair to say that it represented signiﬁcant progress in
the design and implementation of public policies aimed at recognizing some
of the impact of the conﬂict that aﬀect the lives of the victims of violence. In
addition the law acknowledged the role of land in the Colombian conﬂict, the
right of victims, and the role of the state as a guarantor of the victims’ rights.
Additionally, the law facilitated the establishment of a series of institutions
devoted to implementing land restitution policies, and deﬁned a supporting
legal and institutional framework that included the establishment of judges
specialized in land restitution, and a government unit devoted to support
restitution processes: the Land Restitution Unit.8 The example of Law 1448
illustrates that the creation and establishment of state institutions might have
some inconsistencies and challenges, but have the potential to foster state
capacity and the human rights of Colombian citizens.
In addition, a special jurisdiction has been set in place for restitution, where
the state has been assigned the responsibility to represent and defend the rights
of the dispossessed in the restitution proceedings. This process oﬀers sub-
stantially more guarantees to the peasants in terms of access to the administra-
tion of justice, as well as post-ruling orders issued by judges for the provision of
public goods. The characteristics of the land restitution procedure created for
the restitution jurisdiction has demonstrated that it has positive eﬀects in
attaining the formalization of and the access to property rights for the peasant
population.
There are a series of practices and actions that have managed to success-
fully reverse dispossession. These are important to support a future institution
for peace as framed by the agreements on transitional justice signed between
the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government. These can facilitate the
possession, registry, and ownership of land in the country (Quinche Ramírez,
et al, 2015). Some of the most promising land restitution practices developed
under Law 1448 are captured below. If these practices are captured in the new
programmes for peace, they can be a step in the right direction in terms of the
construction of statehood.
Through the representation of the victims in the restitution proceedings by
the state and the provision of assistance during the return process following
the ruling by courts, the land restitution process intends to break down the
structural barriers that have prevented communities from obtaining eﬀective
recognition of their rights (Rengifo, 2011). To a degree, Law 1448 overcomes
previous barriers that acted against victims in seeking out and reaching insti-
tutional mechanisms to defend their rights such as the cost of the proceedings
(in terms of time and money), and access to information and speciﬁc knowl-
edge (which creates asymmetries that favour powerful landlords and armed
groups entrenched in regional politics). The formalization of this process also
reduces the incentives that promote informality in transactions involving rural
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assets, and counterbalances the prevalence of privatized protocols of specifying
rural property rights (Peña Huertas, et al., 2014b).
Furthermore, the creation of a new set of institutions devoted to implement
the land restitution policy is a very positive aspect of Law 1448, of which the
existence of judges specialized in land restitution constitutes a vital advance.
In addition, the national government created the National Lands Agency,9
which is now the highest land authority of the nation, i.e., an entity that
manages, recovers, awards, and defends vacant lands, which by deﬁnition are
to be awarded to landless peasants. This ﬁlls a gap in terms of institutional
capacity that has been present in the life of the Colombian state, since the
19th century (LeGrand, 1984; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014). The way in which land
tenure is organized and the legal security of property rights are two of the
principal issues addressed by this new agency. Although, the results remain to
be seen, taking into account that this entity was created in December 2015,
this mandate is promising.
The post-agreement scenario represents a major challenge for these inci-
pient but promising institutions that are conceived to defend the rights of
peasants, the dispossessed, and the victims of recent decades of armed conﬂict
and violence. The challenge remains to design public policies aimed to a
redistribution of rural assets, breaking with the tradition of excluding peasant
communities from public policies that exclusively favour large entrepreneurs
(Peña Huertas, et al., 2014b; Uribe López, 2013). In this context, the agree-
ment has major signiﬁcance because of its promise for changing the structure
of state agencies and the way land has been managed (e.g. the absence of a
cadastre) and the design of institutions that promote rural development for
small and large landholders and producers alike.
Reﬂections on the post-agreement scenario and its practice
While land inequality was a pre-existing condition in the Colombian conﬂict,
this inequality is at the heart of the armed conﬂict in Colombia. Therefore,
dealing with the land issue is an opportunity to address some of the historic
causes of the conﬂict. Having said this, the agreement on transitional justice is
simply not enough to fully reach the objectives outlined in the victims’ com-
ponent of the agreement with regards to land restitution. It is therefore
important that the victims’ agreement is coherent and is synergetic with the
agreement on agrarian matters. Although land restitution constitutes an
important mechanism for the state to address vulnerable groups (peasants,
women, rural women, ethnic groups, etc.) and handle their claims (secure
their rights), as a transitional justice mechanism by itself it is not able to
guarantee an complete reparation or, more importantly, a transformation of
the structural conditions that enabled the dispossession of land and land
inequality in the ﬁrst place.
For this reason, a more holistic approach, which supports and is supported
by the other elements stated by the agreement (e.g. agricultural reform) and
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their implementation, has the potential to address some of the structural ele-
ments that have made land tenure frail in Colombia in a more coherent way.
The absence of public policies, government institutions, and legal mechan-
isms has favoured the emergence of groups that have preyed on the weak-
nesses of the state in the exercise of its role as a sovereign. Land, its
possession or absence, cannot solely explain the existence of the conﬂict; there
are other factors that unchained the violence and set it in place as a political
economy system (Pizarro, 2015; Uribe López, 2013; Duncan, 2015). To
address this, the consolidation of public policies in regards to land, titling,
and its registry are vital. These require institutions at a national level that can
title, formalize and deﬁne the use of land.
It should be noted that the transitional justice agreements, in conjunction
with the agrarian reform agreement—and other elements of the peace agree-
ment—could provide land to landless peasants and public goods that enable
the comprehensive development of the countryside. As such, these elements
of the general agreement can be seen as an attempt at rural reform. However,
the government commitment to promote co-operative arrangements between
small, mid-sized and large growers leaves many open questions about its
implementation.
The post-agreement scenario can be seen as a junction, ﬁlled with uncer-
tainties about its practice and implementation, not only with regards to the
challenges it will face in light of a transitioning political context and state
weakness, but also because the agreements are being operationalized by
institutions that might have clashed against the ultimate goals of the agree-
ment. The agreement provides a promise and a call for the state to be ful-
ﬁlled, but it risks its implementation on institutions that are weak, and in
some cases non-existent.
This is a context where political entrepreneurs, warlords, and the networks
that have proﬁted from war and violent dispossession, can proﬁt from and
implement measures that favour the entrenchment of structural inequalities
and marginalize de facto victims and their rights. An example of one of these
attempts was the debate that arose because of the presentation of a draft of a
law to modify the entire agrarian regime (access to property and other rural
assets) that was aimed at favouring the interests of large entrepreneurs, leav-
ing the system of unequal access to rural assets by the peasantry intact
(Medina, 2017; Peña Huertas, et al., 2017). Actions such as these will provide
not only a dissonance between the promise of justice and its practice, but will
also undermine the legitimacy of the state. However, these challenges are to
be expected: the parallel institutions that have proﬁted from dispossession will
not relinquish their beneﬁts so easily.
One of the lessons from the land restitution process implemented with Law
1448 was that it provided mechanisms for previously excluded peasants to
gain eﬀective access to land, plans and programmes. It gave peasants and
victims an avenue through which to engage with the state, replacing the role
of warlords and other armed groups as mediators. This is vital, as the legal
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jurisdiction that is foreseen in the agreement, as well as the government
institutions that were created for land governance in Colombia, have the
potential to deepen this process of state consolidation and legitimisation.
Finally, transitional justice is a valuable tool for post-conﬂict situations. In
post-agreement scenarios, such as the one in Colombia, transitional justice
constitutes a window of opportunity for the implementation of structural
public policies aimed at land distribution, the recognition of the rights of
historically excluded groups, and a roadmap for the development of margin-
alized communities, for example landless peasants. Law 1448, its lessons and
its institutions, are thus a valuable starting point for the development of such
policies that aim to consolidate state capacity.
Notes
1 This investigation was developed within the programme Observatorio de Restitu-
ción y Regulación de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria (Observatory for the restitution
and regulation of agrarian land rights), funded by Colciencias. See www.observa
toriodetierras.org/. The author thanks María Mónica Parada for her comments
and assistance in the paper.
2 Comisión de Seguimiento a la Política Pública sobre el Desplazamiento Forzado.
3 Understood as the ability to carry out, in a free and autonomous way, diﬀerent
transactions, in accordance to the norms and regulations set by the state.
4 The illiteracy rate in the rural areas of Colombia stands around 12%.
5 The Justice and Peace Law, or Ley de Justicia y Paz.
6 The Pinheiro Principles on housing and property restitution for refugees and dis-
placed persons are a series of principles adopted by the United Nations on the
promotion and protection of human rights for displaced persons.
7 The Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria
(Observatory for land restitution and regulation of agrarian rights). See www.
observatoriodetierras.org/observatorio-quienes-somos/.
8 Unidad de Restitución de Tierras.
9 Agencia Nacional de Tierras.
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7 Creole radical feminist
transitional justice1
An exploration of Colombian feminism in
the context of armed conﬂict
Lina M. Céspedes-Báez
Introduction
The peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP)2 had
to deal not only with the political interest of the parties to the negotiation, but also
with the mainstream knowledge Colombian society had accrued over the
years to explain the causes and consequences of, and solutions to, the internal
armed conﬂict. International law, particularly human rights, and humanitar-
ian and criminal law, has played a crucial role in determining the content of the
peace negotiations. The growing importance this body of law gained in the 1990s
(Mattei, 2003), coupled with the pre-eminence the Colombian Constitution of
1991 gave to international human rights law, situated it as a mandatory refer-
ence to build the basic narrative of the armed conﬂict. The content of this nar-
rative has been the implicit point of departure for the negotiators, and has been
open to challenge, reinterpretation, or consolidation during the negotiation.
The mainstreaming of international law as a key language to articulate the
vicissitudes of the Colombian conﬂict also entailed the arrival and domes-
tication of its particular feminist framework. International law brought to the
Colombian setting a radical feminist reading of women’s experiences in con-
ﬂict that an important sector of the Colombian women’s movement appro-
priated to genderize the internal conﬂict and advance their feminist claims
(Céspedes-Báez, 2017).3 This feminism, the theoretical point of departure of
which places the origins of the subordination of women in men’s sexual
domination over them, had already proved its ability to include women as
distinct victims in the Bosnian and Rwandan conﬂicts (Halley, 2008). Creole
radical feminism emerged in the 2000s from the Colombian women’s rights
movement’s deployment of radical feminism through their strategic use of
international law and its appropriation by the Colombian Constitutional
Court. This interface between the women’s movement and the Constitutional
Court placed gender, as a synonym for women, as a germane category to
understand the internal war and the design of the transitional justice setting
needed to structure a way out of it (Céspedes-Báez, 2017).
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Creole radical feminism has shaped a legal subjectivity for women in the
Colombian conﬂict mirroring the inﬂuence international law’s radical femin-
ism has had on the gender-based interpretation of other wars (Halley, 2008).
This has meant the creation of a paradigmatic woman victim, mainly exposed
to sexual violence, to allocate speciﬁc genderized rights and remedies. It has
also entailed the implementation of a particular methodology to build this
subject: consciousness-raising through documentation and litigation (MacK-
innon, 1991). The inclusion of a gender dimension to the negotiations in
Havana, Cuba, entailed bringing this legal subject and methodology to the
table, either to strengthen or challenge them. Two years of negotiations
between the Colombian Government and the FARC—EP were not able to
modify this one-dimensional representation of women’s predicament in armed
conﬂict, demonstrating the pervasiveness and wide acceptance of this rendi-
tion of womanhood in the context of conﬂict. Moreover, the role the issue of
gender had in the backlash against the agreement in the plebiscite4 only bol-
stered a traditional depiction of women as mainly victims of a heterosexual
gender order (Céspedes-Báez, 2017). Some opposition groups took advantage
of the fact that the notion of gender in the version of the agreement that was
voted on the plebiscite (the ﬁrst version of the agreement, dated 24 August
2016) also included diverse sexual orientation and gender identity to awaken
fears within some conservative religious factions. The maintenance of gender
as a relevant category in the second version of the agreement (24 November
2016) came at the price of narrowing it down again to the radical feminist
version of women (Céspedes-Báez, 2016).
In this article I want to explore the implications of the radical feminist
methodology transplanted and translated to Colombia once the domestic
women’s rights movement embraced international law to advance women’s
cause in the context of conﬂict. I further want to explore its inﬂuence in
conﬁguring a particular legal subjectivity for women, and the implications it
had in the peace negotiations with the FARC—EP. To do so, I divide this
paper into four sections. In the ﬁrst section, I lay out the connections between the
radical feminist methodology, transitional justice, and the production of speciﬁc
international law to eradicate sexual violence and discrimination against
women. In the second section, I unpack the genderization of the Colombian
armed conﬂict following the radical feminist script and methodology, the emer-
gence of a Creole version of that feminist trend, and its implications in creating a
narrow vision of women in this setting. In the third section, I explore how the
knowledge built around Creole radical feminism operated in the Havana peace
negotiations with FARC—EP regarding the issue of women and land. In the last
section, I oﬀer some conclusions and issues to explore further.
Radical feminist methodology and transitional justice
Radical feminism gained traction internationally at almost the same time
transitional justice was emerging and consolidating itself as the legal and
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legitimate model to help countries entrenched in dictatorships and/or conﬂicts
to move towards democracy and peace (Weinstein, et al., 2010). The fall of
the Berlin Wall in late 1989 enabled the rise and hegemony of international
human rights and criminal law, solidiﬁed the international community, and
subdued the debates around social and economic rights. Thus, the 1990s were
a fertile ground for strengthening feminist enterprises that reinterpreted the
conﬂict/non-conﬂict dyad as loci to implement an internationalized version of
peace, security, and the rule of law (Fassin, 2008; Rincón Covelli, 2012).
Radical feminism and transitional justice became ethical manifestos whose
programmes and political agendas were camouﬂaged under the narrative of
human rights and protection of victims (Eckel, 2013; Meister, 2011).
Radical feminism is rooted in an understanding of patriarchy as a system
that creates and continuously reproduces sex/gender as hierarchies in which
men dominate women (Céspedes-Báez, 2014b). Sexuality and sexual violence
are central to its explanation of discrimination and violence against women,
since gender not only generates the sexes, but also organizes sexuality and
society. Law is central to this process, since the state inevitably reﬂects and
breeds this order, and does so using legal regulation (MacKinnon, 1991). Thus,
gender as sex is the primary site in which the domination of women takes place
and it is enforced through the obligation of women to have sexual intercourse
with men. Therefore, sexual violence in the context of warfare is the device to
maintain patriarchy and the epitome of gender-based harm (MacKinnon,
1983; MacKinnon, 1991).
Radical feminism oﬀers a structural and standardized explanation of male
domination that does not take into account political or socio-economic contexts.
Radical feminism constitutes a hegemonic model of womanhood and drafts a
linear history that applies to all women in the world. Its theory is universalistic,
and aims to explain every harm women endure anywhere (Halley, 2006).
Even though the structural nature of women’s subordination seems
unchangeable, radical feminism outlines a methodology to research, compre-
hend, and upset this sexual arrangement (Halley, 2002). Law is the main device
through which patriarchy imposes its reasoning and renders women’s sub-
ordination invisible. Hence, strategic and localized interventions in the legal
realm pave the way to undermine patriarchy and its epistemology. To do so,
radical feminism determines law’s role in reinforcing and diminishing women’s
role in society, thus designing legal tactics, such as legal reform and litigation,
to undermine this order from within (MacKinnon, 1991).
Radical feminism proposes a one-sided epistemology in which only women
can talk and create knowledge about women and their relation to men. Its
methodology is focused on collecting evidence of their sexual domination, since
its conception of gender revolves around the production of sex, sexuality, and
mandatory heterosexuality. Its ﬁndings place an emphasis on the impossibility
of consent in sexual intercourse between men and women, and on the dis-
pensability of force and/or violent rejection as a marker of rape and sexual
violence in general (MacKinnon, 1983).
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One of the ﬁrst examples of the consolidation of radical feminism in the
international arena can be seen in the 1990s interpretation of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
(Céspedes-Báez, 2017). This 1970s instrument of international law was the
emblem of the encounter between feminists from the Communist bloc and the
west. CEDAW initially focused on discrimination and excluded any rhetoric
on violence (Donert, 2014). However, in 1992, after the Berlin Wall had
fallen, CEDAW’s Committee issued General Recommendation No. 19. In it, an
authoritative and expansive reading of the term ‘discrimination’ to include violence
against women was oﬀered. To this end, the Committee stated that dis-
crimination encompasses violence, either the one ‘that is directed against a
woman because she is a woman or that aﬀects women disproportionately’
(emphasis added) (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, 1992). This recommendation foreshadowed the traction sexual vio-
lence would gain in international law, side-lining economic and social issues
such as women’s land tenure.
Building on the successful introduction of violence against women as an
essential topic in international law, radical feminists were able to defy the
traditional views on rape and sexual violence in international law that posi-
tioned them either as a side eﬀect or as crime against honour (Ni Aolain,
2012). Radical feminists documented cases of sexual violence in the most
visible armed conﬂicts of the 1990s and, after intense lobbying and activism,
brought them before the international ad-hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia. There, radical feminists began to structure relevant inter-
national case law that placed sexual violence at the centre of women’s
experience in conﬂict (Halley, 2008).
Based on the knowledge radical feminists had accrued, they organized
around the Rome Conference (1998), the body that was going to discuss the
International Criminal Court (ICC) statute, with the objective of consolidat-
ing the centrality of sexual violence against women as an international crime
and to dispute the role of force and consent in its conﬁguration. Although
radical feminists did not achieve a complete victory, since force and consent
did not entirely disappear from international criminal law (Halley, 2008), they were
able to turn sexual violence into the paradigmatic gender-based crime in
international law. In this line, sexual violence was placed at the epicentre of
international law eﬀorts to achieve peace and security from a gender perspective.
Thus, it was turned into an integral part of transitional justice.
In 2000, the United Nations Security Council fortiﬁed this connection,
approving Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. In it, the Security
Council underscored the necessity of engaging women in peacebuilding pro-
cesses and conﬂict resolution initiatives. Although the resolution’s wording
strove to underscore women’s agency, its depiction of the crimes that aﬀect
them the most in contexts of armed conﬂict reinforced understandings of
gender rooted in notions of women’s sexual vulnerability. Therefore, sexual
violence was placed at the centre of the resolution as the paradigmatic
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gender-based crime, and highlighted that ending impunity and forbidding
amnesties for sexual-related crimes were crucial steps to protect women
(United Nations Security Council, 2000). This understanding was further
narrowed by Resolution 1820 of 2008, which left aside almost any reference
to women’s agency and focused on women as victims of sexual violence and
the use of this crime as a tactic of war (United Nations Security Council, 2008;
Otto, 2010). Resolution 1888 of 2009 called for the appointment of a Special
Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence and Armed Con-
ﬂict (United Nations Security Council, 2009). In 2013, in London, the foreign
ministers of the Group of Eight major industrialized nations (G8) signed the
Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conﬂict, and resolutions 2106
and 2122 of the same year reiterated the urgency of prosecuting this type of
violence (Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce; G8 UK, 2013; United Nations
Security Council, 2013a; United Nations Security Council, 2013b).
Several reasons could explain why international law was receptive to radi-
cal feminism: (i) it was formulated in English by the Global North; (ii) it
presented a totalistic interpretation of women’s experiences that was easily
extrapolated to every part of the world; (iii) it allowed an understanding of
discrimination and violence against women that did not challenge the existing
economic and political order; and (iv) it was coherent with the emphasis
placed by both transitional justice and international criminal law on prosecution
to achieve peace and security (Céspedes-Báez, 2014b).
Creole feminist transitional justice
The genderization of the Colombian armed conﬂict was the outcome of a
process that started in the 1990s. It followed the radical feminist script and
adapted it to the particular conditions of the Colombian setting. An élite within
the Colombian women’s movement focused on consciousness-raising, legal
advocacy, and litigation to make their presence and their agenda relevant in the
Colombian context. They became Creole radical feminists (Céspedes-Báez,
2014a). The momentum radical feminism had gained in international law and
transitional justice made this development almost inevitable. However,
embracing this approach to situate women in conﬂict has impeded an in-depth
analysis of the socio-economic damages inﬂicted upon Colombian women.
The 1990s was a decade of escalation for the Colombian armed conﬂict.
The ﬁght for territorial control drove the escalation of attacks and produced
an increase of human rights violations against civilians. Millions of Colom-
bians had to ﬂee their homes to escape from massacres, selective killings,
combats, forced disappearances, and torture, among others (Pecaut, 2004).
The inﬂux of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the cities and nearby
towns attracted the attention of the government and the international com-
munity (Céspedes-Báez, 2014b).
The Colombian state responded to the increase in forced displacement by
passing legal regulations to provide remedies for its victims. The Colombian
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Congress passed Law 387 of 1997 to deﬁne who qualiﬁed as an IDP, created a
national system to attend this population, and provided guidelines to design
public policies to support their transition out of that status.
The prevalence of armed conﬂict and forced displacement narratives in
public opinion inﬂuenced the feminist movement in Colombia to leave aside
their historical ﬁghts for equality in the family, work, and public life, and turn
their attention to the situation of women in war in their own country (Wills
Obregon, 2007). To do so, and in order to genderize the analysis of IDPs’
situation in Colombia, the Colombian feminist movement employed a twofold
strategy. On the one hand, they appropriated and deployed international law to
build a solid theoretical framework in which women’s rights were at the centre,
coupled with the narrative of their particular vulnerability. On the other hand,
they replicated radical feminist methodology and collected testimonies of women
in conﬂict to give substance to their legal arguments. Their main goal was to have
a robust argument to pressure the Colombian Government, shame it before
the international community, and litigate against it before national and
international courts. They embraced law in its ambivalent nature as the
instrument of patriarchy, but also as the means to dislocate male domination.
The Creole radical feminist’s theoretical approach was grounded on the
CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 19 and on a radical
feminist approach. This entailed positioning sexual violence at the centre of
women’s experiences in peace and in conﬂict. For women, their argument
goes, peace and war take place in the context of patriarchy, thus violence
against them does not vary substantively, only in proportion. Even though
forced displacement did not target women nor men particularly, situating
women in conﬂict ﬁrst and foremost as victims of sexual violence allowed the
linking of gender with forced displacement (Rueda, 2001; Mesa de Trabajo,
Mujer y Conﬂicto Armado, 2003). In this sense, sexual violence paved the way
to claim that forced displacement was impacting women disproportionately,
because women IDPs were exposed to the intensiﬁed incidence of sexual
domination that occurs in the context of conﬂict (Céspedes-Báez, 2017).
In the Creole radical feminist reading of forced displacement, women were
ﬂeeing from their home towns to escape from the increased occurrence or
threat of sexual violence. This move permitted the genderization of forced
displacement and the Colombian conﬂict. Although Creole radical feminists
did not have reliable data on the incidence of sexual violence against women
in the context of conﬂict at the time, this approach dispensed the use of precise
ﬁgures to support the Creole radical feminists’ claim (Roth, et al., 2011).5
Consciousness-raising was vital to make radical feminism operative in the
Colombian context. Creole radical feminists needed not only to prove the link
they had established between forced displacement and sexual violence, but
also to underline that the experience of one woman who had been victimized
represented all women in conﬂict. Testimony-gathering and case documenta-
tion served that purpose. Both promoted the standpoint of the victim and con-
tributed to her and the readers’ consciousness and knowledge of patriarchy.
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Underscoring the commonalities across diﬀerent women’s accounts, they illu-
minated the ubiquity and oppressiveness of patriarchy, and constituted material
for litigation and advocacy (Rueda, 2001).
As early as 2001, Colombian women’s rights non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and feminist coalitions were collecting testimonies, documenting cases,
and publishing reports on women and armed conﬂict (Mesa de Trabajo, Mujer
y Conﬂicto Armado, 2001). Over the years they put together a methodology
and guidelines that gradually gave more prominence to the documentation and
litigation of sexual violence in Colombia (Rueda, 2001;Mesa de Trabajo, Mujer
y Conﬂicto Armado, 2006; Corporación Humanas Colombia, 2009). Although
at the beginning they tried to document other human rights violations, such as
obstacles related to access to health, work, and education, their scope of
research and ﬁndings were narrowed by methodological, theoretical, and stra-
tegic reasons that gave pre-eminence to sexual violence and the genderization of
the internal armed conﬂict along the lines of radical feminism. That contraction
did not entail eliminating other abuses from their reports, but implied linking
sexual violence or the threat of sexual violence as the primary cause or under-
lying meaningful experience of any other armed conﬂict-related harm. In this way,
they kept theoretical coherence, built a strong advocacy campaign centred on just
one crime, and successfully genderized every other aspect of the internal conﬂict.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, land dispossession had been secondary to
forced displacement in the Colombian Government’s responses to the internal
conﬂict. The Government’s priorities were localized in attending IDPs at host
towns and cities. Land was turned into a matter of its own when the Colom-
bian state embarked on its ﬁrst transitional justice eﬀort to demobilize para-
military groups through tailored prosecutions (see Chapters 4 and 6). To do
so, Congress approved Law 975 of 2005, commonly known as the Peace and
Justice Law. The discussions this law sparked around victims’ rights and
reparations paved the way for exploring what had happened to the land IDPs
lost in their ﬂight and oﬀered women’s rights NGOs and activists the oppor-
tunity to litigate through a procedure speciﬁcally established to try armed
conﬂict crimes (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación—Grupo
de Memoria Histórica, 2010). In this context, the Peace and Justice Law
constituted an opportunity to strengthen the narrative of sexual violence
against women in conﬂict and tie it to land seizure and abandonment.
The deployment of the Creole radical feminist theoretical framework and
methodology to participate actively in the space of litigation and advocacy
brought by Law 975 enriched the account of women’s ordeals in the internal
conﬂict, and at the same time reinforced their depiction as victims of sexual
violence. Even though Creole radical feminists and their NGOs began to
investigate the impact of forced displacement on women’s land tenure, they
did so mainly to link it to sexual domination. Their theoretical commitments,
drawn in the early 2000s did not give them a lot of room for manoeuvre.
Sexual violence was at the heart of their account of masculine privilege, and
their genderization of the conﬂict depended on it. Predictably, their
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methodology replicated the world vision they had decided to endorse to make
women stand out as a group that was bearing a diﬀerentiated and disproportionate
impact in the context of conﬂict.
In 2006, after several years of presenting the problem of women and land
tenure in the context of conﬂict just as a peripheral issue, Colombian Creole
radical feminists began to hammer out the connections between forced dis-
placement, sexual violence, and land loss. They held the state accountable for
not protecting IDPs’ real rights over land, and highlighted that women
usually face more hurdles in defending their property since male kin usually
mediate their ownership over it. For this reason, they alleged that frequently
women do not know with certainty what kind of right they have to the land,
whether the deeds were in their and/or their partner’s name, and the area and
boundaries of the lot (Mesa de Trabajo, Mujer y Conﬂicto Armado, 2007).
Creole radical feminists built the association with forced displacement and
sexual violence using a particular interpretation of the ﬁndings of a survey
conducted in 2007 by the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce of Colombia among IDPs and
other vulnerable populations (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2008). Although the
study included a small percentage of men and the questions regarding sexual
violence were not formulated to capture exclusively women as victims, fem-
inist NGOs read the study ﬁndings as evidence exclusively pertaining to
women IDPs, and turned it into the deﬁnitive ground to support the ideolo-
gical centrality of sexual domination in the incidence of forced displacement
and land loss (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2008; Mesa de Trabajo, Mujer y Con-
ﬂicto Armado, 2008; Céspedes-Báez, 2017). The Colombian Constitutional
Court applied this mode of argumentation to protect the rights of women
IDPs from the State’s lack of enforcement. It placed sexual violence as the
paradigmatic gender-based crime and described other damages women
endure in the internal conﬂict without giving them the same pre-eminence
(Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2008).
After the 2008 survey by the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce, Colombian feminist
NGOs devoted more energy to documenting the relationship between sexual
violence and land loss, to expand their knowledge on female sexual domina-
tion in the context of conﬂict (Céspedes-Báez, 2017). Land loss thus became
another type of evidence of the pervasiveness of sexual violence and of its use as
a weapon of war. In 2009, Corporación Sisma Mujer6 reported that the evi-
dence it gathered through a victims’ support group suggested that there was a
strong relationship between forced displacement and land abandonment,
paving the way to make the connection between land loss and sexual violence
(Mesa de Trabajo, Mujer y Conﬂicto Armado, 2009). That same year, Cor-
poración Humanas7 published a guide to litigating cases of sexual violence in
the context of the armed conﬂict. Drawing on the experience of the international
ad-hoc tribunals and the regulations of the Rome Statute of the ICC, this
guide aimed to advance an interpretation of sexual violence in the Colombian
conﬂict as torture, and as an international crime, and at ﬁghting impunity
through an eﬀective prosecution in domestic tribunals. The guide established
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that sexual violence has been used as a strategy to seize land in conﬂict
(Corporación Humanas Colombia, 2009).
In doing so, the NGO reinforced the idea that this crime is conscientiously
deployed to obtain a military gain, and that sexual violence is the primordial
weapon against women through which other harms are imposed. In this
sense, if sexual violence is eradicated, women’s subjugated position would be
upset and the correlated harms to which this crime contributes would dis-
appear. The three amicus curiae8 Corporación Humanas ﬁled to participate in
the prosecution of paramilitaries under Law 975 of 2005 supported this con-
clusion. Land loss was only made a relevant issue when it was possible to link
it to sexual violence (Corporación Humanas Colombia, 2013).
The terms of the genderization of the internal armed conﬂict and its impact
on the understanding of the issue of women and land tenure were thus
informed by these interventions when the Colombian Congress discussed the
bill that led to Law 1448 of 2011. The particular knowledge the deployment
of radical feminism, and its method, had created to genderize the under-
standing of the conﬂict demonstrated its strengths and shortcomings when it
was time to debate and approve that ambitious transitional justice scheme.
Deliberations in Congress underlined the importance of providing special
consideration to sexual violence, while its considerations on women and land
loss were scarce (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2010; Congreso de
la República de Colombia, 2011)
Feminist advocacy before Congress placed an emphasis on tightening the
link between sexual violence and land loss. To do so, feminist organizations
proposed the introduction of a presumption in which women victims of sexual
violence would not have to prove their status as victims for land restitution
purposes (Corporación Sisma Mujer et al., n.d.). Whereas the deﬁnitive reg-
ulation paid particular attention to the prosecution of sexual violence as a
remedy, the issue of women and land was tackled in cursory terms. The only
operative provision for women in the matter of land restitution was the
reiteration of the obligation of joint titling, a victory rural women had
obtained in the late 1980s (Sañudo Pazos, 2015).
The discussion and approval of Law 1448 of 2011 was a lost opportunity to
eﬀectively promote women’s land tenure through a transitional justice
mechanism. Creole radical feminist knowledge was not able to oﬀer a strong
case for the issue of women and land in Colombia, and its interaction with
armed violence. For that reason, their proposals were not able to grasp what
was needed to eﬀectively promote women’s acquisition, control, and recovery
of real rights. Their interest in mastering the discourse of international law
and transitional justice to make visible sexual violence against women led
them to leave aside the study of national property law. When the time came to
debate the Victims and Land Restitution Law, they were experts in interna-
tional human rights and criminal law, but did not have the needed expertise
on the specialized mechanics of property regulation. Even though Colombian
feminist activists and NGOs advocated for the recognition of women’s legal
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relationship to real estate while Law 1448 was being discussed, they were not
able to provide clear evidence on how a country that recognized full legal
capacity for women since 1932 was still having problems promoting and
guaranteeing women’s economic and property rights (Corporación Sisma
Mujer et al., n.d.).
While Creole radical feminists demonstrated their expertise on sexual vio-
lence, they did not explore in depth whether the social separation of repro-
ductive and productive work was having any inﬂuence on the regulation of
property to women’s disadvantage. Also, recommending only that Law 1448
should presume that women claiming land restitution were possessors, occu-
pants, and good faith tenants, missed that the land restitution process was not
going to reproduce the heterosexual order having exclusively women as
plaintiﬀs and men as defendants, but that it was likely going to be a judicial
forum in which women would have to confront other women.
At the time of writing, Colombian feminist NGOs continue to produce
mostly reports and materials on sexual violence in conﬂict, while they have not
published any signiﬁcant assessment on how women have fared in the Law
1448’s land restitution process (Casa de la Mujer, n.d.). Their ﬁxation on the
radical feminist version of violence and discrimination against women has
impeded their capacity to systematically approach the study of women in
property-related litigation; however it might be feasible that this is due to the
lack of information (in a country in which reliable data has been always
evasive and land tenure records defective), or of expertise on researching on
these topics. Whereas they have devoted a signiﬁcant number of analyses to
the litigation of sexual violence in peace and war, their examination of the
instances in which women litigate property is almost non-existent.
Women and land in Havana
In 2012, when the peace talks with FARC—EP started in Havana, Creole
radical feminists had consolidated a well-recognized expertise on gender and
conﬂict centred on sexual violence against women. Since the main negotiation
agenda to which the guerrillas and the government had agreed did not
incorporate gender as a speciﬁc item for discussion, feminists exerted pressure
to have this topic recognized and included as an indispensable aspect of the
discussions (Gobierno de la República de Colombia and Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC, 2012). For that purpose, in 2014 the
Government and FARC—EP created a commission for the analysis of gender
within the peace process. The mandate of this advisory body was to produce
recommendations and inputs to eﬀectively introduce gender in the dialogues
(Mesa de Conversaciones Gobierno Nacional—FARC—EP, 2014).
On 24 August 2016, the Government and FARC—EP signed an agreement
that was rejected in a plebiscite on 2 October. This outcome led to its revision
and the publication of an amended version on 24 November 2016. The com-
bination of these two documents revealed how Colombian society had
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reached some shared understandings of the conﬂict and of the strategies
which were needed to resolve its structural causes, and in which areas that
consensus had not been reached or was under challenge. Gender became one
of the main weapons the detractors of the agreement wielded against it. The
essence of their argument was that the agreement was subverting traditional
heterosexual values (Céspedes-Báez, 2016).
While the agreement of 24 August 2016 deployed a wider understanding of
gender (not limited to women), its use of this category was complex and
confusing. In most cases, the term ‘gender’was used in the agreement to identify
women and the gender binary, and sometimes to refer to sexual orientation
and diverse gender identities (Céspedes-Báez, 2016). Even though it was dif-
ﬁcult to grasp the precise meaning of gender in the 24 August accord, the
inclusion of a more ﬂuid rendition of gender constituted an opportunity for
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) communities to have a
more visible place and role in the transitional justice setting.
In this fashion, the ﬁrst version of the agreement incorporated the Creole radical
feminist knowledge, but also opened the door for more inclusive understandings
of gender and its role in the internal armed conﬂict. While it mostly deployed
sexual violence to genderize diﬀerent issues of the agreement, it also ordered
government measures to promote the constitutional rights of LGBT persons.
The agreement was amended to narrow the meaning of gender in order to
incorporate the voice of the sectors that argued that its gender components
were subverting traditional mores in Colombia. The references to sexual
orientation and gender diversity were erased, gender was watered down to the
heterosexual interrelation between men and women, and the link between
sexual violence and women was strengthened (Céspedes-Báez, 2017).
Two main ideas that illustrate the pervasiveness of the trope of women and
sexual violence remained in the adjusted agreement. The ﬁrst was the approach
to sexual violence in the transitional justice jurisdiction to try armed conﬂict-
related crimes. The peace agreement pledged not to grant amnesties to those
who committed these crimes, and created a special investigation group to
guarantee its investigation and prosecution before the transitional justice
apparatus, as well as deﬁning a series of psychosocial rehabilitation measures
for sexual violence survivors.
The second idea was the issue of women and land tenure that replicated or
drew on interventions of the past, such as (i) an inclusive language aimed at
making sure that every policy, action, and plan takes women into account; (ii)
explicit references to the importance of outlining aﬃrmative actions in the
implementation phase to guarantee women’s empowerment in areas related to
the strengthening of their organizations; and (iii) the inclusion of sex as a
relevant category in the establishment and update of the rural cadaster,
among others (Sañudo Pazos, 2015). Although all of these will make women
more visible in the agrarian world, facilitate the enforcement of their rights
through the availability of speciﬁc inclusive wording, and contribute to
establishing a baseline regarding their ownership of real estate, they fatally
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mirror approaches that have failed before because the basic association
between women and reproduction has not been systematically addressed in
agrarian policy and legal regulation.
The agreement reﬂects the recent history of Creole radical feminism and
the strategies it has employed to guarantee the genderization of the peace
negotiations with the FARC—EP. While Creole radical feminists conducted
an intense campaign to make the negotiators aware of the seriousness and
high incidence of sexual violence against women, they fell short in oﬀering
them insights regarding the subject of women and land tenure. Their advo-
cacy campaign Cinco Claves9, which focused on the necessity of including
sexual violence against women as a speciﬁc transitional justice topic, did not
have an analogous intervention to demonstrate the importance of oﬀering real
remedies to women’s situation regarding access, control, and recovery of real
rights over land to the negotiation parties (Red Nacional de Mujeres; Cor-
poración Sisma Mujer; No es Hora de Callar; Corporación Humanas
Colombia, n.d.). Their exclusive focus on the study of sexual violence impe-
ded them from outlining an accurate diagnosis on the subject of women and
land that would have contributed to reaching a more robust and adequate
approach to solve this issue in the context of the negotiations between the
Colombian Government and the FARC—EP.
Although some women’s rights activists considered the subject of women
and land tenure key to the negotiations and advocated for its inclusion, their
input was not able to challenge the pervasiveness of the Creole radical fem-
inist narrative of women and sexual violence that has dominated the inter-
pretation of gender in the management of conﬂict and transitional justice in
Colombia since the 2000s (Cumbre Nacional de Mujeres por la Paz, 2013).
The peace agreement has become an instrument of the reinstitution and
enhancement of the severance between production and reproduction in as far
as it states that women have two roles—reproductive and productive—and
remains silent regarding men’s involvement in the former. Failing to address
this ignores the hurdles women face in securing land tenure in the allocation of
land in the rural world in patriarchal societies. A methodical examination of the
particular manifestations of these assumptions would be a good place to start in
constructing an understanding of how public policy and legal regulation helps
to maintain them, and thus creates speciﬁc hurdles to women’s access, control,
and recovery of land tenure. If there is not an accurate understanding of the
mechanisms that support and legitimate this divide, women’s land ownership
and control will remain exceptional, insecure, and, sometimes, unattainable.
Although the parties to the accord agreed to recover inappropriately occu-
pied wastelands, massively formalize land tenure, and establish an agrarian
jurisdiction to expeditiously resolve land-related conﬂicts, amongst other
commitments (see Chapter 3), the current structure of the agreement can pose
additional dangers to rural women on the matter of land tenure. If land res-
titution programmes are not paired with particular knowledge on how women
fare in litigation and the structural hurdles they face, women will still
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encounter the same problems they have had before in presenting evidence to
support their relationship to property, thus restricting and impeding their
acquisition, control, and recovery thereof (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y
Reconciliación— Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2010; Osorio Perez & Villegas
Caballero, 2010).
A possible response to this challenge would be to take some distance from radi-
cal feminism and its methodology to make room for other theoretical frameworks
and methods that investigate the validity of displacing the source of discrimination
against women from sexual domination to the divorce between production and
reproduction (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación—Grupo de
Memoria Histórica, 2010; Villegas Caballero, 2010).
Conclusion: radical women are mainly victims, yet not owners
A systematic reading of the agreements of 24 August and 24 November 2016
indicates how radical feminism has become embedded in the narrative of the
internal armed conﬂict, the extent to which its methodology has sought and
found the evidence to sustain its foundations, and the blind spots it creates in
its deployment. It also demonstrates that this feminist understanding of vio-
lence and discrimination against women is incapable, in some cases, of oﬀering a
full appreciation of, and strategy to respond to, the economic impacts of conﬂict
on women. Centring radical feminist strategies to improve women’s lives in con-
ﬂict and peacebuilding through the foregrounding of sexual violence and its
prosecution overlooks the complexities of their experience, and ingrains a
conception of women as primarily bodies, psyches, and sexual objects.
An analysis of conﬂict that tackles the relationship between production and
reproduction is necessary to determine the conﬂict’s impact on property-related
litigation, land restitution plans, and important dimensions of women’s
experiences of the conﬂict. Eradicating discrimination and violence against
women entails more than putting sexual violence oﬀenders behind bars. It
also requires acknowledging women’s entrepreneurship, work, and contribution to
development, and creating economic opportunities to grant their autonomy.
The bias of Creole radical feminism became evident not only through the
agreement, but also through the interpretation the FARC—EP has presented
around women in conﬂict as well. Although this guerrilla organization seems to
have initially endorsed the Creole radical feminist agenda, it has left a point of entry
to develop its own version of it in the future. It has challenged the radical feminist
tone of the agreement underscoring that patriarchy was deeply entrenched in the
logic of capitalist domination. Although the FARC—EP did not develop this
idea further, it certainly forecast the possible impact its integration in civilian
life would have in the interpretation of the situation of women in conﬂict and
peace. Perhaps its feminism will force Creole radical feminists to consider
other dimensions and explanations of discrimination against women (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, 2016).
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Notes
1 This article draws on my previous work about feminism and armed conﬂict in
Colombia. In 2014, I coined the term “creole radical feminism” to refer to a group
of Colombian feminists that has strategically used international law and radical
feminism to genderize the reading of the internal conﬂict and position themselves as
experts on the situation of women in this context (Céspedes-Báez, 2014a).
2 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
3 According to research I have conducted, the entirety of the women’s movement did
not subscribe to and/or appropriate the radical feminist discourse to introduce
women as a relevant category in the understanding of the internal conﬂict in
Colombia. Some women’s rights activist organizations localized in Bogotá, who
already had connections with the Government and the NGO movement, and the
international community, embraced it to genderize the conﬂict and become relevant
actors in the national public sphere.
4 In Colombia, the plebiscite is a constitutional public participation mechanism
(article 103 of the Colombian constitution). According to Law 134 of 1994, the
President can call for a plebiscite to ask the polity whether they approve certain
executive decisions. President Juan Manuel Santos called on Colombians to vote
against or in favour of the peace agreement with the FARC—EP on 2 October
2016. A narrow majority rejected the agreement, thus the negotiators had to revise
it to adjust it to the demands of the opposition. The revised version of the agree-
ment, or its second version, was approved by the negotiators on 24 November 2016.
This agreement was not subjected to a plebiscite and was ratiﬁed by Congress.
5 This situation has changed with the Consolidated Registry of Victims (Registro
Único de Víctimas) established in Law 1448 of 2011.
6 One of the most important Colombian Creole radical feminist NGOs in Colombia,
devoted to advocacy and litigation.
7 Another well-known Colombian Creole radical feminist NGO.
8 An impartial advice oﬀered to a court of law in a particular case.
9 Five Points.
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8 From combatants’ boots
Reincorporation and reconciliation1
Diana Acosta-Navas and Carlos Felipe Reyes
Introduction
Peacebuilding eﬀorts encompass diverse and often conﬂicting elements. Pro-
cesses of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) often require
oﬀering incentives to ex-combatants, which may be at odds with the goals of
truth, accountability, and reparation pursued by institutions of transitional
justice. However, transitional justice and DDR need not be antagonists
transitional justice mechanisms can actually contribute to prevent large-scale
recidivism by enabling local, community-based processes of reconciliation.
Hereinafter we examine a potential alliance between DDR and transitional
justice in the implementation of the peace accord between the Colombian
Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército
del Pueblo (FARC–EP)2.
Eﬀorts at DDR in Colombia currently face several challenges: threats to
FARC members, murders of social leaders, persistence of illegal armed groups
and drug-traﬃcking networks, and the desertion of ex-combatants. These
realities leave little room for DDR institutions to maneuver. Transitional jus-
tice mechanisms can contribute to the prevention of large-scale recidivism by
enabling local, community-based processes of reconciliation. We argue that
insofar as the peace accord creates an institutional apparatus designed for the
reconstruction of social fabric, it has the potential to discourage former
combatants from re-engaging in criminality. However, while the mechanisms
for state-led reconciliation are well delineated in the accord, their local coun-
terparts have not been as clearly devised. And whereas this allows grassroots
initiatives to take control over local processes of reconciliation, it also opens
the door to corruption and co-option by a variety of political operators.
Recent DDR experiences and challenges in Colombia
For the past three decades Colombia has implemented DDR programmes to
facilitate several waves of demobilization. Between 1989 and 2007, nine dif-
ferent armed groups demobilized,3 accounting for 36,362 ﬁghters (López,
2016). Between 2003 and 2016, 58,765 combatants demobilized;4 58% of
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whom did so as part of collective processes, and 42% as individual demobili-
zations (ACR, 2017).
In the midst of the peace process with the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (AUC) between 2003 and 2006, the administration of the erstwhile
President Álvaro Uribe established a new institutional architecture for demo-
bilization processes, naming it the Alta Consejería para la Reintegración
(ACR).5 The entity’s mandate was twofold: to facilitate former combatants’
re-entry into civilian life and to motivate further demobilizations. Of the
guerrillas and paramilitaries who have demobilized since then, 85% have been
through the DDR process established by the ACR, and 24% have successfully
completed it (ACR, 2017).
Among the results of previous DDR eﬀorts in Colombia, three indicators
shed light on the risks and challenges that lie ahead. Homicide rates reveal
the risks associated with the return to civilian life. Between 2003 and 2016,
2,830 demobilized combatants were killed. These constitute over 5% of the
entire population registered in the ACR programme during this period (ACR,
2017)6. High homicide rates of former combatants occurred in departments
with high levels of urban and rural crime. At the top of the list are the
departments of Nariño and La Guajira, where murder rates of the demobilized
population are above 13%; Arauca, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca, Chocó,
Norte de Santander, and Antioquia have rates greater than 8% (ACR, 2017). In
some departments, homicide rates of ex-combatants are as high as six
percentage points above the annual average in the departmental population.
Unemployment reveals ex-combatants' diﬃculty to be assimilated into the
economic life of host communities. Rates vary greatly across regions. In
Bogotá, Casanare, Antioquia, and Cundinamarca unemployment rates for ex-
combatants are below 10%, following the national average. In other depart-
ments, such as Sucre, Guaviare, and Vaupés, unemployment rates for former
combatants are 24.8%, 30.6% and 33.3%, respectively (ACR, 2017), whereas
unemployment in these departments’ capitals is 10% (Sincelejo), 13.2% (San
José del Guaviare) and 9.2% (Mitú) (DANE, 2017).
The third and perhaps the greatest challenge is the prevention of recidi-
vism. The Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2015) estimates that by
2009 some 15.5% of the entire demobilized population, including guerrillas
and paramilitaries, had returned to criminal activities.7 In 2014, the Fun-
dación Ideas para la Paz8 calculated the average recidivism rate across the
country to be around 24% (Zukerman Daly, 2014 ). A former FARC–EP
combatant reports being regarded as ‘high-skilled labour for criminal organi-
zations’.9 The demobilization of paramilitaries in the early 2000s left a clear
sign of caution against large-scale recidivism (Centro de Memoria Histórica,
2012 and 2015). By 2007, the Organization of American States reported the
discovery of 22 criminal networks with participation, command, and control
structures attributed to former AUC combatants (Ribetti, 2009). An esti-
mated 25% of the demobilized combatants captured for criminal activities in
the period between 2005 and 2009 were associated with emerging criminal
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gangs (bandas criminales, or BACRIM). Scholars refer to the DDR process as
one of recycling and re-engineering existing structures under new franchises
rather than dismantlement (Theidon & Laplante, 2006; Buitrago, 2006).
Research on the causes of recidivism yields heterogeneous results. Some of
the relevant factors include: the welfare, status and ties that ﬁghters had in
armed groups, and whether they were subjected to abuse during their partici-
pation in the group (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007). Structural elements,
such as poverty, lack of economic opportunities, and unemployment, also
increase the likelihood of returning to war (Hill, Taylor, & Temin, 2008).
In the case of Colombia, recidivism rates are explained by the interaction
of driving and restraining factors (Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). Driving factors,
which increase the probability of recidivism, include personality traits and the
presence of criminal or armed groups in the territory where the cadre is residing.
Restraining factors, which decrease the likelihood of recidivism, include strong
family ties, and educational attainment.
It has been noted that recidivism in Colombia is signiﬁcantly higher among
former paramilitaries than among former guerrillas. In fact, former para-
militaries are almost 50% more likely than former guerrillas to return to
criminal activity (Ribetti, 2009; Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). Before 2016, most
ex-guerrillas who demobilized did so out of an individual choice to abandon their
groups, incurring substantial risks in the process. By contrast, the great majority of
paramilitaries, on the other hand, merely followed orders to demobilize.
Another contributing factor, is the persistence of ties between cadres and
warlords, which facilitates re-engagement in war and criminality, and exposes
former combatants and their families to threats and violence (Godos, 2013).
Hence, severing the links between combatants and their former groups could,
in theory, facilitate the demobilization process, and improve the success rate
of DDR processes (Themner, 2011; Zyck, 2009).
From a diﬀerent perspective, the experiences of former cadres in the rein-
tegration process have been found to be more accurate predictors of direct
recidivism than external factors, and this experience is deteriorated by the
erasement of their identity as member of an armed group (Zukerman Daly,
2014). Studies by the ACR claim that 80% of the ex-combatants that com-
pleted the ACR route express satisfaction with their lives after demobilization
(Mitrotti, 2016). Independent studies, however, reveal their discontent with
paternalistic aspects of the ACR route (Gómez, 2014). Of particular concern
is the institutionally-based rejection of ex-combatants’ past: ‘the government
projects an image of reintegration as a “rebirth” that denies the past of
former combatants [… Reintegration] routes are based on alleged social,
emotional and production defects of former combatants favouring individual
interventions, neglecting the context in which they live, their diﬀerences,
postponing the integration of their family and social networks’ (Fattal &
Hoyos, 2013, p. 8; see also Hoyos, 2011; Cárdenas, 2005).
A process that disregards the beliefs, past experiences, and group identities
of former ﬁghters renders the process of reintegration more likely to produce
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dissatisfaction. This highlights the need for DDR policies to be attuned to the
speciﬁc reasons of individuals who joined illegal armed groups (O’Neill,
2015). Such tailoring requires sensitivity to the psychological and emotional
characteristics of individuals who have been aﬃliated with a guerrilla organi-
zation. These include: loyalty, solidarity and the perceived primacy of the
organization over individuals (Castro, 1997); identiﬁcation with a political
project (Henao, 1997); and pervasive models of masculinity (Theidon, 2007;
Theidon, 2009). The structure, cohesion, and collective identity of FARC—
EP may thus serve to tailor a reintegration policy that successfully prevents
the dispersion and atomization of ex-combatants (ICG 2014).
Successful DDRwill also turn on communities’ disposition to assimilate the
presence of ex-combatants, and their ability to come to terms with their past.
Although a recent study reveals that a large number of Colombians have
positive attitudes towards reconciliation, considerable obstacles remain. In
conﬂict-aﬄicted areas, 41% of community members view ex-combatants with
fear, and 82% perceive them as being less trustworthy than non-ex-combatants
(Rettberg, 2014). Cadres are well aware of this, as one of them relates: ‘You
end up stigmatized as if you were the scum of the earth, a plague or
something, like that [sic] demobilized people are bad people’ (Kaplan &
Nussio, 2015).
Given these conditions, current DDR eﬀorts will need to counteract the var-
ious factors driving recidivism. Educational attainment and job opportunities
may not be suﬃcient. Strengthening social participation in the wider commu-
nity is also a crucial step in allowing former combatants to be successfully
reincorporated (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015). Special attention should be payed to
the acknowledgment and recognition of former combatants’ identity, past
experiences, their sense of belonging and agency, and the acceptance of
former ﬁghters as members of the community. Both will require the pro-
motion of social reconciliation.
Because the current DDR process is part and parcel of a wider peace-
building eﬀort that includes transitional justice initiatives, it may be seen as
particularly well adapted for the promotion of social reconciliation. However,
the joint action of transitional justice and DDR does not straightforwardly
lead to reconciliation and successful reintegration. Furthermore, the goals of
DDR and transitional justice tend to conﬂict and to hamper processes of
reconciliation. The next section will revisit, and address, some arguments
against the use of transitional justice institutions for facilitating DDR.
DDR and transitional justice: friends and foes?
This section argues that local institutions of transitional justice can operate in
tandem with DDR to promote social reconciliation, and that the Colombian
case could be a fertile ground for such a collaborative approach. For the
purposes of this paper, we will adopt a minimalist conception of reconciliation,
as the re-establishment of constructive and productive political relationships
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that leverage and sustain other political and economic changes (Rettberg,
2014). Reconciliation, in this sense, does not require agreement, but the pos-
sibility of peaceful public debate and collective deliberation. It does not
require forgiveness, but the reparation of large-scale political relationships
(Murphy, 2010). The reconstruction of political relationships requires forging
the conditions for mutual trust, which ought to be based on interpersonal
accountability, as it is enforced by the power of the state. Hence, the restitu-
tion of trust in the rule of law plays an important role in this process.
At a ﬁrst glance, DDR policies run contrary to regular forms of account-
ability, and may sow mistrust among citizens. The presence of ex-combatants
in communities may be perceived as compromising security and the rule of
law. Moreover, the amnesties and monetary incentives provided to incentivize
demobilization may be regarded as rewards for criminality (Sriram &
Herman, 2009). This perception of unfairness and lack of accountability is
likely to erode the broader community’s trust, and create resentment.
The role of creating accountability and promoting reconciliation in post-
conﬂict scenarios is normally attributed to institutions of transitional justice.
Someone could argue, however, that such institutions are unnecessary or even
harmful to the prospect of achieving reconciliation. International bodies,
including the World Bank, the Oﬃce of the United Nations (UN) High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN itself, advocate the use of
‘dual-targeting strategies’. These are designed to reduce apprehension towards
ex-combatants’ beneﬁts, by providing proportional assistance to former com-
batants and members of conﬂict-aﬄicted communities. (Pfeiﬀer, 2014; Verzat,
2014; Lundy & McGovern, 2008; Mani, 2000; Pugh, 2000; United Nations
Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, 2014). These strategies can
be implemented with the aid of ‘peace infrastructures’ meant to empower
members of society, from grassroots organizations to national-level agencies,
to take ownership over peacebuilding processes (Pfeiﬀer, 2014; Verzat, 2014).
The proper implementation of these strategies might suﬃce to counteract
resentment in the community and create a more welcoming environment for
ex-combatants. If that were the case, transitional justice mechanisms might
seem superﬂuous. However, isolated from transitional justice, dual-targeting
strategies cannot secure reconciliation, as they are purely forward-looking
mechanisms that fail to address past human rights violations. If trust is based
on forms of mutual accountability that are sanctioned and enforced by an
authoritative body (either the state or the community), it requires a warranted
expectation that citizens will be backed in their claims against others who
harm them. Allowing these harms to go unaddressed and unacknowledged
sabotages the accountability upon which trust could be built.
Furthermore, simply oﬀering economic incentives to community members
in exchange for their acceptance of ex-combatants may be negatively perceived
as a way of purchasing their acquiescence. Such a perception, in addition to the
silent, or passive, denial of abuses, is more likely to erode than to bolster trust.
An oﬃcial attempt at confronting and acknowledging past abuses could lie
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the grounds of accountability and trust that drive political reconciliation
(Quinn, 2010). Transitional justice institutions are meant to seek the truth
about past harms and acknowledge them as the basis of a social renewal
project (Du Toit, 2000).
Nevertheless, it is far from clear that they can drive society towards recon-
ciliation. Although some see these institutions as means of ‘settling accounts
with the past’ (Minow, 1998; Hayner, 2001), sceptics believe that, at best,
truth seeking institutions could enable ‘contentious coexistence’ in post-conﬂict
societies (Payne, 2008). Perpetrators’ accounts in truth commissions are
transgressive. They may cause social instability, unrest, and resentment, thus
undermining relations of mutual trust.
Moreover, nationally-led transitional justice institutions may appear alien
and distant from the actual stakeholders, namely, victims, combatants and
members of host communities (see Chapter 14 for the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina). And even though these mechanisms can serve the creation of a
national narrative of reconciliation, they may also instill the fear ‘that it is all
a “façade”—the state in its theatrical register, orchestrating a transition that
does not reach beyond the ﬂat shiny surface of the television screen” (Theidon,
2007, p. 88; see also Payne, 2008).
While these objections are fair, they are based on a particular picture of
transitional justice institutions, and a prevalent model of violence. The model
takes the paradigmatic case of violence to be exercised by a powerful perpe-
trator, usually embodied in a state, on a powerless victim. This form of ‘vertical
violence’ is essentially asymmetrical. It is opposed to ‘horizontal violence’,
which is characterized by the absence of power imbalances, and the fact that a
large percentage of agents can simultaneously be identiﬁed as victims and
perpetrators (Orozco, 2005).
Although we do not argue for this view, there are several reasons to think
that Colombia’s conﬂict is horizontal (Orozco, 2005; Molano, 2015; Comi-
sión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2015). For instance, it has been
reported that around 50% of FARC—EP members were victims of child recruit-
ment (Semana.com, 2014). Further, several illegal armed structures participating
in the conﬂict had their origins as self-defence movements. Many combatants
in Colombia enlisted in illegal armed groups seeking either security or revenge
(Orozco, 2005). Thus, cadres in armed groups ‘ﬁnd themselves in the tension of
having to represent themselves through the diﬀerent categories that include them:
ex-combatants, perpetrators, non-beneﬁciaries of the war, beneﬁciaries of the
state, victims of the groups that recruited them, structural victims of the con-
ditions that led them to enlist’ (Hoyos, 2011, p. 14).
The traditional discourse on human rights that informs transitional justice
framers ignores these overlaps (Orozco, 2010). Blindness to this fact may
impair the reconciliatory powers of such institutions. A truth commission
designed to address instances of state violence is unlikely to ease the reincor-
poration of ﬁghters into—mostly rural and vulnerable—host communities,
which necessitates that cadres are integrated in the networks of reciprocal
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accountability and trust that bond community members qua community
members. This entails that they hold themselves accountable to the commu-
nity, and vice versa. A truth commission designed to address instances of
state-led violence, through nationwide broadcast of a confession, and a state-
sanctioned amnesty, cannot re-establish this reciprocity, and hence cannot
create the conditions for reconciliation.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is a useful
illustration of such ‘top-down’ transitional justice. Although the TRC may have
been successful at promoting political reconciliation at the national level
(Minow, 1998; Gutman & Thompson, 2000; Kiss, 2000), it prevented the direct
confrontation of victims and perpetrators, which gave victims the idea that white
South Africans were entirely disengaged from the process (see Chapter 12). Hence,
their punitive and revengeful impulses were intact (Wilson, 2001), and the
local-level conﬂict dynamics were unaddressed (Van Der Merwe, 2008).
In the words of the former Mayor of Bogotá, ‘diﬀerent forms of barbarism
require diﬀerent transitions’ (Mockus, 2005, p. x). In cases of horizontal vio-
lence, reconciliation requires the recognition of ‘the presence and meaning of
the gray zones; of ﬁgures that are simultaneously victims and perpetrators’.
(Orozco, 2005, p. 256; Theidon, 2006; Theidon, 2012). In recognizing this
dual status, there is an acknowledgment of both the harms done to the ex-
combatant, and the harms they did to the community. This mutual acknowl-
edgement lays the foundations for accountability. This requires, in turn, an
exercise of empathy (Orozco, 2005). The performance of this empathetic act
may lead to a shift in the way that we perceive ex-combatants, re-humanizing
them, restoring our perception of them as individuals as opposed to anon-
ymous members of a stereotyped group (Halpern & Weinstein, 2004). This
shift could potentially contribute to remove the obstacles for the forging of
mutual trust.
There are known cases of post-conﬂict societies that have appealed to local
peacebuilding strategies, framed with the rhetoric of transitional justice, as
mechanisms for the pursuit of accountability and reconciliation (Sharp, 2013).
These include the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (Fierens, 2005; Kirby, 2006;
Schabas, 2005); the Ardoyne Commemoration Project in Northern Ireland
(Lundy & McGovern, 2008); communal justice practices in Peru (Theidon,
2012); and unoﬃcial truth projects, in Guatemala, Brazil and Uruguay
(Bickford, 2007), among others. These processes were led by the communities
themselves, and not imposed by central governments. (Theidon, 2006). These
‘bottom-up’, participatory approaches to peacebuilding bring communities
much closer to properly addressing the essential detail of conﬂict dynamics
(Lundy & McGovern, 2008). In fact, some community-led approaches to
transitional justice are described as reversing the dehumanization process that
took place during the conﬂict, and fostering the reintegration of combatants
in society (Theidon, 2006).
These initiatives carry their own set of drawbacks. Given that local com-
munities are not accountable to state-wide institutions, they risk having little
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to no legitimacy, and becoming a simple means for the entrenchment of
existing power imbalances. In Rwanda, for instance, the Gacaca Courts pro-
hibited legal counsel for defendants and compelled them to answer the
Court’s questions, leading to a grave disregard for due process, and large
numbers of false convictions (Schabas, 2005; Kirby, 2006; Fierens, 2005). The
Ardoyne Commemoration Project ran afoul of exclusiveness, establishing a
one-sided version of history (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). Thus, overly
romanticized ideas of community and empowerment can become a cover for
marginalization and exclusion, and a recipe against reconciliation. In the case
of Colombia, these risks are particularly salient. Unhealthy power dynamics
in local communities may be further entrenched if these bottom-up approaches
to justice remain unchecked and unaccountable.
This brings us to the last objection we will consider in this section, namely
that the recent attempt at DDR and transitional justice in Colombia resulted
in large-scale recidivism and not much reconciliation. In fact, the transitional
justice institutions implemented during the paramilitary demobilization were
criticized for legitimizing existing criminal structures and power imbalances
(Hurtado, 2010; Tapias, 2010), forcing reconciliation on victims and aﬄicted
communities (Castro, 2010), and devaluing victims’ rights (Tapias, 2010). So
why should we expect the current process to be any diﬀerent?
The current peace accord is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one reached in
the early 2000s. During the implementation of Law 975 of 2005, the discourse
adopted by the Government and the heads of paramilitary organizations
stood in stark opposition to bottom-up and grassroots narratives of that
peace process (Diaz, 2008; Arias, 2010). Victims’ voices did not have the
platform they were given during the negotiation of the current accord. Fur-
thermore, the truth commission that was implemented then was limited to
perpetrators’ versiones libres10 (Lecombe, 2010). This resulted from a partial
importing of the South African model (Lecombe, 2010), which failed to fully
incorporate transitional justice measures to the reintegration process. That
attempt was essentially a top-down mechanism, which excluded victims’ and
aﬄicted communities’ voices, and deprived them of agency in the process of
peacebuilding. While it created truth-telling institutions, these did not promote
direct engagement between ex-combatants and communities.11
The institutional structure created by the current peace accord has the
potential to grant decision-making power to, and foster the participation of,
community-based, ex-combatants’ and victims’ organizations, while preser-
ving bonds of accountability to nationwide institutions. These institutions
seem better suited to the task of creating community-wide accountability
promoting reconciliation, and preventing recidivism of ex-combatants. While
this may not be suﬃcient to guarantee the overall success of the process, it
may contribute to creating a diﬀerent perception of reconciliation, and thus
creating a more favourable social environment for reintegration.
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DDR and transitional justice in the framework of the Peace Accord
This section explains the conditions for the reintegration of former comba-
tants after the period when they will be located at Temporary Rural Areas of
Normalization (ZVTN).12 Section 3 of the peace accord sets the conditions
for the economic, social, and political reincorporation of FARC—EP mem-
bers over the age of 18 years13 (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia and
FARC—EP, 2016). The accord creates several lines of support through which
ex-combatants will be assisted in their reintegration process, and may voluntarily
continue to interact with other former FARC—EP members.
Several institutions will assist in the process of reintegration. The National
Council for Reincorporation14 (CNR) establishes activities, timetables, and
monitoring mechanisms (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia and FARC—EP,
2016). The process will use the existing infrastructure of the reintegration
agency, the ACR. The CNR council will contribute to tailoring some of the
policies to the speciﬁc needs of FARC—EP cadres.
For the political reincorporation of former guerrillas, a new political party
has been created. The FARC15 enjoys legal status, economic and technical
support, access to media outlets, and security conditions. The party constitutes
a venue from which former cadres can pursue lawfully their political project
(Gobierno Nacional de Colombia and FARC—EP, 2016).
A series of economic aids are given to each demobilized FARC—EP
member (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia and FARC—EP, 2016): First, a
basic income corresponding to 90% of the country’s minimum wage (around
US $253 per month in 2017), which they receive for 24 months after the end
of ZVTN. Second, unemployed cadres can receive social security for a period of
24 months. Third, a sum of 2m. Colombian pesos (US $688), to be used for
relocation. Fourth, a lump sum of 8m. Colombian pesos (approximately US
$2,750) for the implementation of productive projects, which can be executed
individually or through the Economías Sociales del Común (ECOMUN)16.
The latter is a solidarity-based economic organization aimed at promoting
productive initiatives and supporting reincorporation through income-generating
activities (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia and FARC—EP, 2016).
The aforementioned economic beneﬁts grant cadres a large degree of inde-
pendence in the realization of their personal projects and in the process of
reincorporation. They are not conditional on the maintenance of links with
other ex-combatants or the FARC political party. These measures respect ex-
combatants' autonomy to decide what bonds with the organization they want
to preserve, and which they rather prescind.
In addition, the peace accord contemplates the design and implementation
of social programmes for the demobilized population, which include formal
education, job and skills training, as well as psychological support. These
programmes will be designed by the CNR and implemented by the Colombian
Government through the ACR.
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Guidelines for the interaction of FARC—EP members with host commu-
nities are established as part of reparations programmes. Participation in
concrete actions of reparation is voluntary, but can be taken into account for
judicial beneﬁts in the context of criminal prosecution (Gobierno Nacional de
Colombia and FARC—EP, 2016). These are not tailored to FARC—EP
members but to all the parties involved in the conﬂict, including state agents.
FARC—EP is collectively committed to carrying out reparative activities,
such as: working on infrastructure reconstruction in the most aﬀected terri-
tories; cleaning and decontaminating programmes in territories of anti-personnel
mines, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ammunition or explosive
remnants of war; participating in illegal crop substitution programmes; con-
tributing to the search, location, identiﬁcation and recovery of remains of
persons killed or missing in connection with the conﬂict; and supporting
reforestation programmes and other environmental projects (Gobierno
Nacional de Colombia and FARC—EP, 2016).
National plans for collective reparation of victims are also embedded in the
Rural Development Plan17. Finally, the national government will develop
programmes for the reconstruction of the social fabric in territories aﬄicted
by violence (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia and FARC—EP, 2016). While
this constitutes an ambitious agenda for reparative and reconciliatory activ-
ities, it should be noted that none of them are mandatory. Further, the
conditions for the encounter of FARC—EP members with receiving com-
munities are not explicitly stated by the document, and will be determined by
the CNR.
The challenges ahead for DDR and transitional justice in Colombia
Over the past decades the Colombian Government has created a peace
infrastructure as part of its various attempts to end the conﬂict (Pfeiﬀer,
2014). However, some DDR programmes were executed by the central gov-
ernment without a clear articulation and co-operation with regional and local
authorities. The programme for the mass demobilization of former AUC
combatants, for instance, imposed reintegration programmes while failing to
provide local authorities the appropriate resources and incentives to partici-
pate in the process (Jaramillo, et al., 2009). It has been argued, on the other
hand, that the ‘lack of reconciliation [after this peace process] is partly due to
the fact that initiatives aimed at ensuring truth, justice and reparations did
not accompany the DDR process’ (Jaramillo, et al., 2009, p. 5).
The current peace accord lays the institutional groundwork for a colla-
borative interaction between DDR and transitional justice while incorporat-
ing some lessons from those past eﬀorts. The juridical framework creates
transitional justice mechanisms to hold the perpetrators of serious human
rights violations accountable. The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP—
Special Jurisdiction for Peace)18 grants amnesties to combatants that did not
commit human rights abuses. The accord also creates opportunities to
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articulate DDR and transitional justice in ways that redress past harms. The
measures for reparation that the FARC—EP has committed to undertaking
as an organization can contribute to creating venues for reconciliation and
collaborative work with communities.
The burden falls mostly on the CNR, as it is in charge of planning and
monitoring the political, economic, psychological, and social reincorporation
of former combatants, and is responsible for carrying out pedagogical activ-
ities for peace and reconciliation. The institutional architecture of the CNR
lends itself to address the horizontal aspects of reconciliation. Although it is a
central governmental agency, one of its tasks is to create ‘territorial councils’,
and seek alliances with local and regional governments. Territorial councils
open a potential space for local and community initiatives, giving a voice to
the main stakeholders of the process. In this sense, the CNR is part of a peace
infrastructure, which makes use of the existing architecture of the ARN19
(Pfeiﬀer, 2014; Verzat, 2014). Since FARC—EP members are part of the
board of this institution, there is a higher likelihood that initiatives will be
more responsive to the voice and needs of former combatants. Thus, the CNR
harbors the potential to foster ex-combatants’ constructive participation in
their receiving communities, without denying their past and identity. The
accord applies a horizontal model of reconciliation to address a horizontal
conﬂict.
There are, however, serious risks in the process of implementing these
policies. First, improvisation is one of the greatest detractors for the eﬀec-
tiveness and the legitimacy of peace infrastructures (Verzat, 2014). Improvi-
sation is part of what undermined previous DDR processes in Colombia
(Jaramillo, et al., 2009; Ribetti, 2009), and has created serious downfalls for
the current one, as has been made clear from the preliminary reports on the
situation of the ZVTN.20
Second, the fact that the Government has not committed resources to the
CNR means that it must seek funds from international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and donors. The donor-based architecture allows
international organizations to determine the agenda of peacebuilding eﬀorts,
thereby imposing their own values, interests, and agendas (Pugh, 2000;
Mani, 2000; Lundy & McGovern, 2008), instead of bolstering the work of
grassroots organizations that represent the real interests of the community
(Pfeiﬀer, 2014; Lundy & McGovern, 2008). Thus, the ideal of community
empowerment may be eroded, as the local actors are deprived of agency.
These institutions also run the risk of being co-opted by criminal organi-
zations. In the early 2000s, a number of high-proﬁle cases took place, includ-
ing the co-option of DDR resources by an AUC front (Ribetti, 2009), and the
Corporación Democracia.21 This was an agency founded by the local gov-
ernment in Medellín to assist the process of AUC reintegration, and was
designed to implement community-based projects, involving former comba-
tants. A few years after its creation, it was found to be co-operating with the
so-called Envigado Oﬃce22. The agency had essentially become a façade to
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capture public resources while carrying out illegal activities (ICG, 2014;
Verdad Abierta, 2011).
In addition to the challenges inherent to process of reincorporation, the
broader picture should be kept in mind. Any DDR policy will be vain if the
violence against social leaders and ex-combatants continues, or if their lack of
conﬁdence in the process leads them to desertion. Likewise, the presence of
other illegal armed groups and their inﬂuence across the national territory
could undercut any attempt at reconciliation. The possibility of linking tran-
sitional justice with DDR is an interesting point of entry to prevent the return
of cadres into warfare and to promote reconciliation at the level of commu-
nities. While it may be the case that the values guiding the processes of DDR
and transitional justice are at odds with each other, the implementation of the
current peace accord with the FARC—EP can provide a fertile ground for
productive interactions between them.
Notes
1 The authors would like to express their gratitude towards all the people who con-
tributed to the development of this work. In particular, we want to thank Germán
Escovar Álvarez, for his contribution to the ﬁrst section of the paper and his tire-
less support throughout the process; Cristina García Navas, for collaborating in
the organization of the ‘Empathy and Reconciliation’ workshop at the IV Har-
vard-MIT-BU-Tufts Colombian Conference (Cambridge, MA, April 2016), which
prompted us to write on demobilization and reintegration; Fidelis Magalhaes and
Joshua Mitrotti, for their interventions at this workshop; and to Regis Ortiz, for
sharing with us his story, which gave us the inspiration and motivation to write this
piece.
2 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army.
3 The Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), Par-
tido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), Movimiento Armado Quintín
Lame (MAQL), Comandos Ernesto Rojas (CER), Corriente de Renovación
Socialista, El Frente Francisco Garnica, El Movimiento Independiente Revolu-
cionario Comandos Armados (MIR—COAR) and the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (AUC).
4 From diﬀerent guerrilla and paramilitary groups
5 In 2017 the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR), a Colombian
agency for the reintegration of people and armed groups, changed its name to the
Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (ARN—Agency for Rein-
corporation and Normalization.
6 Oﬃcial estimates show that the proportion of deceased within the demobilized
population that has not joined the ACR programme is three times higher (Mitrotti,
2016).
7 These calculations are based on captures and homicides related to delinquency:
however, it is argued that impunity—and under-reporting—might in fact imply
that this rate could in fact be much higher (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histór-
ica, 2015).
8 Foundation Ideas for Peace.
9 Quoted from a conversation with ex-FARC combatant, Regis Ortiz, in the context
of the IV Harvard-MIT-BU-Tufts Colombian Conference. Cambridge MA, April,
2016.
130 Reincorporation and reconciliation
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
10 Voluntary declarations. These are the voluntary statements from actors involved in
a particular legal process, in which the involved actors can present their account of
particular events.
11 There are exceptional cases of locally-based institutions that fostered these
encounters and sought to do justice to the horizontal nature of the conﬂict,
including the Victims Project and the mental health programmes sponsored by
AMOR (Asociación de Mujeres del Oriente Antioqueño), Conciudadanía, and the
Peace Programme of the Jesuit Community, all grassroots organizations based in
Antioquia. (See Diaz, 2008)
12 Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización.
13 FARC—EP combatants under the age of eighteen will be given the same legal
treatment awarded to victims of the conﬂict, and special conditions for their rein-
tegration will be set by the CNR.
14 Consejo Nacional de Reincorporación.
15 Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común.
16 A co-operative company created by FARC members that aims to undertake pro-
ductive projects with former guerrillas in their transit to civil life.
17 Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET). They will be the state’s
main instrument to implement development projects in the municipalities most
aﬀected by the armed conﬂict.
18 The framework that deﬁnes the Transitional justice setting in Colombia. For an
explanation on the mechanisms and institutions taking place in the JEP, see
Chapter 5.
19 Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (ARN). Formerly known as
the ACR, see footnote 5.
20 Press articles have denounced the absence of appropriate infrastructure, the
breaking-down of community bonds among former FARC—EP members, and
the high rates at which they are joining other illegal armed groups in their areas.
(See Prieto, Ardila, Velez, & Arenas, 2017; Ardila, 2017)
21 Democracy Corporation.
22 The ‘Oﬁcina de Envigado’ is a powerful criminal gang based in the Medellín area.
It was led by the paramilitary leader Don Berna until his extradition to the USA
in 2008. Despite the death or capture of many of its leaders, the Envigado Oﬃce
remains active today.
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9 Historical memory as symbolic
reparation
Limitations and opportunities of peace
infrastructures as institutional designs
Eliana Jimeno
Introduction
Memorialization processes implemented in deeply divided societies in the
wake of mass violence have the potential to repair social relations, dignify the
survivors, and reestablish relations between victims and the state. When
implemented appropriately, eﬀorts to memorialize a conﬂict can be an
important part of a government’s symbolic reparation programs. However,
this is not always the case. In Colombia, a lack of victims’ ownership over
symbolic reparation processes resulted in memorialization processes that had
negative repercussions on communities rebuilding after violence. Examining
the institutional design of Colombia’s mechanism for victims’ participation
within the National Reparations Program demonstrates how these can
become a barrier to victims proper involvement. To analyse this situation, the
chapter discusses the concept of peace infrastructures.
Colombia has implemented transitional justice mechanisms to redress vic-
tims since the 1997 Ley de Atención a Población Desplazada1 (Internal Dis-
placed Population Law), which aimed to address the consequences of internal
displacement in the country. However, in 2005 a fully-ﬂedged transitional
justice framework was implemented with the enactment of the Ley de Justicia
y Paz 2 (Justice and Peace Law—JPL) (see Chapter 4).
Previous work has criticized the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) for its per-
petrator-oriented approach and its lack of results (Stone, 2011; Cepeda,
2011). The process was deemed to be largely ineﬀective and the judiciary
instruments to vindicate victims’ rights proved insuﬃcient (International
Crisis Group, 2013). The exception was the symbolic reparation mechanisms,
which found reasonable success despite the ongoing violence (OACDH, Oﬁ-
cina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos
Humanos, 2009; Ruiz, 2015).
In 2011, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos incorporated
lessons from the JPL to pass a new law: the Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de
Tierras3, a framework oriented towards victims’ recognition and integral
reparation. The law created the Plan Nacional de Atención y Reparación
Integral a las Víctimas4 which comprised measures for reparation to be
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provided at the individual and collective level through material and symbolic
means.5
The inclusion of satisfaction measures facilitated the development of a
broader understanding of symbolic reparations to support peacebuilding in
Colombia, and facilitated the recognition of the state’s duty towards remem-
brance, through measures such as memory reconstruction, commemorations,
and oﬃcial apologies. These measures revised and modiﬁed of the mechan-
isms for victims’ participation in symbolic reparations that had been estab-
lished by the JPL, therefore aﬀecting the frameworks that were under
operation. However, this created a transitory uncertainty for victims around
how to access to the new procedures.
This chapter uses the concept of peace infrastructures to analyze the insti-
tutional design of victims’ participation in symbolic reparation measures
within Colombia’s transitional justice framework. The ﬁndings oﬀer key les-
sons and recommendations for implementing new mechanisms for victims’
participation in the symbolic reparation measures considered in the recent
peace agreements with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP).6 Importantly, I argue that a constantly
changing institutional framework can have negative consequences on the
social dynamics of victims’ mobilization and on their ability to eﬀectively
partake in the processes of symbolic reparation and memory reconstruction.
Symbolic reparations in transitional justice: ﬁnding the balance between
top-down and bottom-up approaches to historical memory
When mass violations of human rights during periods of conﬂict, dictatorship
or political repression are dealt with in accordance to international law, give
rise to transitional justice processes which include judicial mechanisms such
as prosecutions, trials, and vetting, and non-judicial mechanisms such as truth
seeking, institutional reform, and reparations (Teitel, 2003; Sriram, 2007;
Sisson, 2010). Although both mechanisms are equally relevant in a society’s
attempt to come to terms with the past, a greater deal of attention has been
paid on the tools to prosecute human rights violators than to those oriented
to satisfy the needs of victims by way of reparations (De Greiﬀ, 2006).
Reparations are considered an integral part of any transitional justice
initiative, even though neither the meaning nor the goals of reparations have
been settled either in theory or in practice (Richards, 2007). Under interna-
tional law the most common forms of reparations comprise restitution, com-
pensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-recurrence7 (De
Greiﬀ, 2006; United States Institute of Peace, 2008; REDRESS, 2013).
National reparations programmes usually adopt a simpliﬁed categorization of
reparations with beneﬁts conceived of either individually or collectively, and
as material or symbolic. Often times in the case of symbolic reparations, the
measures related to satisfaction, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition
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are, for policy purposes, combined and put under the same category of
actions aiming to repair the intangible impacts of the conﬂict.
The role of symbolic reparations in transitional contexts has increasingly
been recognized as equally important as material reparations, due to the
potential of the former to promote redress, foster solidarity, reweave a com-
munity’s social fabric, and restore the dignity of victims and survivors (De
Greiﬀ, 2006; REDRESS, 2013; & Lederach, 2014). Even though ‘symbolic
reparations may not have the media impact of trials and assertive forms of
truth recovery’ (Brown, 2013, p. 274), they have a powerful ritual and com-
municational capacity: symbolic reparations function as carriers of meaning.
Victims have a key role in deciding what is meaningful. Otherwise, survivors
may feel that the “meaning” that the state has created is empty.
Historical memory initiatives are an important example of symbolic
reparation activity that aims to realize the individual and collective ‘right to
truth’, to ﬁnd out what happened during the conﬂict and to comprehend the
circumstances that led to gross human rights violations. Previous work has
deﬁned historical memory as a society’s central or dominant narrative while it
is consistent in can evolve over time, and exists alongside other narratives that
are integrated within the community’s social and political life. However, while
in some cases historical memory can bring individuals together and form an
important part of nationalist movements, these narratives can also be polar-
izing. Hence, the importance of memory reconstruction in transitional con-
texts lies in the possibility it provides to build a narrative of the future, based
upon a thorough revision of the past and the elements and actors that elicited
and enacted violence. These initiatives of historical memory open space for
the emergence of victims’ testimonies, contributing to the creation of a wider
account of what happened, in which victims can controvert, validate, and
challenge the hegemonic narratives of the conﬂict.
The scope of memory reconstruction processes within transitional justice
endeavours is usually deﬁned ‘from above’ with mechanisms designed by the
actors who negotiate the peace, and implemented by national governments
and institutions or by international non-governmental organizations through
diﬀerent procedures that seek to ascertain the truth and achieve account-
ability according to minimum international human rights standards (Mani,
2002; Minow, 1998; Gómez Isa, 2012). However, memorialization practices
are not exclusive to the state, international parties, or negotiating groups. In
fact, societies and communities that have endured long periods of conﬂict
develop mechanisms that seek to preserve testimonies and other accounts of
the conﬂict in the hope that in a transition period those narratives can
emerge. These informal practices of memory reconstruction may take the
form of localized memory initiatives and make use of non-institutional vehi-
cles such as murals, poetry, music, and storytelling among others (Centro
Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013).
This recognition of the value of historical memory ‘from below,’ builds on
the participation of a wider constituency beyond the state and seeks to be
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context-sensitive, allowing the local to inform the instruments of memory
reconstruction (Uprimny & Saﬀon, 2008). The process then rests more
meaningfully on citizens as key stakeholders and agents of change, on their
knowledge of the root causes of the conﬂict they experienced, and on their
experience of the socio-political environment, as opposed to externally
imposed assessments of their realities and needs (Lederach, 1997; Doyle &
Sambanis, 2000).
Exclusively ‘top-down’ processes of memory reconstruction ﬁnd their
weakness in the lack of victims’ eﬀective participation. This hinders the
potential for memory processes to eﬀectively transform a society as they fail
to integrate social sectors that have been historically disenfranchised, and
therefore reproduce schemes and structures of segregation and power. This
eﬀect is ampliﬁed when the institutions that implement the reparations pro-
gramme are the same or mimic the practices of those that committed human
rights abuses during the conﬂict. Likewise, historical memory processes, when
driven by predeﬁned understandings of justice and operationalized as ‘one-
size-ﬁts-all’ programmes, fail to recognize and respond to the multi-faceted com-
plexities and dimensions of a conﬂict, leaving the needs of victims ill-addressed
(Mani, 2002; Heyzer, 2004; McEvoy & Eriksson, 2006).
Exclusively bottom-up historical memory processes also have their own
limitations. In the ﬁrst place, the term ‘bottom-up’ implies that the informa-
tion must come from the ‘bottom’ and the responses should also be ‘loca-
lized’. However, the meaning of ‘local’ is often not clear, since local is deﬁned
in relation to places, levels, and networks (Hirblinger, 2017). Therefore, ‘loca-
lized’ memory initiatives mean diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people. Secondly,
there often is an assumption, when using the term ‘local’, that there is a
community attached to it. However, multiple group identities can exist within
a single community; and some even have opposing beliefs, norms and values.
Therefore, romanticizing the local can fall into the trap of failing to recognize
complexities such as the existence of diﬀerent identities, the presence of ‘good’
and ‘bad’ locals (peacebuilders and peace spoilers), as well as the unequal
power relations that occur at the grassroots level (Mac Ginty & Polanska,
2015; Hirblinger, 2017).
Likewise, ‘bottom-up’ historical memory initiatives are not per se context
sensitive nor empowering to the most aﬀected and silenced victims of a com-
munity. There is the risk of assuming that all locally-led historical memory process
will represent victims’ needs, when in reality local memory initiatives can also
reinforce existing power structures and narratives and leave victims’ needs
unaddressed (Mac Ginty & Polanska, 2015).
Both top-down and bottom-up memory reconstruction approaches are
nonetheless based on the great potential of memory to reconstruct a nation’s
narrative, re-establish community life, provide symbolic closure and cathartic
healing, foster reconciliation, and transform social relationships (see Chapter
12). However, designing a symbolic reparation programmes as part of
national transitional justice processes requires a thoughtful consideration of
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how to strike balance between the political interests and goals of the state in
awarding reparations and the victims’ need to break their silence, share their
testimonies, ﬁnd and have their suﬀering acknowledged, and have their dig-
nity restored. After all, public memory is a contested space where diﬀerent
narratives of the past dispute their place in a nation’s future identity. There-
fore, the institutional design of symbolic reparations programmes is a key
aspect for bridging the gap between bottom-up and top-down approaches to
historical memory.
Institutional Design of Victims’ Participation Mechanisms in Colombia:
An Evolving Framework?
Colombia has been implementing national reparation programs within tran-
sitional justice frameworks for many years (see Chapter 4). The Internally
Displaced Population Law (IDPs Law, 1997) set a precedent for the mechan-
isms for victims’ participation within reparation processes, as it established
procedures to allow Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) to partake in the
design, implementation, and monitoring of reparations-like programmes at
the local and national level. The IDPs Law was established to address the
consequences of forced internal displacement in the country. While the law
was not originally designed as part of a transitional justice framework, it has
had an important impact on subsequent transitional justice initiatives.
The law created two mechanisms that considered victims’ participation: 1)
The Plan Integral Único (PIU),8 a planning instrument that compiled the
programmes and projects for IDPs territorial attention, and 2) the Comités
Territoriales de Atención a Población Desplazada9 as councils for the discus-
sion of the design of the IDP regional strategy. Despite their existence, the
mechanisms were left unimplemented until 2005 when the Constitutional
Court of Colombia ordered the Colombian state to guarantee the eﬀective
participation of IDPs in the implementation of the law (López Pedraza &
Restrepo, 2009). In response, the state activated the aforementioned mechan-
isms and created eight new mechanisms: four permanent ‘National Boards’,
one for each stage of the IDP policy—prevention and protection, emergency
humanitarian assistance, socioeconomic development, and organization
strengthening—and four equivalent ‘Territorial Roundtables.’
On the surface, it appeared that this would ensure victims were more
involved in the process, however the implementation of these participation
mechanisms had multiple ﬂaws. First, they presumed victims’ organizations
had a type and level of organizational structure, as they demanded all local
organizations to be articulated with national ones in order to have access to
the established participation scenarios. Second, no clear operational rules and
procedures for the participation of victims’ representatives were deﬁned.
Third, the institutional design disregarded any informal forms of victims’
organizations that did not ﬁt into the parameters established by the law.
Fourth, the absence of clarity in the distribution of responsibilities made it
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diﬃcult to guarantee their eﬀective implementation; and ﬁnally, the lack of
funding for the newly constituted participation bodies translated into the sti-
ﬂing of these participation scenarios (Vargas Reina, 2014)
As a result – despite having formally opened a space – integrating victims’
participation in the implementation of reparation-like frameworks, few vic-
tims actually participated. As one scholar describes, the institutional design of
the IDPs Law did not consider the ‘formal and informal procedures, routines,
norms and conventions that are embedded in the organizational structure of
the political community’ (Uribe-López, 2015, p. 9). Therefore, the law trans-
ferred the responsibilities to local authorities that did not have the required
technical capacity and created participation scenarios without considering the
nature of the organizational processes of the IDPs, falling into the trap of
assuming ‘the success of peacebuilding depends on the design of ‘right’ institutions,
without taking into account the plurality of situations related to the various
relationships between formal and informal rules’ (Uribe-López, 2015, p. 10).
In 2005, a second precedent for mechanisms of victims’ participation was
established through the JPL, a transitional justice framework issued to
achieve the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of illegal armed
groups, mainly former members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(AUC).10 The law also aimed to recognize and enforce the rights of the vic-
tims to truth, justice, and reparation, and to conduct criminal proceedings
against the leaders of these groups that were responsible for the commission
of serious crimes (International Criminal Court, 2010).
In writing, the JPL adopted the standard reparations mechanisms recom-
mended in international law, including restitution, compensation, rehabilita-
tion, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-recurrence. Moreover, to implement
the provisions speciﬁcally related to measures of satisfaction, guarantees of
non-repetition and memory preservation, the Comisión Nacional de Repara-
ción y Reconciliación (CNRR)11 was created in 2005. The CNRR adopted
the concept of ‘integral reparation’ in the execution of its mandate. This
implied, on the one hand, that reparations must coherently advance justice,
truth and reparations, and on the other, that reparations should not be limited
to their material dimension but should also include the symbolic dimension
for individual and collective victims (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y
Reconciliación, 2006).
The CNRR conceived mechanisms for victims’ participation within the
National Program of Reparations in four types of processes: (1) the process of
psychosocial recovery and attention to special needs, (2) the judicial investi-
gation process of judgement of the person responsible, (3) the administrative
process of collective reparation to communities or groups aﬀected by acts of
systematic violence, and (4) the process of social construction of truth and
memory (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, 2006). How-
ever, due to the CNRR’s institutional design, planned as a centralized insti-
tution with restricted articulation to the country’s municipalities and
departments and with insuﬃcient regional presence,12 victims had limited
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access to the aforementioned participation mechanisms (Comisión Inter-
americana de Derechos Humanos, 2013).
The Grupo de Memoria Histórica (GMH)13 was the oﬃce within the
CNRR in charge of advancing the memory reconstruction process as part of
symbolic reparations. The GMH’s objective was to construct and disseminate
a comprehensive narrative of the Colombian conﬂict that could serve as a
platform for dialogue between the diverse conﬂict actors and issue a ﬁnal
report on the origin and evolution of the illegal armed groups (Congreso de
la República de Colombia, 2005). Two important aspects made the GMH’s
memory reconstruction process distinctive. First, its non-legally binding
character, meaning that no testimony collected by the GMH could serve as
evidence to support judicial cases; second, its academic-oriented approach
was thought of as a shield to protect the GMH’s memorialization work from
the national political dissension and social discomfort potentially caused by
the exercise of memory reconstruction in the midst of conﬂict.
The absence of clear mechanisms for victims’ participation within the
GMH’s symbolic reparation process was not well received by victims and
victims’ organizations. In a country where locally led memorialization initia-
tives had existed since the late 1980s, the proposed top-down, centralist
approach did not take root. As a result, the GMH adjusted its discourse and
framed historical memory reconstruction as a participative process where the
testimony of the victims should be at the centre of the historical account of
the country’s violence. As a former GHM researcher put it:
The GMH opted to redeﬁne the interpretation of the law’s mandate by
incorporating four principles about the role memory reconstruction
should play in a society in transition as follows: First, to contribute to clarify
human rights violations and acts of violence from the victims’ perspec-
tive; second, to dignify and serve as a platform to provide the victims
with a space in which to voice their suﬀering; third, to make visible the
damage caused by conﬂict; and fourth, to eﬀectively repair victims.
(GMH Researcher #1, 2013).
By adopting this discourse and incorporating the demands of victims for an
open process, the GMH was able to dissipate the initial doubts victims, vic-
tims’ organizations, and human rights defenders had about the authenticity of the
GMH’s historical memory reconstruction project. The GMH was then able to
guarantee the inclusion and participation of, at least, those victims who took
part in the memorialization processes—also known as ‘memory reports’—
that the GMH completed during its mandate.14 Nevertheless, not all victims
had the opportunity to participate in this memory reconstruction process.
The failure to include all victims’ voices was an outcome of the centralized
institutional design of the JPL, which allocated limited budgetary and human
resources to its implementing institutions. The GHM only had one oﬃce in
Bogotá, and no regional presence. This structure made it diﬃcult for victims
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to have an eﬀective level of participation in the process of memory recon-
struction within the spaces provided by the GMH. The process for including
the voices of victims lacked a standard process or mechanism for victims’
participation. As a result the form and scope of including victims in this
process varied depending on the methodological decisions by the lead
researcher of each memory report.15
Moreover, this centralized institutional design, was further limited by an
ongoing and active conﬂict in Colombia. The dynamics of this conﬂict
imposed physical barriers to the process of memory reconstruction within the
JPL. This precluded the inclusion and participation of multiple victims and
victims’ organizations, since only those victims or organizations located in the
regions with adequate security and favorable political conditions were subject
to the GMH intervention. As a result, ‘the memory report became a privilege
among disenfranchised communities’ (GMH Researcher #2, 2013). This had
the unintended consequence of creating status diﬀerences among victims and
victims’ organizations (Missionary Sister #1, 2013).
Some progress was made during the third and most recent transitional jus-
tice framework, the Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras16 (known as The
Victims’ Law—see Chapter 4). This is the ﬁrst piece of legislation by the
Colombian state to oﬃcially recognize the existence of an internal armed
conﬂict in the country. The law aims to provide a set of measures for victims’
integral reparation, including humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, eco-
nomic compensation, land restitution, and satisfaction measures. Further-
more, the law establishes a legal victimhood status for any person who
suﬀered grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law
as a result of the conﬂict since 1985 (Congreso de la República de Colombia,
2011), meaning that access to reparations is also granted to victims of crimes
other than forced internal displacement.
With regards to symbolic reparations, the Victims’ Law strengthened the pre-
existing institutional framework, focusing on memory reconstruction through the
creation of the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH)17, which
assumed the role of the GMH. With CNMH, the Colombian government gave
a strong political backing of the role of memory reconstruction as a tool for
reparation and peacebuilding. The law’s provisions also designed mechanisms
for victims’ participation in all reparation measures, including the process of
memory reconstruction. This was done via the reactivation and adjustment of
the aforementioned mechanisms created under the IDPs Law, as well as through
the establishment of a Participation Protocol to regulate the eﬀective and active
participation of victims.
The enactment of this protocol embodies the institutional recognition of
the failures and limitations of previous initiatives by the Colombian state. The
Victims’ Law sought to guarantee that all victims would have the right to
participate in memory initiatives. It implied a change in the participation
rules by means of regulating the requisites for the period of, election by,
functions of, prohibitions of, and incentives for the participation of victims’
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representatives in the boards and institutions that execute the Victims’ Law
(Vargas Reina, 2014). Likewise, in comparison to the participation framework
stated in the IDPs Law, the protocol ‘promotes the inclusion of people aﬀec-
ted by diﬀerent victimizing facts, creates mechanisms for articulation between
the diﬀerent levels of government, establishes open dialogue sessions in the
territorial councils and assemblies, and oﬀers incentives for participation’
(Vargas Reina, 2014, p. 186).
The intention of this institutional design was to decentralize the imple-
mentation of all the main components of the Victims’ Law.18 With regards to
those components pertaining to memory as symbolic reparation, the goal was
to give victims a higher degree of inﬂuence in the framing and decision-making
over the institutionally-led memory processes, to recognize the diversity of the
country’s memory landscape, to strengthen local memory initiatives, and to
further expand the state’s duty to remember to local authorities. However, as
can be seen in Table 1, the number of formal mechanisms created speciﬁcally
for memory reconstruction, even when put into eﬀect in all of the country’s
1,122 municipalities and 32 departments (DANE, 2016), are insuﬃcient to
eﬀectively guarantee the right of more than 8.5m. victims to participate in
symbolic reparations (UARIV, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral
a las Víctimas, 2017).
Neither the Victims’ Law nor the Participation Protocol addressed the
absence of speciﬁc mechanisms that could ensure the eﬀective participation of
victims eﬀective in the processes led by the CNMH, former GMH. Even the
institution that was created to coordinate the implementation of the Victims’
Law, the Unidad de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV)
was unable to guarantee victims’ participation in memory initiatives.19
Moreover, the two institutions did not have clear procedures to harmonize
their memory reconstruction programmes. This has often led to duplication
of eﬀorts, ineﬀective budgetary execution, and further obstruction of vic-
tims’ participation. This is because the scope of the competencies of each
institution at the territorial level is not necessarily clear to victims and
victims’ organizations. In this sense, the institutional design of the participation
mechanisms for memory reconstruction within the Victims’ Law inherited
both the representation and co-ordination problems of the IDPs Law, and
those of the JPL transitional justice framework (Arias & Caballero, 2005).
While these examples highlight the shortfalls of mechanisms for victims’
participation in historical memory processes in Colombia, this experience also
provides important lessons for improvement, to achieve the goal of guaran-
teeing and promoting the eﬀective participation of victims and victims’
organizations in the institutionally-led national, regional, and local pro-
cesses of historical memory. In the following section, I discuss the concept
of peace infrastructures to analyse the Colombian institutional design for the
participation of victims in symbolic reparation programmes. Building from
this idea, I argue that the social dynamics of victims’ mobilization needs to be
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Table 9.1 Mechanisms of Victims’ Participation in Colombia
Function IPD Law
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considered when designing victims’ participation mechanisms if the goal of
victims’ inclusion in symbolic reparation processes to be realized.
Symbolic Reparations as Peace Infrastructures
The concept of peace infrastructures is part of the turn to the contested local
in peacebuilding studies and peacebuilding practice (Richmond, 2013). Peace
infrastructures are a ‘dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechan-
isms, resources, values, and skills which […] contribute to conﬂict [transfor-
mation] and peacebuilding in a society’ (Kumar, 2011, p. 385). These peace
infrastructures have, as the name suggests, a structured and systematic char-
acter that ‘distinguishes them from the ‘naturally evolved’ peace con-
stituencies found at diﬀerent levels of society. […] They have a high level of
government involvement and intra-governmental coherence that emphasizes
the commitment of the regime to support peace eﬀorts’ (Hopp-Nishanka,
2013a, p. 4), as well as a domestic foundation, meaning the performance
aspect of the network depends on the capacities of the socio-political structures
and the stakeholders that comprise those networks.
The concept of peace infrastructures can enrich studies on how victims’
participation mechanisms are designed and implemented and the ways in
which existing institutions can support the reparation process. First, the idea
of peace infrastructures suggests an interdependent network of structures or
values, acknowledges the complexity of any peacebuilding endeavour. This
accounts for the diﬀerent levels of decision-making that need to be involved, (the
social, cultural, political and economic factors that need to be accounted for) and
the meanings (values) attached to the mechanism. Second, the structured
character of peace infrastructures speaks to a holistic understanding of
peacebuilding, where diﬀerent parts of the process need to be articulated in a
complementary manner. Third, the systematic quality of peace infrastructures
articulates an eﬀort that needs to be sustained in time. Finally, this concept
highlights the need for a domestic foundation or ownership of the structure at
its level of implementation implies that these infrastructures rely on societal
participation, and are as aﬀected by informal rules as they are by formal ones.
Based on these elements, I argue that symbolic reparations should be
established as a peace infrastructure, as a ‘system’ involving not only the sum
of diﬀerent types of symbolic measures (memory reconstruction, archives,
apologies, commemorations, museums) but also the set of societal levels (top,
middle, and grassroots), administrative units (local, district, regional, and
national), actors (institutions, organizations, and individuals), frameworks
(councils, roundtables, boards, and committees), processes (validation, elec-
tion, and participation) and outcomes (alliances, platforms, projects, and
initiatives) which are involved in the design, implementation, sustainability,
and appropriation of this form of reparation (Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a).
A peace infrastructure approach could address the deﬁciencies in the design
of mechanisms for victims’ participation in memory reconstruction processes
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in Colombia as the concept highlights the extent to which a careful con-
sideration of the synergies between the diﬀerent aspects involved in imple-
menting symbolic reparations have been absent. Peace infrastructures
emphasizes the importance of considering the interdependent interaction
between the type of symbolic measure, the societal level at which is imple-
mented, the administrative unit responsible for the implementation, the actors
involved in the process, and the outcome expected has in the design and
implementation of mechanisms for victims’ participation in symbolic
reparations.
The analysis of the participatory components of historical memory pro-
cesses as symbolic reparations in Colombia shows that the aforementioned aspects
are either disregarded or not fully considered in the institutional design of the
mechanisms. This is precisely because they are not being conceived as a
system, but rather seen as independent processes. Hence the disconnection
between the reparation goals and the impact of those reparations at the local
level is made evident in practice—a disconnection that the institutional design
is not able to, or does not intend to, address (Paladini Adell, 2013).
This is not to say that all the already constituted councils, committees,
roundtables, and other mechanisms for victims’ participation created by the
three transitional justice frameworks analysed do not create a network. In
the laws, the connections between these frameworks exists: they are part of
the institutional framework for victims’ participation. However, in the context
of their performance as a mechanism that guarantees eﬀective victims’ parti-
cipation, and in their functioning as a structure in interaction with other
institutions of the transitional framework, these participation mechanisms
have failed to deliver in their role as transitional institutions for symbolic
reparation. Their physical and material presence is irrefutable, but so is their
limited scope and impact as they have, in many municipalities, ‘remained
empty shells, risking being captured and instrumentalized for partisan interests’
(Hopp-Nishanka, 2013b, p. 58).
In this context, framing symbolic reparations as a peace infrastructure for
institutional design purposes directs policy makers to carefully consider how
the interaction of all components of the system, and victims’ inclusion, can
work in order to have a positive impact in the moment of practical imple-
mentation of the reparation (Moon, 2012; Paﬀenholz, 2015). It also prompts
policy makers to consider all of the interactions between the institutions and
actors, facilitating reparations and bringing into the light the lessons from
previous initiatives. Two decades of attempts at reparation cannot be discarded
by decree.
Thus, the eﬀective inclusion of a systemic lens and a lessons-learning per-
spective that informs this peace infrastructure in reparation programmes calls
for the active participation of a broad number of actors (such as local autho-
rities, local leaders, victims’ representatives and other grassroots and middle-
level actors and organizations) not only as beneﬁciaries, but also as key
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contributors to the decision-making around the establishment of the frame-
works to implement eﬀective victims’ participation in symbolic reparations.
To address this disconnect in the implementation of symbolic reparations
(including historical memory processes), giving monitoring competencies to
other sub-national actors who have been supporting peacebuilding in
Colombia for years could provide a venue for bringing lessons and reﬂection
on what works and does not work in this system. For example, institutions
such as the Programas de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio20 and the
Comunidades de Paz21 de San José de Apartadó, Samaniego, Mogotes and
Tarso, as well as structures such as the Consejo Nacional de Paz22 or the
Comisión Nacional de Conciliación23, inter alia, can serve as guarantors, not
only of the eﬀective participation of victims, but also of the adequate inter-
locution and interaction of the diﬀerent components of the system of sym-
bolic reparations as a peace infrastructure, with enough recognition to bring
legitimacy to these discussions and enough institutional capacity to serve as
holders of the lessons of past initiatives.
As a new set of victims’ participation mechanisms for symbolic reparation
measures are considered as part of the peace agreement between the Colombian
government and the FARC-EP, this chapter oﬀers four recommendations.
First, future eﬀorts should make use of the country’s polycentric territorial
organization, which involves the existence of multiple decision centres such as
municipalities, departments, provinces, sub-regions, and regions, as guaran-
tors of the implementation of the symbolic reparations mechanisms included
in the ﬁnal accord and for the participation of victims (Uribe-López, 2015).
Second, these eﬀorts should promote the self-transformative aspect of peace
infrastructures in symbolic reparation processes by creating awareness at the
decision-making level about the ﬂaws and limitations of the current mechan-
isms for victims’ participation in symbolic reparation processes so that cur-
rent mistakes become lessons for policy makers (Hopp-Nishanka, 2013b;
Powers & Proctor, 2015). Third, new processes of symbolic reparations should
be linked to long-term agendas for change such as the ones that several vic-
tims’ organizations have already created as part of their ‘Collective Repara-
tion Plans’ (Paladini Adell, 2013). Fourth, these initiatives should design
participation mechanisms that connect the identity, history, traditions, and
forms of organizations of victims and victims’ organizations, for the proposed
mechanisms of symbolic reparations. After all, only by bringing sub-national
issues and ideas to the national level, and contextualizing and rooting the
participation mechanisms in local realities, aspirations, and agendas, can the
symbolic reparation measures contemplated in the peace agreement be turned
into an eﬀective infrastructure to build sustainable peace in the long run in
Colombia (Paladini Adell, 2013).
The lens oﬀered by the concept of peace infrastructures helps us think of
the institutional settings and the ways in which organizations and their capa-
cities can prove or fail to provide reparation. It also allows for the recognition
of the diﬀerent actors, structures, and issues that are part of a complex system
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that shape peacebuilding infrastructures, and the ways in which they coalesce
and dissociate not according to ﬁxed norms, but in response to the incentives
and deterrents the context oﬀers (Mac Ginty & Polanska, 2015).
This implies the norms, the institutions, and the peacebuilding activities
developed by local and national actors are constantly reshaped by means of
the everyday interactions among them (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012). As a
result, tactics ranging from total acceptance, negotiation and co-optation, to
counter organization, resistance and open rejection become visible. These
bring to the forefront the processes of negotiation, adjustment, and accom-
modation that take place at diﬀerent implementation levels, among a broad
range of actors, over local, national and international peace goals such as
symbolic reparations and victims’ participation.
The utility of adopting the concept of peace infrastructures lies in the pos-
sibilities it opens to grasp historical memory reconstruction at the local level
for what it is: a complex, living social process where memory entrepreneurs at
the local, national, and international level are constantly interacting and
adapting their behaviour according to the emerging changes in the context.
Likewise, this approach to memory reconstruction brings to light the social,
political, and economic factors that can inﬂuence the participation of victims
and victims’ organizations, such as: their form of organization, level of
strength, degree of knowledge about memory and reparations. It also high-
lights contextual aspects such as institutional designs, security conditions,
political will, and the availability of economic resources for the implementa-
tion of the symbolic reparation.
In the case of Colombia, the value attributed to the bureaucratic design
and procedural details necessary for establishing symbolic reparations tends
to overshadow the emblematic meaning and operational procedures for the
reparation itself. This is true even when it is that symbolism that plays a
crucial role in reconstructing the social fabric, and healing collective and
individual social wounds (Lykes & Mersky, 2006). This leaves little to no
room for victims to have a say in neither the design of the main objectives, or
the mechanisms through which memory is being implemented. Too often
these decisions have been made at a governmental level, without the eﬀective
participation of victims. This creates tensions in local memorialization prac-
tices, especially when the language, symbols, and metaphors in which com-
munities frame their narratives are not integrated or considered in the
institutional symbolic reparation endeavour.
As the Colombian government begins establishing mechanisms to imple-
ment the transitional justice agreement with the FARC-EP, there is a critical
need to bridge local and national goals through memory reconstruction as
symbolic reparation. It is important to create eﬀective participation scenarios
where negotiation over the interests, needs, meanings, and goals related to
memory reconstruction can take place, peace infrastructures is a useful con-
cept for improving the design of victims’ participation mechanisms during
memory reconstruction in the country, as it directs policy makers towards an
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approach that is more ﬂexible and responsive to the complex realities and
diverse expectations of a transitional period. This can help ensure that pro-
cesses of memory reconstruction are relevant to the collective and to the
individual, by both speaking to the institutional needs of the state and
achieving the goals of symbolic reparations for victims.
Notes
1 Law 387 of 1997.
2 Law 975 of 2005.
3 Victims and Land Restitution Law, Law 1448 of 2011.
4 National Plan for the Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims (PNARIV).
5 Compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation, restitution, and guarantees of non-
repetition.
6 Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conﬂicto y la Construcción de una Paz
Estable y Duradera.
7 Restitution seeks to restore the victim to the situation that would have existed had
the crime not happened. Compensation refers to the quantiﬁcation of the harm
suﬀered and the measures to make up for it. Rehabilitation refers to social, medical
and psychological care. Satisfaction includes apologies, commemorations, public
disclosure of the truth, searches for the disappeared, and the restoration of the
dignity of victims through remembrance. Guarantees of non-recurrence include
cessation of violations, administrative and judicial sanctions, and institutional
reform.
8 Unique Integral Plan.
9 Territorial Committees for the Comprehensive Care of Internally Displaced
Population.
10 United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia.
11 National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation.
12 The CNRR only had ﬁve regional oﬃces, in Antioquia, Bucaramanga, Sincelejo,
Barranquilla and Bogotá; and a non-permanent presence in seven cities: Valledu-
par, Cartagena, Quibdó, Cali, Pasto, Mocoa and Villavicencio. These are 12 oﬃ-
ces, in just 12 out of 1,122 municipalities.
13 Historical Memory Group.
14 Under the GMH mandate, 13 processes of historical memory reconstruction were
conducted. During this time, the GMH also initiated the research phase of the
General Report published in 2013, Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y
Dignidad.
15 The methodology applied by the GMH to advance the memory reconstruction
process was based on ‘emblematic cases’ that could portray the diﬀerent modalities
of violence in the Colombian conﬂict and exemplify its impact on transversal
issues such as gender, ethnicity, and justice, among others.
16 Victims and Land Restitution Law, Law 1448 of 2011.
17 National Center for Historical Memory.
18 i) Comprehensive care and assistance; ii) integral reparation; iii) prevention and
protection; iv) truth and justice; and v) complementary measures (such as judicial
and psychological support).
19 Unit for Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims.
20 The Programs of Development and Peace of the Magdalena Medio.
21 Peace Communities.
22 National Peace Council.
23 The National Conciliation Commission.
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10 Enhancing reconciliation in the




Colombia has been at war for more than 50 years, and is now embarking on
an ambitious process of reconciliation. What constitutes the practices of
reconciliation, the timing to achieve it, whether it is a goal or process, or if it
occurs at national or individual levels are a few of the questions that make it
diﬃcult to agree on a deﬁnition of reconciliation (Gloppen, 2005; Olsen &
Reite, 2010; Skaar, 2013). Objectives of reconciliation widely discussed in the
literature include: acknowledging the past, restoring relationships, bringing
justice, establishing a common narrative, unveiling the truth, and re-establishing
trust within a society. These objectives are usually presented in diﬀerent
combinations, sequences, and timing with respect to implementation.
Most authors agree that reconciliation more closely resembles a process
rather than a speciﬁc outcome, and that this process entails a constant itera-
tion between the micro interpersonal dimension and the macro national/political
dimension (Hamber, 2009; Lederach, 1997; Philpott, 2015). Some scholars,
however, see reconciliation as both a goal and a process, with the goal of
reconciliation being to provide vision or ideal from which the process of
transitioning from war can ﬁnd inspiration and meaning (Bloomﬁeld, 2016).
For the purposes of this chapter, it is useful to provide a working deﬁnition,
which includes common elements from other deﬁnitions (Gloppen, 2005;
Lederach, 1997; Philpott, 2015; Hayner, 2001):
Reconciliation can be understood as a multi-level process of restoring
broken relationships among individuals or groups of a given society,
whereby they ﬁnd ways to deal with a violent past and envision the goal
of building a cohesive society in which their rights are acknowledged and
respected.
Reconciliation does not happen in the abstract and cannot be mandated by
decree or judicial order. Because it involves individuals and groups discerning
ways to decrease tensions, change negative beliefs about others, and heal
emotional and social damage, it is clear that reconciliation involves
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
psychosocial1 tasks. This chapter discusses the psychosocial tasks present in
national reconciliation eﬀorts, and identiﬁes opportunities to tackle them in
one present-day example of a practice of reconciliation—the forthcoming
Colombian truth commission.2
Truth commissions—usually with a mandate to contribute to national
reconciliation—are a common element of transitional justice frameworks. For
example, the goals of the Colombian truth commission highlight the impor-
tance of promoting coexistence and guarantees of non-repetition.3 While a
well-implemented truth commission has enormous potential for enhancing
national reconciliation in a country, its success in so doing is far from assured.
While some authors are critical of the link between transitional justice mechanisms
and reconciliation,4 (Hayner, 2001; Leebaw, 2008; Ignatieﬀ, 1997; Mendeloﬀ,
2009), these critiques often originate from various schools of thought (e.g. jur-
idical, political, etc.), which tend to view reconciliation through their respective
methodological lenses..
In this chapter, a psychosocial lens is used to refocus the discussion on the
processes and procedures practices of truth-seeking exercises, wherein it is
believed that the potential of reconciliation lies.
Provided that complete healing is not possible (Herman, 2015; Minow,
1998), adopting a psychosocial lens in the design and implementation of the
Colombian truth commission will help to clarify the complexities and
ambivalences that surround the socio-emotional5 tasks of reconciliation.
Speciﬁcally, this chapter argues that if the Colombian truth commission looks
beyond truth-seeking and truth-telling as the core objectives of the commis-
sion, to include enabling practices for reﬂecting and processing contested
collective and social identities and narratives, it will have a greater likelihood
of supporting the emotional healing of its participants and promoting the
reconstruction of shattered political identities and projects. Therefore, enhancing
the potential for reconciliation.
Truth commissions, psychology and reconciliation
Truth commissions and reconciliation
A truth commission is usually a mandated mechanism of inquiry and truth-
telling, which is supported by a legal framework. Its procedures, objectives,
and results are determined by the context in which it takes place. Three main
objectives of truth commissions are: 1) establishing the truth about crimes and
events, what persons/groups are responsible for crimes, the causes of abuses, and
historical explanations; 2) protecting, recognizing, and restoring the rights of
victims; and 3) fostering positive social and political transformations (González
& Varney, 2013). As such, truth commissions provide a middle ground between
trials and amnesties as they balance political limitations (such as peace agree-
ments) and demands of justice, such as acknowledgment, truth-seeking and
truth-telling (Olsen & Reite, 2010). Because truth commissions create a
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platform where key elements to converge (for example, diﬀerent narratives,
victims and perpetrators, and public accounts), they have the potential to enable
the use of speciﬁc psychosocial tasks that foster national reconciliation.
However, what holds the potential to be reconciliatory in a truth commis-
sion is not entirely clear and some authors have expressed their concern in
assuming a causal link between the two (Hayner, 2001; Hamber, 2009; Igna-
tieﬀ, 1997; Mendeloﬀ, 2009). For instance, one assumption is that hearing
and telling truth leads to psychological healing or is in itself reconciliatory.
Even though storytelling and testimony can provide a signiﬁcant form of
denunciation of human rights violations and could be used as a ritual with
positive psychological eﬀects, the potential to foster healing or reconciliation
goes beyond truth by itself. The healing potential lies in the quality of practices,
procedures, and methodologies in which that truth is revealed or heard. In other
words, assuming simplistically that ‘revealing is healing’ could even undermine
the potential for healing and reconciliation presented in a truth commission
(Castro & Gómez, 2013; Hayner, 2001).
Often, the possibilities of achieving synergies between truth commissions
and reconciliation are lost when the vast project of a truth commission is
reduced to just ‘telling the truth’ or to an outcome—usually a report. This
simpliﬁcation risks overlooking the signiﬁcance of the process and its related
potential to rebuild trust in the social contract, repair relations, and bring
acknowledgement and awareness of what happened during the conﬂict.
In transitional justice mechanisms, there is a tendency to see psychology
and law as contradictory, rather than complementary, disciplines. This creates
a lack of reference of psychological knowledge in these mechanisms, such as
the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(Hamber, 2009; Minow, 1998). This presumed tension between psychological
and judicial procedures may reﬂect a false dichotomy between individual and
socio-political processes, or could be based on the belief that psychology is
subjective, hence ambiguous and uncontrollable, and that judicial methods
are objective, hence easier to measure and control (Estrada Mesa, et al., 2010;
Hamber, 2009). However, legal practices such as those enacted in a truth com-
mission (statement-taking, hearings, inquiry, and testimonies) can exert an
important inﬂuence on the socio-political dimension of the psychological
damage inasmuch as they can provide public acknowledgement of this
damage by giving voice back to those once silenced, restoring the dignity of vic-
tims, and contributing to building a more diverse and inclusive narrative of what
happened. As such, commissions should consider developing and articulating
psychological and judicial processes—‘psycho-judicial’ processes—into their
work (Falk, 2002).
Psychology and truth commissions
A psychosocial approach to understanding the emotional impacts of the
armed conﬂict in Colombia highlights the relationships between mental
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health, trauma, coexistence, and the national reconciliation project. There-
fore, psychosocial healing and reconciliation are closely related because the
experience of violent conﬂict tears the social fabric, sparks negative emotions,
causes emotional suﬀering, creates rigid beliefs, and weakens human rela-
tionships. However, violent conﬂict and war also ignite resilience and activate
personal and collective resources that help people and communities to deal with
the consequences of violence. Therefore, a psychosocial approach to reconci-
liation entails restoring positive human relationships and seeks to reactivate
community and cultural resources that contribute to social reconstruction and
coexistence, with a focus on agency (PNUD, 2012).
It is likely that we can better grasp the complexities of human experience in
conﬂict, and the psychosocial harms produced by political violence and war,
by highlighting the intrinsic interconnection of psychological and social pro-
cesses. In doing so, we can contribute to the discussion on the complexities of
the tasks of reconciliation within truth commissions (Martín-Baró, 1988).
The psychological dimension of reconciliation is often related—and rightly
so—with the emotional damage that victims have suﬀered due to violent
conﬂict. Psychology can make clear that this damage is not exclusively related
to individual trauma, nor is it isolated from other social and political factors.
These external factors inﬂuence and transform the psychosocial manifesta-
tion’s intensity, and the trajectories of the psychological damage. Therefore,
these social and political factors too determine what could be useful or not in
helping to heal this damage. When the emotional damage is also placed in
collective and political realms, it is more evident how justice, truth, repara-
tions, and non-repetition guarantees can contribute to healing (Martín-Ber-
istain, et al., 2010; Herman, 2015). In line with this, highlighting that the
victimization caused by political violence and war does not stop with the
individual subject, but that victims are also collective and political projects
shattered and silenced in their socio-organizational processes, allows for a
wider understanding of the nature of the trauma, and the need for reconci-
liation (Castro & Gómez, 2013).
The psychological lens also highlights the importance of ethical considera-
tions of the workings of the commission in order to restore dignity, empower
citizens, and avoid doing harm to its participants. For example, there is a
psychological importance for aiding healing in the storytelling and narrative
processes that take place in a truth commission (Hamber, 2009; Castro &
Gómez, 2013), an aspect that must not be forgotten or underestimated in lieu
of mere fact-checking or truth-seeking practices.
The lens of psychology in reconciliatory practices unveils the task of ques-
tioning and renegotiating parts of one’s own beliefs and one’s own social
identity in order to decrease the perception of the other as a ‘threat’. Trans-
forming perceptions and social identities is necessary for building a sense of
community where justice, truth, and responsibility can take place (Kelman,
2010). Truth commissions, as a space where diﬀerent narratives and identities
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converge, provide a valuable opportunity for such interpersonal transforma-
tion, which is necessary for reconciliation.
The next section of this chapter identiﬁes three speciﬁc psychological tasks
for reconciliation that Colombian truth Commission could support in its
process of implementation: (1) transforming social identities, (2) healing the
psychological damage, and (3) reactivating social action and civic engage-
ment. Although they are presented separately to facilitate the identiﬁcation of
contributions, these tasks in reality are interconnected and inform each other.
Contributions and recommendations
Transformation of social identities
Reconciliation involves the restoration of broken relations between people
and social groups in a society divided by violent conﬂict (Lederach, 1997).
The re-establishment of these relations necessarily involves, to some degree,
changing negative beliefs, feelings, and stereotypes. The narrow and often
rigid categorizations of the ‘other’6 that people create during times of conﬂict
constitute an example of a psychological mechanism of protection of one’s
social identity (Kelman, 2005). However, these social identities need to be
redeﬁned and expanded on some level in order to enhance the prospects of
reconciliation.7
Social identities work by comparison with other groups. People use char-
acteristics of their own group as a reference and then compare it with other
groups in order to establish their own identity. These social categorizations
are then used to positively assess one’s own identity and negatively assess the
other’s identity, and to trace boundaries between ‘our’ and ‘their’ identities,
creating a cognitive bias and becoming a potential source of conﬂict (Van
Knippenberg & Tajfel, 1984). A task of reconciliation is then to create
opportunities for negotiating certain elements of one’s own identity in order
to provide commonality wherein elements of reconciliation—such as justice,
truth, and accountability—can take place. For instance, the work of Kelman
(2010) in inter-group political conﬂicts, such as the Palestine-Israel conﬂict,
describes a process of revisiting one’s own identity to an extent that allows the
acknowledgement, accommodation, and coexistence of the other’s identity in
an internally coherent narrative. In this process, which includes progressive
contact with the other, old conﬂicting attitudes start to transform through
interaction, and, with time, new and more accommodating attitudes replace
the old ones.
Thus a truth commission in Colombia whereby diﬀerent social actors,
‘truths’, and identities converge in public hearings, and before audiences,
represents a signiﬁcant opportunity for aiding in the transformation of contested
social identities. If the Colombian truth commission wants to contribute to
reconciliation, the procedures of its implementation should promote con-
versations and encounters that amplify contested identities and enrich the
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national narrative about the past in a way that builds conditions for the
future. Despite the diﬃculty of shifting narratives about the conﬂict that have
become anchored in social identities after decades of conﬂict, this could
become more viable if promoted through multiple mechanisms in the transi-
tional justice framework and at multiple levels of Colombian society (Sluzki,
2010). The more opportunities social groups have to reﬂect on stereotypes,
contrasting versions of the conﬂict, prejudices and beliefs about others, the
better the prospects for reconciliation.
From victim to survivor: transforming for empowerment.
A particular transformation of social identity that contributes to reconcilia-
tion is the transition from the identity of a ‘victim’ to the identity of a ‘sur-
vivor’ (Sugiman, et al., 2008). Victims must ﬁrst realize that they have been
subjected to damage so they can make sense of their own experience and
realize that their rights were neglected. Identifying themselves as victims is
one of the ﬁrst steps towards recovery (Herman, 2015). However, this reali-
zation of victimization should serve as a precondition for regaining a sense of
agency; by making sense of their experience, they can create more empowered
narratives of themselves as survivors.8
The use of testimony by the truth commission in Colombia as part of its
inquiry activities can facilitate narratives that support empowerment, by
recognizing the psychological importance of storytelling for transitioning
from victim to survivor of political violence (Herman, 2015; Becker, et al.,
1990). The testimony itself constitutes an important acknowledgement of the
victim’s story and their recognition as a political subject, but it is the process
of preparing and giving testimony that allows people a reshaping of victi-
mizing narratives and restores a sense of dignity and coherence to their iden-
tities that can greatly contribute to overcoming victimization (Rebolledo &
Rondón, 2010; PNUD, 2012). For the Colombian truth commission, this
requires an understanding that its truth-seeking activities are tools of identity
building and not mere factual accounts of what happened during conﬂict.
An example of using testimony for transforming identities comes from the
case of Chile, where victims of the political repression in the 1970s and 1980s
were supported by therapists and trained advocates to create testimonies
useful for their own personal processes, such as speaking their truth,
demanding information and accountability from their perpetrators, and
claiming their right to reparations (Becker, et al., 1990; Lira, et al., 1995).
This constitutes an example of how the psychological and judicial tasks of
reconciliation can come together in the context of a truth commission.
Addressing the identity needs of the perpetrator
A central, but often forgotten, aspect for fostering reconciliation via restoring
broken relationships is addressing the harms felt also by perpetrators who
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have inﬂicted harm onto others or who have participated in the conﬂict (see
Chapter 8). Nadner & Shnabel (2008) depict this in their research on socio-
emotional reconciliation between victim and perpetrator. Both parties suﬀer a
negative impact on their identities. The victims suﬀer an impact in the power
dimension of their identities because the pain that the perpetrator has inﬂic-
ted goes unpunished. The perpetrators suﬀer an impact in their moral
dimension by recognizing that their actions have harmed others. These
impacts can be resolved positively by the apology-forgiveness interaction
between victim and perpetrator, whereby the latter apologizes and victims are
entitled to grant or deny forgiveness, and both parties start to diminish the
threats to their identities (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).
One case depicted as an example of positive changes in the perceptions of
victim/perpetrator identities is the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. A study showed
a reduction of the negative stereotypes about ‘others’ and less pronounced in-
group categorizations after the declaration of culpability and an apology
within a ritualized ceremony. This transformation also contributed to the
social cohesion of involved communities (Berinstain, 2000).
Healing the emotional and psychosocial damage
Dealing with the psychosocial trauma9 of violent conﬂicts involves both vic-
tims and perpetrators working through emotions like pain, grievance, fear,
anguish, anger, and guilt (Martín-Baró, 1988). It also implies making mean-
ing of the potentially traumatic experiences and how they can be integrated
into their own story and into a collective story of the past (Hamber, 2009).
The psychosocial task of making meaning of violence and generating a more
empowered narrative can promote reconciliation. The social platform created
in a truth commission, where diﬀerent testimonies and truth can emerge,
represents a signiﬁcant opportunity for supporting victims in dealing with
psychosocial damage.
Perhaps the most obvious initiative that the Colombian truth commission
can take to help heal the psychosocial damage of victims and perpetrators is
the provision of psychological services to manage the stress or suﬀering that
the procedures of the commission may produce in its participants. Indeed, it is
of utmost importance to provide culturally sensitive and diﬀerential psycho-
logical support by well trained and supervised staﬀ with particular attention
to victims (PNUD, 2012), while also not forgetting the healing needs of per-
petrators. Notwithstanding this central component, the contribution to heal-
ing of psychosocial trauma in the Colombian truth commission can go well
beyond provision of services. In general terms, it can be summarized in the
following four aspects: 1) psychosocially sensitive and dignifying practices
and procedures; 2) a better understanding of the interconnection between
public testimony, truth and healing (Becker, et al., 1995); 3) an acknowl-
edgement of the limitation of complete healing (Hamber, 2009); and 4) a
focus on resources instead of deﬁciencies to avoid the pathologization10 of
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victims (PNUD, 2012; Estrada Mesa, et al., 2010). These aspects are not
mutually exclusive and they are all inspired by the ethical and political
intention of doing no harm and restoring the dignity of victims as tasks of
reconciliation.
The practices and procedures of the truth commission are linked to exam-
ination practices like statement-taking and giving or hearing testimonies. The
latter are typically marked by fact-based or judicial style processes, as they
are mainly for unveiling truths and facts about what happened during the
conﬂict. However, as discussed earlier, truth becomes more meaningful for
reconciliation and healing the psychosocial damage when it serves the pur-
pose of weaving together memory and providing meaning to the violence
suﬀered (Castro & Gómez, 2013). In order to do this, these examination
practices will greatly beneﬁt from incorporating more psychological and nar-
rative styles, hence choosing dignifying communicative styles, establishing a
caring and respectful rapport, posing better questions aimed at protecting the
integrity of the victim, and identifying opportunities to highlight resources
and coping mechanisms (Montero, 1991; Rebolledo & Rondón, 2010). This
also means that the staﬀ involved in such practices could greatly beneﬁt from
psychosocial training.
Making the most of truth-telling/seeking practices in the truth commission
for enhancing its healing and reconciliation potential entails the use of the
public characteristic of testimony. The establishment of a detailed record of
the victim’s traumatic experience, and the process of creating and contributing
with their testimony to the historical memory of the conﬂict, constitute a
form of acknowledgement of the wrongdoings and provide meaning to the
past, as well as a regained sense of control over the environment (Herman,
2015). Therefore, truth is not only a report of factual events, but it becomes a
form of transformative social action with expected positive psychological
eﬀects. The use of testimony provided a signiﬁcant form of psychosocial sup-
port in truth commissions in Central America, and helped some victims
restore a sense of connection to the collective as survivors (Herman, 2015),
thanks to their participation in the commissions. However, the contrary can
also happen, as reliving traumatic stories through testimonies without the
appropriate care and support can leave individuals feeling vulnerable and
re-traumatized (Martín-Beristain, et al., 2010; Hayner, 2001).
Including a psychosocial lens in the design and implementation of the truth
commission in Colombia will assist in understanding the complexities and
ambivalences that surround the emotional recovery of victims. There are
intrinsic limitations to attaining ‘complete healing’, since it is not possible to
return to a state prior to the harm occurring (a rape or a murder cannot be
undone). Additionally, the ambivalence of healing is attached to contextual
and wider factors that play a signiﬁcant role in the process of healing, such as
access to justice, reparations, and truth for acknowledgement. Similarly, like
reconciliation itself, the trajectories of psychosocial healing in people are not
linear, nor do they follow a clear progression, so assumptions about whether
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the person is a ‘victim’ or ‘survivor’ must be avoided, because while some
people feel like victims, others might feel like survivors (Hamber, 2009). This
fact should shape expectations and diﬀerent practices of what a commission
can and cannot do.
Reactivating personal and collective resources is a better process for promoting
psychosocial healing than focusing too much on the trauma and its deﬁ-
ciencies. While it is a moral imperative to acknowledge the suﬀering of victims,
highlighting their personal and collective resources in facing violence should
also be an ethical standpoint of the commission (Castro & Gómez, 2013).
Social action and civic engagement
The armed conﬂict in Colombia had political causes and motivations, and
violence has been used to silence alternative political projects and to destroy
socio-organizational processes of individuals and groups (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2012). These collective forms of violence and trauma
erode the social fabric and social capital, constrain narratives about what
happened in the past, and weaken people’s capacity to mobilize politically,
undermining the relationship between citizen and state (de Greiﬀ, 2008). The
transitional justice framework in Colombia, including its truth commission,
should also address these psychosocial damages embodied in individuals and
groups, in order to bring back oppressed voices, promote a plural narrative of
the past, and help restore damaged local socio-political projects.
The truth commission can become an important public forum where victims
can denounce past abuses, talk about the damages produced and, as such,
create more speciﬁc demands for reparations. Moreover, through their testimony,
victims can show society that the harms they suﬀered also activated their
capacities and sources of resilience and resistance through socio-organizational
projects (Castro & Gómez, 2013).
Applying a psychosocial framework to truth commissions helps to unveil
an ethical and political dimension of truth-telling, as it recognizes that the tes-
timonies come from victims of an intentional violence that created harms in
their personal lives, but also in their political subjectivity. Testimony, as long
as it is addressed integrally, becomes one of the most powerful symbolic tools of
reparation of the harm and distrust between citizen and state. It provides the
opportunity to dignify the victim through active and respectful listening, to
acknowledge responsibility for harms of commission or omission, and to
incorporate the victim’s story into the narrative of the country (Minow, 1998).
Hamber (2009) recognizes that for victims of political violence, social
action can be the ﬁrst opportunity to initiate their psychological recovery.
When victims recover the possibility of speaking out and telling their truth via
testimony in diﬀerent transitional justice scenarios, this tends to unchain socio-
organizational initiatives that mobilize them for social action in demanding
justice, social changes, and reparations (Herman, 2015). As an example,
research on truth commissions such as the Truth and Reconciliation
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Commission in South Africa, the Guatemalan Truth Commission and the
Gacaca courts in Rwanda (Martín-Beristain, et al., 2010) reveals the impor-
tance of public testimony for increasing the political eﬃcacy of victims and their
self-conﬁdence. This reactivation of civic engagement could be a positive sign of
psychosocial healing and empowerment that in turn can also contribute to
making progress towards the re-establishment of the social contract and civic
trust between citizen and state; thus, advancing in the path of national reconci-
liation (de Greiﬀ, 2008).
Another layer of the ethical and political dimension that the psychosocial
lens contributes to transitional justice practices is the nature of the socio-
emotional support most conducive to reactivating social action and civic
engagement in a transitional society. This type of support could be deﬁned as
psychosocial accompaniment, which is informed by a human rights perspec-
tive, is committed to do no harm, and respects the agency and capacities of
the victims to deal with their diﬃculties (Rebolledo & Rondón, 2010; Estrada
Mesa, et al., 2010). As might be expected, it takes distance from interven-
tionist and directive approaches in psychology, to avoid overlooking funda-
mental social and personal resources for recovery and to avoid pathologizing
normal psychological reactions to abnormal situations such as political vio-
lence (Martín-Baró, 1988; Montero, 1991).
Adopting more empowering methodologies to accompany and support
victims and even perpetrators in exercises of truth-telling is not new in
Colombia. The country is home to many national, regional, and civil society-
led practices of historical memory that have thoughtful psychosocially-
informed methodologies, which oﬀer capacities and lessons learned to enrich
the design and implementation of an oﬃcial truth commission.11
Conclusion
As Colombia leaves a political conﬂict behind, it is confronted with the
paradox of building a peaceful future from a violent past. This transition
requires an adequate and timely balance of justice and peace to facilitate the
level of national reconciliation needed to prevent the re-eruption of conﬂict
and political unrest.
This chapter has argued that transitional justice mechanisms have a poten-
tial to contribute to national reconciliation, and to coexistence. In particular,
a psychosocial lens is thus useful for enhancing the reconciliatory potential of
truth commissions. In order to maximize its potential, the Colombian truth
commission must not only be a vehicle to unveil factual truths, but princi-
pally, it must exploit the richness of the truth-telling process, support the
transformation of contested identities, address the psychosocial damage, and
enhance the social action and civic engagement of its participants. Should the
commission’s mandates, strategies, relationships and communicative practices
be sensitive to these three aspects, the value of the truth-seeking exercise
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could be augmented, and so too its eﬀectiveness in fostering national recon-
ciliation and coexistence.
The Colombian truth commission could add value to national reconcilia-
tion if it oﬀers opportunities for victims, perpetrators and society in general to
safely confront the stereotypes, beliefs, and narratives that positively feed their
social identities. A negotiation of parts of those social identities will facilitate
the creation of common narratives that positively add to the national social
cohesion. For this, it is imperative that victims are supported in their healing
process through dignifying practices and the provision of ethical and relevant
services, and that participants feel that they are eﬀectively accompanied in the
ambivalence of recuperating from the emotional harm caused by others.
The reactivation of social action and civic engagement by assisting in
repairing socio-organizational processes damaged by violent conﬂict is some-
thing that can be facilitated by the Colombian truth commission, as it can be
a useful space for regaining agency, while it can facilitate the restoration of
the relationship between citizens and state.
Ultimately, the contribution of psychology and of a psychosocial approach
is re-framing the value of the truth commission in the process; thus, seeing
truth as a process may spark important reﬂections on the types of justice
needed for victims and society at large when seeking to create healthier nar-
ratives of the past and a future without violence. A transitional justice fra-
mework which is aware of the reconciliatory potential that lies in the
implementation of its practices will contribute to broaden the perspectives of
justice beyond punishment towards the goal of restoring broken relationships,
and it will be more attuned to providing the necessary conditions for individuals
and groups to live in a more peaceful society.
Notes
1 The term ‘psychosocial’ is a compound word. Psycho- refers to the psychological
dimension of individuals. The term ‘social’ indicates the social dimension of indi-
viduals and communities. Thus, the term ‘psychosocial' coins the interrelation of
individual, psychological factors of human experience with the cultural, social and
political dimensions.
2 Comisión para el esclarecimiento de la verdad, la convivencia y la no repetición.
3 The creation of the commission was agreed under point 5 of the Havana peace
agreement relating to the victims of the conﬂict (Gobierno de Colombia y
FARC—EP, 2016). See www.acuerdodepaz.gov.co/.
4 In particular as regards tasks related to emotional healing and closure, the creation
of a national narrative about the past and the extrapolation of individual and
national healing.
5 Socio-emotional and psychosocial are used as interchangeable terms in this
chapter.
6 The other is understood here as an abstraction of ‘what I am not’, or the limit
between ‘me and other’.
7 This aspect is exempliﬁed in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic
identities became even more polarized after the war and constituted the most
important identity marker, creating an obstacle for peaceful coexistence.
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8 Colombia has made signiﬁcant progress in acknowledging the existence of millions
of victims of the internal conﬂict by passing Law 1448 of 2011, which was instru-
mental in formally starting the process of recognition and reparation of victims
and land restitution by the state.
9 Ignacio Martín-Baró coined the term ‘psychosocial trauma’ when talking about
the emotional impacts of war and human rights violations, to refer that this
trauma is a phenomenon embedded in the social, political and historic particula-
rities of the context where it happened.
10 Pathologization is the tendency to judge as abnormal, inadequate, or pathological
those behaviours of those providing testimonies. This entails the awareness of
assuming that all victims are traumatized and require psychological or psychiatric
treatment. Avoiding pathologization also acknowledges the possibility of dealing
with past experiences with other mechanisms that require more of accompanying
processes, so that victims can make sense of their experience in a way that helps
them to build their future.
11 For instance, a national women´s organization, Ruta Pacíﬁca de las Mujeres,
published the report of a national project of truth-telling of Colombian women
victims of the armed conﬂict called La verdad de las Mujeres, which helped in
recuperating the voice and diﬀerent experiences of women victims through an
innovative methodology of data gathering informed by a psychosocial approach.
Another important initiative in truth-seeking and historic memory is the National
Center of Historic Memory, which gathers and produces information about human
rights violations within the internal armed conﬂict. Another initiative is The His-
toric Memory Commission, created in the context of the negotiations in Havana,
which provided a comprehensive account of the causes and consequences of the
internal conﬂict. Initiatives like these can provide important contributions that
inform the work of the truth commission.
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11 Transmission in times of transition
Intergenerational approaches to Colombia’s
violent past and present
Ariel Sánchez Meertens
War, knowledge and transitional justice
When I recently asked high school students in the town of Gaitania whether
they remembered a particular incident of violence in their village—from where,
back in 1964, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército
del Pueblo (FARC—EP) originated—one of them replied: ‘Yes, one day we
were celebrating Halloween in the town’s main square, when suddenly the
guerrilla came. One person was killed; it was the clown… who was a soldier’.1
This recollection points to the role of testimony in making sense of war.
But testimony is nevertheless only one form, among multiple forms, of
knowledge (re)production on war. The production of memories is part of ‘a larger
process of cultural negotiation’ (Macgilchrist, et al., 2015, p. 2) of which, I
suggest here, transitional justice should have a critical awareness, for the
design of interventions and policies.
The transmission of knowledge in war is deployed through an array of
communicative actions, among them the institutionally sanctioned practices
in high schools. What meanings surrounding our troubled history are we
allowing to remain through time? How do we teach the youth about what
happened in Colombia? How can we acknowledge the horrors, oﬀer victims
the recognition they deserve, sanction perpetrators, and simultaneously pro-
mote reconciliatory attitudes among the younger generation? How do we
begin to do all this today, when the rush of reintegration, demobilization, and
the other initiatives taking place as part of the peace accord may overshadow
the pedagogical imperatives of transitional justice?
As Colombian society steps from the twilight of an armed conﬂict into a
critical political transition, the implications of knowledge production regard-
ing that violent past and present must be scrutinized. Thus, it is vital to study
the transmission of knowledge in times of transition.
Even though the deﬁnition of transitional justice refers to measures imple-
mented to redress the legacies of crimes under international law (Duthie,
2009), achieving this is not solely dependent on the kind of justice provided in
courts, nor are transitional justice instruments limited to legal dispositions.
The eﬀects of sustained violence that transitional justice seeks to confront,
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and the implied societal commitment required to move on, makes transitional
justice an eﬀort in rethinking the state. Thus transitional justice is not about a
return to the normalcy experienced before the war, but about establishing a
new normality in the country (Davies, 2004).
However, instituting this new normalcy is in fact an eﬀort that involves the
social construction of knowledge, values, and experiences embodied in the
interactions between citizens (Giroux & Searls Giroux, 2004). Therefore,
transitional justice is part of an enterprise that requires the consideration of
cognitive and emotional interventions. Transitional justice and its link with
education is consequently of the utmost importance in order to guarantee the
rights of all citizens in the process of transition, to avoid the repetition of
violence, and to foster the necessary changes to achieve durable peace. Thus,
in order to be able to understand the links between transitional justice and
education, the ﬁrst step is to understand how knowledge about war in
Colombia has been produced and reproduced.
As transitional justice recommendations do not generally encourage such a
diagnosis before mandating educational and curricular reforms, they risk
implementing measures without knowing the departure point from which these
reforms should take place. These diﬃculties are partly symptomatic of the
lack of previous diagnoses, and a ‘liberal peace’ approach, where a ‘top-down’
policy is imposed, disregarding local expertise on education that responds to
particular contexts (Chandler, 2004). This is also informed by an ontology that
considers students as subjects of policy reform, never as agents of change.
Although high school students cannot yet vote, they constitute nothing less
than the cornerstones of post-war Colombian society and are historical agents
and stakeholders of the future: students are old enough to have known the
armed conﬂict, yet are young enough to still have their entire adult life ahead
of them. Thus, given their position, it is vital to diagnose and conceptualize
high-school students’ knowledge of war.
There is a tendency in the academic literature to address separately the
spaces of transmission (museum, family), its modalities (testimony, experi-
ence, second-hand learning), the vehicles (texts, conversations, expositions),
and its agents (teachers, peers, community leaders). This propensity under-
estimates the critical aspects of the processes that restructure, fuse, and rein-
vent narratives. In addition, it underestimates their components, the diﬀerent
discursive domains in the production of memories, and more broadly, of
knowledge. To avoid such fragmentation, we combined attention to education
policy, school textbooks, teachers’ and students’ voices, but we also identiﬁed
their source of information allowing us to explore the ways in which diverse
data emerging from multiple domains are narratively brought together by
single or collective actors.
During 2015 and 2016, my research team and I gathered more a than 1,500
accounts by high school students across Colombia (see Figure 11.1), collect-
ing their knowledge on the armed conﬂict’s history, details on the sources
from which they obtained their information, as well as their personal
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experiences with violence and their views of the future. The research focused
predominantly on students in grades 10 and 112, combining interviews, eth-
nography, and questionnaires (consisting of 25 questions pertaining to stu-
dents’ media consumption and learning processes, as well as knowledge about
the armed conﬂict and their sources, the responses to which were individual
and supervised).
For this, we visited more than 40 schools, in areas directly aﬀected by the
armed conﬂict, but also in regions less hit by its violence. Of the students
interviewed, nearly half claimed they or their close family members had been
aﬀected by the armed conﬂict.
The study of knowledge transfer requires special attention in educational
spaces. Yet, the focus is less on the institution as such (school), and more on
the ways in which multiple forms of knowledge transmission converge and are
refashioned within schools.
The school is a space designed to produce and transmit knowledge with the
potential to join together other sites of pedagogical eﬀorts. Yet, when the link
between education and conﬂict is made, and schools are the locus of analysis,
this institutional space is generally engaged with the education about the
conﬂict as if it is separated from other social ﬁelds of knowledge production
such a family settings, the media, the church, etc. This chapter aims to bring
insights into this gap.
To do this I begin with a brief revision of pertinent educational policy
regarding the teaching of a violent history in Colombia; then I explore how
course materials, teachers, and schools relate to the armed conﬂict and their
history. Next, I diagnose the current sources of knowledge and transmission
Figure 11.1 Municipalities where data was collected
Source: Own elaboration
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among high school students in Colombia. Finally I conclude by presenting a
series of recommendations in relation to the centrality of education for a
reconciliatory process in Colombia.
Educational policies dealing with contested histories
One of the more salient characteristics of the current political transition in
Colombia is the emergence of institutions and practices traditionally asso-
ciated with post-agreement settings. In Colombia, these institutions are
emerging before the actual signing of accords with the diﬀerent armed groups
in Colombia. Policies, practices, and institutions considered to be central to
the implementation of peace agreements have appeared in Colombia’s public
arena before the signing of a political settlement, functioning instead as
peacebuilding mechanisms. These institutions created a ‘peace infrastructure’
(Unger, et al., 2013) that paved the way to a successful negotiation process
between the Government and the FARC—EP. Examples of such infra-
structure include the Victims Unit3, the Land Restitution Unit4 and the
National Centre for Historical Memory, as well as the Peace Curriculum Law
(Cátedra de la Paz), all of which were established before the signing of the
Peace Agreement in 2016.
Until the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, the history of the Colombian
conﬂict was not systematically included in Colombia’s educational agenda,
either as a curricular subject or as an object of pedagogical work (Rodríguez
Ávila & Herrera Cortés, 2012). Rather than designing content around sym-
bolic violent episodes, the focus of programmes and materials was on ethical
and civic postures rejecting violence (González, 2011). However, recently two
major pillars of public policy have emerged which provide institutional sup-
port for initiatives dealing with the past: the Victims’ Law and the Peace
Curriculum Law5.
Within the Victims’ Law, the Government established the requirements for
a social pedagogy promoting constitutional values, which were understood to
lead to reconciliation as a guarantee of non-repetition.6 This is further devel-
oped in the decree that regulates this law7, which states that such pedagogy
must create and cement a culture of knowledge and understanding of
Colombia’s socio-political history with regard to the armed conﬂict (Ortega
Valencia & Herrera Cortés, 2012). It also establishes that the Ministry of
Education shall foment, from a rights-based approach, the development of
programmes and projects that promote the restitution and fulﬁlment of chil-
dren’s rights, and foster reconciliation and guarantees of non-repetition of
incidents which threaten children’s integrity and rights.8
The second pillar, known as the Peace Curriculum Law, is further regulated
by Decree 1038 of 2015, which can be read as the further development of the
Victims’ Law with regards to pedagogy and education. It strives inter alia ‘to
foment the process of knowledge appropriation and competencies related to
territory, culture, socioeconomic context, and historical memory; with the
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aim of recreating the social tissue, promoting prosperity, and guaranteeing the
eﬀectiveness of the principles and rights consecrated in the Colombian Con-
stitution’ (Article 2, Decree 1038 (2015), author’s translation). To achieve this,
educational institutions are required to address at least two of the following 12
themes: a) justice and human rights, b) sustainable use of natural resources, c)
protection of cultural and natural national treasures, d) peaceful conﬂict
resolution, e) prevention of bullying, f) diversity and plurality, g) political par-
ticipation, h) historical memory, i) moral dilemmas, j) projects of social impact,
k) history of international as well as national peace agreements, and l) life
projects and risk prevention. Finally the ﬁfth article of Decree 1038 of 2015
establishes that, from 2016 onward, the National Proﬁciency Exams in Colom-
bia must evaluate achievements corresponding to this peace curriculum.
Though surely well intended, the Peace Curriculum Law has at least three
critical deﬁciencies. First, there is insuﬃcient familiarity among educators (if
any) and only very vague implementation guides. In the majority of schools
visited for this research, educators were either ignorant of the details and
implications of the peace curriculum or they were upset and annoyed that
they were expected to implement it without having been consulted or
instructed on how to do this. This has exacerbated certain doubts and inse-
curities as teachers believe in the importance of teaching about the Colom-
bian conﬂict, but feel unprepared in terms of training and materials—a
similar situation to that found in Guatemala by Michelle Bellino (2014). This
information and guidance is not only necessary for teachers but also for par-
ents, as they can object to the contents of the courses (Paulson, 2015), or can
be even re-victimized in the process of teaching the curriculum.
Second, the design of the Peace Curriculum Law disregards the rather vast
experience of educational institutions across the country in dealing—albeit
often informally—with violence in Colombia. Due to the relative autonomy
of schools in the country there is an ample variety of approaches concerned
with direct or indirect experiences of the armed conﬂict and with teaching its
history. One needs to consider that both educators and students can function
as critical partners in—and provide crucial inputs to—the design of a peace
curriculum.
A third problem with the Peace Curriculum Law is the vagueness of its
content. This poses serious diﬃculties in both in its implementation and in
the evaluation of its impact. The holistic approach to the concept of peace is
certainly laudable. So, too, is the associated ﬂexibility aﬀorded by oﬀering 12
thematic foci, of which the schools must choose only two (in practice, this gives
66 possible combinations). But this ﬂexibility creates the problem of several
combinations of themes where it is possible to avoid dealing with the Colom-
bian conﬂict and its history, as it indeed is the case in many of the schools vis-
ited. Although the importance of several topics should not be undermined,
lacking an explicit and mandatory link to the dynamics of the Colombian war
can end up sanitizing the debate and preventing uncomfortable but fundamental
conversations about history.
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All three deﬁciencies point to a common gap in Colombia: that is, the
presence of sophisticated legislation—much of which is impressive and quite
innovative—that faces great challenges in its implementation, given the lack
of institutions to fulﬁl these mandates or clarity on the plans and procedures.
Nevertheless, setting these critical issues aside, we can argue that both the
political will and legislative tools are available to establish a strategy by which
the violent past could be thoroughly addressed in the classroom. It is also
clear that there is a need to adjust several of these instruments, and to develop
in more detail the resources, activities, and approaches for these mandates to
take place. Nonetheless, as the next segment will show, the lack of policy
clarity has not prevented several commercial high school publishers from
addressing our conﬂictual history; initiatives brought about autonomously
from the government guidelines seem to be capable of providing more clarity
on the practice of educating learners about the Colombian conﬂict.
Finally, one could also suggest a third pillar to support the design of
materials about the armed conﬂict’s history in an educational setting. Mate-
rials such as the reports from the Historical Commission of the Conﬂict and its
Victims (CHCV)9, from the Truth, Clariﬁcation, Coexistence, Justice and Non-
Repetition Commission10, as well as the reports of the National Centre of His-
torical Memory (CNMH)11, can provide these inputs for all educational
institutions, following the examples of Guatemala, Argentina and South Africa.
Textbooks, teachers and schools
The possibility of transcending decades of violence through strategies for the
emerging political transition relies, at least partly, on the social representa-
tions we make of the Colombian armed conﬂict. It is no surprise, then, that
schools, and school textbooks, constitute a key site for the reproduction of
normative imaginaries.
History textbooks are ‘mass media for the dissemination of oﬃcially
approved images of history and, at the same time, mirrors of societal con-
troversies surrounding sensitive issues’ (Macgilchrist, et al., 2015, p. 4). The
market also heavily conditions textbooks, for they are produced for sales, with
market distribution and consumer needs in mind (Binnenkade, 2015).
Therefore, both political leaders and corporations can shape students’
thoughts, interests, and behaviour through textbooks. They also can trivialize
debates to guarantee the broadest market possible with a ‘one book ﬁts all’
strategy (Hickman & Porﬁlio, 2012). Despite the above, textbooks can also be
what Binnenkade (2015, p. 32) calls ‘boundary objects’, connecting diﬀerent
kinds of knowledge, regions, communities, thoughts, practices, traditions, and
duties. Textbooks embody ‘the potential to create coherence across a [diverse]
cultural landscape’ (Binnenkade, 2015, p. 40); however, coherence is not to be
equated with uniformity.
Despite the undeniable growth in the coverage of the conﬂict’s history in
high school textbooks in Colombia12, several shortcomings remain. One of
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them is that violence is still treated in the abstract, with victims and their
stories often reduced to statistics. Massacres, forced disappearances, and
forced displacement as features of Colombia’s recent history seldom appear in
most of the textbooks from the last decade. As González (2011) would put it,
what the manuals tended to put forward was either a history without events
or a collection of events without history.
In some of the textbooks published since 2010, both the voices of survivors
as well as elaborate descriptions of speciﬁc events have gained more space,
being included either directly in the textbook pages or as additional material
and suggested references for activities and discussions. Some textbooks even
mention the existing legislation and propose debates on speciﬁc events, such as
the Bojayá massacre.13 In this instance, the textbook Caminos del Saber 10
(2012) asks students, amongst other things, what they consider the actions and
responsibilities of the illegal armed actors involved in the massacre should be if
they were to decide to take part in a peace process, and whether the students
believe the perpetrators should oﬀer reparations to the victims of this massacre.
However, not every attempt at addressing the violent past is a successful
one. Another textbook, Sociales para Pensar 10 (2011, p. 59), poses the fol-
lowing question to students: ‘What is a massacre and how many deaths do we
need to consider that something must change?’ This kind of statement
embraces the practice of rhetorical and detached debates on topics that seem
abstract and distant, lacking the possibility of fomenting knowledge and
reﬂections on the history of violence in Colombia.
As the ﬁeldwork conducted showed, books by themselves are not enough as
tools for reﬂection. It is also important to explore the development and
practice of the activities and debates suggested in some teachers’ manuals, to
shed light onto the actual usage of a course material. However, the diversity of
the regions and their practice showed that none of the schools visited thus far
used these textbooks or has implemented the proposed exercises. This was
because either schools did not have textbooks, teachers refused to use them, or
they had older or simpler editions that avoided the history of the war altogether.
An additional concern is that in the event that such representations and
activities are mainstreamed, it is possible to anticipate a backlash, given the
highly polarized political climate surrounding the peace negotiations, as was
the case in Peru (Paulson, 2010), and the imposition of a guiding narrative to
Colombian teachers who are representative of the diversity of the Colombian
territory. How is one to link very diﬀerent, sometimes contradictory ways of
‘thinking, feeling, talking, and acting about speciﬁc events in the past’ as part
of a national exercise? (Binnenkade, 2015, p. 32) Teachers are not distant
from the conﬂict (Paulson, 2011), and as a personal interview with a teacher
showed us14, they can also be not only victims or observers, but also former
combatants and victimizers.
Schools are also sites of physical and symbolic disputes. As in Sri Lanka
and most countries aﬀected by civil war, schools in Colombia have been
wanted by militant groups as strategic points for stationing troops, recruiting
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children, and imparting propaganda. The discourses and behaviour of both
pupils and instructors are regulated and monitored in conﬂict areas in
Colombia. As recalled by a teacher in Planadas,15 armed actors instructed
teachers on the accepted teaching guidelines and demanded that teachers
presented themselves at their base, where they were held accountable for the
ways in which they performed their duties. This was sometimes followed by
warnings and sometimes by punishment.
Thus in a way school materials and practices can be a locus of mandated
institutional knowledge transfer, and at the same time they can be also a
theatre of counter-institutional knowledge. In this fashion the guerrillas and
paramilitaries have strategically exploited the spaces for the understanding of
war and peace, contesting the state from within.
Students, sources and sensitivity
The repertoires of war knowledge transmission are often presumed, rather
than identiﬁed. Although scholarly work on education and conﬂict acknowl-
edges the existence of discursive domains other than the educational institution
(Cole, 2007; Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011), these are seldom studied.
Both the presupposition of repertoires and the failure to incorporate sources
beyond the school miss the opportunity to understand where students actually
learn from about conﬂict, and how these sources relate to the institutional
stream of a school.
Instead of assuming the sources of knowledge, in the ﬁeldwork we asked
students what they know and how (from where) they know about the conﬂict.
I asked them what they experienced and what they had learned. We inquired
about the ways in which the past was incorporated in their consciousness and
the future projected in their desires and imaginaries. This is possible due to
the fact that students embody what Binnenkade (2015) calls a discursive node.
They are citizens in the making and the oﬀspring of society at the same time,
hence expected to absorb and reproduce the oﬃcially sanctioned knowledge,
whilst simultaneously projecting the commonly diverging memories of their
own contexts (Macgilchrist, et al., 2015).
Learning through ‘zapping’
Students in Colombia learn about Colombia’s past through television (28.1%
of the total sources mentioned), mainly through news broadcasts, but also
through particular television series (see Figure 11.2). This may not come as a
revelation; however, it is worth noting that when I asked the same question in
Sri Lanka (where I conducted a similar investigation) media also came out
on top, yet it was not television that was cited the most, but newspapers.16 In
Colombia television was mentioned as a source of knowledge regarding the
history of the armed conﬂict almost twice as much as educational institutions
and teachers (18.3%). This has clear policy implications, as it could mean that
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such broadcasts should be used as an input for guiding and accompanying
work oﬀered by schools. Educational institutions cannot deny the media as a
pedagogical force, but they cannot simply yield to that power either. Perhaps
instead of a diluted and ambiguous peace curriculum, a media consumption
curriculum might have a bigger impact on memory, identity and knowledge
production in general.
Aﬀected, but not learned?
Another interesting point of analysis is that 47.7% of the students claimed to
be directly aﬀected by violence, but only 10.7% of the referred sources of
conﬂict knowledge were lived or witnessed experiences. Violence in a civil war can
thus be seen as having a ‘pedagogical’ intention. This diﬀerence on the aﬀec-
tation and the sources of knowledge can reveal how testimony and the
embodied experiences of violence do not necessarily become structured,
appropriated, or ‘narratable’ knowledge about the conﬂict. Violence for victims
has a clear communicative intent and result, but it is unintelligible on its own.
This makes the case for the production of contexts, and spaces that allow
the intertwining of information and experiences beyond a single event, and
the fact that both the local and the individual experience can have pedagogical
potential that can facilitate learning about the conﬂict.
Although many students claim not to have been directly aﬀected by the
armed conﬂict, they do remember violent incidents in their communities.
Both survivors and ‘observers’ tend to limit their conception of personal
impact to violence inﬂicted upon the personal or familial body. But having to
shelter from bombs, being impeded from attending school or watching your
neighbour being shot are not just indirect eﬀects of war upon one’s life.
Therefore, the fact that violence was so routine for many years has created
distortions in people’s own deﬁnition of victimhood, a distortion that may in
Figure 11.2 Students’ Sources of War Knowledge
Source: Own elaboration.
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fact amount to a mode of trauma that is linked with the capacity and the
ability to learn about the conﬂict.
Many students are able to remember at least one event where violence
impacted their lives. These include experiences such as the one that occurred
in Gaitania (the assassination of a clown) mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter. In addition, in Toribío17 students (almost all members of the Nasa
indigenous community) regularly mentioned the rural bus-bomb18 that
‘destroyed almost half of our town’.19 Most students in Mitú20 remembered
the town’s siege by the FARC—EP. Thus, across the country young citizens
build part of their knowledge of the conﬂict from their memories of speciﬁc
armed confrontations close to their houses or schools.21
However, not all these recollections are lived experiences. Learned recol-
lections also inform the learning of students, such as the case of students in
Segovia who recalled the massacre in that town as a memory of their own.
Two issues can be highlighted here: ﬁrst, students referencing this incident
were not born at the time; second, students using the same signiﬁer—the
Segovia massacre—were actually referencing diﬀerent incidents taking place
in the same location at diﬀerent times.22
Microfoundations of narratives of violence
Studies on violence in civil war have shown how motivations for perpetrating
violence at the local level may in fact respond to personal vendettas (Kalyvas,
2006), but are often framed as part of civil war dynamics through deliberate
misinformation. These strategies have also been used in Colombia and are part
of the narratives and the knowledge transmission mechanisms that were
observed. A student in San Miguel23, mentioned the history of his brother,
who was accused and judged by guerrillas for a murder he did not commit.24
Therefore, the existence of other accounts, in which actions are attributed to
diﬀerent citizens and actors, is part of war dynamics and its transmission.
The latter does not mean that discussing and reﬂecting on violence, histories,
and narratives is an easy task. A youth in Puerto Carreño25 who, when asked
whether he remembered witnessing violent acts, simply but powerfully, replied
‘yes [but] I rather keep quiet’.26 The challenge of having these conversations
in a country where violence has not totally stopped and where reprisals are a
possibility is something educational interventions must take into account.
The place of violence and conﬂict
Given the overwhelming presence of violence in the memories and daily lives
of the students across the country, one would expect that when asked about
places they associated with conﬂict and violence, their replies would point to
their immediate surroundings. Unexpectedly, their answers point to what I
call ‘War in the Mirror’. Violence is exteriorized. Most of the students sur-
veyed referred to the Cauca region as the place they associate with violence
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and conﬂict (see Figure 11.3), with Bogotá, the capital of the country, listed
as the second most frequently identiﬁed place of violence and conﬂict (by
students from outside the capital). This suggests that often the places asso-
ciated with war in people’s minds are the places of the ‘other’ and how tele-
vision imagery can trump one’s own experience in consolidating an account.
These are conjectures worth exploring further in the future.
What this shows indisputably is the pedagogical impact of the media: if
students are bombarded with images of robberies and assaults occurring in
Bogotá, to which news outlets dedicate a considerable segment of their
broadcasts, then it comes as no surprise that the capital becomes a place
Figure 11.3 Imagined Geographies of Violence—The places associated with war
Source: Own elaboration.
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associated with fear and violence. Quite notably, the multiple forms of crim-
inality shown in the media, particularly television, are seen as part of a con-
tinuum of violence, thus for students there is no categorical distinction
between the robberies seen on television and the armed conﬂict fought
between the Government and the rebel forces.
The origins of conﬂict in Colombia
I also inquired among students about what they considered was the beginning
of the armed conﬂict, an inquest that—inter alia—enables a fruitful discussion
on the link between history education and transitional justice. For this, ﬁrst
the conﬂict and its associated violence must be understood and recognized as
a historical process. One-quarter of the students approached (25.5%) had no
speciﬁc notion of when the war emerged; 9.1% did not answer the question on
the origins of the armed conﬂict; and 6.6% talked about the eternity of war,
of the war being something that ‘started before Christ’. Even among those
that provided some kind of timeframe, several established the origin as ‘a long
time ago’, ‘when Christopher Columbus died’ or ‘since my birth’.27 Having
known no other reality, for many students the existence of armed conﬂict and
violence is a fact of life. Thus, to historicize war is not just a matter of
fomenting knowledge on what occurred; it is also a crucial task in denatur-
alizing violence and thereby generating a sense of agency, and stimulating the
reappearance of hope in a better and more peaceful tomorrow.
When students were asked about the causes leading to the armed conﬂict it
was interesting to note there was no dominant answer (see Figure 11.4),
though ‘ideological diﬀerences’ did stand out slightly. Such result prompts
some important elucidations: ﬁrst the vagueness of the leading reply suggests
little clarity on the issue, which is only reinforced by the second most
common answer: ‘I don’t know’. Moreover, this second most repeated reply
suggests both a gap in students’ knowledge and insuﬃcient pedagogical intent
by institutional as well as informal discourse producers.
Secondly, a war’s alleged cause may be considered to diﬀer according to loca-
tion. The geographical expansion of an armed conﬂict is hardly the result of the
same cause in diﬀerent places. Instead, local tensions are incorporated into the web
of meanings, sustaining and legitimizing violence. This makes it unlikely to ﬁnd the
predominance of one type of justiﬁcation among a diverse and diﬀerentially
aﬀected community, as the students’ voices indeed substantiate.
Third, the prolonged character of the confrontations contributed to such
variations in causal explanations (students also mentioned ‘inequality’, ‘the
Spanish conquest,’ ‘power and territorial disputes’ and ‘corruption’, among
others). This also has facilitated the understanding of the conﬂict having
arisen from already existing socio-historical problems, including natural
resources and illicit goods. Thus for several students (in particular in regions
hit by this phenomenon) drug traﬃcking is understood to be the originator of
armed groups, instead of a later component of war.
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The actors of war
Students considered the FARC—EP to be the main actor in Colombia’s
armed conﬂict (see Figure 11.5), with the number of mentions doubling any
other actor (19%). However, for many students, particularly in the periph-
eries, the Medellín drugs cartel leader Pablo Escobar, as a symbol of drug
traﬃcking, has the leading role in the conﬂict (this is partially the result of
popular television shows focusing on his life in recent years). It also stands
out that in several responses ‘the guerrilla’ is thought to be an independent
and distinguishable actor from the FARC—EP or Ejército de Liberacíón
Nacional (ELN) insurgencies, rather than a generic term.
Peace negotiations and transitional justice
Meanwhile, students’ views on the peace agreement between the Colombian
Government and the FARC—EP were rather evenly divided (see Figure 11.6).
There were those that considered the peace process ‘a big step for human-
ity.’28 However, when students made explicit their rejection of the dialogues,
they often expressed themselves in rather radical terms, notably more so in
areas less aﬀected by the dynamics of war. A boy in Leticia29, for example,
said, regarding the negotiations: ‘that doesn’t work … so are we supposed
to let them kill us to achieve peace? It’s better to just ﬁnish oﬀ those
bastards.’30 Another classmate put his pessimism in almost epistemological
Figure 11.4 Causes of Conﬂict According to Students
Source: Own elaboration.
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terms: ‘…Why search for peace when man has never had peace, he doesn’t
know what that is. And if it he doesn’t know what it is, how is he to know whe-
ther he’s reached it or not?’31 It comes as no surprise then that several of them
suggest that the best strategy to end the armed conﬂict is ‘to kill them once
and for all’32, a position shared by others, though at times accompanied by
certain doubts. Finally, there are those with a more systemic kind of pessi-
mism: ‘[the peace process] is a failure because peace is achieved not only with
the FARC—EP, there are other groups generating violence death, kidnap-
pings and other sorts of crime. […] [Besides, among the FARC members there
are those] who have murdered, kidnapped and aggravated society in general.
Figure 11.5 Main Actors of Armed Violence in Colombia According to Students
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 11.6 Students’ Views on the Peace Process
Source: Own elaboration.
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They deserve to be in jail, but no, they are free and want to be in government.
It doesn’t seem a fair process for Colombians.’33
There are also those who ﬁnd it impossible to believe that people who have
killed will now somehow ﬁnd peace, and those that believe the peace agree-
ment to be a farce linking this with the high levels of unemployment in con-
temporary Colombia. They reason that ‘if there’s peace what are they gonna
do? It’s going to be worse. […] It’s all bullshit’.34 Finally, there are those
claiming peace is only ‘God-given’, so the government eﬀorts are misplaced,
arrogant or perhaps even insulting to them.
There were nevertheless other types of replies oﬀering alternatives to ending
the war, such as ‘hiring plenty of psychologists to change people’s way of
acting and thinking life’ or ‘making sure combatants demobilize, hand over
their weapons while the Government gives them a lot of money for them to
be happy and abandon war once and for all’. Lastly there are those who bet
on knowledge, education, and memory, and suggest ‘giving kids information
about this armed conﬂict so they’ll be aware in the future.’35
Amongst students there was also a lack of knowledge on the contents of
the peace agreements. This indicates the need for pedagogical operations to
socialize the details of what was agreed upon as part of the pedagogical
dimension of the transitional justice interventions to come. But that alone is
not enough. Given the weak understanding about the peace agreements
among high school students, it is important to consider how to teach about
the peace agreements signed with the FARC—EP. Teaching about the peace
agreements will also imply teaching about the history of the armed conﬂict.
As the understanding of future citizens about the role of the transitional jus-
tice institutions establishing themselves in the country will be central for the
endeavour of peace and reconciliation, education about the agreements and
the history of the conﬂict becomes central for peace.
Twilight transmission: concluding remarks
So what does the above tell us about transmission in times of transition?
First, that the knowledge systems sustaining war (Jabri, 1996) are nurtured by
historical narratives and emotional memories which are part of a pallet of
diversity. Memory is intersectional: what and how things are remembered
varies according to region, ethnicity, age, gender, and the experience of vio-
lence among other markers of diﬀerence. No single narrative is produced,
transmitted and shared to maintain a sense of ‘the’ armed conﬂict. Instead,
both the reproduction of war and its transformations are made possible by a
web of semantic alliances.36 It is by virtue of these semantic alliances that we
can conceptualize, imagine, and (intergenerationally as well as translocally)
transmit something conceived of as ‘the Colombian armed conﬂict’: a single
but unstable signiﬁer capturing an array of diverse experiences and meanings.
A key to the transmission of knowledge about the conﬂict lies less in rigid
texts and more in the (re)joining of fragmented knowledge systems, stemming
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from multiple discursive domains. These can better relate to the experiences
of Colombians and give a clearer representation of the diversity of Colombia
and its violence.
Students in diﬀerent parts of Colombia do not share a similarly arranged
historical discourse of the decades of armed confrontations. How could they,
if they have experienced it diﬀerently, their consumption of media varies, and
their institutional exposure to speciﬁc readings of the past diﬀers? There are,
nevertheless, certain images that circulate at a national level, which students
seek to connect to local incidents or personal experiences. The pedagogical
and educational strategy devised in post-agreement Colombia should not be
one in which we settle on a ﬁxed and more or less consensual or institution-
ally authorized narrative of what happened. The very eclectic, unstructured,
associative way in which actual knowledge transfer occurs serves as an
important cue for how we can reconﬁgure our policy on dealing with the past.
Thus, there is great pedagogical value in using students’ voices to teach
children about the experiences of others in war, to educate through the per-
spectives of others, and to explore conjointly the imaginaries of the future.
The great richness could inform what Jansen and Weldon refer to as post-
conﬂict pedagogies (Jansen and Weldon, 2009). This would entail, not simply
including facts in a history programme, but involving ‘raw emotions’ in the
curriculum (Davies, 2004, p. 119).
Students’ textbooks and classroom interactions could greatly beneﬁt from
having a reservoir of experiences and narratives on conﬂict and violence from
their peers in other parts of the country. Such accounts could serve the pur-
pose of exposing students to occurrences through the eyes of other youngsters
much like themselves in other parts of the country. Such exposure may pro-
voke new discussions and the inclusion of their own tales of life and in fact
co-produce a diverse historical account.
The choice is often made to postpone addressing the history of the armed
conﬂict in the immediate aftermath of war. I argue instead for the imperative
for action in the midst of transition. For this, we should not only focus on
creating new curriculums in accordance to the mandate of the Peace Curri-
culum Law, but as this research shows, how history is in fact taught and
learned as well. If education is meant to support a process of reconciliation
and cohabitation as part of a transitional justice framework, it is important to
pay attention to the future generations of Colombians, what they learn, and
how they engage with our history.
The pedagogical dimension of transitional justice I suggested at the begin-
ning of this chapter is more evident now that we have sketched the instruc-
tional force of the students’ voices. These are voices expressing concerns with
the present and future, testimonies of violence and resilience, voices operating
as integrating nodes of a nation fragmented by more than half a century of
war. Education thus becomes a tool for reconciliation and cohabitation, a
space for reﬂection and debate, a place for democracy.
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However, it is important to consider curricular and extracurricular inter-
ventions that encourage more critical media consumption by the youth. This
is because ‘future peace [in Colombia] depends on children being able to resist
propaganda’ (Davies, 2004, p. 120) and on them recognizing that, despite
their visual power, not every ‘meme’ evokes a truth. From this research the
power and impact of television has become evident: therefore, being able to
teach students how to reﬂect on media and their messages becomes central for
the process of reconciliation.
This initial approximation to the youth’s learning and knowledge paths
should be expanded to create a more robust diagnosis of the ways in which
teaching and learning about the armed conﬂict has taken place. Such a diag-
nosis, hand in hand with truth commission reports, documented reparation
strategies, and reconciliation projects, can constitute an important input for
any future policy on conﬂict education as part of a transitional justice strat-
egy in Colombia and its future generations.
Notes
1 Questionnaire PL128, July 15th 2015. From here onward, all quotes are the
author’s translation.
2 Grades 10 and 11 correspond to the last two years of high school in Colombia.
3 Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas.
4 Unidad de Restitución de Tierras.
5 Law 1732 of 2014.
6 Ordinal (e) of article 149 of the Victim’s Law (Law 1448 of 2011).
7 Decree 4800 of 2011.
8 Article 145, paragraph 7, Decree 4800 of 2011.
9 Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas.
10 Comisión para el esclarecimiento de la verdad, la convivencia y la no repetición.
11 Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica.
12 For example, the following textbooks: Caminos del Saber 9 (Santillana, 2013),
Caminos del Saber 10 (Santillana, 2012) Caminos del Saber 11 (Santillana, 2013),
Hipertexto 9 (Santillana, 2010), Hipertexto 11 (Santillana, 2010), Normas Sociales
para Pensar 9 (Norma, 2011), Normas Sociales para Pensar 10 (Norma, 2011),
Normas Sociales para Pensar 11 (Norma, 2011), Nuevos Horizontes Sociales 9
(Editorial Educativa, 2012), and Retos Sociales 9 (Carvajal, 2013).
13 In this massacre, 119 civilians were killed while taking refuge in a church while a
clash between the FARC—EP and the right-wing paramilitaries was taking place.
14 This teacher admitted proudly to us that he had been part of a right-wing para-
military force operating in the region, and he had killed a guerrilla member, to be
part of the paramilitaries. He also acknowledged he attempted to enter the
Colombian Army but had failed the psychological tests. At the time of the inter-
view, he was a school teacher.
15 A municipality in the south of the Tolima Province. It was in this municipality
where the FARC—EP emerged in 1964.
16 For more details on my previous research in Sri Lanka see Sánchez Meertens,
Ariel. 2013. ‘Courses of conﬂict: transmission of knowledge and war’s history in
eastern Sri Lanka’. History and Anthropology. 24 (2): pp. 253–273.
17 Toribío is a municipality in the Cauca province, one of the most conﬂict-ridden
regions of Colombia.
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18 “Chiva-bomba”. It was a bus made into a bomb.
19 Questionnaires, 29 September 2015.
20 Capital of the Vaupés province. Mitú was the largest town ever besieged by the
FARC—EP.
21 Questionnaires PL112, SR015.
22 The Segovia Massacre generally refers to the killing of 43 people in this mining
town (a leader in gold extraction) of the Antioquia Province, which was perpe-
trated on 11 November 1988 by right-wing paramilitary groups. However, nearly
ten years later, on 18 October 1998, the ELN guerrilla group (Ejército de Libera-
cíón Nacional) blew up an oil pipe in the outskirts of Segovia (in a hamlet called
Machuca). The resulting ﬁre killed 73 civilians. Two years earlier, on 22 April
1996, right-wing paramilitary forces massacred 14 people in two billiards halls in
the town, ‘El Flay’ and ‘El Paraíso’..
23 A town and municipality located in the Putumayo province.
24 Questionnaire September 21st, 2015.
25 Capital of the Vichada province.
26 Questionnaire, 24 September 2015.
27 Questionnaires ET046, T019, TO001.
28 Questionnaire LE005.
29 Capital of the Amazon province.
30 This student attends to a school managed by the Colombian Navy. Questionnaire
LE003.
31 Questionnarie LE011.
32 Questionnaires LE003, LE010 and LE011.
33 Questionnaire PC026.
34 Questionnaire PL110.
35 Questionnaires LE015, PC026, PL107, PL110 and P126, LE004 and PL108;
PL117.
36 See: Sánchez Meertens, 2013.
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12 Rethinking the Colombian transition
to peace through the South
African experience
Jerónimo Delgado Caicedo and
Juliana Andrea Guzmán Cárdenas
Introduction
The debate on transitional justice has been deﬁned around the contrast
between retributive and restorative justice. While retributive justice focuses on
guilt and punishment, restorative justice focuses on responsibility and
reparation (McLeod, 2015). In the former, punishment is used to educate the
oﬀender; in the latter, the recreation of the bond between the oﬀender and
society is prioritized, while truth and justice are a central part of the re-
weaving of a social covenant (Armstrong, 2014; Howse & Llewellyn, 1999;
Wenzel, et al., 2008; McLeod, 2015).
However, this debate cannot be disconnected from the juridical demands for
justice imposed by the international community. Transitional justice processes
thus face the challenge of dealing with the tensions between the international
legal imperatives of punishment for perpetrators of crimes against humanity,
and the need for amnesty in transitional contexts (Gutiérrez Ramírez, 2014;
Schabas, 2011). In other words, transitional justice seeks ‘to ﬁnd a politically
viable solution that, without giving rise to impunity, does make it possible to
achieve lasting peace and reconciliation’ (Saﬀon & Uprimny, 2005, p. 271).
Transitional justice is one of the most diﬃcult mechanisms to implement
during the post-conﬂict period (Duthie & Siels, 2017), where the mismatch
between what was agreed upon and the reality of implementation creates
tensions (DeRouen, et al., 2010). While most of these agreements are char-
acterized by promises of reform, reconstruction of societies, and the transition
to democracy or non-violent contexts, for some, their beneﬁts remain unclear
(Sensabaugh & Van der Merwe, 2017).
The Colombian Government reached a peace agreement with the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP)1
on 24 November 2016. The peace agreement’s journey forward will most
likely not be oblivious to various obstacles and diﬃculties that usually arise
during the processes of national reconciliation and reconstruction of the
social foundations of a country after an armed conﬂict. The reintegration of
former combatants and the overall rehumanization of society are amongst the
most important hurdles to overcome.
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In turn, the history of South Africa and its experience with transitional
justice provide a benchmark for reﬂection about the Colombian case. South
Africa is commonly regarded as a successful transitional justice model and
experience in recent history (Aﬀa’a-Mindzie, 2015; Gibson, 2009; Mawhin-
ney, 2015; Traniello, 2002; Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd, 2000): nonetheless,
evidence shows that the country’s transition was far from perfect. This chap-
ter focuses on the South African transitional justice experience and assesses
its successes and failures which, in turn, can inform the policies and practices
to be undertaken during the implementation of the Colombian peace
agreement.
To do so, the chapter discusses the process of transitional justice in South
Africa and the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as its
main mechanism. Subsequently, an assessment of the main lessons learnt
from this process is undertaken, including its main critiques as well as its
successes, taking into consideration how pertinent they are for the Colombian
process. Finally, several reﬂections are made on what should be considered for
the Colombian case, so that mistakes from other experiences are not repeated
and the obstacles can be minimized during the path towards reconciliation.
The South African experience and the TRC
Between 1948 and 1994, the South African government implemented the
policy of Apartheid. With the arrival of the National Party to power in 1948,
the white government’s oﬃcial policy was based on the term ‘apartheid’, a
system that—at least in theory—intended to generate separate developments
for the diﬀerent races in the country (Delgado, 2016). In reality, however, this
regime legalized political, social, and economic discrimination against non-
whites (blacks, Indians and coloureds) in order to disempower these commu-
nities and make them subservient to the white population in the country.
Apartheid’s main characteristic was its policy of ‘divide and rule’ (Henrard,
2003). During this period, structural violence was present in all spheres of the
country (political, economic, and social), which led to a systematic dehuma-
nization of the population based on race and gross human rights violations
(Wielenga, 2017).
An institutional framework was designed to enact and reinforce the policy
of segregation and discrimination. For example, only English and Afri-
kaans—languages mainly spoken by whites—were recognized as oﬃcial lan-
guages of the country (Boddy-Evans, 2017). Other examples include the
forbidding of marriages between whites and non-whites (Ratuva, 2013), the
implementation of residential segregation (Massey, 2013), the separation of
public spaces for each racial group (Landis, 1957), and the Bantu Education
Act, which established a diﬀerent education system for whites and non-whites
(Christie & Collins, 1982).
In the last years of apartheid, domestic and international factors con-
siderably inﬂuenced the need to consider a negotiation agenda (De Klerk,
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2002). In the 1980s, mass revolts and mobilizations against the regime
increased and spread throughout the country. Also, churches and mainstream
media started to play a more active anti-apartheid role which encouraged
social mobilization (Maharaj, 2008). Furthermore, the grim prospects for the
economy convinced many in the business community that it was necessary to
explore other solutions to the conﬂict (De Klerk, 2002).
In the international arena, with the independence of Angola, Mozambique,
and Zimbabwe, the ideological barrier that South Africa had sought to
establish began to crumble. Also, Western powers that had supported apart-
heid, such as the USA, the United Kingdom and France, ‘began to come
under increasing pressure from their own citizens and within international
forums’ (Maharaj, 2008, p. 16). Finally, eﬀorts made by the African National
Congress (ANC) overseas were successful in pressuring political leadership
(De Klerk, 2002; Maharaj, 2008).
The end of apartheid was negotiated between 1990 and 1994 (Barnes & De
Klerk, 2002). This negotiation process lasted for a period of about four years,
during which, as in Colombia in recent times, destabilizing events and ongo-
ing tensions remained common. In 1994, following that period of negotiation,
democratic elections were held, and an interim constitution was passed that
legally ended the system of apartheid (Mawhinney, 2015). In 1995, the Man-
dela Government enacted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconcilia-
tion Act2 which set up the South African TRC. The TRC was undoubtedly
the most important transitional justice tool in the country during the transition
to democracy, and its objective was ‘to promote national unity and reconci-
liation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conﬂicts and divisions of
the past’ (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 1995). This mechanism
achieved the most important elements to enable truth and reconciliation
during a transition process: legitimacy, neutrality of the commissioners, and a
clear mandate (Mawhinney, 2015).
The TRC, using a restorative approach, intended to (i) build a bridge
between the past of a deeply divided society and a future founded on peaceful
coexistence for all; (ii) prevent a repetition of the past events in the future,
through the establishment of truth; (iii) reconcile the people of South Africa
and reconstruct the social fabric; and (iv) avoid the proliferation of vengeance
by cultivating understanding and reparation (Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission of South Africa, 2003). According to the Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation3 (IJR), ‘it was believed that if the country did not come to
terms with its past in a way that initiated a healing process, it would at some
point in the future revert to its original cycle of systematic violence’ (Goven-
der & Hofmeyr, 2015, p. 3).
The TRC faced many challenges related to its implementation, one of
which was related to the scale of injustice this mechanism was commanded to
respond to. Even though the number of deaths under the apartheid regime
has not been oﬃcially established, it is estimated that 18,000 people were
killed, 80,000 of the regime’s opponents were detained and approximately
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6,000 were tortured (Wielenga, 2017). According to Aronson, ‘as many as
2,000 people are missing from the Apartheid era in South Africa. Of these,
[only] 477 were oﬃcially recognized by the TRC’ (Aronson, 2011, p. 262). In
terms of forced displacement, some 3.5m. black South Africans were force-
fully relocated (Abel, 2016). These ﬁgures highlight the great challenge the
South African Government faced in relation to providing redress to victims,
reconciliation, and national unity.
Political support for the TRC was also a challenge, as not all parties
involved in the conﬂict agreed with the implementation of this mechanism
(Ladduwahetty, 2011), especially those actors who saw an amnesty as a more
desirable alternative for them (Foster, et al., 2017). However, at the time, this
was the best alternative that could be achieved, as the adoption of a punitive
policy could have had compromised the negotiation process and peace
(Buarque de Hollanda, 2013).
The presence of imperfection
Transitional justice initiatives in post-agreement scenarios are far from per-
fect. In South Africa, after the culmination of the TRC’s mandate, a series of
critiques have emerged revealing the existence of numerous weaknesses of this
process. Diﬀerent critiques have been raised with regards to the TRC’s inability
to eﬀectively achieve restorative justice and meet the people’s expectations, the
construction of selective historical records, and the limited time frame given
for fulﬁlling its mandate, among others (Boshomane, 2016; Buchanan-Clarke,
2015; Cole, 2007; Gibson, 2005; Mawhinney, 2015; Mokgatle, 2016; Valji,
2004; Van der Merwe, 2003).
Four especially salient critiques are explored in this section, as they hold
the most relevance for the Colombian process: the granting of amnesties to
human rights oﬀenders; the non-binding nature of the TRC recommenda-
tions; the institutional weakness of restoration programmes; and the lack of
economic reconciliation and transformation.
Amnesty to human right oﬀenders
The issue of amnesty has been one of the main arguments against the South
African process and its implementation. According to Mawhinney, ‘by oﬀer-
ing oﬀenders amnesty in exchange for truth telling, the TRC pursued truth at
the expense of restorative dialogue and reconciliation, and thus created a false
sense of reconciliation’ (Mawhinney, 2015, p. 36). The practice of granting
amnesty to perpetrators of crimes regardless of whether they committed
massive violations of human rights is still highly controversial.
Amnesty was conceived as an individual prerogative for the interested par-
ties to give a full public disclosure of their crimes, but it was also an oppor-
tunity for the victims and the nation to become cognisant of what actually
happened during apartheid (McLeod, 2015). The TRC received 7,116
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amnesty applications, and ultimately granted amnesty to only 849 applica-
tions (Foster, et al., 2017).
Other assessments argue that justice was traded for a truth that was not
necessarily complete. This perception of a lack of justice was reinforced by the
fact that very few individuals who did not receive amnesty were actually
prosecuted (Foster, et al., 2017) as a consequence of the TRC’s limited ability
to administer justice in terms of prosecutions and reparations, since it could
not institute any legal proceedings against perpetrators of crimes (Sensabaugh
& Van der Merwe, 2017).
Also, there was a lack of synergy between the perpetrators’ and victims’
processes due to the fact that they were addressed by diﬀerent committees. In
addition to this, doubts have emerged as to the TRC’s capacity to mediate
reconciliation between victims and oﬀenders, since there was not real dialogue
between them, besides some opportunities the former had to face the latter in
an amnesty hearing (Howse & Llewellyn, 1999).
However, one could question the plausibility of a transition from apartheid
in the absence of incentives such as amnesties (Mawhinney, 2015). Without
them, the transition towards democracy could have failed. Without the oﬀer
of amnesty, perpetrators within the apartheid regime could have incentives to
spoil the peace process and the transition, or abandon the negotiations, as the
continuation of the regime could have been more secure for those perpetrators
of crimes (Gibson, 2005). Thus it can be said that the South African model
was a pragmatic choice that responded to the necessities of the transition
towards a new social order (Hamber, 2013).
In South Africa, in a similar way to Colombia, negotiation emerged as the result
of a mutually damaging stalemate (Zartman, 2001). In these cases, the
granting of concessions such as amnesties seems to be more natural to a
negotiation process, as opposed to a military victory. Amnesty was of great
importance to members of the apartheid government, and to ANC members who
committed crimes. In fact, most of the applicants for amnesty were indivi-
duals who claimed association or membership of the Pan African Congress,
the Azanian People’s Liberation Army, or the ANC (Foster, et al., 2017).
TRC recommendations were not binding
The TRC was mandated to compile ‘a report providing as comprehensive an
account as possible of the activities and ﬁndings of the commission […] which
contains recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of
human rights’ (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 1995). The com-
missioners produced a ﬁnal report of more than 3,500 pages in seven volumes,
published in 2003, which included, among other things, recommendations for
redressing past injustices and promoting future justice.
These recommendations, which were supposedly aimed at structural chan-
ges, were undermined by the Government’s relative inaction in responding to
the ﬁndings. In fact, the Government’s reluctance to follow up on the
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recommendations, such as lack of prosecution of perpetrators, compensation
of victims, and absence of diﬀerent forms of restitution, is one of the biggest
sources of critiques to the process (Govender & Hofmeyr, 2015; Buchanan-
Clarke, 2015). Changes implemented by diﬀerent state bodies following the
advice from the TRC would have had a greater impact than the commission
itself (Boshomane, 2016), and would have dealt with structural issues such as
the widespread inequality that exists in the country (Leibbrandt, et al., 2007).
The South African TRC was only able to make recommendations regarding
reparations and had limited resources to assist victims (Sensabaugh & Van der
Merwe, 2017). Amongst the main suggestions made to political leaders were:
(i) the creation of a reparations fund through corporate contributions, (ii) the
restructuring of the foreign debt the apartheid regime incurred to maintain
the police state, and (iii) the collection of a one-oﬀ tax on the patrimony, from the
white population (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 2003).
In April 2003, the South African Government announced its response to
these recommendations, which included a small payment to the victims
recognized by the TRC4 and the provision of facilities to those who wanted to
make voluntary contributions to the reparations fund (Valji, 2004).
The capacity of the Colombian state to act on the ﬁndings and recom-
mendations of its truth commission, the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de
la Verdad, la Convivencia y la no Repetición (CEV),5 will be critical. Such a
commission may call for the establishment of programmes and the imple-
mentation of changes that will probably transcend the term of a single gov-
ernment, making reconciliation a state agenda. It is thus imperative to avoid
the politicization of truth commissions and ensure that they and their sub-
sequent recommendations form a social commitment that transcends political
patronage (Buchanan-Clarke, 2015).
Failure in the implementation of restitution initiatives
Another challenge emerged with regards to the capacity of existing institutions
and courts to implement policies the state had created in the post-apartheid
period. Land restitution for apartheid’s victims is an illustrative example.
Policies implemented by the apartheid governments from the 1950s up to
the early 1990s resulted in the fact that 80% of the population lived on 13% of
the land (Du Plessis, 2004). This inequality was the consequence of the forced
relocation policy implemented during the apartheid regime (Cole, 1993).
The restitution of land by the South African Government has not been as suc-
cessful as had been intended. After the white minority rule ended, it was a diﬃcult
task for the new regime to redistribute the land fairly and eﬃciently. When apart-
heid ended, the Government aimed to redistribute 30% of the land from
whites to blacks in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the new government (by 1999); by
2010, only 8% of that 30% had been reallocated (Atuahene & Brophy, 2015).
This is an important warning for Colombia, taking into account that more
than 10% of its total population has been forcibly displaced (Díaz & Quiñones,
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2015). The Colombian Government has tried to implement land restitution
policies before the peace agreement with the FARC—EP6 (Agencia Presidencial
para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, 2011). The problems that
have emerged in this matter are related to the mismatch between the law and the
capacity to implement policies by the state, speciﬁcally in terms of service
delivery (Díaz & Quiñones, 2015).
Economic reconciliation
As the TRC focused on developing a national political reconciliation process,
not enough attention was given to the underlying structural socioeconomic
conditions created by centuries of institutionalized inequality, colonialism,
and racism. The political reconciliation process was not translated into eco-
nomic redress and restitution (Buchanan-Clarke, 2015).
The historical legacies of apartheid still reinforce old patterns of socialization
and prejudice, which have had an impact on inclusive development and
growth (Govender & Hofmeyr, 2015). Thus, the current levels of inequality,
and high levels of poverty amongst the black population within the country,
are in fact connected to the lack of economic reconciliation (Asaf, et al.,
2009).
The IJR in South Africa has researched and analyzed public opinion
towards national reconciliation, social cohesion, transformation, and demo-
cratic governance in South Africa, mainly through the South African Recon-
ciliation Barometer (SARB).7 They have identiﬁed how, for South Africans,
income inequality is the main source of social division within the country,
and argue that it is impossible to achieve a reconciled society as long as those
discriminated under apartheid remain poor (Valji, 2004). In fact, according to
the IJR research, over time South Africans have shifted their perception of
reconciliation, transcending the forgiveness spectrum to link reconciliation
with higher socioeconomic equity (Wielenga, 2017).
Thus although the country ‘may have avoided civil war during the transition
to democracy two decades ago, this does not mean the country’s majority is
content with their situation’ (Atuahene & Brophy, 2015). Nowadays, the achieve-
ments of the South African transition and reconciliation process are hindered
by the economic legacy of apartheid and the lack of structural changes in society.
Economic inequality and levels of dissatisfaction related to structural and
socioeconomic factors are also salient in Colombia, as the country has a high Gini
coeﬃcient (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2017).
Colombia’s patterns of violence have been shaped and have shaped stark inequal-
ities. In Colombia, in a similar fashion to South Africa, the use of violence was
instrumental for securing economic gains. The legacy of this is entrenched
inequalities.
The economic scope of reconciliation will also be important in the case of
Colombia for the sustainability of the overall peace process (National Aboriginal
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Economic Development Board, 2016). Unchanging inequalities potentially deepen
social conﬂict, aﬀect reconciliation, and present the seeds of future conﬂicts.
From the good we learn even more
The South African transitional justice process also provides a series of practices
and experiences with regards to conﬂict resolution and reconciliation that pro-
vide valuable lessons to consider. Its successes are of key importance for any
country beginning a transition, either political or from conﬂict to peace. While a
number of positive aspects can be identiﬁed from the South African experience,
there are three of special interest to bear in mind for Colombia. These include
the construction of historical memory, the achievement of a socio-political
reconciliation, and the importance of leadership for reconciliation.
Construction of historical memory
The construction of historical memory is important not only as a reparation
and healing mechanism, but also as part of a nation-building project. It implies
more than just recording atrocities and facts of the past (Ross, 2006), and includes
the creation of a version of the truth about what happened (Gibson, 2005).
Even though it is argued that the truth delivered by the TRC was unba-
lanced or biased (Sensabaugh & Van der Merwe, 2017), this process oﬀered
South Africans, as part of a community, the opportunity to reﬂect on the past
through storytelling, memorialization, and the inclusion of a local perspec-
tive. These processes formed the basis for reconciliation, through allowing
individual narratives to gain signiﬁcance and incorporating them into a more
general discourse, as well as facilitating discussions and allowing an increased
awareness, debate and reﬂection on the atrocities committed during apartheid
(Foster, et al., 2017). Given that the TRC received approximately 22,000
statements from victims and witnesses (Bacler, 2005), the creation of spaces
for reconciliation and reﬂection can constitute a cathartic space for a country.
Although they did not manage to involve all the voices or the narratives,
some of the outputs of the TRC, such as the ﬁnal report and a series of
memorials, became a reference point for the events that occurred during the
apartheid years (Briceño & Guzmán, 2015). By recording testimonies, the TRC
report allowed people to refer to and reﬂect on the extent of the viciousness of
this period. On the other hand, national legacy projects, such as memor-
ialization events and the construction of monuments and memorials, were of
key importance in the transformation agenda (Department of Arts & Culture
of the Republic of South Africa, 2017).
Socio-political reconciliation
Reconciliation is a complex process that encompasses diﬀerent domains and
requires ‘continuous dialogue to better comprehend and address the sources
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of division that threaten peaceful coexistence’ (Du Toit, et al., 2015, p. xii). In
this sense, reconciliation processes require a state and a society committed to
addressing the structural causes of conﬂicts, and should be aimed at recon-
structing destroyed social structures. These processes do not end with the truth
commissions or other transitional justice initiatives (Du Toit, et al., 2015).
For most South Africans, the term reconciliation meant forgiveness of
perpetrators, a reduction in violence, a general commitment to peace, and the
establishment of the truth about the past. However, it cannot be doubted that
the South African society was able to achieve a particular understanding of
reconciliation that allowed the emergence of a new politics and the partici-
pation of formally marginalized South African in everyday politics (Delgado,
2016). As the 2015 SARB, illustrated, 59.2% of the respondents believed that
the country had made progress towards national reconciliation since the end
of apartheid. In addition, 69.7% of the respondents believed that the country
had to continue to pursue reconciliation as a national objective (Govender &
Hofmeyr, 2015).
Despite the fact that the economic consequences of the apartheid regime still
loom over South Africa and its future, the country has come a long way towards
socio-political reconciliation. The rehumanization of victims and perpetrators
alike, the uniﬁcation of the population around a common national objective,
the consolidation of new national symbols, and the creation of a new social
covenant are achievements that cannot be denied (Delgado, 2016).
Colombia has signiﬁcant wounds that will require healing, something that
will only be possible with the active participation of the whole society. As in
South Africa, there is a need to construct a state of aﬀairs in which the whole
population, including perpetrators and victims, can coexist.
Role of leadership
One of the most important lessons that the South African case oﬀers is the
role of leadership, demonstrated by ﬁgures like Nelson Mandela, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, and Frederik Willem (F. W.) de Klerk. Political will and lea-
dership can deﬁne transitions and promote successful spaces for reconciliation
and justice (Rognvik & Sánchez, 2012). Without it, South Africa’s process
could have failed, considering the strong political and social divisions that
deﬁned the transition away from apartheid. Leadership does not replace jus-
tice, or the structural transformation and reconstruction of social relation-
ships, but it can guide the country in a path where the conditions for justice
are possible.
Mandela rejected the exclusion of diﬀerent groups and dismissed the pos-
sibility of revenge. Although in doing so, he placed reconciliation above jus-
tice, he nonetheless empowered a unifying vision of the country (Mandela,
1990), that allowed the country to move away from apartheid. This in fact
constituted an exercise in nation-building, that ‘encourage[d] the blacks and
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the whites to collaborate because South Africa belonged to them all’
(Maanga, 2013, p. 98).
In addition, Mandela’s leadership gave unconditional support to the work
done by the TRC, aﬀording it the political capital to look for a reconciliation
process that was initially seen as valid for the population. This was of great
importance, since a truth commission without legitimacy cannot eﬀectively
achieve its objectives (Gibson, 2009).
On the other hand, Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s role in the TRC as its
chairperson was of considerable signiﬁcance. He ﬁrmly believed that South
Africa should have a collective catharsis process during the TRC years of
work. His leadership was critical on giving the TRC its restorative character
(Gibson, 2009).
Finally, F. W. de Klerk was responsible for presiding over the South Afri-
can transition, representing the minority that had installed apartheid. On 2
February 1990, in his inauguration speech as President, he announced several
important reforms to end the apartheid regime and recognized that ‘only a
negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire
population [was] able to ensure lasting peace’ (De Klerk, 1990). Without his
leadership, there would have been no transition, as he mobilized a sector
within the white population to end the regime. This leadership was reasserted
in the country’s whites-only referendum, where the majority voters (white)
agreed on ending the apartheid system and approved the negotiations to end
the conﬂict (South African History Online (SAHO), 1992).
These lessons from South Africa should be kept in mind, especially in
processes such as that being pursued in Colombia. The South African transi-
tion was led by strong and charismatic political ﬁgures that facilitated peace,
whereby South Africans came to recognize that more violence would not be
the solution. As some political parties and political leaders argue for the
rejection of the Colombian peace agreements, the contrast of the South African
leadership seems to prove the value of leadership for peace. Although leader-
ship does not replace implementation and institutions, leadership facilitates
peace and can mobilize the state towards these goals.
Conclusions
Although the South African experience is regarded as a successful transitional
justice model, evidence shows that there were many shortcomings. For South
Africa, it has been argued that the absolution of—and absence of legal pro-
ceedings against—perpetrators of crimes that contributed to the dehumani-
zation of society, has promoted a culture of impunity and frustration,
especially from the victims’ perspective. In this aspect, the agreement between
the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government aims to address this issue by
granting amnesty only for politically-related crimes and not for crimes against
humanity. By doing this, the objective is to avoid a general perception of
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impunity amongst the population and truly contribute to national
reconciliation.
Honouring the recommendations delivered by the transitional justice
mechanisms such as the TRC is another aspect that should not be overlooked
in transition scenarios. After acknowledging the facts that led to a violent
context, hearing the victims’ and perpetrators’ voices and experiences, and
promoting forgiveness and coexistence, the transitional justice spaces should
inform the state about the necessary steps to guarantee a successful reconci-
liation in the forthcoming years. Although the CEV will be responsible for
providing these recommendations to the Colombian Government, the possi-
bility of structural change transcends reports, and will depend on the gov-
ernment’s ability and willingness to implement what is suggested by the CEV
in order to enact structural change.
Transitional contexts also demand successful restitution initiatives and
proper economic transformation. The incorporation of structural changes
that aim to reduce inequalities—not only in terms of income but also, for
example, in terms of land ownership—is of outstanding importance in order
to facilitate meaningful reconciliation. Allowing past economic legacies
caused by violence to prevail might translate into future social conﬂicts, such
as the ones that are currently emerging in South Africa.
The implementation of transitional justice tools should not be considered
as the ultimate solution to a conﬂict. Even though the TRC provided the
most important elements towards reconciliation and coexistence, additional
initiatives were (and are still) necessary in order to overcome the challenges
that have arisen after its implementation. These include signiﬁcant inequality,
poverty and unemployment rates, which create a sense of frustration and
discontent in the population.
During a nation-building and social reconstruction project, historical
memory is of key importance for the future common understanding on what
happened in the past. The construction—not imposition—of truths and
memories is an opportunity for a society to redeﬁne its identity, rebuild social
bonds, and reconcile. Colombia must avoid a mandated memory or selective
amnesia, through encouraging everyone—including members of the FARC—
EP—to participate in this process.
The challenge of reconciliation remains for both Colombia and South
Africa at diﬀerent levels. In Colombia, political leadership is required to encou-
rage the participation of the entire population in the construction of a new
country. This represents an opportunity for Colombians to be part of the project
of shaping a new, peaceful country. South Africa, on the other hand, must con-
tinue to address the new challenges that are emerging, such as the importance
of equality and opportunities for all South Africans beyond the structural
conditions that have deﬁned a legacy of inequality and marginalization.
Leadership, planning and political willingness to overcome the old prac-
tices of corruption and caudillismo 8 are required in Colombia. Colombian
leaders must understand that a country cannot be brought together by decree.
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Nobel Prizes can be won, but if the idea of peace is currently meaningless to
signiﬁcant sectors of the population, peace itself is at risk. The Colombian
leadership must embrace the task of promoting the idea of reconciliation.
The understanding of reconciliation must be integral, including the social,
political and economic spheres. Focusing only on one or two spheres may
lead to the emergence of future problems that can considerably undermine the
current eﬀorts to achieve peace. Consequently, the approach should not only
include forgiveness, coexistence, political inclusion, and rehumanization, but
also it must address other structural causes of conﬂict through reparations
and assistance.
After 50 years of conﬂict, it is time for Colombian society to achieve peace.
During the years to come this will be an interesting and instructive process to
study and assess, which will provide additional insights on transitional societies
and transitional justice.Meanwhile, the South African experience will undoubtedly
continue guiding the way in many aspects and, most importantly, will point
out the shortcomings, setbacks, and limitations of peacebuilding initiatives in
the Global South.
Notes
1 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army.
2 Act No 34 of 1995.
3 This institute was founded in 2000 and its objective was to follow up on the TRC
work. It aims to ensure that lessons learnt from South Africa’s transition were taken
into account nationwide and in other countries.
4 Victims of human rights violations received a small, one-oﬀ compensation payment
of 30,000 rand (about one-quarter of what the TRC recommended) (Sensabaugh &
Van der Merwe, 2017, p. 37).
5 Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition
6 Law 1448 from 10 July 2011.
7 It is a survey that has been implemented annually in South Africa since 2003, which
measures perceptions regarding progress in reconciliation in the country over time.
8 Caudillo translates to English as leader. Caudillismo refers to a political system,
based on the leadership of a strongman or a charismatic ﬁgure.
References
Abel, M., 2016. Long-run eﬀects of forced resettlement: evidence from Apartheid
South Africa. Harvard University, pp. 1–36.
Aﬀa’a-Mindzie, M., 2015. A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice: Learning
from the Experiences of African Countries. In B.-S. Baek & R. G. Teitel, eds.
Transitional Justice in Uniﬁed Korea. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 175–194.
Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, 2011. Ley
de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras. [Online] Available at: www.centrodememoria
historica.gov.co/descargas/ley_victimas/ley_victimas_completa_web.pdf [Last acces-
sed 25 July 2017].
Armstrong, J., 2014. Rethinking the restorative-retributive dichotomy: is reconciliation
possible? Contemporary Justice Review, 14(3), pp. 362–374.
200 The South African experience
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
Aronson, J. D., 2011. The Strengths and Limitations of South Africa’s Search for
Apartheid-Era Missing Persons. [Online] Available at: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/a
rticles/PMC3185365/ [Last accessed 13 July 2017].
Asaf, Z., Cato, N., Jawoko, K. & Rosevear, E., 2009. Addressing Inequality in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto.
Atuahene, B., Brophy, A. L., 2015. In South Africa, Land Apartheid Lives On. [Online]
Available at: www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/opinion/south-africas-land-inequity.htm
l?_r=0 [Last accessed 25 February 2017].
Bacler, D., 2005. Evaluating Transitional Justice in South Africa from a Victim’s Per-
spective. [Online] Available at: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0012.207/
–evaluating-transitional-justice-in-south-africa?rgn=main;view=fulltext [Last acces-
sed 25 July 2017].
Barnes, C. & De Klerk, E., 2002. South Africa’s multi-party constitutional negotiation
process. Accord, Issue 13, pp. 26–33.
Boddy-Evans, A., 2017. The Afrikaans Medium Decree. [Online] Available at: www.
thoughtco.com/the-afrikaans-medium-decree-43416 [Last accessed 07 July 2017].
Boshomane, P., 2016. 20 years after the TRC hearings South Africa’s pain persists. [Online]
Available at: www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/opinion/2016/04/10/20-years-after-
the-TRC-hearings-South-Africas-pain-persists [Last accessed 28 December 2016].
Briceño, D. & Guzmán, J., 2015. Memoria histórica para el posconﬂicto en Colombia.
In A. Molano Rojas, ed. El Posconﬂicto en Colombia: reﬂexiones y propuestas para
recorrer la transición. Bogotá: Instituto de Ciencia Política Hernán Echavarría
Olózaga/Fundación Konrad Adenauer Colombia, pp. 95–106.
Buarque de Hollanda, C., 2013. Human rights and political transition in South Africa:
the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Brazilian Political Science
Review, 7(1), pp. 8–30.
Buchanan-Clarke, S., 2015. Colombia and the search for truth in Latin America’s




Christie, P. & Collins, C., 1982. Bantu Education: Apartheid Ideology or Labour
Reproduction? Comparative Education, 18(1), pp. 59–75.
Cole, C. M., 1993. Land Reform from Post-Apartheid South Africa. Boston College
Environmental Aﬀairs Law Review, 20(4), pp. 699–759.
Cole, C. M., 2007. Performance, Transitional Justice, and the Law: South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Theatre Journal, 59(2), pp. 167–187.
De Klerk, E., 2002. South Africa’s negotiated transition: Context, analysis and eva-
luation. Accord, Issue 12, pp. 14–19.
De Klerk, F., 1990. F. W. de Klerk’s speech at the opening of Parliament 2 February
1990. [Online] Available at: www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/
03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02105.htm [Last accessed 15 July 2017].
Delgado, J., 2016. A Colombia le falta un Mandela. [Online] Available at: http://pa
ciﬁsta.co/a-colombia-le-falta-un-mandela/ [Last accessed 13 January 2017].
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2017. Pobreza Monetaria y
Multidimensional en Colombia 2016. [Online] Available at: www.dane.gov.co/index.
php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/pobreza-y-desigualdad/p
obreza-monetaria-y-multidimensional-en-colombia-2016 [Last accessed 15 July
2017].
The South African experience 201
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
Department of Arts & Culture of the Republic of South Africa, 2017. Statement by
the Department of Arts and Culture on National Legacy Projects. [Online] Available
at: www.dac.gov.za/content/statement-department-arts-and-culture-national-lega
cy-projects [Last accessed 25 July 2017].
DeRouen, K. J. et al., 2010. Civil war peace agreement implementation and state
capacity. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), pp. 333–346.
Díaz, F. A. & Quiñones, F., 2015. The use of managerial tools to support policymaking
in a peace process: the case of displaced population in Colombia. [Online] Available at:
www.researchgate.net/publication/277016019_the_use_of_managerial_tools_to_supp
ort_the_policymaking_in_a_peace_process_the_case_of_displaced_population_in_
colombia [Last accessed 15 July 2017].
Du Plessis, J., 2004. Land restitution in South Africa, Bethlehem: BADIL Resource
Center.
Du Toit, A., Nyoka, A. & Woolard, I., 2015. Radical Reconciliation: critical choices
for economic justice, Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.
Duthie, R. & Siels, P., 2017. Justice Mosaics. How context shapes Transitional Justice
in fractured societies. 1st ed. New York: International Center for Transitional
Justice.
Foster, D., Govender, R. & Lefko-Everett, K., 2017. Measuring Social Change in
South Africa. In D. Foster, R. Govender & K. Lefko-Everett, eds. Rethinking
reconciliation. Evidence from South Africa. Braamfontein: HSRC Press, pp. 3–22.
Gibson, J. L., 2005. The Truth About Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa.
International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique, 26
(4), pp. 341–361.
Gibson, J. L., 2009. On legitimacy theory and the eﬀectiveness of truth commissions.
Law and Contemporary Probelms, 72(123), pp. 123–141.
Govender, R. & Hofmeyr, J., 2015. National Reconciliation, Race Relations and Social
Inclusion, Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.
Gutiérrez Ramírez, L. M., 2014. La obligación internacional de investigar, juzgar y
sancionar graves violaciones a los derechos humanos en contextos de justicia tran-
sicional. Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, 2(16), pp. 23–60.
Hamber, B., 2013. Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South Africa and
Northern Ireland. [Online] Available at: http://humanrights.uconn.edu/wp-content/
uploads/sites/767/2014/06/RightsReasonsCambridge.pdf [Last accessed 21 July 2017].
Henrard, K., 2003. Post-Apartheid South Africa: Transformation and Reconciliation.
World Aﬀairs, 166(1), pp. 37–55.
Howse, R. & Llewellyn, J. J., 1999. Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The University of Toronto Law
Journal, 49(3), pp. 355–388.
Ladduwahetty, N., 2011. The forthcoming UNHRC meeting and Darusman Report.
[Online] Available at: www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=arti
cle-details&code_title=32997 [Last accessed 10 July 2017].
Landis, E., 1957. Apartheid Legislation. Africa Today, 4(6), pp. 45–48.
Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, C. & Woolard, I., 2007. Poverty and Inequality Dynamics in
South Africa: Post-apartheid Developments in the Light of the Long-Run Legacy.
Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour & Development Research Unit, University of
Cape Town.
202 The South African experience
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
Maanga, G. S., 2013. The relevance and legacy of Nelson Mandela in the twenty-ﬁrst
century Africa: An historical and theological perspective. African Journal of History
and Culture, pp. 96–113.
Maharaj, M., 2008. The ANC and the South Africa’s negotiated transition to democ-
racy and peace. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conﬂict
Management.
Mandela, N., 1990. Speech. Address by Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the
African National Congress (ANC), at the 26th Assembly of Organisation for African
Unity (OAU) Heads of State and Government. [Online] Available at: www.mandela.
gov.za/mandela_speeches/1990/900709_oau.htm [Last accessed 15 July 2017].
Massey, R., 2013. Competing rationalities and informal settlement upgrading in Cape
Town, South Africa: a recipe for failure. Journal of Housing and the Built Environ-
ment, 28(4), pp. 605–613.
Mawhinney, E. B., 2015. Restoring Justice: Lessons from Truth and Reconciliation in
South Africa and Rwanda. Journal of Public Law and Policy, 36(2), pp. 21–52.
McLeod, L., 2015. Reconciliation through Restorative Justice: Analyzing South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Process. [Online] Available at: www.beyondintractability.
org/library/reconciliation-through-restorative-justice-analyzing-south-africas-truth-a
nd-reconciliation [Last accessed 27 December 2016].
Mokgatle, T., 2016. 20 years after the TRC: Are we any the better? [Online] Available
at: https://africlaw.com/2016/08/18/20-years-after-the-trc-are-we-any-the-better/#m
ore-1211 [Last accessed 28 December 2016].
National Aboriginal Economic Development Board, 2016. Without equal economic
opportunities, there can be no reconciliation with Indigenous Canadians. [Online]
Available at: www.naedb-cndea.com/without-equal-economic-opportunities-no-r
econciliation/ [Last accessed 25 July 2017].
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 1995. Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. [Online] Available at: www.justice.gov.za/legislation/a
cts/1995-034.pdf [Last accessed 16 August 2017].
Ratuva, S., 2013. ‘Black empowerment’ policies: Dilemmas of aﬃrmative action in
South Africa. In Politics of preferential development. s.l.: ANU Press, pp. 219–240.
Rognvik, S. & Sánchez, E., 2012. Building Just Societies: Reconciliation in Transitional
Settings. New York: United Nations.
Ross, F., 2006. La elaboración de una Memoria Nacional: la Comisión de Verdad y
Reconciliación de Sudáfrica. Cuadernos de Antropología Social, Volume 24, pp. 51–68.
Saﬀon, M. P. & Uprimny, R., 2005. Capítulo 7: Justicia Transicional y Justicia Res-
taurativa: Tensiones y complementariedades. In Entre El Perdón Y El Paredón.
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, pp. 211–232.
Schabas, W., 2011. Transitional Justice and the Norms of International Law. [Online]
Available at: www.jsil.jp/annual_documents/2011/fall/schabas_trans_just911.pdf
[Last accessed 17 July 2017].
Sensabaugh, K. & Van der Merwe, H., 2017. Truth, redress and reconciliation: Evaluat-
ing transitional justice from below. In K. Lefko-Everett, R. Govender & D. Foster,
eds. Rethinking reconciliation. Evidence from South Africa. Braamfontein: HSRC
Press, pp. 25–44.
South African History Online (SAHO), 1992. President F. W. de Klerk announces
Whites-only referendum results. [Online] Available at: www.sahistory.org.za/dated-e
vent/president-fw-de-klerk-announces-whites-only-referendum-results [Last accessed
15 July 2017].
The South African experience 203
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
Traniello, M., 2002. Power-sharing: lessons from South Africa and Rwanda. Interna-
tional Public Policy Review, 3(2), pp. 28–43.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 2003. Final Report, s.l.: s.n.
Valji, N., 2004. Reconciliación y reparación: un balance. Vanguardia Dossier, Issue 12.
Van der Merwe, H., 2003. The Role of the Church in Promoting Reconciliation in
Post-TRC South Africa. Religion and Reconciliation in South Africa, pp. 269–281.
Villa-Vicencio, C. & Verwoerd, W., 2000. Looking back, reaching forward. 1st edn.
Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
Wenzel, M., Okimoto, T. G., Feather, N. T. & Platow, M. J., 2008. Retributive and
restorative justice. Law and human behavior, 32(5), pp. 375–389.
Wielenga, C., 2017. A comparison of the reconciliation barometers in South Africa
and Rwanda. In K. Lefko-Everett, R. Govender & D. Foster, eds. Rethinking
reconciliation. Evidence from South Africa. Braamfontein: HSRC Press, pp. 45–61.
Zartman, W., 2001. The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe
Moments. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1(1), pp. 8–18.
204 The South African experience
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;





While the rest of Latin America experienced a ‘pink tide’ of centre-left poli-
tics sweeping across the region from the mid-2000s, Peru and Colombia stood
out as the odd cases where this did not happen (Bull, 2014; Yates & Bakker,
2014). Indeed, governments with clear right-wing, or centre-right, orientations
have ruled both countries over the past 20 years (1996–2016), some of them
even sharing more than a few authoritarian traits in their leadership styles
(for example, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Álvaro Uribe in Colombia, albeit
with diﬀerent approaches to formal democracy). Both countries have experi-
enced internal armed conﬂict and guerrilla war, waged by leftist guerrillas.
However, the scope of the violence experienced in Colombia surpasses that of
Peru in terms of the duration of the conﬂict, the number of victims and actors
involved, and most notably, the massive internal displacement and land dis-
possession characterizing the Colombian armed conﬂict (see Chapter 6). The
countries also have large rural populations, and the proﬁle of the victims is
also similar: rural, poor, black or indigenous origin. Yet, in spite of contextual
similarities, there are also some signiﬁcant diﬀerences concerning the way the
two countries have chosen to deal with human rights violations of the past.
Peru underwent two transitions: a transition starting in 1992, following
internal armed conﬂict, and a political transition away from an authoritarian
regime in 2000. The achievements recorded by Colombia in terms of applying
transitional justice mechanisms, both prior to and after the signing of the
peace agreement between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP) guerrillas (see
Chapter 3), put the Peruvian experience in perspective, and vice versa.
In this chapter, I aim to explore the Peruvian experience in implementing
transitional justice since 2000, adopting a lessons-learned approach in order
to highlight those aspects most relevant for the transitional justice mechan-
isms designed by the Colombian Government. The focus is on the work of the
truth commission, the challenges of retributive justice, and the implementa-
tion of victim reparation programmes in Peru. I start by discussing the main
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features of the Peruvian case2 and conclude the chapter with a discussion of
its implications and lessons for the Colombian case.
Characterizing the Peruvian case
The Peruvian transition is characterized as a dual transition: a transition from
armed conﬂict to a post-conﬂict phase in the mid-1990s, and a political transi-
tion from an authoritarian, although formally democratic, regime that could be
described as an illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997) to a democracy. The end of
the armed conﬂict in Peru is commonly associated with the capture of Abi-
mael Guzmán, the leader of the Maoist Communist Party faction Shining
Path (Sendero Luminoso) in September 1992, after 12 years of violence. With
Guzmán’s capture and trial, the Peruvian state declared both military and
political victory over Shining Path, avictory that remains unchallenged in Peruvian
society and history and that gave Fujimori (the president at the time) ample poli-
tical support and popularity. Between 1992 and 2000, however, the Peruvian state
and armed forces continued their counter-subversive activity against both real
and alleged senderistas 3 (Burt, 2006; Burt, 2007). The political transition
took place following the collapse of President Fujimori’s regime in 2000,
while initiating a contested third term in power. The leaking of the infamous
‘Vladivideos’ showing the presidential advisor and head of the intelligence
service Vladimiro Montesinos paying oﬀ top leaders of the judiciary, media,
and private sector revealed the authoritarian nature of the Fujimori regime.
A second observation concerns the lack of familiarity of the Peruvian
society with the term ‘transitional justice’ and what it entails—in spite of the
passage of time and some implementation. The term is seldom used beyond
the realm of human rights organizations, not even among victims’ organiza-
tions. This is at least partly due to the fact that accountability issues and
transitional arrangements were never framed in terms of a transitional justice
paradigm or framework, in sharp contrast with the Colombian experience.
This is even the case after the delivery of the truth commission report, which
did address victims’ rights. The absence of such a framework limits coherence
and a holistic approach to accountability for past human rights violations,
although it did not necessarily imply the absence of speciﬁc implementation.
Thus it is possible to trace the development and implementation of transi-
tional justice mechanisms, including a truth commission, prosecutions, and
victim reparations, in Peru since 2001.
In addition, it is important to reﬂect on the political structures in place and
the strength (or weakness) of the judiciary in the country as contextual factors
that deﬁned the transitional justice that took place in Peru and the challenges
it met. Until recently, the Peruvian political process has been characterized by
the near-absence of political parties. This was not always the case, but the
economic crisis of the 1980s, combined with the crude violence of the internal
armed conﬂict, resulted in the eﬀective dismantling of the political party
system (Tanaka, 1998). State repression weakened labour unions and social
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movements, suspected of being inﬁltrated by the guerrillas. As a result, an
already fragile system of political representation and interest mediation
crumbled. The weakness of political parties and the vulnerability of social
movements in the late 1980s left the political scene to be occupied by inde-
pendent candidates such as Fujimori, who had no previous political experi-
ence or party aﬃliation.
Fujimori rose to the presidency in the 1990s and put an end to the eco-
nomic crisis with a series of neoliberal market-friendly policies, amid huge
social costs. However, his rise to power did not do much to address the crisis
of representation or reconstitute the political arena. On the contrary, on 5
April 1992, Fujimori closed the Congress as part of a ‘self-coup’, allegedly to
secure the governability of the country and re-establish the constitutional
order by calling for a new constitutional assembly. By 1993 Peru not only had
a new constitution, but a reordered political system where the legislative and
judiciary were subjected to the interference of the executive, setting the
ground for the establishment of an authoritarian regime (Burt, 2007).
Currently, there is a competitive electoral system in Peru, yet congressional
representatives still have few incentives to establish constituencies based on
collective agendas rather than on individual political ambitions. The latent
weakness of a political system characterized by volatile electoral lists rather
than solid political parties also aﬀects the relationship between the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of power, as well as the possibility for civil
society to inﬂuence the political agenda through mechanisms of political repre-
sentation. Although this threat was most critical during the Fujimori regime, the
Peruvian judicial system remains permeable to political inﬂuence at all levels.
The weakness of the political and judicial systems is important for the
particular case of human rights trials, as advances made by some court deci-
sions are not guaranteed to set jurisprudence. This weakness also reﬂects the
limited political inﬂuence held by the Peruvian human rights sector. Advo-
cacy campaigns of victims’ organizations typically deal with events that took
place a long time ago in remote areas of the country. Their cases are con-
ducted with limited resources, far from the political decision-making scene,
and have had limited success in mobilizing popular and political support for
accountability issues and in inﬂuencing the political agenda. Victims’ organi-
zations largely reﬂect the overall proﬁle of victims of the Peruvian armed
conﬂict in Peru: poor, peasant, indigenous citizens, from rural areas, living at
the fringes of the state (García-Godos, 2013).
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad
y Reconciliación —CVR) was established in 2001 by the transitional govern-
ment of President Valentín Paniagua (November 2000—July 2001)4 and
endorsed later by elected President Alejandro Toledo in 2003. The creation of
the CVRwas not the result of massive popular demand; rather, it reﬂected the
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strength gained by the human rights sector at the time the political transition
took place. At the broader political level, the transition became a window of
opportunity for the political establishment to reconstitute itself and move
towards more inclusive and democratic practices. The transitional govern-
ment was receptive to the issues and demands raised by civil society and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) voicing the demands of victims’ groups.
The overall idea of the CVR was to initiate a process of accountability for
human rights violations committed not only during the armed conﬂict, but
also by the authoritarian Fujimori regime. The period to be investigated was
1980–2000, focusing on violations both by guerrilla groups (Shining Path and
the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru—MRTA) and by state agents.
The CVR was composed of 12 commissioners, all of whom were well
respected public ﬁgures. They included members of academia, the human
rights community, the Catholic and Evangelical Churches, and a representative
from the military. However, the inclusion of a few commissioners from the left
of the political spectrum provoked unnecessary mistrust in the work of the
commission, particularly from the political establishment and the armed
forces. The CVR’s mandate was broad: to investigate the crimes and human
rights violations committed in the context of violence by both guerrilla
groups5 as well as state agents, to produce an explanation of the factors that
led to violence, to contribute to justice, and to make recommendations for
reparations and for institutional reform. The commission had formal author-
ization to interview victims and others, request information from institutions,
and organize public hearings, but could not initiate judicial cases. The CVR
was provided with ﬁnancial and technical resources to carry out its work for
an initial period of two years; this was extended to 26 months.
During its time of operations, the CVR eﬀectively collected 17,000 testi-
monies from victims and organized 12 public hearings with victims in diﬀer-
ent regions. It investigated a number of cases in an eﬀort to identify
perpetrators, demonstrated that the armed actors had committed crimes
against humanity, and proposed a legal framework for prosecution of human
rights violations. The commission identiﬁed 24,000 full names of victims,
made a list of 8,000 disappeared persons, and identiﬁed the existence of 4,644
burial sites, having collected preliminary evidence in 2,200 of them (Comisión
de la Verdad y Reconciliación—CVR, 2003).
On 28 August 2003 the CVR delivered its ﬁnal report, which included an
in-depth account of the events and a well-documented analysis of the armed
conﬂict in Peru, along with a detailed set of recommendations (Comisión
de la Verdad y Reconciliación—CVR, 2003). The conclusions of the
CVR’s Final Report expressed the brutality and discriminatory nature of the
conﬂict:
Violence fell unequally on diﬀerent geographical areas and on diﬀerent
social strata in the country. […] The TRC has established that the tragedy
suﬀered by the populations of rural Peru, the Andean and jungle regions,
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Quechua and Ashaninka Peru, the peasant, poor and poorly educated
Peru, was neither felt nor taken on as its own by the rest of the country.
This reveals, in the TRC’s judgment, the veiled racism and scornful atti-
tudes that persist in Peruvian society almost two centuries after its birth
as a Republic.6
Until the delivery of the CVR’s Final Report, Peruvians had come to terms
with the oﬃcial ﬁgure of 25,000 fatal victims of the armed conﬂict. Yet the
commission estimated that the total number of dead and disappeared persons
exceeded 69,000. This is possibly the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding of the CVR, as
the gap between the oﬃcial (and accepted) death toll and the death toll esti-
mated by the CVR is illustrative and explained by Peruvian society’s dis-
regard for the rural peasant and indigenous population which constituted the
majority of the victims. Another ground-breaking conclusion of the CVRwas
that the Shining Path guerrillas were the main perpetrators of violence in the
Peruvian armed conﬂict, accounting for 54% of casualties.
The delivery of the CVR Final Report generated public controversy, parti-
cularly from the armed forces and some political parties, but it was generally
well received—or at least passively accepted. The recommendations received
great attention in political circles, and from human rights organizations and
the media, as they addressed measures of retributive justice (including the
creation of a specialized prosecutions system), a comprehensive plan of victim
reparations (restorative justice), and institutional reform.
Fifteen years after the delivery of the CVR Final Report, there have been
some advances in the recommendations concerning justice and reparations,
yet institutional reforms have been completely neglected. Recent years have
seen a trend toward hostile questioning of the CVR’s ﬁndings in the public
debate, indicating the existence of a struggle for memory in Peru. As observed
in the public debate concerning the establishment of the national memory
museum, the Lugar de la Memoria (LUM), inaugurated in 2015, the
achievements of the Peruvian truth commission and the clarity and vision of
its Final Report are yet to be embraced by all political actors. The lack of a
broad constituency in support of the CVR ﬁndings is possibly the most serious
challenge to the legitimacy of the CVR’s account.
Criminal accountability after the political transition
The families and relatives of victims of human rights violations have sought
justice since the beginning of the armed conﬂict in the early 1980s. The state
of emergency imposed in most of the areas aﬀected by the armed conﬂict was
the main impediment to the independent work of the judiciary in support of
victims during the conﬂict. Military command overran civilian authorities
and as a result access to information, habeas corpus, and the right to due
process were easy to set aside and ignore. Many cases could not proceed for
lack of judicial evidence or simply because the military claimed legal
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jurisdiction over them—that is, it conducted investigations and cases in mili-
tary courts. Most of the cases brought in this way were subsequently closed
or, if processed, resulted in extremely lenient sentences for those found
responsible. A situation of impunity was dominant long before it was institu-
tionalized by the Amnesty Law of 1995,7 closing all possibilities to pursue
criminal prosecutions and accountability for human rights in courts in Peru:
civil and military courts alike.
The transition to democracy in 2000 brought about a refreshing impetus
concerning criminal accountability for past human rights violations in Peru.
In 2001 the Amnesty Law was nulliﬁed by the Peruvian congress as a result of
the Barrios Altos decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
This decision established the incompatibility of amnesty legislation in Peru
with the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights. Following an agree-
ment with the Inter-American Court, Peru identiﬁed 159 emblematic cases to
be processed and/or reopened to fulﬁl the eﬀective right to due process.8 47
additional cases were presented to the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce following the
delivery of the Final Report of the CVR in 2003. The cases were to be mon-
itored by the Peruvian Ombudsman’s Oﬃce. However, based on data for 194
cases monitored by the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce since 2001, the results are not
very satisfactory.9 By May 2013, only 32 of the cases had reached a verdict,
while 77 had been dismissed (archived). Another 36 were in the preliminary
investigation stage, and 32 were in other intermediate stages of the judicial
process (Defensoría del Pueblo—Ombudsman, 2013). Of the 35 verdicts
issued in the 32 completed cases, 20 were acquittals, 12 were condemnations,
and three were mixed sentences (Defensoría del Pueblo—Ombudsman, 2013).
Among institutional changes that promoted criminal accountability in Peru
after the transition were: the creation of specialized human rights prosecu-
torial system operational at national (2002) and regional levels (2003), a spe-
cialized chamber for human rights cases in 2004 (Sala Nacional Penal,
initially also with regional jurisdictions), and a new criminal code in 2004.10
The Constitutional Tribunal has also made substantial contributions to
criminal accountability in Peru through a signiﬁcant number of decisions
regarding human rights violations, the right to due process, and the uncon-
stitutionality of military jurisdiction for human rights cases and counter-sub-
versive legislation. As a result, judicial processes against guerrilla members
conducted by military courts (characterized by ‘faceless judges’11) during the
Fujimori regime were to be started anew after 2001.
A second moment of strength for criminal accountability in Peru occurred
during the Fujimori trials, where former president Alberto Fujimori was
sentenced to 25 years in prison for two cases of human rights violations on
April 7 2009. The verdict marked the end of a 15-month judicial process
about the events that took place in La Cantuta–Barrios Altos (1991) and
Sótanos SIE (1992), leading to the killing of 25 people by a paramilitary
organization called Grupo Colina (Burt, 2009). The prosecuting authorities
identiﬁed Fujimori as directly responsible for the crimes, referring to a
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national security policy that allowed the creation of paramilitary groups in
order ‘to eradicate’ guerrilla members. The legal process proved that Fujimori
knew about the existence of Grupo Colina, endorsed its methods, and showed
little or no willingness to stop its actions in spite of having the powers to do
so. Fujimori was convicted as the main culprit responsible for the crimes
committed within the framework of a national security policy that allowed
systematic human rights violations (Salmón, 2014). Against a grim back-
ground of weak judicial independence, Fujimori’s conviction was considered a
test for the Peruvian judicial system, and has passed into history as the ﬁrst
time a former head of state has been prosecuted for human rights violations
in and by his own country.
In spite of the advances made in the ﬁrst years after the transition and the
Fujimori trials in the late 2000s, the path towards criminal accountability for
human rights violations in Peru has been uneven, and in some cases even
reversed. Structural and institutional changes that weakened the specialized
human rights system were accompanied by some serious setbacks concerning
political interference in judicial processes during the presidency of Alan
García (García-Godos & Reátegui, 2016). In 2005, the judiciary moved
towards a centralized institutional design for human rights cases, which
meant that all such cases in the provinces would be transferred to courts in
Lima for the investigation and trial phases. The argument behind this was
that it would improve the eﬀectiveness and quality of investigations. However,
the mandate of the specialized units focusing on human rights cases has been
expanded since 2006, and now also includes cases of corruption and drug
traﬃcking, illegal mining, money laundering, social unrest, and others
(Defensoría del Pueblo—Ombudsman, 2013). Progress has obviously been
limited. For the victims, the centralized justice system means that judicial
processes take place far from where violations occurred and/or families actu-
ally live, in courts overwhelmed with other cases besides those dealing with
human rights violations (see Chapter 15 for a similar account in Bosnia and
Herzegovina). Additional challenges to accountability include the persistent
resistance by the armed forces to providing information about the composi-
tion of units deployed during the armed conﬂict (Defensoría del Pueblo—
Ombudsman, 2013); the limited mechanisms of legal support and protection
for victims, witnesses and human rights advocates; and the reluctance of
members of the Peruvian judicial system to consistently recognize and apply
relevant national and regional jurisprudence.
The most serious setback for criminal accountability in Peru came, how-
ever, not from the judiciary but from the executive. Indeed, on December 24
2017 current Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski granted a humani-
tarian pardon to the jailed former president Fujimori, on health grounds.
Announced only two days after a failed process of presidential impeachment
led by the opposition party Fuerza Popular, the pardon has been interpreted
as the result of political bargaining and not due to humanitarian considera-
tions. The pardon has been questioned nationally and internationally,
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producing protests across the country. Human rights organisations represent-
ing the victims of La Cantuta-Barrios Altos cases have appealed (once more)
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in an attempt to annul the
pardon. A decision is expected in March 2018.
Victim reparations in Peru
In Peru the CVR introduced victim reparations as a mechanism of transi-
tional justice, as its mandate included the design of proposals for ‘moral and
material redress for victims or their relatives’ (Comisión de la Verdad y Recon-
ciliación—CVR, 2003, p. 147). The CVR introduced the categories of ‘victim of
violation’ and ‘victim reparations’ in order to address the needs of the citizens
who had experienced human rights violations during the armed conﬂict and
the authoritarian regimes in Peru. Previously the government spoke of ‘people
in areas aﬀected by violence’ or ‘support to areas aﬀected by violence’—not
of ‘victims’ and ‘reparations’ (Garcia-Godos, 2008). Accordingly, the post-
conﬂict reconstruction period of the mid-to-late 1990s involved increased
state presence in the ‘areas aﬀected by violence’ through investment, devel-
opment projects, public services, employment opportunities, and security and
law enforcement—all measures that were necessary for the people living in
these areas during and after the end of the armed conﬂict. The diﬀerent terminol-
ogy used before and after the political transition is, however, not merely a matter of
linguistic preference. The terms ‘victim’ and ‘reparation’ convey a diﬀerent type of
relation between the state and individual citizens, emphasizing that those
whose rights have been violated are entitled to remedy oﬀered by the state.
The CVR’s Final Report included a comprehensive plan for victim
reparations, which guided the reparations programme that was designed two
years later. The law creating a national reparations programme (PIR—Pro-
grama Integral de Reparaciones) was approved in 200512 and regulated in
2006.13 Interestingly, an administrative unit to design, implement, and moni-
tor victim reparations in Peru was created in 2004, before the law was passed
(Multi-Sectoral High Level Commission to follow-up the Truth Commission’s
Recommendations— CMAN14). The law created a National Victims Registry
(Registro Único de Víctimas—RUV) to be monitored by a Reparations
Council (Consejo de Reparaciones—CR). The CR had an important task to
fulﬁl, involving not only the design and operation of the RUV, but also the
development of criteria to determine whether or not a person or groups of
people can be characterized as victims (accreditation), and thus be included in
the victims’ registry and access the beneﬁts granted by the diﬀerent reparations
programmes. While the deﬁnitions of ‘victim’ and ‘beneﬁciaries’ in the law and
the rules of procedure for the victims’ registry are relatively inclusive and
broad, including victims of the guerrilla groups and state agents alike, there is
an important exclusion from the status of victim, precluding access to repara-
tions: members of guerrilla groups. While military and police personnel as well
as peasant patrols (rondas, or self-defence committees) can have the status of
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victims, the exclusion of guerrilla members (also present in the CVR’s Final
Report reparations proposal) points to the political character as well as the limits
of transitional justice mechanisms in post-conﬂict societies (Laplante, 2009).
The PIR is a comprehensive reparations programme consisting of six dis-
tinct areas or programmes: health, education, housing, civil rights, symbolic
reparations, collective reparations and economic compensation to prioritized
groups. The Collective Reparations Program (PRC) was the ﬁrst to be imple-
mented, starting in 2007 on the basis of needs assessments of local commu-
nities aﬀected by the armed conﬂict. The programme was co-ordinated by the
CMAN and implemented at the local level by PIR regional oﬃces. The col-
lective reparations programme can be considered mainly as a mechanism of
restorative justice. The programme involved ﬁnancial support to implement
smaller development projects in peasant communities, often accompanied by a
symbolic act of recognition and commemoration of the victims and survivors.
The type of projects most preferred by the communities involved basic infra-
structure and productive initiatives, but also included day-care centres,
schools or playgrounds. Some human rights organizations have criticized this
type of support, as it can be diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate collective reparations
from development projects (García-Godos & Reátegui, 2016). It is argued that
development initiatives are the duty of states under any circumstance, and elude
the restorative dimension that reparations are meant to fulﬁl. The PRC was
most active until 2011 and was for long time the only reparations programme in
operation. According to the CR, 5,697 communities are registered in the
registry of communities aﬀected by the armed conﬂict, of which 33% have
received collective reparations (Defensoría del Pueblo—Ombudsman, 2013).
The National Registry of Victims became operational in 2008, system-
atizing information on individual and collective victims. By March 2013, the
registry included 182,350 individual victims (59% identiﬁed as direct victims,
41% as indirect victims) and 5,597 collective victims (Defensoría del Pueblo—
Ombudsman, 2013). The registration and accreditation processes have
involved a considerable amount of resources, both in terms of technical
capacity as well as political commitment. The completion of this registry was
considered a precondition for the implementation of programmes focusing on
various forms of individual reparations, most notably the Program for Indi-
vidual Economic Reparation (PREI), which became operational in 2011.
While the registry continued to receive applications for accreditation, access
to the PREI was closed in 201115, a decision contested by victims and human
rights groups. Access to the PREI was re-established in 2016.
The economic reparations programme, although welcomed by victim
organizations, faced serious criticism due to the unilateral design of the mea-
sures provided. Economic compensation was set to a maximum of 10,000 new
soles16 per victim of disappearance, death, sexual violence or permanent or
partial disabilities—independently of the number of potential beneﬁciaries
involved. For example, if a victim of disappearance has only one relative-
beneﬁciary entitled to compensation, the full amount will go to that person
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alone; whereas if for example, the victim left a spouse, children and parents,
the same amount will have to be divided among them (50% for the spouse,
50% for the other beneﬁciaries).
According to the CN, there are 82,710 individual beneﬁciaries entitled to
economic compensation corresponding to 88,559 registered violations (afec-
taciones). By August 2014, economic compensation had been granted for 62%
of these violations. In terms of beneﬁciaries, 54,856 individual beneﬁciaries
had received compensation, at an average of 3,359 new soles17 per beneﬁciary
(Defensoría del Pueblo, 2014). Although the programme is currently under
implementation, problems have persisted. Other reparations programmes are
still at an initial implementation stage.
A number of issues must still be addressed in the majority of victim
reparations programmes in Peru, the most important one being that the
country does not yet have a coherent and co-ordinated state policy on victim
reparations (despite current implementation). For instance, while symbolic
reparation initiatives to restore the memory and dignity of victims have been
incorporated in the collective reparations programme across the country,
these are not the result of a co-ordinated eﬀort to promote symbolic repara-
tions, but rather reﬂect the sensitization of PRC oﬃcers in the ﬁeld. Institu-
tionally, CMAN lacks the mandate to co-ordinate and execute across
sectorial ministries, thus leaving reparations, particularly on education, hous-
ing and health, unfulﬁlled.
Lessons for Colombia
The Peruvian experience with transitional justice mechanisms has been
mixed, showing both advances and challenges, and not a few setbacks. What
lessons can we extract for the Colombian transitional process with the
FARC—EP guerrillas?
To start with truth-ﬁnding initiatives and the work of truth commissions,
what stands out from the Peruvian experience is that legitimacy is the most
crucial aspect in any attempt to establish historical truth. The most compe-
tent, trustworthy and technically sound eﬀort to disentangle and explain the
many truths left by protracted armed conﬂict can be let down by the lack of
legitimacy and support from at least some political and civil society actors. At
the operational level, the CVR is considered a best-practice model due to the
eﬀectiveness and scope of the data collection process as well as the quality of
the analysis it achieved during the relative limited time it had available. The
quality of professional and technical staﬀ available to a truth commission
cannot be underestimated. In the Colombian case, the truth commission can
build upon the work of the National Centre for Historical Memory, a solid
start for a truth-ﬁnding initiative.
Concerning civil society engagement, the CVR engaged in outreach activ-
ities yet failed in building alliances with actors beyond the NGO and human
rights sectors, falling short in communicating and engaging in an eﬀective
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manner with groups that might be supportive of its ﬁndings and proposals,
such as students, labour unions, peasant self-defence groups and others. The
importance of mobilizing political support for the ﬁndings of the truth com-
mission at all levels must not be underestimated if the goal is to consolidate
the legacy of its work. Political support is particularly important in relation to
the construction of oﬃcial history/histories for future generations. Given the
contentiousness of the peace agreements in Colombia, as shown by the rejection
of the agreements in the plebiscite of 2 October 2016, this is a key element to
take into account.
Concerning prosecutions and retributive justice, Peru did not establish spe-
cial judicial jurisdictions or proceedings for the prosecution of perpetrators
such as the Justice and Peace courts or the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (the
exception being trials against persons accused of terrorism in the mid-1990s
during the Fujimori regime, and military trials). Instead, Peru established a
specialized human rights system to deal with human rights violations com-
mitted during the armed conﬂict within the existing legal structures. While
this was indeed a novel improvement, the success of the specialized jurisdiction
has been tempered by the inclusion of other types of crimes in the functions
of the courts. The courts’ focus on human rights violations has thus been
diluted among its many other duties. At the moment, the Special Jurisdiction
for Peace to be established in Colombia to investigate and prosecute former
FARC—EP guerrillas, members of the military, and other actors involved in
the conﬂict, does not seem susceptible to the danger of a dilution of functions.
The challenge will be whether legal action against state agents (police, mili-
tary, public service) and guerrillas accused of human rights violations will face
the same fate as in other countries of the region, including Peru, where constant
delays and obstructions to the course of justice have been the norm.
As the trials of key actors of the FARC—EP leadership or high ranking
state agents are initiated, the right to due process becomes a key issue. The
main lesson from the Fujimori trials in Peru is that paradigmatic trials not
only need to be conducted in an impeccable manner; they also need to be
presented as such to the media and the general public in order to minimize
the risk of future political backlash. Indeed, while for the majority of the
country and international observers the proceedings were beyond reproach
and the right to due process was strictly observed, for Fujimori’s supporters
the trials were partial and unjustiﬁed, and thus they continue to set doubt
about the trials and its key participants.18 To this day, the Fujimori trials and
conviction continue to polarize public debate and the political scene in Peru.
The unexpected presidential pardon of December 2016 has increased this
polarization even further, dividing the country in those for and those against
the pardon. This complex situation shows that the limits to criminal
accountability can indeed be at the mercy of political decisions.
Concerning victim reparations, the main lesson from the Peruvian experi-
ence is the need for expediency in implementation and the participation of
victim groups and beneﬁciaries in the design of appropriate measures. At the
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core of these two issues lies the acknowledgement of victims’ suﬀering and
agency. Procrastination in the implementation of reparations will negatively
aﬀect the prospects of re-establishing trust between the individual victims and
the state. Mistrust and disappointment are also likely to be fostered in a
context of noticeable expediency in providing support to demobilized ex-
combatants relative to victims. Similarly, by oﬀering or imposing measures
that decision makers think are appropriate for victims without considering
their needs and wishes, reparation programmes will fail to become meaningful
vehicles of acknowledgement and recognition, let alone of the loftier objective
of reconciliation. The Peruvian experience with collective reparations is illus-
trative of the mismatch between what some human rights activists, interna-
tional NGOs and local civil society organizations consider appropriate
reparations for victims, and the actual preferences of victims. The Colombian
Victims Unit and reparations programmes are well positioned to face this
challenge, given the existing dialogue and interaction developed with victim
organizations, but this lesson should be continuously reﬂected upon, as men-
tioned by Jimeno in Chapter 9.
The main diﬀerence between the transitional processes in Colombia and
Peru is that while Colombia opted for a negotiated solution to the armed
conﬂict, in Peru the victorious state set the rules of the game. Both during the
post-conﬂict reconstruction period in the 1990s, and the transitional period
from the 2000s, the authority of the state has remained unchallenged, in
the sense that there is a central state directing more or less the course of the
country, not regional power holders keeping the central state out. This is one
of the most evident challenges facing Colombian institutions, as in some parts
of the country an armed oligopoly still prevails (López, 2016).
Seen from outside, enjoying a partly booming and stable economy, Peru’s
political scene seems similarly stable. Seen from inside, however, there are far
more struggles, mobilizations and contestations than reach the international
observer. Yet with ups and downs and some political scandals in between, the
state manages to take control over speciﬁc situations. The authority of the
state remains intact. Social conﬂicts, sometimes ending in violence, have
occurred in Peru since the political transition; yet these seldom invoke human
rights of the past. It is other kinds of conﬂicts that occupy the national
agenda, such as socio-environmental conﬂicts, the provision of welfare ser-
vices, or the protection of socioeconomic rights. At the same time, the legacy
of the armed conﬂict is so unbearably present. The political scene is currently
dominated by a Fujimori-majority in the national congress, and former Pre-
sident Ollanta Humala (2011–16) has been denounced for violations com-
mitted during the armed conﬂict. A case of systematic sexual violence by the
military in the 1980s is in the trial phase, and the controversial pardon of
former President Fujimori continues to ﬁll the headlines.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be taken from the Peruvian experi-
ence for post-agreement Colombia is the need, in spite of all limitations and
shortcomings, for an assertive central state that is eﬀectively present and
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guarantees the rule of law and justice in all corners of the country. Peru did
not, and does not, have a coherent, holistic human rights policy to address
violations of the past, nor did it publicly and oﬃcially endorse a transitional
justice approach. Yet the country has made some advances in the path
towards accountability. A peace accord or a transitional agreement does not
only imply an ending point. It marks the beginning of a transitioning process
where the interaction and participation of diﬀerent social actors in diﬀerent
areas of public life becomes institutionalized and part of the daily life of a
democracy in the making (Tarrow, 2011). In my view, Colombia has a good
starting point based on the experience the country has already gained from
implementing transitional justice before the end of the conﬂict. The challenge
now is how to keep a steady course towards increased accountability, preferably
under the leadership of one—and only one—legitimate central state.
Notes
1 I thank Félix Reátegui for initial discussions and inputs in the design of this
chapter. The chapter beneﬁts from previous collaborative work (García-Godos &
Reátegui, 2016).
2 The present account is obviously not exhaustive for reasons of space. For more
detailed discussions of the Peruvian experience, see Villarán de la Puente (2007),
Root (2012), Burt (2013) and García-Godos & Reátegui (2016).
3 The term used in Peru to refer to the members of Sendero Luminoso.
4 This transitional government dealt with the political transition after the demise of
the Fujimori regime.
5 In Peru, the term commonly used to refer to members of guerrilla groups since the
beginning of the armed conﬂict in 1980 until today is ‘terrorists’. Related terms
such as ‘combatants’ or ‘guerrillas’, used for example in Colombia, are very
seldom used by the Peruvian public or oﬃcials. I use ‘guerrillas’ here for the sake
of consistency with the rest of the book.
6 From the CVR’s oﬃcial English translation of the report’s General Conclusions
(paragraphs 8–9), available on the CVR website at www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/iﬁna
l/conclusiones.php. The nine-volume Informe ﬁnal (CVR 2003) is available in
Spanish in the same website.
7 Law no. 26479, approved on 16 June 1995.
8 Comunicado de Prensa Conjunto suscrito entre el Estado peruano y la Comisión
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Costa Rica, 22 February 2001 (OEA:
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2001).
9 The total number of ongoing human rights cases in Peru is not readily available.
As of August 2013, the Peruvian judicial system did not have a single, uniﬁed
registry or database of human rights cases, according to the Ombudsman report.
This situation continues in 2017.
10 Peru’s criminal justice system follows a prosecutorial model. The state, represented
by the public prosecutor’s oﬃce, undertakes investigation and presents evidence
before a judge or group of judges in public, oral proceedings. The judge(s) reach to
a decision based on evidence presented. Victims can participate in the process as a
civil party.
11 This is one of the darkest chapters of Peruvian history, when thousands of people
were imprisoned and prosecuted on charges of terrorism in military courts in the
mid-1990s as part of the counter-subversive strategy. To protect the identity of the
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prosecutors and judges from possible revenge, they covered their faces, and were
thus known as ‘faceless judges’ (De la Jara Basombrío, 2001).
12 Law no. 28592, approved on 28th July 2005.
13 Congreso de la República del Perú D.S. N° 015–2006-Jus—Regulations for Law
28592.
14 Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel.
15 Congreso de la República del Perú D.S. N° 051–2011-PCM.
16 About US $3,000 as of 2017.
17 About US $1,000 as of 2017.
18 A similar delegitimizing strategy has already started in Colombia concerning the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace. (See for example El País, 2017).
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14 Bosnia and Herzegovina




Transitional justice, understood as a way of dealing with past atrocities in the
process of transitioning towards peace and democracy, has undergone a sig-
niﬁcant transformation since its inception. The concept evolved from a focus on
war crimes trials to a multilevel process that includes retributive and repara-
tive justice processes, vetting and lustration practices and truth-telling initia-
tives, as well as processes of remembrance and memorialization; it has adopted
an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach in both theory and practice.
This evolution has grown to an understanding of local realities and their poli-
tical and economic contexts to see how peacebuilding initiatives can address
local demands via a wide array of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.
Transitional justice has gained increased notoriety in post-agreement
operations in recent years. Its evolution implied an increase in the scope of
transitional justice’s aims and activities, making it a complex and contested
term for academics and practitioners. Incorporating transitional justice
mechanisms into peace agreements has become a method for facilitating
peacebuilding that, coupledwith state-building measures, is expected to support
reconciliation and stability. Transitional justice is assumed to address societal
divisions left unaddressed by power agreements seeking the end of conﬂict
(Kostic´, 2012).
The evolution of transitional justice can be summarized in three phases
(Skaar & Malca, 2015). An initial phase took place between the end of the
Second World War and the Cold War. This phase was characterized by
interstate co-operation, war crime trials and sanctions via the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials. A second phase emerged in the early post-Cold War years,
where mechanisms focused on legal responses, ensuring rule of law and the
formalization of transitional justice as a tool for transitioning from dictator-
ships to democracies. The third (and current) phase is characterized by tran-
sitional justice becoming an established component of post-agreement
processes, with the presence of non-governmental and non-local actors, and
an interest in local and traditional processes for justice and reconciliation,
informed by an international jurisprudence and international standards.
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The debate around transitional justice has moved from considerations regarding
the impact of retributive justice and the rule of law towards discussions about
the meaning of truth, justice and reconciliation in post-agreement contexts and
the relationships established between these concepts (Skaar & Malca, 2015).
Although the ‘peace versus justice’ debate continues, there are an increasing
number of peace processes inclusive of transitional justice measures, showing
not only an international trend towards criminal accountability but also the
emergence of diﬀerent ways in which transitional justice mechanisms can
contribute to the implementation of peace accords (García-Godos, 2015).
A comprehensive view of transitional justice is expected to include institu-
tional reforms, the establishment of reparation programmes, and the promo-
tion of reconciliation practices (Van Zyl, 2006). Thus, as transitional justice
extends its range of activities, a call for a holistic and comprehensive view has
featured in contemporary scholarship. Holistic interpretations focus on the
need for accountability, truth recovery, and institution-building: thus, they
demand a combination of approaches including both retributive (aimed at
punishing perpetrators) as well as restorative practices (symbolic reparation,
material compensation that acknowledges victims suﬀering). Holistic approa-
ches are also inclusive of initiatives for trust and relationship-building that can
serve as preconditions for reconciliation (Fischer, 2011). Therefore the com-
bination of options to deal with past atrocities is not a question of either/or,
but rather a case where a combination of several choices is possible and
desirable (Huyse, 2001). This can be seen as the widening of the mandate of
transitional justice processes, and of applying transitional justice practices as an
inclusive and comprehensive way of consolidating statehood beyond state-building
formulas (Andrieu, 2010).
This approach towards a holistic transitional justice emerges as a response
to the failures of previous experiences. Reliance on a ‘one size ﬁts all’ model
often results in a very restrictive and restricted approach for dealing with past
human rights atrocities, which does not meet expectations. As the contexts
where transitional justice operates are marked by a tradition of non-compliance
with norms, devastation of judicial sectors and institutions, and traditions of
systematic violations of norms, there is a limit to what a ‘standardized’ transi-
tional justice programme can achieve by itself. Thus, the holistic approach to
transitional justice can be seen as understanding the contexts and their complex-
ities, in order to understand and address how the mechanisms, programmes, and
institutions are meant to operate.
Calling for an extended and comprehensive view of transitional justice thus
implies recognizing the diversity of tools and mechanisms available, how their
choice and implementation relate to the understanding of local realities in
conﬂict areas, and the challenges to post-conﬂict reconstruction on the
ground. Excessive reliance on ‘Lego-like’ transitional justice mechanisms may
be a recipe for failure as they may be insuﬃcient to satisfy speciﬁc demands
for justice, accountability, truth-seeking, and relationship-building in societies
trying to part ways with violence.
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This chapter seeks to understand the challenges and failures of transitional
justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1992–1995 war and to show how
the overreliance on individual and speciﬁc instruments of transitional justice
brought a series of unintended consequences that has hindered the processes
of reconciliation and state-building. This in fact, can serve as warning for
other transitional processes (such as the one taking place in Colombia), with
regards to the importance of understanding the need for having a scope of
instruments, policies, and approaches that can facilitate inclusion of society
within the transitional justice process.
To do this, the document describes how Bosnia’s reconstruction incorpo-
rated a state-building focus, highlighting the use of ethnic markers as con-
stitutive of the Bosnian political system in the post-accord phase. It also
highlights how the international character of the process aﬀected peace-
building and transitional justice, as it created an internationally legitimate
transitional justice process, but undermined the legitimacy of the process locally.
Then the chapter presents how the model of state-building and statehood
brought by the Dayton Peace Agreements envisioned a particular role for civil
society, which, following a Western model, meant to support accountability
and statehood. The result is a system that favoured the consolidation of eth-
nicity as a political marker, in which justice is alien for citizens, and in which
civil society is seen as trying to perform a role meant for other geographies. The
combination of these three challenges has considerably aﬀected the possibility
of reconciliation, justice, and the consolidation of the state.
State-building, the ‘ethnic key’, and international intervention:
peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The focus on state institutions was prioritized in the process of building peace
after the Bosnian war. This approach marked a trend in the way peace-
building interventions were envisioned and developed, and how transitional
justice was related to this process. This connection between state-building
initiatives had an impact on the process of political, economic, and social
reconstruction, and it deﬁned and aﬀected the development and implementation
of transitional justice initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Bosnian civil war of 1992–1995 was a violent consequence of the dis-
solution of Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War (Šaviha-Valha & Sahic´,
2015). Bosnia and Herzegovina was as a test case for thinking about new
peacebuilding strategies for a post-socialist state, whose transformation was
interrupted by a multi-layered conﬂict dominated by ethno-national perspec-
tives. Bosnia andHerzegovina reﬂected a paradigm shift in the way peace was to be
conceptualized and treated via the international relations system. The ending
of the conﬂict involved external military intervention and the combination of
diplomacy and negotiations.
Peacemaking eﬀorts culminated in the General Framework for Peace,
known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), agreed in November 1995 in
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Dayton, Ohio, USA. As the war allowed the emergence of power structures
within the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Bosnians-Croats and Bos-
nians-Serbs) in conﬂict to emerge, Dayton incorporated their political lea-
dership into the negotiation process. These power structures were represented
by three nationalist parties who became the interlocutors during the negotia-
tions: The Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), led by Alija Izetbe-
govic´, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) led by Croatian President
Franjo Tuđman, and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) led by the Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic´. All three parties insisted on regional auton-
omy, control over executive branches and the military, and the management
of the economy as their demands during negotiations (Cox, 2001).
Due to the ethno-national interests marking the war and the political views
represented in the leadership present in Dayton, the agreement was written up
along these ‘ethnic’ lines and instilled them on the post-war Bosnian political
system as a model of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1969).
The Dayton Agreement established a new internal, political and territorial
landscape for Bosnia and Herzegovina based exclusively on the register of
ethnicity by actors during the war (Šaviha-Valha & Sahic´, 2015). Dayton
divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into three entities: Republika Srpska (RS),
the Croat and Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a third
level of government, the national institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Ignatieﬀ, 2003). The establishment of this ethnic distribution within the
Bosnian State structure meant a federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina
that established both Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as the only constitutionally recognized entities in the country.
This arrangement built consociationalism into all levels of the Bosnian
state, turning the country into a confederal union between two political enti-
ties (RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Bose, 2006).
Dayton established an internal territorial division of ethnicities through the
creation of entities and cantons whose order was to be guaranteed by an
external control mechanism via the United Nations (UN) Oﬃce of the High
Representative (OHR).1
Politically, RS is a centralized entity whereas the Federation is composed of
ten cantons: of these, ﬁve have absolute Bosniak majority, three have Croat
majority, and two cantons are mixed (Institut za društveno-politicˇka istraži-
vanja—IDPI, 2016). This divergence in institutional and political settings
builds in complexity for the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Zivanovic´, 2015). The power-sharing structure brought by the Dayton accord
also created a bicameral legislature where the three constituents (Bosniaks,
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats) have representation in parity in the house
of peoples and in the collective presidency. In addition, the representatives of
each of the three ethnic groups have veto power over any proposed legislation.
The executive power distribution was also conﬁgured according to an ethnic
key, as ministers and deputies are to be chosen in order to comply with the
ethnic key present in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Marko, 2005).
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The Dayton Peace Agreements deﬁned a nation-building process that wove
various international actors into the process of building institutions. For
example, the annex on elections required the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to establish an elections programme. The agreement
on refugees and displaced persons called for the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCR) to develop a repatriation plan for refugee and min-
ority returns. The annex on international police ascribed the task of estab-
lishing a police force and a law enforcement agency to the UN. The Dayton
Peace Agreements thus seemed to outsource the entire post-conﬂict state-
building and peacebuilding design to international institutions (Sloan, 1998).
Thus, it is no surprise that several critiques of the agreements have
emerged. These critiques include: the continuation of ethnic markers created
by the war (Bieber, 2006), and the feudalization of the state into two entities,
ten federation cantons, 149 municipalities and a special district, Brcko Dis-
trict (Cox, 2001). In addition, the rejection of the existing power structures of
the socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the ‘airdropping’ of a new state-
hood, created a vacuum as a product of the belief that a state can be built
from scratch by an international mandate.
In addition, the diminished sovereignty created by the Dayton Peace
Agreements replaced state institutions with international organizations and
created a crisis of representation, thus hampering the consolidation of statehood
(Chandler, 2000). This, in fact, has made participation by locals more diﬃcult
and has aﬀected the sustainability of the new institutions in the long term.
The arrangements about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Dayton
accords resembled a form of protectorate more than a democracy, as a result of
the fact that the OHR acquired unlimited powers to impose laws and dismiss
public oﬃcials through the ﬁgure of the ‘Bonn Powers’ of 1997 (Cox, 2001).
The consequence of these actions has been a sharp criticism of the interna-
tional presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Bosnians. This unexpected
consequence has aﬀected the legitimacy and perception of international transi-
tional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Transitional justice thus was not seen
as an opportunity for Bosnians to reconcile, but as an imposition from an overlord.
This disconnection between Bosnians and the Dayton Peace Agreements
was further stretched by some of the intervening agents. Peace was seen as a
problem to be managed and solved through professional managerial struc-
tures, vertical subordination, within clear principles and narrow action fra-
meworks corresponding to Western standards (Šaviha-Valha & Sahic´, 2015).
These practices were informed by the belief that the implantation of demo-
cratic practices taking place in Western societies would have the same eﬀects
in the target country regardless of diﬀerent geopolitical, social, and cultural
contexts. One in fact could argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a perfect
example of the liberal peace paradigm (Doyle, 2005).
Thus, for some Bosnians, the Dayton Peace Agreements are a tool of
Western ideas and practices, where locals become instrumental, not central to
the agenda for peace. This raises serious questions about the role of imposed
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democratization and marketization in post-conﬂict societies, and how this
compromises the sustainability of peace in the long term (Mac Ginty, 2008).
For Bosnians, the Dayton Peace Agreements are a synonym for complex insti-
tutions, high unemployment, the imposition of a transitional justice framework,
dependency on external aid, the loss of agency and the predominance of
ethnic politics (Bieber, 2006).
From the ICTY to the domestic courts: The challenges of transitional
justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Evaluating transitional justice implies giving attention to how good govern-
ance, constitutional, and legal equality can encourage inter-group co-operation;
how these mechanisms generate accountability for war crimes; and how an
understanding of the past facilitates a conversation about the future of a coun-
try (Kostic´, 2012). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, transitional justice was based
on establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via (ICTY), rebuilding justice institutions, and fostering a non-governmental
organization (NGO) sector for ‘bottom-up’ reconciliation initiatives. All these
mechanisms have faced challenges derived from the imprinting of ethnic keys
on the state, and the external inﬂuence on the implementation of transitional
justice.
The ICTY model of justice is one of retributive justice focused on prose-
cuting and trying those responsible for the widespread human rights violations,
mass killings, systematic detention of civilians, rape, and ethnic cleansing
since 1991 (United Nations Security Council, 1993). The ICTY has been
leading the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the
former Yugoslavia (Fischer, 2011).
The ICTY sees as its main achievements (i) holding leaders accountable
and dismantling impunity for war crimes in the region, (ii) bringing justice to
victims and giving them a voice by holding individuals responsible for crimes,
(iii) establishing beyond a reasonable doubt crucial facts related to war crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia, (iv) consistently and systematically
developing international humanitarian law, and (v) strengthening the rule of
law by inﬂuencing the judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia to reform and try
perpetrators of war crimes (International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia—ICTY, 2017).
The ICTY developed a retributive angle; however, this angle has been the
focus of political rejection by several Bosnians. This has been partly due to
the disconnection between prosecutions and the rebuilding of social relations.
The ICTY narrowly deﬁned its mandate to prosecute war crimes, and thus it
either assumed or ignored how the decisions taking place in a court could
relate to the society this was intended to help (Eastmond, 2010). The geo-
graphical isolation of the court (which is located in The Hague, The Nether-
lands) geographically removed the courts from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
aﬀected citizens and its territory, undermining its capacity to achieve local
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inﬂuence, and making its decisions something abstract and separated from the
realities in the country. In addition, the ICTY lacked an outreach strategy
(initially) to reach its constituents (the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina),
making it incapable of linking its decisions with promoting and supporting
the reinstatement of the rule of law in Bosnia (Sriram, 2010).
Thus critiques which claimed that the ICTY was ethnically biased against
Serb communities, or that it did not put enough eﬀort into the defence of
Bosniak and Croat victims, were met with a system located far away, sepa-
rated from local realities and limited resources, leading to transitional justice
being reinterpreted through dominant ethno-political discourses. This nega-
tive local perception of the ICTY is the product of its incapacity to reﬂect the
local concerns of Bosnians, and its failure to allow local ownership of the
judicial process (Hoogenboom & Vieille, 2010). Trials did not succeed in set-
ting reconciliation as Serbs complained that the ICTY unfairly targeted them
and Croats felt excluded from the process.
The ICTY also was not a participatory process for victims. The only way
for personal narratives to be present at the ICTY was as witnesses, an out-
come of the focus on prosecutions by the court (Garbett, 2004). This might be
a consequence of the lack of formal mechanisms that linked the Bosnian
judiciary with the ICTY and the society it was supposed to help to reconcile.
Disconnecting the court from civil society, and bypassing other spaces for
reconciliation outside the judicial sphere, made the ICTY a legal enclave iso-
lated from society (Hoogenboom & Vieille, 2010).
The disconnection between the ICTY and the Bosnian public was not only
geographic. The court was conceived within an internationalist ethos, trials
were conducted in English and French, and only some parts of the processes
were translated into local languages. This facilitated the distortion by local
political élites who focused on the ‘ethnic bias’ of the ICTY (Banjeglav, 2015).
These problems were only addressed in 1999 with the establishment of out-
reach programmes. Despite the development of an outreach programme in
1999, many are still sceptical of the legitimacy of the ICTY in the region.
Although ICTY judgments are now available in local languages, these are not
necessarily physically accessible by local people, or written in a style to which
locals can relate (Banjeglav, 2015).
In addition to this, the politicization of indictments and charges of ‘ethnic
bias’ aﬀected the legitimacy of the courts, and made local institutions highly
resistant to co-operation. The compliance with justice and the ICTY in some
cases was facilitated to pacify political opposition and show compliance with
the international community, rather than to advance democratic accountability.
Whilst this allowed the local élites to be more legitimate internationally, it did
not develop democratic accountability (Loyle & Davenport, 2016).
These failures of the Bosnia and Herzegovina transitional justice frame-
work were magniﬁed by the lack of results on the delivery of justice in regards
to disappeared persons, reparations for victims, and the re-victimization of
victims looking for reparations.
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Victims’ reparations have been unsuccessful and unsystematic in the coun-
try. Transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina was focused solely on
judicial prosecutions and war crime tribunals (Hronešová, 2016). The ICTY
lacked a reparatory notion of justice and left victims with only the national
courts as an institutional source for seeking compensation (Garbett, 2004).
Thus, reparations have been included as part of the social security and
veteran protection systems, which has meant that reparations are being man-
aged by programmes with a diﬀerent mission (Lai, 2016), and the creation of
a hierarchy where veterans who are more politically connected with the state
often have better beneﬁts and payments than victims who struggle for their
recognition by the state.
Depending where the victim is residing, his or her entitlements vary, and
his or her institutional avenues change. For example, female victims of war-
time rape have a special status entitling them to compensation at the Fed-
eration; however, in the RS, victims of sexual violence need to provide
medical evidence of physical disability supported by witness statements.2
Thus, in this scenario of institutional inconsistency, it should come as no
surprise that victims are unable to enforce their rights to ﬁnancial compensa-
tion in criminal proceedings. For citizens attempting to survive, undertaking
the task of facing a complex and diverse system that facilitates patronage and
regional patrimonialism is a daunting task.
These challenges place a strong emphasis on the development of the Bos-
nian judiciary. The state has started to implement a series of measures con-
cerning the challenges mentioned above. In 2005, a section for war crimes was
created in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state-level organ for
dealing with human rights atrocities (Fischer, 2011). Legislation was tabled
for supporting this institution together with the establishment of a War
Crimes section within the oﬃce of the Prosecutor and the Registry, which led
to the enactment of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003.
The Bosnian Ministry of Justice has been important in pursuing reforms in
the judicial sector since 2003 These have focused on building capacity within
the Court and Prosecutor’s oﬃce in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Grubešic,
2014). Other mechanisms, such as a witness protection programme, were
established in 2005. There was also the creation of a National Strategy for the
Prosecution of War Crimes (designed in 2008) with the aim of completing
highly complex cases by 2015 and other lower level cases by 2023. Also
noteworthy is the tabling of the Law on Missing Persons in 2004, a con-
sequence of a consultative process between various national and international
institutions (Sarkin, et al., 2014).
Despite advances in legal and political agreements and the establishment of
domestic institutions, many processes have been hijacked by local élites. In
some cases, politicians have obstructed the extradition of citizens of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in war crimes trials, which highlights the need for the
repudiation of obstructive ethno-nationalist rhetoric and manipulation. These
challenges highlight the need for institutional reforms to ensure and promote
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non-repetition, education, judicial independence, independent media, and a
human rights culture.
Both the international establishment of a retributive instrument for justice
(the ICTY) and the domestic process for creating a Bosnian judiciary have
been aﬀected by the ethnic dimensions, characteristic of the post-Dayton
Peace Agreements state-building model. As political élites co-opted the state
structure to pursue their own agendas, they have used ethnic motivations to
criticize the ICTY’s work, as well as to ﬁnd strategies to delay and create
obstacles for judicial reform.
Importing the Western NGO model: The role of civil society in Bosnia
and Herzegovina’s transitional justice
A solid and sustainable civil society can be an important complement to the
development of state institutions. It can serve as a check on the powers of the
government and support social processes for accountability. In the context of
transitioning countries, civil society can support restorative justice and crea-
tive ways of dealing with the past, greatly supporting transitional justice. Civil
society can be a space for fostering political pluralism and for citizens to
articulate views and demands to the state, encouraging trust and co-operation
between state and society (Hoogenboom & Vieille, 2010). Thus the impor-
tance of the work of organizations from civil society in transitional spaces
includes documenting past atrocities, giving a voice to victims, and having the
ability to increase pressure on governments for accountability towards victims
(Austin, et al., 2013).
The Bosnian model for peacebuilding was based on establishing NGOs that
would help engage in projects of truth-telling, trauma healing, and other
transitional justice strategies. What the international community envisaged for
Bosnia was a sector of advocacy organizations that would foster a culture of
interaction and political engagement, where local NGOs would present alter-
natives to the nationalist-ridden political élites (Fagan, 2005). This design was
meant to balance the ‘top-down’ inﬂuence of the international community,
and bypass the ethnic politics by stimulating local political activity. Thus
NGOs have the potential to raise awareness, monitor and advocate around
prosecutions, provide psychosocial support and assistance to victims, conduct
research and produce publications, promote mediation and interethnic dialo-
gue, and other cultural and artistic activities that can be seen as restorative
approaches (Nikolic´-Ristanovic´ & Ćopic´, 2015).
The end of the war allowed a booming growth of civil society activism
through donor-driven NGOs. In the initial years of post-war reconstruction,
most NGOs were in fact service providers of humanitarian aid and of inter-
nationally planned projects (Monroy-Santander, 2016b).
However, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s civil society sector suﬀered from the
artiﬁcial implantation of models that were not part of Yugoslav society and
that seemed more responsive to Western donor interests than to the local
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realities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian civil society suﬀered thus an
‘NGOization’ (Belloni, 2001). This externally driven process, dependent on
international resources, aﬀected grassroots-type initiatives that were not
necessarily globally connected, ignoring the objective of mobilization of
alternative networks for representation and accountability.
The dependency on foreign support by the NGO sector has posed a threat
both to the sector’s ability to grow and to its sustainability. As Hoogenboom
and Vieille (2010) note, Bosnian citizens avoid participating in voluntary
organizations as they feel that their needs are not met through the latter, and
the prevalence of donor priorities in the country guide the interests of NGOs.
This disconnection between the NGO sector and the citizens was evident in
the anti-government demonstrations in February 2014 (Lai, 2016). The pro-
tests, which brought socioeconomic justice issues to public debate, led to a
series of ‘plenums’ where citizens would state their demands against the state,
demanding accountability from local and national politicians. The process
was marked by protesters’ insistence on keeping NGOs out of the protests.
One of the reasons for this resistance to NGOs derives from the fact that
they are internationally incepted and not organic to Bosnian society. The
emerging sector of NGO professionals funded by Western donors see their
role as essentially technical and apolitical, opposing a nationalist-dominated
political arena (Fagan, 2005). However, such separation would result in the
inability of NGOs to connect with their communities and to challenge the
dominant political discourse within Bosnian society.
The international sources that led to creating Bosnian civil society led to
groups that are underdeveloped and unable to exercise power as advocates, gov-
ernment watchdogs, and as forces to set the agenda for political debate, lacking the
necessary elements for building social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The structural disconnection between NGOs and the state is further fuelled
by the non-existence of a country strategy for government and civil society
co-operation (Sterland, 2006), and NGOs’ opposition to engaging in dialogue
with political parties, as these are seen as dirty and corrupt (Barnes, et al.,
2004). This has created a political vacuum where civil society does not engage
with the state.
The political landscape described above is complicated by the emergence of
illiberal segments of civil society as obstacles to achieving post-conﬂict. There
are NGOs that operate with nationalist agendas similar to those of political
parties. These are generally represented in veteran associations and informal
political groups that oppose the acceptance of culpability by the state and
processes for political apology.
An example of these challenges is the NGO-led RECOM3 initiative.
RECOM, established in 2004, evolved as a reaction to the shortcomings of
retributive justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is concerned with giving a
voice to victims and enhancing a debate on how symbolic or material com-
pensation should promote reconciliation (Fischer, 2011). RECOM gathered a
network of more than 1,800 NGOs, associations, and individuals to promote
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the eﬀort of establishing a lasting truth commission (Subotic, 2016). However,
RECOM has been met by resistance among certain civil society groups in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a focus on reconciliation rather than justice
was a diﬃcult sell. Other controversies concerning the role of victims versus
the role of veterans in these processes became evident. This was due to poli-
tical discrepancies between victim-focused organizations and veteran groups
(known to be closely connected to political parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina).
RECOM’s work is also limited by the support and political will of political
parties and the leaders of both state and entity structures in order to enact
change. Although RECOM has constantly denounced how Bosnia and Her-
zegovina politicians fail to address reconciliation and have reduced truth-tell-
ing to oﬃcial visits and the signing of documents, without making any bigger
steps to involve state action in this process, some of its member organizations
have expressed concerns with the many levels of compromise that RECOM
has had with politics, which might compromise its own goals and the estab-
lishment of the truth (Monroy-Santander, 2016a).
In a similar fashion to the ICTY and the development of reparations within
the Bosnian judiciary, RECOM is accused of ignoring ordinary people’s
voices, particularly due to its lack of public engagement and acknowl-
edgement, including the absence of commoners from the consultations pro-
cess. RECOM, it is claimed, has become so specialized in its operation and
language that it only involves a speciﬁc élite of students, victims, and veter-
ans’ associations that have been invited to take part in the initiative (Obradovic-
Wochnik, 2013). This case shows how the disconnection between the victims
and the organizations that claim to represent victims can occur not only at a
state or international level, but how even local NGOs can be seen as highly
technical and politicized institutions, which can fail to re-weave a social
contract.
Concluding remarks
The need for a comprehensive, holistic understanding of transitional justice
entails recognizing the interconnectedness of diﬀerent practices to meet dif-
ferent challenges present in processes for dealing with mass violations of
human rights. This requires a conﬂict-sensitive approach to transitional justice
that appreciates diverse local realities and challenges in order to establish the
needs and focus covered by diﬀerent practices that will be part of transitional
justice programmes.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process of social reconstruction had a
focus on building state institutions for the establishment of democratic and
capitalist structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance to the Dayton
Peace Agreements (a ‘liberal peace’ model). This impacted negatively on the
possibilities of transitional justice bringing transformative changes, by
imprinting into the agreements an ‘ethnic key’. This in turn led to very
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complex and divided political dynamics, and an administrative system that
has allowed the hijacking of state-building and transitional justice by political
élites that rely on nationalist ethno-political propaganda. The fact that these
processes were externally driven and distant from local processes did not help
matters and created a legitimacy gap that would permeate transitional justice.
The process of establishing the ICTY, the rebuilding of justice institutions
and the creation of an NGO sector for reconciliation-focused initiatives may
have been well intentioned initiatives, but have all been aﬀected by co-option
from ethno-political élites of peacebuilding in order to further their nationalist
aims. In the case of the ICTY, its geographical and social distance gave way and
space to accusations of ethnic bias and illegitimacy by political leaders in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the initial pre-eminence of the ICTY
over the domestic judicial processes led to various deﬁciencies in the process
of implementing judicial reforms, legislative reforms, and the establishment of
a fair reparations process.
This pre-eminence of the international vision of Bosnia, rather than the
territorial vision of Bosnians, in fact stiﬂed not only the justice system and the
transitional justice process but also incepted the NGOswith a series of practices
and challenges that aﬀected their possibility of facilitating the transitional jus-
tice processes. This was due to the structures and practices imprinted on the
sector that have subsequently complicated the consolidation of a sustainable
and solid civil society. The case of RECOM is illustrative of these challenges.
The warning that derives from the study of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
complex transitional justice history serves as a lesson for Colombia in terms
of the need to understand the political, social, and economic realities that
derive from a conﬂict-sensitive view of peace building. A localized view of
transitional justice, that visualizes the diversity of the needs and concerns of
victims, communities, and collectives, has a greater potential to facilitate
institutional reforms and state-building processes that drive post-agreement
reconstruction. A disconnection between top-down and bottom-up approa-
ches risks the peril of creating legitimacy gaps and misinterpretations of
judicial and non-judicial processes, gravely aﬀecting the prospects for sus-
tainable peace and the eﬃciency of peacebuilding, which can then be exploi-
ted by warlords and political operators. The risk of a legitimacy gap opens the
door for transitional justice and peacebuilding to fail.
One important issue that deserves close attention for the Colombian case is
the role that reparations have in transitional justice processes and the possible
injustices and inequalities, which can be perceived by diﬀerent sectors. The
imbalances between payments to veteran groups or demobilized actors, as
opposed to the material and ﬁnancial reparations for the victims of human
rights atrocities, can generate tensions and a new source of conﬂicts, or can
aﬀect the legitimacy of the process of transitional justice. For Colombia, this
should serve as a lesson in the need for a clear reparations policy that can reﬂect
an attention to victims’ needs, and that avoids any form of discrimination that
can later become a barrier to reconciliation.
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Equally important is the role of civil society actors in the process of tran-
sitional justice and reconciliation. The support that civil society organizations
can give to state-based measures can promote accountability and the inclu-
sion of victims and diﬀerent sectors of society processes of reconciliation, thus
giving a voice to citizens. Yet, this process needs to ﬁnd ways to ascertain
legitimacy within local populations and organizations, paying close connec-
tion to their needs and demands. In the case of Bosnia, the externally-led and
project-driven nature of NGOs became a barrier to their acceptance and
legitimacy, both by local populations as well as the political élite. In the case
of Colombia, civil society may enjoy a better reputation within local popula-
tions, particularly victims’ organizations, but it still may suﬀer the peril of
politicization along ideological, donor, and even party lines, which can further
aﬀect grassroots-based transitional justice initiatives.
Notes
1 The purpose of the OHR is to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton
Peace Agreements. The Dayton Peace Agreements created the legal basis for the
OHR. Annex 10 provides for the institution of the Oﬃce of the High Representa-
tive (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the civilian implementation of
the agreement, representing the countries involved in the Dayton Accords through
the Peace Implementation Council. In addition, in 1997 the Peace Implementation
Council agreed to grant further substantial powers to the OHR, in order to avoid
the implementation of the Dayton agreement being delayed or obstructed by local
nationalist politicians.
2 Victims of sexual violence need to prove through medical documentation that they
have suﬀered 60% of bodily harm in order to apply for victim status.
3 RECOM is a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes
and other serious violations of human rights committed in the former Yugoslavia
from 1 January 1991 until 31 December 2001.
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The history and the causes of the civil war in Sri Lanka (1983–2009) are
popularly found to be grounded in the contentious ethnic relations between
the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, and the political and eco-
nomic marginalization of the latter community by the successive majority-
backed Sinhalese governments that have come to state power since indepen-
dence from the British in 1948 (De Silva, 2000; De Votta, 2004). According to
a recent literature survey conducted on the state of democracy in Sri Lanka,
Uyangoda observed that many scholars had applied cultural and ideological
yardsticks to explain the growth and spread of majority and minority ethnic
politics within the conventional nation-state framework (Uyangoda, 2009).
In addition to the popular ethnocentric explanations, the aspect of eco-
nomic marginalization of the minorities in national development planning
since independence is identiﬁed as another cause for the intensiﬁcation of
tensions between the two main ethnic groups. The economic analysis of the
conﬂict has gained traction in academic and policy studies, particularly since
the introduction of liberal economic policy under the J. R. Jayawardene
Government in 1977 (Dunham & Jayasuriya, 2001). However, according to
Moore, a clear correlation cannot be found between economic liberalization
and heightening of ethnic conﬂict since the late 1980s (op cit., Uyangoda,
2009). To date, although the ethnic aspect of the conﬂict dominates the
mainstream discourses on the conﬂict, researchers have argued that intra-élite
class relations (between the traditional and the new élites in the Sinhalese
majority community) conceived during the colonial phase of state capitalist
transformation, and their continued struggle for political and state power,
having had played a key role in conﬁguring various events that led up to the
brutal civil war (Jayawardena, 2003; Jayasundara-Smits, 2013).
While the causes and the manifestations of the ethno-political conﬂict and
the civil war continue to be debated and contested, in May 2009, after almost
27 years of ﬁghting (with brief periods of cessation of hostilities), the civil war
ended with a unilateral military victory for the government armed forces.
Many in the south of Sri Lanka—the majority of whom were Sinhala-
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Buddhists—equated the ‘end of war’ with ‘dawn of peace’. However, this
remains hardly the case for many Tamils, especially those who are still living
in the parts of war-ravaged north and east of the island (Sarvananthan, 2016).
It is in this context, for the radical Sinhala-Buddhists and for some mem-
bers in the Tamil diaspora, that the pursuit of peace and justice in the post-
war period has become another platform for the continuation of war: a war of
words (Jayasundara-Smits, 2011). The civil war that ﬁnally ended without a
negotiated peace agreement can be seen as establishing a victor’s peace1
(Goodhand, 2010), leaving many blurred boundaries and questions about
how to make the transition from war to peace, beyond the military defeat of a
particular group. More importantly, it raised a bigger question on how to deal
with the issues of past human rights violations and alleged war crimes com-
mitted by both warring parties, especially during the last months (January to
May 2009) of the war. Particularly, the victor’s peace psyche party prevails
among the majority Sinhalese community, and stands as a major impediment
in envisioning a programme that allows the transition from war to peace and
the realization of a ‘positive peace’2 or ‘justpeace’3 agenda in Sri Lanka. As
Uyangoda notes, the attempts made by President Maithripala Sirisena and
his coalition government towards breaking this adversarial duality of ‘victor’s
peace vs. the Tamil vanquished’, have thus far proven to be an enormously
diﬃcult task (Uyangoda, 2016). Post-war community relations are also
marred by a lack of remorse and empathy towards the direct victims of the war,
who largely belong to the Tamil ethnic group. Instead of showing empathy,
some radical segments in the majority Sinhala-Buddhist community blame
the war victims in the north and east of the country for having supported the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)4 and the ‘terrorists’.
According to the radical Sinhalese Buddhists, war is a ‘thing of the past’.
Similar to what Van Der Merwe observed in South Africa (Avruch, 2010),
also in Sri Lanka, the majority in the Sinhalese community regards granting
the alleged perpetrators (in their terms ‘war heroes’) amnesty from criminal
responsibility as a wiser option, and a necessity in order to safeguard the
hard-earned peace. Consequently, any attempt made at bringing a justice
agenda, particularly the ones that attempt to hold the state or government
parties criminally accountable, is perceived as unnecessary and a step back-
wards. Given these observations, the developments since the end of the civil
war in Sri Lanka constitute an incomplete ‘transition.’5 As succinctly
summed up by Höglund and Orujela, 'there is no ‘transition’ in Sri Lanka in
the sense of transition from a militarized society to a non-militarized society,
nor a transition from an undemocratic to a democratic society’ (Höglund &
Orujela, 2013, p. 6). Instead, the passage of transition is burdened with
haunting memories of recent and past episodes of violence, and a long list of
atrocities, committed during and in the post-war period, that has not been
addressed6. Thus, the end of the civil war is perceived as the closure of one
unfortunate episode of violence within the multiple histories of violence of the
country (Somasundaram & Sambasivamoorthy, 2013). Therefore, any attempt
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made at digging in to the legacies of this particular era of violence tends to draw
overwhelming attention from the public (across all three main ethnic groups)
and add pressure for bringing justice to all the victims of all episodes of vio-
lence. Consequently, any piecemeal style of justice process that highlights and
privileges one ethnic community’s victimhood over others—particularly that of
the Tamils over the Sinhalese—ﬁnds it diﬃcult to gather support (especially
from the Sinhalese majority in the South, who claim victimhood in all past
violent episodes.)7
Given the above, it is correct to state that politicking of the discourse of
justice and accountability has marked the post-war political environment in
Sri Lanka.8 This development has left diminishing space for any moral
reﬂection or conceiving a decent sense of moral accountability towards the
victims.9 Thus, the opportunity presented in post-war Sri Lanka for carrying
out a transitional justice process, whether it is led locally, internationally or
both in combination, is not welcomed. It is not seen (especially by the radical
Sinhalese Buddhists) as a vehicle or a critical moment in achieving the long-
due collective political (democratization) and social goals (social justice) that
led to a war. As a result, the current debates on post-war transitional justice
discourse tend to centre around divisive, politically charged opinions that
deny any criminal accountability of the state armed forces and amnesty to the
LTTE, and to achieve parochial political interests. Under the above condi-
tions, it is correct to claim that the transition from war to peace only resem-
bles an uncertain peaceful stalemate (Goodhand, 2005). In this context, it
remains important to think about how to capitalize on the moments of the
peaceful stalemate to inspire and realize a meaningful transitional justice
agenda.
The international transitional justice agenda and its domestic
muddling eﬀects
Following up on the evidence gathered by a special panel appointed by the
United Nations (UN) Secretary- General on war crimes and crimes against
humanity, the panel’s ﬁnal report10 demanded that the Sri Lankan authorities
conduct a credible war crime probe into the war and the actions of the war-
ring parties. The evidence of wrongdoing by state forces presented in this
report included: shelling on a large scale in three consecutive ‘No Fire Zones’,
where it had encouraged the civilian population to congregate; depriving
trapped civilians of humanitarian aid; summarily executing suspected LTTE
members; and the torture and harsh interrogation of internally displaced
persons in refugee camps (United Nations, 2011). Alongside the evidence
against the state armed forces, the report also presented an account of the
alleged atrocities committed by the LTTE. These include: forced conscription
of children as young as 14 years old; locating military equipment in densely
populated areas; and shooting civilians who attempted to escape from certain
areas. The report also indicated that, during the last phase of the civil war, as
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many as 40,000 civilians were killed, mostly as a result of shelling by govern-
ment forces. According to a recent statement released by the Oﬃce of the
Missing Persons (OMP)11 that partially conﬁrms some of these ﬁndings, there
were about 65,000 disappearances reported in Sri Lanka (Ruki, 2016). Esti-
mates presented by civil society organizations suggest that the number of
disappeared citizens and unaccounted deaths is even higher (CPA, 2015).12
While the victims and their families continue to struggle to bring a proper
closure to their pain and sorrow through the means of cultural and social
customs, ritual performances, and/or by oﬃcial legal and administrative pro-
cesses,13 the country’s top politico-military élites and some of the surviving
members of the LTTE who were in leadership positions continue to enjoy
impunity for their actions. The stringent criticisms and increased scrutiny of
the international community, spearheaded by the UN, often backed by the USA
(under the Obama Administration), the United Kingdom, and the European
Union (EU), eventually led to calls for a war crimes probe that have fallen on
the deaf ears. As the independent panel appointed by the UN Secretary-
General observed, during and even in the aftermath of the civil war, the Sri
Lankan authorities and the LTTE have shown a disregard for established
international norms (United Nations, 2011).
The disregard for the repeated calls from the UN for the Sri Lankan Gov-
ernment (notably under President Mahinda Rajapaksa) to conduct a credible
war crimes investigation was viewed as a serious threat to the entire regime of
international law designed to protect individual dignity (Mortimer, n.d.).14
Although the Rajapaksa regime attempted to present numerous local initia-
tives of justice—such as the Presidential Commissions of Inquiry, established
in 2006, and the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)15 ,
appointed in 2016—as suﬃcient eﬀorts in the pursuit of justice, none of these
impressed the West. These local initiatives were seen as politically inﬂuenced
processes and poor ploys for buying time to avoid responsibility.
The eventual non-implementation of the recommendations of the ﬁnal
LLRC report (issued in November 2011) further proved the duplicity of the
local processes as suspected by the international actors. As the UN indepen-
dent panel also implied, the disappointing outcomes of the local processes of
justice demonstrated a lack of political will, on the part of state authorities, to
conduct a credible judicial process to hold the perpetrators accountable. Also,
the choice to ignore repeated calls made by the UN for the establishment of a
credible and independent process by the country’s top leadership was seen as
a serious assault on international law. As the UN panel put it, ‘the entire
regime of international law designed to protect individual dignity has been
weakened by the Government of Sri Lanka’s actions and perceived impunity’
(Mortimer, n.d., p. 2). For some critics in the international community, ‘the
scorched-earth tactics’ employed by the Sri Lankan political regime were set-
ting a dangerous trend and were an attempt of legitimizing the breaking of
any international rulebook for ﬁghting terrorism (Mortimer, n.d., p. 2). Fur-
ther, the liberal western coalition for justice also maintained that Sri Lanka’s
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shortcomings in delivering justice and holding the perpetrators accountable
for their misdeeds signalled a broader failure of governance and the rule of
law (Mytili, 2015). Thus, the subsequent UN resolutions on Sri Lanka put
forward even stronger demands for undertaking extensive and meaningful
state reforms. In another report issued in 2014 by the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, Sri Lanka’s lack of domestic progress could ‘no
longer be explained as a function of time or lack of technical capacity rather
a question of political will’ (Mytili, 2015). In 2016, during a visit to Sri
Lanka, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, accepted the failures of the
UN system in protecting the civilians during the last phase of the war while
lamenting the lack of progress in bringing justice to the victims and holding
the perpetrators accountable for their misdeeds (Deen, 2016).
However, the consistent framing by the former president Mahinda Raja-
paksa16, of the last phase of the civil war as a ‘humanitarian war’ or ‘a war
against terrorism’, when the war ended with a unilateral military victory for
the government armed forces, it also left no room for realizing a political
agenda for accountability and justice. Particularly, in his framing of the last
phase of war within the international ‘war against terrorism’, ex-president
Rajapaksa hoped to erase any grounds for the need for a special account-
ability mechanism and a justice agenda that could target the state and gov-
ernment parties to the war. Hence, while the majority Sinhalese took to the
streets to celebrate the war victories and the ‘defeat of terrorism’, the ‘top-
down’ punitive international transitional justice agenda began to make swift
inroads into the post-war discourses, and became part of domestic political
squabbles.
At the same time, one could also note that the international justice agenda
created two levels of division: (i) divisions between the locals that supported
the war and those that supported peace (local-local division), and (ii) divi-
sions between the local advocates of war and the international community
advocates of justice (local-international division). However, the Rajapaksa
regime continued to capitalize on the war victories platform and wasted no
time in appropriating the international transitional justice agenda as its main
topic in domestic electoral politics, framing it as the main enemy of the
‘sovereign local people’. The unexpected defeat of Rajapaksa in the mid-term
presidential elections held in 2015 further exacerbated the domestic divisions
related to the international justice agenda. Some segments in the southern
Sinhalese constituencies framed his electoral defeat as a plot by western gov-
ernments, aided by some circles in the Colombo-based westernized and liberal
intelligentsia, who were targeting the war heroes by advocating for an
internationally-oriented transitional justice agenda.
Before the dust settled from the defeat of Rajapaksa, the newly-elected
President Sirisena and the coalition government which came to power in early
2015 began to come under pressure from the international community to
deliver a credible transitional justice process. The eventual co-sponsoring of a
resolution with the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC)—Resolution
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30/1, adopted in October 2015—with the backing of the USA is one early
outcome of this process. It is also the ﬁrst sign of a new government trying to
appease and work around the international agenda. As Bell has observed in
her work on the politics of transitional justice, the culmination of a series of
developments in post-war Sri Lanka and the bitter ﬁght to control transi-
tional justice mechanisms and their desired direction brought another war: a
war of words with regards to justice. As much as the actual physical conduct
of the war, the discursive war surrounding the transitional justice agenda in
post-war Sri Lanka reﬂects attempts to tilt the transitional justice process
towards an end point that approximates victors’ battle ﬁeld goals (Bell, 2009).
Diﬀerent agendas of justice: collisions, juxtapositions
and marginalization
The literature on the politicization of transitional justice agendas, and their
eﬀects on domestic politics in diﬀerent post-war contexts, is growing in
volumes (Van der Merwe, 2009). Following such trends, there is already quite
a substantive body of literature dedicated to revealing the diﬀerent agendas
and politics surrounding the transitional justice agendas in Sri Lanka (Uyan-
goda, 2016; Xavier, 2015; Walton, 2015; Mytili, 2015; Höglund & Orjuela,
2013). These studies advance and advocate for two main agendas for achiev-
ing post-war transitional justice, namely (i) a transitional justice agenda that
is oriented internationally, and (ii) a transitional justice agenda that is orien-
ted domestically. In addition to these two main agendas, the radical Tamil
diaspora’s agenda for justice and accountability is widely thought to be
intersecting with the internationally oriented justice agenda promoted by the
UN and a coalition of western liberal states. As much as the UN-sponsored
international agenda for justice and accountability has been criticized, so too
has the Tamil diaspora’s agenda by the local rivals. Many radical Sinhalese
Buddhists believe that the commitment and support extended by the Tamil
diaspora, for an internationally handled punitive form of transitional justice
and accountability mechanism, is nothing other than playing identity poli-
tics and diaspora politics sans accountability. These criticisms seem to fall
in line with Benedict Anderson’s studies on diaspora politics as part of ‘long
distance nationalism’, and ‘the guilt of departure’ and ‘lawfare’ (op. cit.,
Mytili, 2015, p. 1).
As demonstrated above, currently the two main transitional justice agendas
are producing clashing eﬀects due to their diﬀerent framings, purposes, modus
operandi, and modus vivendi.17 They often lead to contentions and barriers for
bringing justice to the most direct victims of the war. The consistent demands
put forward by successive UN High Commissioners for Human Rights, par-
ticularly since the end of the war, for establishing a hybrid court with local
and international judges remains a major point of contention. Initially,
although Sri Lanka agreed to the participation of foreign judges in any war
related criminal proceedings, it later backtracked on this agreement by
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insisting on having purely local courts to investigate the alleged war crimes.
The changes in the Government’s stances on the international transitional
agenda and the cherry-picking of its various components mirrors the domestic
political whirlwinds surrounding and going beyond the transitional justice
discourse. In a number of respects, the overall situation in Sri Lanka on the
question of how to go about post-war justice can be attributed to the legal
maxim, ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’, or, as William Penn echoed, ‘to
delay justice is injustice’.
The current situation is likely to prevail, and recalls bitter memories of
repeatedly failed attempts of international liberal peacebuilding experiments
and state-/peacebuilding agendas in the island (Jayasundara-Smits, 2013). To
these eﬀects, the promotion of an internationally led transitional justice pro-
cess in Sri Lanka is undoubtedly a highly controversial and seemingly unde-
sirable measure (Walton, 2015). Domestically, any genuine move towards
holding the perpetrators of alleged war crimes accountable, using any process,
is like walking in a political mineﬁeld. As Uyangoda notes, although some
seemingly genuine symbolic gestures and institutionalized initiatives have
been pursued by the government of President Sirisena, there are doubts about
their seriousness and the Government’s ability to manoeuvre the domestic
political divisions in constructing a broader political consensus to address
issues of justice, accountability, reconciliation, peacebuilding, and state-
building (Uyangoda, 2016). As revealed in early 2017 by the then Minister of
Foreign Aﬀairs, Mangala Samaraweera (Associated Press, 2017), Sri Lanka’s
intentions of requesting more time from the UN to conduct the war crimes
probes only raises more doubts about the Government’s commitment. This
further reveals the diminishing political leverage that the Sri Lankan Gov-
ernment has in pursuing a credible justice process in the future. However, it is
worth mentioning that, in a similar manner to ex-president Rajapaksa, the
President Sirisena also relies on the support of the Sinhala nationalist voter
base or ‘the victors of the war’, for his political survival, thus, facing strong
pressures to avoid any restorative measures or retributive justice measures
against the state armed forces (Walton, 2015, p. 18).
Any justice process that could potentially frame Rajapaksa and his
‘strongmen’ as war criminals or perpetrators is likely to have serious negative
repercussions on Sirisena’s political career, his troubled coalition government,
and the overall political environment of Sri Lanka. By all accounts, as Walton
sums up, ‘Sirisena’s [election] victory also reveals the wider constraints facing
Sri Lanka’s Southern elite in their eﬀorts to build peace’ (Walton, 2015, p.
18). As Vinjamuri and Snyder’s work suggests, the current situation in Sri
Lanka exposes the eﬀects of the creeping of the international justice agenda
into the national political context (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004). Among which,
the political expediency that they render to the divided political élites in the
domestic electoral political arena is worrying. Worst of all, they expose the
mundane ‘politics of denial’18 of the ‘top brass’ political élites.
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In parallel with the brewing domestic political tensions surrounding the
international transitional justice agenda, the tensions within the international
community on Sri Lanka’s transitional justice process (i.e. the withholding by
China and Russia of any support for an international crimes probe) is worth
highlighting. The tensions at the international level expose the connection,
mutually reinforcing and reproducing eﬀects between the international and
local justice agendas, although at the outset they seem constituted as each
other’s binary opposites. The tensions at the international level surrounding a
punitive justice process for Sri Lanka denote ‘politics as usual’ between the
western liberal camp on one side, and China and Russia on the other. It has
been argued that the latter were instrumental in allowing Rajapaksa to avoid
any internationally oriented justice agenda. They supported Rajapaksa’s
framing of the situation and his accusations of the West’s eﬀorts as threats to
the country’s sovereignty. They endorsed Rajapakse’s claim, the war was a
necessary measure, inasmuch as it was a humanitarian war, and it was the
duty of the state to exercise its sovereign and legitimate right to protect its
citizens, including the innocent Tamils ﬂeeing from LTTE terrorism. Raja-
paksa’s representation of the conﬂict in this way exploited and fed into the
long-standing tensions within the international community (Höglund &
Orjuela, 2013) and, more precisely, fuelled the ﬁght between the ‘sover-
eigntists’ and the ‘cosmopolitans’. By exploiting these tensions, Rajapaksa
attempted to advance his parochial political interests domestically.
Meanwhile, the Rajapakse administration’s non-aligned foreign policy,
which was increasingly directed towards the East and towards oppressive
regimes such as Libya and Myanmar, was judged in some quarters as a ser-
ious threat to global peace and justice. Building alliances with these countries
to counter war crime charges and human rights abuses using the pretext of a
‘war on terror’ is considered as a dangerous model and a threat to interna-
tional peace and security Mortimer, n.d.). The UN’s real and perceived failure
to address the threats posed by the so-called ‘Sri Lankan model’ certainly has
helped to reproduce the conﬂict between the ‘sovereigntist’ and the ‘cosmo-
politanist’ camps in international politics and on the domestic front as well.
Although Sri Lanka’s trajectory of the pursuit of (or a lack of) a transitional
justice agenda shows some uniqueness due to the domestic and international
political conditions under which it is being realized. At the same time, it may
not be that unique if one considers similar experiences taking place, such as
the case of Colombia.
Besides the policing eﬀects of the transitional justice agenda, locally and
internationally, the claimed ‘successes’ of international transitional justice
processes (for instance, the trials held in Nuremburg, Tokyo, Croatia, and at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), are assump-
tions that have not been tested rigorously (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004). At the
same time, as Jacoby noted, we are also running out of ideas about how to
address the strong prima facie case or evidence that exists for a moral obli-
gation by the state/society to punish criminals through due process (Jacoby,
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2007). Thus, addressing the social repudiation of past human rights violations
becomes an important moral obligation for any new government carrying out
a transition towards a stable democracy (Verwoerd, 1999). Prosecuting and
punishing the perpetrators often brings justice to the victims. Amnesty is the
least welcomed element of transitional justice in some sectors. The deep need
for retribution to restore a profound sense of moral equilibrium therefore
compels one to demand that people pay for the harm they have done to
others (Verwoerd, 1999). However, in the current context of post-war Sri
Lanka, realizing a societal moral imperative is constrained by the political
tug of war between the local and the international justice agendas, and the
contentious politics underpinning them.
However, any attempt to bring justice to the victims and hold the perpe-
trators accountable through the hegemonic popular punitive processes does
raise fundamental doubts about whether the ‘kind of justice’ they generate
addresses the full spectrum of justice needs19 of the most directly aﬀected
victims. It is not only that the very process of a punitive approach to transi-
tional justice is met with resistance when it is designed to allocate blame,
makes claims about responsibility, and involves criminal punishment. It also
often results in more ambiguities about what justice means to individuals and
diﬀerent groups (Bell, 2009). As a result, sometimes justice is framed in mul-
tiple ways: as a struggle for human rights, as an international intervention, or as
a tool of conﬂict resolution and state-building (Bell, 2009). To this eﬀect, as
recent empirical studies from Nepal have revealed, victims do emphasize the
need for the truth about the disappeared, but their immediate priorities are to
obtain economic support to help meet basic material needs (Robins, 2011).
Such empirical ﬁndings call for reassessing the international transitional
agenda critically and calling out for a meaningful and contextualized justice pro-
cess. Scholars and practitioners who have conducted outstanding and exten-
sive ethnographic research with communities in war-torn Sri Lanka have also
highlighted the priorities of restoring social capital, strengthening social net-
works and community ties, and building social organizations as sure ways of
addressing the immediate needs of the victims (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
Overall, as opposed to macro-level grand forms of ceremonial political and
punitive mechanisms of justice, the empirical ﬁndings tend to recommend
reforming macro social policies and increasing access to external resources,
justice and power, as better ways of satisfying victims’ immediate needs of
justice and their long-term agendas of social justice20 (Xavier, 2015). In light
of the most recent ethnographic work, one may wonder how any ‘top-down’
legalist punitive approach to justice in the forms of criminal trials and prose-
cutions of a few high proﬁle individuals might serve the needs as articulated
by the most direct victims of the war. Similar to post-conﬂict Nepal, in post-
war Sri Lanka, the prioritization and early advent of the discourse of indivi-
dual prosecutions—an agenda pushed by the international community—bla-
tantly reveals the sad truth of ignoring or side-lining the victims’ real needs
and their agendas (Robins, 2011). These recent case studies also reveal that
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this approach can marginalize social, economic, and cultural rights in favour
of the contentious civil and political rights of the aﬀected people (Villalba,
2011). The narrow view of transitional justice as realized through the main-
stream political discourses and their everyday practices fails to address the
deep-rooted social stratiﬁcation of the past; deep inequalities in post-war
societies along class, caste, gender and ethnicity lines; and the risks of letting
greedy political entrepreneurs exploit them for their parochial beneﬁt.
Concluding Remarks
In general, there are diﬀerent discourses, agendas, and rationalities that have
given rise to various models of justice (Fischer, 2011). All these models con-
tinue to grapple with understanding and addressing what justice is, what it
looks like, what it feels like, what goals it should entail, who should decide,
who should own the process, how it should be done, who its main reference
subjects should be, and what the main object of them should be.
In post-war Sri Lanka, so far, for the immediate victims of many episodes
of violence, justice largely remains a void promise. Throughout the island’s
history, ‘justice’ has been a contested topic and continues to remain so. Post-
war (transitional) justice and accountability has become a highly politicized
topic. Currently, the various debates surrounding this issue are driven more
by the logic of emotions and less by the logic of appropriateness, thus ﬁnding
it challenging to strike a meaningful balance between the two21.As discussed
in this chapter, in the post-war context, the two transitional justice agendas
(the local and the international) have their proponents and opponents. The
clash between these two main agendas veto each other, and prevent the rea-
lization of any alternative agenda focus on the needs of the most aﬀected
victims of the war. As many analysts and scholars have noted, there is a clash
or incompatibility between the two main justice agendas. Together, they have
created a situation that blatantly exposes the instrumental use of both these
agendas for achieving narrow political objectives (Uyangoda, 2016, Xavier,
2015, Mytili, 2015, Höglund and Orjuela, 2013).
At the same time, Sri Lanka’s graduation in 2010 by the International
Monetary Fund into lower middle-income country status, just over a year
after the end of the war, and the consequent loss of access to traditional
development trade concession schemes, has put pressure on global powers to
seek new ways to keep their inﬂuence in Sri Lanka. This development has
brought about tensions within the international community and within their
views on transitional justice as a tool to gain a hold in the politics of Sri
Lanka. It is in this context, pushing the global templates of the international
transitional justice agenda, that the West’s strongly embedded punitively-
oriented international human rights agenda has become a crucial means of
regaining the loss of control and regulatory power over the country. The
numerous warnings and threats issued by the international community of
western states—that the trade and foreign aid schemes beneﬁcial to Sri Lanka
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stand to be scrapped unless the country demonstrates good will and com-
pliance with the international human rights agenda—provide evidence of such
a relationship. The EU, by initially imposing a total of 58 conditions related
to human rights abuses, and linking them to continuation or discontinuation
of its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP Plus)22 provides concrete evi-
dence of the connection between justice and trade23.
On the part of the local élites, the tensions which were ignited by the
international transitional justice agenda gave much-needed breathing space
(for both post-war political regimes) to return to politics as usual and con-
tinuation in power. For the Rajapaksa regime, against the backdrop of the
fading rhetoric of war victories and non-realization of the promised peace
dividends, the tensions with the international community helped in buying
time for the regime to consolidate its position. For the Sri Lankan state, in
turn, opening a new confrontation with the West and the liberal international
cosmopolitan élite (joined by some radical Tamil diaspora circles), which
continued to press for internationally-oriented punitive transitional justice
agenda, became an instrument for building political capital domestically.
In the same vein, for the government of President Sirisena, re-engaging with
the transitional justice agenda (subject to limited international orientation) was
to be important in the process of regime consolidation. Rather than being a
factor of unity, his victory further paved the way for making visible the
divergence within the majority Sinhalese-Buddhists, which had been less visible up
to that point due to the essentialism of the ‘inter-ethnic’ aspect assigned to the
conﬂict and the civil war. The overall political atmosphere of post-war Sri Lanka
thus continued to be marked by deep divisions between the Troika (the political-
military-religious élites). Their divisions became more pronounced when Raja-
paksa lost mid-term presidential elections in 2015. Against this backdrop, for Sir-
isena’s coalition Government24, seeking alliances with the international
cosmopolitan élites by re-orienting the international transitional justice
agenda with some modiﬁcationswas to prove a useful strategy, providing Sirisena
with a much-needed political safety net domestically and with protection from
the international community. In this sense, by all accounts, the Sirisena Govern-
ment’s appeasement towards an international justice agenda, that is adapted and
continues to be adjusted to the immediate local political realities, can be regarded
as measures undertaken by the national élite in order to recapture the justice
agenda.
What has been lost in all these processes is the realization of the victims’
agenda of justice and attention to their needs. Similar to the conclusion of
Leebaw, we can draw the conclusion that the case of Sri Lanka exposes and
continues to unfold the dependent nature of international justice mechanisms
on the local élites and the tight interactions, intersections, and reproduction
of local and international élites’ political agendas (Leebaw, 2008).
Wars only produce and reproduce the power of the powerful. It is often
only the promise of justice that is left for the victims. To this eﬀect, it is worth
remembering Michael Ignatieﬀ’s assertion that truth and reconciliation
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processes ‘only reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged
in public discourse’, as the famous Nuremburg and Tokyo trials which only
found few guilty left the rest went untouched (op cit., Verwoerd, 1999, p. 121).
However, at this juncture, one may wonder what Colombia and other
countries currently emerging out of violent conﬂicts and civil wars can learn
from Sri Lanka’s experiences in going about ‘thinking and doing justice’? In
many respects, at least on paper, the case of Colombia certainly oﬀers more
hope for victims in that country than was the case in Sri Lanka. Colombia’s
main conﬂict between the state and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP), ending with a negotiated peace
agreement, has already taken a positive step in this direction. Furthermore,
the current Colombian transitional justice roadmap can be considered as a
victim-centred agenda infused with both punitive and restorative measures.
However, this is just the beginning of a long, arduous, and painful journey
towards healing. In that light, it seems important to think of ways for retaining
this current balance of the ‘logic of appropriateness’, ‘logic of consequence’
andmore importantly the ‘logic of emotion’ for the sake of the victims (Vinjamuri
& Snyder, 2004, p. 345). Since the implementation of the justice agenda takes
place over a very long period of time, even decades, there should be practical and
institutional measurements to preserve this balance and sustain the current political
momentum towards serving the victims’ agenda. On both these accounts,
saving the transitional justice agenda in both its spirit and its content from
(un-)expected diﬀerent ‘winds of change’ in the national and international
political arenas is important.
Although at present, the Colombian transitional agenda seems to be largely
owned by the Colombians, it is important not to let it be hijacked by the
particular local or global economic and political forces, and justice becoming
a bargaining chip in the (trans-) national political games of the élites. Imple-
menting justice agendas can be expensive and requires resources. Therefore,
generating and mobilizing enough resources (with no strings attached) to
prioritize the victims’ needs and their agendas is crucial. Last not least, given
the root causes of the Colombian conﬂict (which were similar to those which
initiated the violence in Sri Lanka), working on a social justice agenda is
vital. To this end, investing in future generations in building a moral-ethical
state and a polity that is resilient, empathic and caring is essential.
Notes
1 A ‘victor’s peace’ is understood as a type of peace following a military victory by
one warring party on whose terms and conditions the post-war peace is being estab-
lished. For an elaborated discussion of this concept, refer to (Richmond, 2014)
2 Galtung deﬁnes positive peace as not only absence of war and direct violence
(negative peace) but also absence of structural forms of violence (Galtung,
1969, p. 183)
3 According to Lederach, ‘justpeace’ is ‘an adaptive process-structure of human
relationships characterized by high justice and low violence: an infrastructure of
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organization or governance that responds to human conﬂict through non-violent
means as ﬁrst and last resorts: a view of systems as responsive to the permanency
and interdependence of relationships and change’ in Preparing for Peace (Leder-
ach, 1995, pp. 3–23).
4 Eelam means ‘separate state’.
5 According to Bell, a ‘transition’ is not the same as a post-conﬂict scenario. In a
context where the conﬂict settlement is arrived at through negotiation, it creates a
set of political and legal institutional structures that enable the same political
struggles to take place less violently (Bell, 2009, p. 25).
6 Major periods of violence include; the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) uprising
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the mass expulsion of the northern Muslims by
the LTTE in 1993, and the Sinhala-Muslim conﬂicts in southern Sri Lanka in the
more recent past.
7 Vamik Volkan uses the term ‘chosen traumas’ to explain this particular psycholo-
gical condition. The chosen trauma functions as a signiﬁcant marker for the large-
group identity and creates a foundation for the society’s development of an
exaggerated entitlement ideology. It is often subject to political manipulation
(Volkan, 2004).
8 Although this chapter primarily focuses on the case of Sri Lanka, the deeper pat-
terns and the underlying structural and international political context seems rele-
vant to other contexts such as Colombia.
9 Among other factors, Uyangoda suggests this is partly a result of the moral com-
munity, namely the Buddhist clergy shunning the path of giving leadership to such
an agenda, instead following the punitive agenda of justice (Uyangoda, 2016).
10 See United Nations, 2011.
11 Oﬃce of Missing Persons (OMP) is the ﬁrst foundation laid for the proposed four
transitional justice mechanisms, which the Sirisena Government has pledged to
establish.
12 According to a recent comment made by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe,
many among those reported disappeared could be dead.
13 As anthropologist Sasanka Perera shows in his seminal study, the human body and
the absence of a dead human body (which could result from disappearances)
makes social practices of mourning incomplete. Besides, under law, the absence of
a human body also prevents the state from issuing a death certiﬁcate and conse-
quently prevents the closure of the administrative legal process related to a death
(Perera, 2008).
14 Edward Mortimer is chair of the Sri Lanka campaign for peace and justice and
senior vice-president of the Salzburg Global Seminar. He was chief speechwriter
and director of communications for UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan until 2006.
15 A veteran and well-respected former civil servant, Prof. Tissa Vitharana, headed
this process.
16 Who was also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
17 In Latin these two terms mean, ‘a usual way of doing something’ and ‘a feasible
arrangement or practical compromise; especially one that bypasses diﬃculties’
(Merriam-Webster, n.d. ).
18 I borrow this term from the works of psychologists Michael A. Milburn and
Sheree D. Conrad (1996). The authors argue that the political life of a nation often
exhibits shared denial of painful realities. Denial is a common practice for states
and nations with histories of atrocities. According to Psychoanalysis, denial func-
tions as a useful defence mechanism to forget or distort the agonizing reality which
inﬂuences perceptions and attitudes on political issues.
19 As per the practice of restorative justice, information regarding the oﬀence, truth-
telling, empowerment, and restitution or vindication are important justice needs
demanded by the victims. For more details of these aspects refer to (Zehr, 2002).
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20 In the simplest sense, social justice means ‘fair and just relation between the indi-
vidual and society’.
21 Logic of appropriateness stems from legalism and logic of consequences from
pragmatism. Logic of emotions recognizes the signiﬁcance of transitional justice
but emphasizes strategies that diverge from the model of legalism (Vinjamuri, and
Snyder, 2004, p. 345). The logic of consequences applies a pragmatic approach to
justice, weighing the social, political, and institutional outcomes of prosecutions
versus amnesties.
22 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP Plus) is an enhanced EU incentive
scheme of which Sri Lanka ﬁrst became a beneﬁciary in 2005. It is a scheme whose
functioning is based on economic and political conditions. In order to qualify for
the GSP+ scheme, a country should comply with 27 international conventions
focusing on core human rights, labour rights, the environment, and good govern-
ance principles. Presently under this scheme, about 7,200 Sri Lankan products are
traded in the EU free of duty (Senewiratne, 2016).
23 After a long ‘tug of war’ between the EU and the Sri Lankan authorities, on 17
May 2017 Sri Lanka re-entered the GSP Plus scheme following a seven-year sus-
pension. The EU Ambassador to Sri Lanka stated on the occasion of re-entry to
the scheme: ‘We are satisﬁed with the Government’s progress as well as their
commitment.’ (Lanka Business Online, 2017)
24 The coalition included the United National Party (UNP), which had a reputation
of western liberal orientation.
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16 A long walk for justice
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón
Colombia has been waiting for peace for more than half a century. While
waiting, generations of Colombians have had their lives spoilt by war, vio-
lence, and tragedy. However, hope is in sight, with the possibility that greater
peace will be established and consolidated through the implementation of the
peace agreement with the FARC—EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia).
The history of Colombia is the history of a country trying to come to terms
with itself as a nation. Thus the drive for the consolidation of statehood,
incurring numerous setbacks or limitations in this regard, has been central to
the country’s development in the last seven decades. One could view the cur-
rent peace process with the FARC—EP as novel, but as Chapter 2 shows,
Colombia is a country that has sought peace for more than three decades,
with multiple attempts involving diﬀerent actors, approaches, and negotiation
schemes, and with diﬀering degrees of success. Colombia’s modern history is
one of peace in the making in the middle of war, an example of state-building
emerging from the midst of war.
The peace agreement with the FARC—EP emerged in a particular histor-
ical and political context. It is the outcome of a series of circumstances and
elements that deﬁned why the Government and the FARC—EP opted for a
negotiated settlement, including the infrastructure and the capacity of the
state to undertake this process and the way the process was structured. This
agreement draws on lessons from previous failed peace processes with the
FARC—EP and the existing peace infrastructure in Colombia, as shown in
Chapter 3.
In the same way that Gabriel García Márquez brought some of the lyricism
and rhythm of Latin American narratives to English speakers, the promise of
the current peace agreements in Colombia between the FARC—EP and the
Colombian Government oﬀers the world a vision of peace crafted by
Colombians, which presents a diﬀerent approach to achieving justice for vic-
tims and achieving peace through recognizing local needs, contexts, and
visions. As One Hundred Years of Solitude was a gift from Colombia to lit-
erature, the peace agreements could mark the beginning of the end of more
than ﬁfty years of war and can be seen as a gift from Colombia to humanity.
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This agreement has been in the making for several decades, and is in fact
the outcome of a history of initiatives related to the Colombian state’s quest
for peace, in part through several peace negotiations. As Chapter 4 illustrated,
transitional justice legal frameworks have been progressively included into the
peace negotiations that took place in the country from 1980 until the for-
mulation of The Victims and Land Restitution Law in 2011, before the recent
agreements reached with the FARC—EP, and this has led to the adoption of
transitional justice frameworks in Colombia that have been instrumental for
peace negotiations with the diverse actors from the country’s armed conﬂict.
The current transitional justice framework deﬁned by the peace agreement
between the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government is the outcome of
this historical process. The complex and elaborate system of principles and
interlocking institutions that comprise this framework is the outcome of
changing needs and of the evolution of understandings as to how to achieve
justice and transition away from war over time in Colombia. The institutions
of the Truth Commission, the Search Unit for Missing Persons, and the Spe-
cial Jurisdiction for Peace, as well as the measures for reparation which have
been considered and stated guarantees of non-repetition, present a signiﬁcant
promise for peace to take hold in the country. However, these institutions will
face uncertainties related to the implementation process: how the peace
agreement is implemented and translated from commitments on paper to
reality will provide legal stability (or instability) for diﬀerent constituents and
for the peace project in Colombia, as shown in Chapter 5.
A view from the South on peace and justice
Peacebuilding and justice can be exercises of post-colonial thinking. As
Mahmood Mamdani recently aﬃrmed at the University of Cape Town
(2017), the production of knowledge begins with ordering, and this ordering
gives ranking to ideas and initiatives according to a series of diﬀerent attributes
that we use to ascribe them value and meaning.
The colonial project casts knowledge as built using categories, theories and
ideas from the Global North, with validation and aﬃrmation harvested in
English, French, and German as opposed to isiXhosa or Quechua. The areas
of peace and justice are no diﬀerent, with the North historically used as a
primary reference point. In doing so, pre-eminence has been given to the
importance of the successes of the Nuremberg war trials: however, less atten-
tion has typically been paid to the lessons which could be learned from the
failures of humanity with regard to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dresden, the
gulags, and the colonial enterprises across the world in Indonesia, South
Africa, Colombia, the Philippines, Algeria, Congo and many other countries.
In many of these contexts, justice and retributive or reparative justice have not
been pursued or fully achieved. Inasmuch as the North has been used as a
point of reference for justice, we should be honest enough to recognize the
lessons oﬀered from its failures as well as its successes. An ideological
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enthusiasm about the promise of a Western vision of the world obscures pro-
ductive and critical engagement with the challenges created by its approach
and its failures, such as the two World Wars, holocausts and genocides, and
the decimation of native populations across the world through missionary and
colonial enterprises.
However, even more balanced interpretations of the approaches to peace
and justice advanced in the North are unlikely to apply across the South. The
realities of the Global South require the assertion of new approaches, that look
beyond the imposition of ‘universal’ models from the North, and that create
space for the emergence of ideas that adjust to the needs and the objectives of
particular constituents and contexts across the world.
Such an approach should not be seen as an argument in defence of impu-
nity and the deployment of pan-Africanism and pan-Americanism as med-
iocre excuses for sheltering war criminals. It is rather a plea to reassert and give
prevalence to the voice of the victims and civilians in the countries where vio-
lence has taken place, so that they have the right to decide the way forward for
their futures. Imposing ideal models onto others is another way of imposing
one’s beliefs onto other human beings—another way of violating their rights.
Every society has the right to decide what is better for them, and this reassertion of
agency fosters responsibility and maturity for societies. However, the mechanisms
for making these decisions may be compromised in contexts emerging from
conﬂict. In these contexts, transitional justice can oﬀer benchmarks for pro-
moting discussions regarding possible interventions or approaches, making
visible the tensions between competing options or interests.
In analysing the agreements reached in Colombia we should depart from
an understanding that the institutional form that the agreements take is not
entirely European or North American, as they are not fully based on North-
ern representations of the form an agreement should take and what it should
include. Although the agreements are informed by international visions of
justice, its realization will be only achieved if the text and implementation
thereof allows the inclusion of local voices and become an equalizing tool
that helps citizens aﬀected by conﬂict to surpass the existing inequality, and
the consequences of violence.
In the case of Colombia, the signing of the agreements with the FARC—
EP marks and signiﬁes the beginning of the country’s journey towards peace.
The achievement of peace will depend on the implementation of the agree-
ments, but also on the role taken by other players in the conﬂict, such as the
paramilitaries and other armed groups, going forward.
Post-agreement, not post-conﬂict
The text has explicitly avoided the use of the term post-conﬂict in describing
the Colombian context. The term references cases where conﬂict has ended
and implies that peace has been reached. The silencing of the riﬂes or the
signing of a document does not immediately produce a state of peace. A
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peace agreement does not equate to peace, and failing to make this distinction
fails to acknowledge the importance of fulﬁlling the promises stated in
agreements.
Inequality and class in Colombia marginalize millions of Colombians on
the basis of their accent or skin colour. To achieve peace it is important to
address the inequalities created by a system that sees and treats indigenous
groups, Afro-Colombians, Roma and peasants as lesser citizens and makes
Colombia the most unequal country on the continent. For peace to take hold,
the state and society should be able to deliver services and grant the eﬀective
entitlement of rights to all Colombians. The reality in Colombia is that these
rights are granted on paper, but not guaranteed in reality; unless changes are
made in the direction of reducing inequality, peace will likely not take root. In
countries with high inequalities, recruiting the poor and mobilizing the mar-
ginalized around diﬀerent armed movements is relatively easily facilitated.
Thus while this peace process removes more than 7,000 cadres from the
FARC—EP, each of these were once recruited, and the possibility of further
recruitment must be minimized for peace to take hold in the Colombian
territory.
If the implementation of these agreements is indeed taken seriously,
Colombia then faces a challenge over the coming decades of a post-agreement
phase, which will demand consistency, perseverance, and cohesion from the
political élites in the country in delivering policies and programmes that can
deal with the structural reasons for the emergence and existence of violence
and high inequality in Colombia.
The debate between retributive and reparative justice and the idea of peace
This volume recognizes the importance of both retributive and restorative
justice practices, but advocates that a more holistic understanding of peace-
building should transcend dichotomies between these pre-deﬁned categories.
Such a holistic approach would enable countries to draw on both approaches
and sets of practices in developing justice models that are responsive to citizens’
needs and interests. The justice model agreed upon can thus reﬂect and
respond to the speciﬁc needs and social covenant of a country. Country-speciﬁc
justice models may serve as a key element supporting countries bridging the
post-agreement phase towards peace.
While local perspectives and visions of justice should be central, key con-
cepts within the retributive and reparative approaches may prove valuable.
The debate between restorative and retributive justice can inform the possi-
bilities and the implementation of initiatives, including via lessons about their
usefulness or their weaknesses in supporting processes of reconciliation and
state-building. For example, the emphasis on restorative justice can bring to
light the importance of supporting the regaining of agency of former victims
of the conﬂict, as well as the possibility of either reconciliation or coexistence/
cohabitation.
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Whereas much of the literature dealing with transitional justice depicts a
romanticized idea of reconciliation, we need to be aware that imposing a
reconciliation perspective might be unfair on victims, as it imposes on them
the obligation of having to forgive and, in some cases, embrace their victimi-
zers. Victims have the choice and the right to forgive or not to forgive, and
they should be allowed this possibility. A distinction between reconciliation
and cohabitation/coexistence should thus be made. The latter allows for the
possibility of being able to share the same space with a harm-doer and does
not impose onto victims the obligation to forgive. As Chapter 10 argued, the
importance of understanding the psychosocial processes of victims allows for
the recognition of mechanisms that can assist victims to regain agency.
Retributive justice has a value and an importance for society as well. If for
a society the possibility exists of cadres serving time in jail or in alternative
punishments that are ways of redressing the harm caused to society, this
should be considered. Imposing a reconciliatory framework that is seen as
unjust can in fact delegitimize both a peace process and the transitional jus-
tice agreements. The receptor of former cadres is society, and society should
be willing to accept former ﬁghters. In this sense the search for alternative
penalties that serve a restorative and retributive potential have the possibility
of improving the reconciliation process and reduce recidivism, as Chapter 8
argued.
Restoring the rights of those who otherwise would be victims if the war
continued is as important as retributive and reparative justice for victims of
past harms. Saving lives holds a signiﬁcant restorative potential of the rights
of the victims that otherwise would exist in the future. Whereas impunity and
the capacity to restore, or retribution should be considered, we should not
forget that the continuation of warfare is most likely to create more victims
whose rights will need to be restituted and/or restored. Justice thus cannot be
presented separately from the idea of peace and a ceaseﬁre. Is justice worth
the life of more human beings? Or is the dignity of past victims more valuable
than stopping a conﬂict? These are questions without easy answers, and where
accurate forecasts of what will happen are hard to understand. The most we
can do regarding this dilemma is to present informed guesses, being mindful
of the consequences—the possibility of impunity versus the continuation of
war. That is why, instead of a language of assertiveness, the debates around
justice should come framed within a language of reﬂection. A social construct
is hard to measure and to understand; its nature is relative and cannot be
mandated from other latitudes.
The challenges
The promise of peace and justice brought by the transitional justice agree-
ment is tempered by the challenges that lay ahead. The context in which the
agreement is being implemented is that of a country in which drug lords and
paramilitaries continue to operate, and in which some sectors within the
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armed forces and the political élites remain against peace and the possibility of
agreement being implemented. The assassination of social leaders after the
ratiﬁcation of the agreements is proof of the serious challenges facing imple-
mentation and the hurdles that need to be surpassed to realize the agreement.
The truth is that what has been signed between the FARC—EP and the
Colombian Government constitutes the best-case scenario for the imple-
mentation of a transitional justice process. Thus, in order to understand what
the process will mean in practice necessitates an understanding of how
abstract expressions and commitments made in the agreement will be trans-
lated into programmes and guidelines that can be implemented at the fringes
of the Colombian state, where state capacity is weak, resources are scarce,
and challenges are plentiful. These challenges are evident with regard to land;
gender; memory; reconciliation; demobilization, disarmament, and reintegra-
tion (DDR); and education policies. These multiple and complex challenges
highlight the necessity of building sound institutions and policies that can
enact change.
To do so it is important to depart from the understanding that the com-
ponent related to transitional justice in the agreement provides only a limited
legal framework for addressing distributive justice issues in contexts of exclu-
sion from access to goods and services. Issues such as the lack of peasants’
rights and access to land in Colombia are an important example of this. As
Chapter 6 illustrated, a restitution programme has been established through a
land restitution law (Law 1448 of 2011) to tackle this lack of rights in the
context of the armed conﬂict and to create a series of legal mechanisms and
institutions that have the sole objective of supporting the restitution of land
rights for the victims of the conﬂict in Colombia. This is promising but,
again, numerous challenges will need to be addressed for the programme to
succeed. Previous land restitution processes in Colombia have had mixed
outcomes, and have foregrounded a series of challenges that will require con-
sideration regarding the asymmetries between victims and oﬀenders and their
capacity to use the existing institutions and mechanisms, and the need to
understand the roles that diﬀerent institutions play in these processes. How-
ever, these previous processes have also generated an institutional framework
and a series of state institutions devoted to these goals. This is the departure
point for the implementation of the transitional justice agreement between the
FARC—EP and the Colombian Government. While challenges with regard
to land restitution remain, the institutional capacity to address this has
improved.
The importance of adopting a gender lens in understanding the impact of
violence on women and minorities is vital; however, a narrow understanding
of gender, and of gender harm as primarily related to sexual violence, has led
to a missed opportunity to delve into more structural issues that aﬀect women
negatively in Colombia. As Chapter 7 showed, a particular interpretation of
gender—and what constitutes a war crime, read through a gender lens—has
overlooked the particularities of gender and war in the Colombian context,
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thus embracing a northern epistemology of gender and how it should be
understood in relation to transitional justice, obscuring other harms women
experience in conﬂict, such as land loss and dispossession. This presents a
dilemma, as the importance of sexual violence should not be undermined, but
the ﬁxation on this as the only gendered crime has left aside a large popula-
tion of women that have been victims of other crimes in Colombia. Chapter 7
further reﬂected on the challenges women face in the restitution of their
rights, as land ownership traditionally follows a patriarchal line, and survivors
from war are left to prove their rights in a system where ownership and titling
is predominantly attached to males.
The understanding of victims and victimization, however, should also con-
sider the role and the importance of victimizers in a transitional justice pro-
cess, as cadres who were victimizers may have also been victims. Recognizing
this, and taking it into account in DDR, may reduce the risks of recidivism
following the conclusion of demobilization processes. Supporting demobiliza-
tion processes is critical. As Chapter 8 argues, reﬂecting on the combatants’
reintegration into society is central to avoiding recidivism. Recidivism will
ultimately aﬀect victims’ abilities to exert their rights. Peace will thus rely on
synergies between the DDR process and transitional justice institutions and
processes. The eﬀectiveness of institutions such as National Council for
Reincorporation (CNR), and their capacity to link with transitional justice
processes such as the Truth Commission, or the implementation of reparatory
measures, will determine the level of support for the reintegration of FARC—
EP members into receiving communities and the broader Colombian society.
The society that produced war ﬁghters is the same one that will need to
embrace them once again as part of society.
However, reconciliation cannot be deﬁned purely in legal terms. It is
important to understand its psychological aspect and relation to the societal
processes of reconciliation/coexistence/cohabitation. Reconciliation cannot be
legislated; it demands an understanding of and reﬂection on how reconcilia-
tion and transitional justice mechanisms can enhance the potential for
reconciliation. As Chapter 10 argued, embracing a deeper understanding of
reconciliation can facilitate the use of transitional justice mechanisms to sup-
port processes through which victims regain their agency, heal psychosocial
damage and activate social action and civic engagement within society.
Therefore the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms cannot be
seen as delinked from psychological and social processes, as the harms caused
by human rights violations and violent conﬂict are experienced by both the
individual and the collective. By using a psychosocial lens in truth com-
missions, it is possible to stress the signiﬁcance of the processes and pro-
cedures for addressing those psychosocial harms in contributing to national
reconciliation/coexistence/cohabitation.
These processes of social healing can be aided by memorialization pro-
cesses, which constitute a form of symbolic reparation. Memorialization pro-
cesses have the potential to rethread social relations in deeply divided
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societies, dignify the survivors, and re-establish relations between victims and
the state. In Colombia, the institutional programme of symbolic reparations
emerged in 2005 with the Peace and Justice Law and was further developed in
2011 through the Victims and Land Restitution Law. However as Chapter 9
discusses, the institutional framework for this programme and its design has,
paradoxically, become a barrier to victims’ involvement. Although the stan-
dardization of these processes—and the number of procedures that victims
need to go through and requisites they need to fulﬁl in order to make the
participatory component of each law eﬀective—are well-crafted for account-
ability, they are not conducive to creating trust for citizens aiming to regain
their agency and rebuild their trust in the state institutions. Hyper-bureau-
cratic approaches can aﬀect victims’ ownership of symbolic reparation pro-
cesses and create mistrust, undermining the role of memory as a transitional
justice mechanism. Thus, for victims’ participation to be eﬀective, the social
dynamics of their participation needs to be considered in the design of such
mechanisms. If the goal of victims’ inclusion in symbolic reparation processes
is to be realized and their participation not treated tokenistically, simply to
meet the requirements of a bureaucratic procedure, then the needs of victims
should be considered in these processes.
Justice, reconciliation and coexistence require coming to terms with how we
learn about war and its history. The pedagogical and educational strategy
devised in post-agreement Colombia should not settle on a ﬁxed and institu-
tionally authorized narrative of what happened. Devising an appropriate
educational strategy for the post-agreement phase will ﬁrst require under-
standing how war and its history have been learned about in the past, and
which mechanisms have facilitated reﬂection upon its history and its nature.
In the case of Colombia, it seems that understandings of conﬂict and war
amongst young people have been primarily shaped through television, even in
places where the conﬂict has been viciously active. In addition to this, and as
Chapter 11 has argued, there is a great heterogeneity in the conﬂict and peo-
ples’ experiences of it across the Colombian territory. This makes attempting
to develop a single mainstreamed version of the Colombian history impos-
sible or artiﬁcial. Instead, this heterogeneity demands a series of strategies
and pedagogies that will allow future citizens to learn about their country in a
way that adjusts to their contexts and allows for reﬂection on the role of war
in their communities. Such an endeavour has the potential to become trans-
formative. Through the mandated peace curriculum, education can become a
tool for reconciliation and cohabitation, a space for reﬂection and debate, a
place for democracy.
The lessons: Not reinventing the wheel
The Colombian case is a promising example of a holistic model of justice,
responsive to both local needs and international legal restrictions, and incor-
porating both retributive and reparative elements of transitional justice.
258 A long walk for justice
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
However, the model’s innovative design still requires implementation. Lessons
from other contexts provide important indications and warnings. As the cases
of South Africa, Peru, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sri Lanka show, a series of
lessons is available to inform transitional justice practices in Colombia as the
country seeks to rethread the social compact and promote reconciliation and
coexistence.
The case of South Africa points to the importance of political consistency
in the implementation of the large and complex changes needed to bring
meaningful improvements in the lives of the citizens of a country. In a similar
case to South Africa, Colombia will face challenges in eﬀecting the structural
improvements that will allow for the real emancipation of its citizens. It will
be important to take stock of the suggestions that the Colombian Truth
Commission will make, especially related to issues of structural change, and
ensure that they inform policy and institutional changes. Failure to do so
would leave in place the structural conditions that gave rise to violence in the
ﬁrst instance and sustained it over time unchanged, and result in an incom-
plete process of reconciliation, as suggested in Chapter 12. As William
Ospina, a Colombian poet, argues, wars do not end when the body count is
ﬁnished but when the reasons for the war cease to exist. Advancing structural
change will demand visionary leadership from the political establishment.
This type of leadership is not yet evident in Colombia, as élites clash for
political posts rather than pursue the project of a nation beyond war.
The case of Peru, as described in Chapter 13, demonstrates the challenges
of implementing transitional justice mechanisms as part of political transi-
tion. The most vital lesson from the Peruvian case for Colombia is the
importance of legitimacy in any attempt to establish historical truth and
change. The quality of professional and technical staﬀ available to a truth
commission cannot be underestimated in order to achieve this legitimacy; its
work should not be left to politicians. Indeed, if trials and processes are seen
as partial or biased, then transitional justice processes may be constrained in
their ability to contribute to a reconciliation project and may instead con-
tribute to the polarization of the political landscape (something that some
Colombian politicians are working towards already). It is further important
that alliances are built to connect actors at regional levels with groups that
might be supportive of the Truth Commission’s ﬁndings and proposals, such
as students, labour unions, peasant groups and those located at the fringes of
the state. This serves to strengthen the bonds between the state and its insti-
tutions, and supports the participation of those excluded by the state during
the conﬂict in the consolidation of the Colombian state. The importance of
mobilizing political support for the ﬁndings of the Truth Commission at all
levels must not be underestimated if the goal is to consolidate the legacy of its
work. Political support is particularly important in relation to the construc-
tion of oﬃcial history/histories for future generations. Given the contentious-
ness of the peace agreements in Colombia, as shown by the rejection of the
agreements in the plebiscite of 2 October 2016, this is a key element to take
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into account. Finally, a peace accord or a transitional agreement does not
only imply an end point for the conﬂict. It marks the beginning of a transi-
tioning process in which the interaction and participation of diﬀerent social
actors in diﬀerent areas of public life becomes institutionalized and part of
the daily life of a democracy in the making.
The imposition of transitional justice initiatives that are separated from
local contexts, their realities and their representatives poses a great risk. While
the transitional justice process will be held in Colombian courts, the distances
(geographic, bureaucratic, social) between the provinces and the war aﬀected
areas of the country and the centre of the country resembles the distances
between Sarajevo and The Hague which problematized the transitional justice
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina as described in Chapter 14. The chal-
lenges in the transitional process in Bosnia and Herzegovina signal the chal-
lenges and pitfalls of how a limited scope in transitional justice can aﬀect its
legitimacy within local populations and thus aﬀect the prospects for the sus-
tainability of transitional justice. In a country as diverse as Colombia, it is
therefore important to be aware of the local needs and local contexts in the
processes of designing and implementing transitional justice initiatives. With-
out this, there is a risk that the process may be perceived as being alien and
imposed, as in the Bosnia and Herzegovina models.
Finally, an additional important element of legitimacy required for the
success of transitional justice processes is that the process is regarded by citi-
zens as seriously and meaningfully pursuing its stated objectives, rather than
operating as a token policy to generate international standing or legitimacy in
accordance with the desires of the international community. Chapter 15 dis-
cusses this in relation to the case of Sri Lanka’s long-fought civil war between
the Government armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam,
after which transitional justice was used instrumentally to demonstrate to an
international audience the ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ nature of the country.
This put the rights of the victims at risk. If the justice needs of the victims of
the civil war and the other multiple episodes of violence that engulf the recent
history of countries departing from war are to be addressed, realizing a social
justice-centred agenda and investing in building an accountable state is para-
mount where structural changes must be eﬀected.
The promise of peace
The diﬀerence between magical realism and the peace agreement signed in
Colombia is that the former was never required to come to life and materi-
alize. However, for peace to take a hold in Colombia it is necessary that the
signatories of the agreement and its attendant institutions manifest the pro-
mise of the agreement. They need to translate the magical into reality, and
this demands the capacity of the state to ﬁnally fulﬁl the promises it has failed
to deliver on since its independence. It is not enough that the beautiful and
powerful ideas of peace are captured on paper and enchanted with a couple
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of signatures; this alone cannot overwrite 50 years of violence. If Colombia
proves it is capable of implementing these agreements, the country would
prove that magic can be transmuted into reality, and peace grafted onto con-
texts of war.
The challenges are as great as the promises of justice and peace. To achieve
this promise, the country needs to overhaul its leadership, its citizenry, and its
institutions. In a country that almost closed the oﬃce of its High Commis-
sioner for Peace whilst in the middle of the implementation of a peace process
(La Silla Vacia, 2017), and in which the promise of peace has been seque-
strated by political parties and their interests, it is evident that some sectors of
the economic and political élite lack the vision to move the country away
from violence. However, the agreements and the transitional justice process
constitute an overture and an opportunity that could facilitate these processes
of change.
Although the FARC—EP presents itself as the sole victim of this armed
conﬂict and the representative of the victims of the country, they have in fact
co-created the victims. The FARC—EP, like the paramilitaries, is a ‘Fran-
kenstein’s monster’ that Colombian society has created, and its existence has
helped to conceal corruption, incompetence, and institutional weakness, as
well as erode popular belief in the possibility of peace. This distrust is the
legacy of the policies of the FARC—EP and its leadership in previous peace
processes, where periods of peace and ceaseﬁre were used as opportunities to
facilitate warfare. This legacy is as harmful as the void promises of peace
made by the state. Now it is the responsibility of both the political establish-
ment and the FARC—EP and its leadership to grant the Colombian citizens
the rights they have denied to them for decades: peace and justice.
This transformation will not be immediate. It will demand institutional
consistency in the prioritizing and pursuit of peace and the implementation of
the peace agreement and the transitional justice agreement, framing this as an
objective of the nation, rather than that of a President, a Government, or a
political party. Only in this way can the eﬀorts and policies needed to move
through the post-agreement phase into peace be ensured for the coming dec-
ades. Peace requires consistency, and breaking the back of a political econ-
omy of warfare will require plans that are crafted to deliver in the long term,
to the middle of the century, to guarantee that the structural issues of
inequality, political participation, and access to justice are dealt with.
The case of Colombia and the promise of peace and justice that is now
emerging illuminate both the fragility of the contexts in which transitional
justice attempts are made, but also the courage of the citizens and Colombian
peoples’ resilience in the search for justice.
The dignity, and the future, of Colombia as a nation rely on the treatment
that it gives to its victims. History is watching.
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